Justia Landlord - Tenant Opinion Summaries

Wright was a correctional officer and lived on the San Quentin premises, in a unit he rented from his employer, the state. Living on the grounds was not mandatory and he paid market rate rent. Wright was injured when he fell in the course of his lengthy walk from his home to his actual place of work and received workers’ compensation. He then sued the state, which moved for summary judgment on the ground that workers’ compensation was Wright’s exclusive remedy, based on the “premises line” rule, which provides that the employment relationship commences once the employee enters the employer’s premises. The trial court agreed and granted the motion. The court of appeal reversed, concluding that there were triable issues of fact as to whether Wright’s injury arose out of and in the course of his employment. That the State did not intend its workers’ compensation policy would insure Wright for all injuries suffered on San Quentin grounds, even at or near the home where he lived, is evidenced by the terms of Wright’s lease agreement, which required Wright to obtain a “broad policy of comprehensive coverage of public liability insurance, naming the State as the insured.” View "Wright v. State of Cal." on Justia Law

A Landlord leased separate properties to two different sets of Tenants using nearly identical written documents. This appeal concerned a dispute between the Landlord and Tenants regarding whether the leases were enforceable for their stated five-year terms or whether a clause providing for “annual review of rental rates” resulted in unenforceable “agreements to agree.” The Landlord sued the Tenants in separate actions, seeking a declaratory judgment to determine its rights under the leases. The district court concluded that the leases were valid and enforceable for their five-year terms. The Supreme Court affirmed as modified, holding that the terms of the leases were clear and unambiguous and contemplated only an annual review without requiring an annual agreement. View "Gibbons Ranches, LLC v. Bailey" on Justia Law

Getty Properties Corp. leased certain properties to Getty Petroleum Marketing, Inc. by way of a master lease. Getty Marketing sublet the properties to Green Valley Oil, LLC. Thereafter, Green Valley entered into an individual sub-sublease with each Defendant, the owners of retail gasoline stations. Getty Properties subsequently terminated the master lease. Getty Marketing then filed for bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court rejected the master lease and ordered that Getty Marketing relinquish possession of the properties to Getty Properties. Getty Properties and NECG Holdings Corp. served Defendants with notices to quit, but Defendants refused to vacate the properties. Plaintiffs subsequently commenced summary process actions against Defendants. The trial court rendered judgment of immediate possession for Plaintiffs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in (1) determining that Plaintiffs’ notices to quit were valid; (2) admitting into evidence the lease between Getty Properties and Getty Marketing, as well as the sublease between Getty Marketing and Green Valley; (3) interpreting the various pleadings in Getty Marketing’s bankruptcy case as terminating the lease and the sublease; (4) finding that Plaintiffs proved a prima facie case for summary process; and (5) failing to dismiss the summary process action as premature. View "Getty Props. Corp. v. ATKR, LLC" on Justia Law

Mosser’s nine-unit residential apartment building is subject to rent control under the San Francisco Residential Rent Stabilization and Arbitration Ordinance, which limits rent increases to tenants in occupancy. Under Civil Code section 1954.53, which provides that “an owner of residential real property may establish the initial rental rate for a dwelling or unit,” local jurisdictions are authorized to impose rent control limiting rate increases until “the original occupant or occupants who took possession of the dwelling or unit pursuant to the rental agreement with the owner no longer permanently reside there.” Brian, then age 13, moved into the apartment with his parents in 2003. When his parents and siblings left the apartment in 2013, Brian remained, with the landlord’s consent. The San Francisco Rent Stabilization and Arbitration Board and the trial court concluded that Brian, although a minor when the rental agreement was entered and not a signatory to the rental agreement, was an “original occupant” entitled to the continued protection of the rent control provision. The court of appeal affirmed; the law, as written, does not permit vacancy decontrol until all lawful occupants vacate the premises. View "Mosser Co. v. San Francisco Rent Stabilization & Arbitration Bd." on Justia Law

Appellant had leased the same apartment at a San Juan, Puerto Rico housing cooperative (Cooperative) for several years. While living at the cooperative, Appellant received benefits under the Section 8 federal housing assistance program, which enabled her to pay her rent. When the Housing Finance Authority concluded that Appellant’s apartment unit was “over-housed” for Section 8 purposes, the Cooperative informed Appellant that she would have to pay market-rate rent without the Section 8 assistance. Appellant subsequently submitted a request to the Cooperative for reasonable accommodation on account of her disability, stating that she could not move to a different unit without compromising her health. The Cooperative denied Appellant’s request. After filing an administrative complaint without success, Appellant filed suit in federal court, alleging that the Cooperative had violated the Fair Housing Act by failing to provide the requested accommodation, by engaging in a pattern of discriminatory actions against her, and by retaliating against her because she had recently prevailed in a separate HUD proceeding against the Cooperative. The district court (1) found in the defendants’ favor regarding the reasonable accommodation and disparate treatment claims; and (2) concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to decide the retaliation claim. The First Circuit (1) affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the reasonable accommodation and disparate treatment claims; and (2) reversed the district court’s decision to dismiss Appellant’s retaliation claim, holding that the district court had jurisdiction to decide this claim. View "Batista v. Cooperativa de Vivienda" on Justia Law

A shopping center owner challenged provisions in its commercial lease with Ross, conditioning Ross’s obligation to open a store and pay rent on Mervyn’s operating a store in the shopping center on the lease’s commencement date and allowing Ross terminate the lease if Mervyn’s ceased operations and was not replaced by an acceptable retailer within 12 months. Mervyn’s filed for bankruptcy and closed its store. Ross took possession of the space, never opened for business, never paid rent, and terminated the lease after the 12-month cure period. The trial court found the provisions unenforceable. The jury awarded $672,100 for unpaid rent and $3.1 million in other damages. The court of appeal held that there was no procedural unconscionability. The parties were sophisticated and experienced concerning commercial leases. The rent abatement and termination provisions must be examined separately because they involve separate consequences triggered by different conditions. The determination that rent abatement constituted an unreasonable penalty was supported by findings that Ross did not anticipate it would suffer any damages from Mervyn’s not being open on the lease’s commencement date and the rent forfeited was $39,500 per month. There is no reasonable relationship between $0 of anticipated harm and forfeiture of $39,500 in rent per month. View "Grand Prospect Partners, L.P. v. Ross Dress for Less, Inc." on Justia Law

The owners of multifamily housing rental projects in Wisconsin that are assisted by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development program under Section 8 of the Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. 1437f sued the Wisconsin Housing and Economic Development Authority (WHEDA), alleging WHEDA breached certain Housing Assistance Payments (HAP) contracts by failing to approve annual rent increases,as required by federal law, and by requiring the owners to submit rent comparability studies as a prerequisite to receiving rent increases. WHEDA filed a Third-Party Complaint against HUD, alleging that, if WHEDA is found to have breached the HAP contracts, then those breaches resulted from WHEDA following congressional and HUD directives. The district court dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Seventh Circuit reversed, noting that the district court’s order was entered without the benefit of the parties’ full briefing on jurisdiction. While state law may create the breach-of-contract causes of action, the only disputed issues involve the proper interpretation of Section 8 and HUD’s implementing guidance. The issues are “capable of resolution in federal court without disrupting the federal-state balance approved by Congress.” View "Wis. Hous. & Econ. Dev. Auth. v. Castro" on Justia Law