Justia Landlord - Tenant Opinion Summaries

In 2004, Berkeley issued a use permit for construction of a building with 51 residential rental units and ground floor commercial space. Permit condition 10 provides: “Before submission for building permit, the applicant shall submit floor plans and schedules … showing the location of each inclusionary unit and the sales or rental prices…. and that the unit rent or sales price complies with Chapter 23C.12” (Inclusionary Housing Ordinance). The Ordinance was designed to comply with Government Code section 65580, requiring a general plan to contain a housing element stating how the local agency will accommodate its share of regional need for affordable housing. The ordinance requires that 20 percent of all newly constructed residential units be reserved for households with below-median incomes and rented at below-market prices. The development took more than seven years. The city sought a declaration that the condition was valid, conceding that the ordinance has been preempted by the Costa-Hawkins Rental Housing Act (Civ. Code, 1954.50), but arguing that it may enforce the condition, the validity of which was not previously challenged. The court of appeal affirmed judgment in favor of the city. View "City of Berkeley v. 1080 Delaware, LLC" on Justia Law

Julie Conason and Geoffrey Bryant (together, “Tenants”) were the rent-stabilized tenants of an apartment in a residential building owned by Megan Holding, LLC (“Megan”). Megan was Tenants’ landlord. Almost five and a half years after she occupied the apartment under a vacancy lease, Conason asserted an overcharge claim against Megan. Civil Court dismissed the overcharge claim without prejudice, reasoning that Tenants failed to prove the amount of the overcharge. Tenants subsequently commenced this action against Megan seeking a money judgment for rent overcharge. Supreme Court granted summary judgment for Tenants and directed an assessment of damages. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that the N.Y. C.P.L.R. 213-a’s four-year statute of limitations did not bar the claim because there was significant evidence of fraud on the record. The Court of Appeals affirmed as modified, holding that, because of the unrefuted proof of fraud in the record, section 213-a merely limited Tenants’ recovery to those overcharges occurring during the four-year period immediately preceding Conason’s rent challenge. View "Conason v. Megan Holding, LLC" on Justia Law

Following Tenant filed a successful rent overcharge complaint, Landlord commenced a holdover proceeding against Respondent seeking to evict Tenant and regain possession of the premises. In support of its claims, Landlord alleged that Tenant breached the lease. Tenant asserted a defense of retaliatory eviction and counterclaimed for attorneys’ fees and damages under N.Y. Real Prop. Law 234, which imposes a covenant in favor of a tenant’s right to attorneys’ fees. Civil Court dismissed the proceeding, finding that Tenant had not breached the lease and that the proceeding was commenced in retaliation for Tenant’s successful rent overcharge claim. The court denied fees under section 234. The Appellate Division modified on the law by granting Tenant’s claim for attorneys’ fees pursuant to section 234 and otherwise affirmed. The Appellate Division subsequently granted Landlord’s leave to appeal, certifying the question of whether section 234 applies to a lease that authorizes the landlord to cancel the lease upon a tenant’s default, repossess the premises and then collect attorneys’ fees incurred in retaking possession. The Court of Appeals answered that section 234 applied to the lease in this case and that Tenant was entitled to attorneys’ fees as the prevailing party in this summary holdover proceeding. View "Graham Court Owner's Corp. v. Taylor" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from a dispute over damage to a leased commercial space. The case was tried before a jury, which awarded plaintiff-landlord David Walsh, just under $11,000 in damages attributable to defendant-tenant Frank Cluba. Following the jury verdict, the trial court awarded Walsh over $44,000 in attorney's fees. Cluba appealed, arguing that the court erred by allowing Walsh to testify on the reasonableness of repair work done after Cluba vacated the property and by awarding Walsh an unreasonable amount of attorney's fees under the circumstances. Walsh cross-appealed, arguing that the court erred by dismissing his claims against defendant Good Stuff, Inc., the business that Cluba and his partner incorporated shortly after Cluba signed the initial lease of the subject property. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Walsh v. Cluba" on Justia Law

Wade, an apartment tenant living alone, was evicted after the City of Los Angeles determined his unit, a converted recreation room, was an illegal rental. Wade asserted he has an orthopedic disability impairing personal mobility. Under the Rent Stabilization Ordinance, a tenant who has lived in a rental unit for three or more years is entitled to relocation assistance of $9,650, unless the tenant is a “qualified tenant,” entitled to an enhanced payment of $18,300. A “qualified tenant” includes a tenant who is handicapped as defined in Section 50072 of the California Health and Safety Code: a family in which the head of the household is suffering from an orthopedic disability impairing personal mobility or a physical disability affecting his ability to obtain employment or a single person with such a physical disability, where the family or person requires special care or facilities in the home. The trial court held a single person with an orthopedic disability was entitled to the enhanced payment. The court of appeal vacated. Under section 50072, only a head of household with an orthopedic disability is deemed to be handicapped. Because Wade was a single person, not a head of household, he was not a “qualified tenant” for purposes of the enhanced payment. View "City of Los Angeles v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law