Justia Landlord - Tenant Opinion Summaries

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The case involves a plaintiff, Joni Fraser, who was attacked by two pit bulls owned by a tenant, Hebe Crocker, who rented a single-family residence from landlords Ali Farvid and Lilyana Amezcua. Fraser sued both Crocker and the landlords. After settling with Crocker, the case proceeded against the landlords. A jury found that the landlords had actual knowledge of the dangerous propensity of the dogs and could have prevented foreseeable harm to Fraser, awarding her damages exceeding $600,000. However, the trial court granted the landlords' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), finding no substantial evidence to demonstrate the landlords' knowledge of the dogs' dangerous propensities.Under California law, a landlord who lacks actual knowledge of a tenant's dog's vicious nature cannot be held liable when the dog attacks a third person. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's ruling. The Court held that the email from a neighbor mentioning "guard dogs" did not constitute substantial evidence that the landlords knew or must have known the dogs were dangerous. The Court also rejected the plaintiff's argument that the landlords' alleged false statements denying knowledge of the dogs constituted evidence of their knowledge of the dogs' dangerous nature. The Court concluded that there was no direct or circumstantial evidence that the landlords knew or should have known the dogs were dangerous. View "Fraser v. Farvid" on Justia Law

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In this case from the Supreme Court of North Dakota, Ryan Kratz, who had entered into a purchase agreement to buy a business and building from Donald and Carol McIlravy, failed to make the agreed-upon payments. The McIlravys initiated two eviction actions, and a separate action seeking damages, cancellation of the contract, and release of funds held in a trust account. The district court initially dismissed one of the eviction actions, but eventually ruled in favor of the McIlravys, awarding them damages and ordering release of the trust funds. Several years later, Kratz filed a motion under Rule 60(b), alleging the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the eviction actions and seeking to vacate or void all findings, conclusions, and orders, except the dismissals of the eviction actions. The district court denied this motion and awarded attorney’s fees to the McIlravys.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota held that Kratz's appeal was limited to the judgment denying his Rule 60(b) motion and that the motion was timely. The court determined that the district court had jurisdiction over the eviction cases and that any violation of N.D.R.Ct. 7.1(b)(1) was harmless error. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees. Consequently, the court affirmed the decision of the lower court. View "Don's Garden Center v. The Garden District" on Justia Law

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In this case, Epochal Enterprises, Inc., also known as Divine Orchids, entered into a commercial lease agreement with LF Encinitas Properties, LLC and Leichtag Foundation. The lease included a limitation of liability clause which stated that the defendants were not personally liable for any provisions of the lease or the premises, and the plaintiff waived all claims for consequential damages or loss of business profits. After the plaintiff sued the defendants, a jury found the defendants liable for premises liability and negligence.The jury awarded the plaintiff damages for lost profits and other past economic loss. However, the trial court granted the defendants’ motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), reasoning that the lease agreement’s limitation of liability clause prevented the plaintiff from recovering the economic damages the jury awarded.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District Division One State of California, reversed the order granting JNOV in the defendants' favor, finding that the limitation of liability clause did not bar plaintiff’s recovery of damages. The court reasoned that the jury's award of damages necessarily implied a finding of gross negligence on the part of the defendants, which would be outside the scope of the indemnification clause. Further, the court held that the limitation of liability clause was void to the extent that it sought to shield the defendants from liability for their violations of the Health and Safety Code, as it violated public policy under Civil Code section 1668.On the defendants' cross-appeal regarding the damages award, the court affirmed the denial of the defendants' motion for partial JNOV, finding that substantial evidence supported the damages award. The court concluded that the jury could reasonably interpret the term "other past economic loss" on the verdict form as a different form of lost profits, and that the evidence presented to the jury provided a reasonable basis for calculating the amount of the plaintiff's lost profits. View "Epochal Enterprises, Inc. v. LF Encinitas Properties, LLC" on Justia Law

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In this case, residents of the Waples Mobile Home Park in Fairfax, Virginia, challenged the park's policy that required all adult tenants to provide proof of their legal status in the United States in order to renew their leases. The plaintiffs, four Latino families, argued that this policy violated the Fair Housing Act (FHA) because it disproportionately ousted Latinos from the park. The district court initially granted summary judgment in favor of the park, reasoning that the policy was necessary to avoid criminal liability under a federal statute prohibiting the harboring of undocumented immigrants.However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment. The court of appeals found that the district court had misunderstood the federal anti-harboring statute. The court of appeals noted that the statute requires more than simply entering into a lease agreement with an undocumented immigrant to be in violation. Rather, a person must knowingly or recklessly conceal, harbor, or shield undocumented immigrants from detection. The court of appeals concluded that the park's policy of verifying tenants' legal status did not serve the park's stated interest of avoiding liability under the anti-harboring statute. Consequently, the park had not met its burden at the second step of the three-step burden-shifting framework established for disparate-impact claims under the FHA. As such, the court of appeals reversed the grant of summary judgment for the park and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. View "Reyes v. Waples Mobile Home Park Limited Partnership" on Justia Law

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In a case brought before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, residents of the Waples Mobile Home Park in Fairfax, Virginia, challenged the Park's policy requiring all adult tenants to provide proof of their legal status in the United States in order to renew their leases. The plaintiffs, noncitizen Latino families, argued that this policy disproportionately ousted Latinos from the Park and therefore violated the Fair Housing Act (FHA). The district court initially granted summary judgment in favor of the Park, reasoning that the policy was necessary to avoid criminal liability under a federal statute prohibiting the harboring of undocumented immigrants.On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The court determined that the anti-harboring statute did not plausibly put the Park at risk for prosecution simply for leasing to families with undocumented immigrants. Furthermore, the court found that the Park's policy did not serve a valid interest in any realistic way to avoid liability under the anti-harboring statute. Therefore, the Park did not meet its burden at the second step of the three-step burden-shifting framework established for disparate-impact claims in Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. Given these findings, the Court of Appeals did not need to reach the third step to determine whether a less discriminatory alternative was available. As such, the court reversed the grant of summary judgment for the Park and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. View "Reyes v. Waples Mobile Home Park Limited Partnership" on Justia Law

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In the case under consideration, the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois affirmed the dismissal of Waukegan Hospitality Group, LLC's appeal by the appellate court due to lack of jurisdiction. Waukegan Hospitality Group, LLC filed a notice of appeal five days after the deadline and did not file a motion seeking leave to show good cause or a reasonable excuse for the late filing. Despite the Group's claim that it had electronically submitted the notice of appeal on the due date and that the clerk erroneously rejected it, the Court ruled that the Group failed to seek recourse for its untimely filing as required by the rules of the Illinois Supreme Court. The Court noted that the record did not support the Group's factual assertions and that the Group did not utilize the remedies available to it, making its claim of due process violation baseless. Therefore, the Court held that the appellate court correctly ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the Group's appeal. The case originated from a two-count complaint for eviction filed by the Group against Stretch's Sports Bar & Grill Corporation, in which the trial court ruled in favor of the defendant. View "Waukegan Hospitality Group, LLC v. Stretch's Sports Bar & Grill Corp." on Justia Law

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In a case concerning subsidized low-income housing, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, ruled that tenants in such housing developments have standing to sue a property management company under the unfair competition law (UCL) if their tenancies are terminated prematurely due to legally deficient notices. The plaintiffs, who lived in housing managed by FPI Management, Inc., claimed that their tenancies were terminated after FPI provided just three days’ notice, instead of the legally required 30 days’ notice. The trial court granted summary judgment to FPI, deciding that the plaintiffs did not suffer an injury that would confer standing under the UCL. The appellate court, however, held that the plaintiffs were prematurely deprived of property rights and subjected to imminent legal peril due to FPI's legally deficient termination notices. This amounted to an injury sufficient to confer standing under the UCL. The appellate court also noted a distinction between the plaintiffs who lived in housing subsidized by the HOME Investment Partnerships Program (HOME plaintiffs) and those living in housing subsidized by section 8 of the United States Housing Act of 1937 (Section 8 plaintiffs). The Section 8 plaintiffs failed to demonstrate their legal entitlement to 30 days’ notice, leading the court to affirm the trial court's summary judgment in favor of FPI regarding the Section 8 plaintiffs' UCL claim. The court also affirmed the trial court's denial of the plaintiffs' motion for summary adjudication, but reversed the judgment and post-judgment order on costs, rendering the cost order moot. View "Campbell v. FPI Management, Inc." on Justia Law

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In this case, Nagla Abdelhalim, an Egyptian immigrant and a Muslim woman, filed suit against her neighbors Aaron and Dinara Lewis and Andrew and Roxana McDevitt, alleging that they violated the Fair Housing Act by engaging in a year-long campaign of harassment against her in an attempt to drive her out of the neighborhood because of her race, national origin, and religion. The dispute began when Abdelhalim started a short-term rental business, renting out her basement on platforms such as Airbnb, which violated a local ordinance at the time and was disapproved by her neighbors. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia granted summary judgment to the defendants, concluding that Abdelhalim had not produced evidence of intentional discrimination based on a protected ground.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered only whether the district court erred in granting the defendants' motions for attorneys’ fees. The Fourth Circuit ruled that the district court had applied the wrong legal standard and thus abused its discretion in granting attorneys’ fees to the defendants. The court noted that while a plaintiff’s failure to prevail is a factor to consider, it alone cannot be the basis for concluding that a claim was without foundation. The court found that Abdelhalim had provided sufficient evidence to support her belief that the defendants intended to discriminate against her based on her race, religion, or national origin. Thus, her claims were not without foundation, and the award of attorneys' fees to the defendants was vacated. View "Abdelhalim v. Lewis" on Justia Law

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In the case before the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho, the plaintiffs, Dallen and Rachel Worthington, filed an expedited unlawful detainer action against the defendant, Carlene Crazy Thunder, for failure to pay rent. Crazy Thunder requested a jury trial, which was denied by the magistrate court. Following a bench trial, the magistrate court ruled that Crazy Thunder had unlawfully detained the Worthingtons’ property and ordered her to vacate the residence. Crazy Thunder appealed to the district court, arguing she had a right to a jury trial under Idaho’s constitution and Idaho Code section 6313. The district court agreed, concluding that section 6-311A conflicted with section 6-313, and that section 6-311A violated Article I, section 7 of the Idaho Constitution. The Worthingtons then appealed to the Supreme Court of Idaho.The Supreme Court of Idaho held that Idaho Code section 6-311A does not violate the Idaho Constitution. The court reasoned that an action for unlawful detainer is an equitable claim, and under Article I, section 7 of the Idaho Constitution, the right to trial by jury only exists for legal claims, not equitable ones. However, the court also ruled that Crazy Thunder was entitled to a jury trial on her legal claims. The court held that in wrongful detainer cases like this one, when issues of fact are presented by the pleadings, those issues must be tried by a jury, unless such a jury is waived. As such, the Supreme Court of Idaho affirmed the district court’s decision, though on different grounds. The court further ruled that Crazy Thunder, as the prevailing party on appeal, was entitled to costs, but neither party was entitled to attorney fees. View "Worthington v. Crazy Thunder" on Justia Law

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In the case before the Supreme Court of Ohio, the issue concerned whether a landlord or landlord's agent can prohibit a person from entering leased premises, even if that person has received permission from a tenant. The case arose when Antonio Randolph was banned from an apartment complex by the property manager and was then later arrested and charged with criminal trespass after he was discovered in his uncle's apartment at the complex, which his uncle had invited him to. The trial court found Randolph guilty of criminal trespass. The Sixth District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's judgment, holding that the city had to prove that Randolph had entered the premises without privilege, and that his uncle's invitation to the apartment contradicted this.Upon review, the Supreme Court of Ohio agreed with the Sixth District's decision. The court held that a landlord or landlord's agent generally may not exclude a person from rented premises such that the excluded person is considered a trespasser when on the premises even if the person received permission to enter the premises from a tenant of the property. The court noted that Ohio law provides that a landlord cedes his or her possessory interests in leased property to the tenant and therefore may not prohibit the tenant from inviting guests onto the property.However, the court also highlighted that a landlord can maintain control over access to a property if the landlord so desires, provided that this authority is reserved in the lease agreement. In the absence of such a provision in the lease agreement, a tenant may invite onto the property a person whom the landlord has sought to ban from the premises. The judgment of the Sixth District Court of Appeals was affirmed. View "State v. Randolph" on Justia Law