Justia Landlord - Tenant Opinion Summaries

Two young children, ages four and two, suffered severe injuries after falling from a second-floor bedroom window in their apartment, which had recently undergone renovations. The property owner and manager had replaced the window without installing a fall prevention device, despite the window’s low sill height and significant drop to the ground. The children, through their guardian ad litem, sued the owner and manager for negligence, alleging both general negligence and negligence per se based on an alleged violation of the California Building Standards Code, which requires fall prevention devices on certain windows.The Superior Court of California, County of Alameda, heard the case. Before trial, the defendants sought summary adjudication and moved in limine to exclude expert testimony regarding the Building Code, arguing that the property was exempt from current requirements due to compliance with the code at the time of original construction and the use of “like-for-like” materials during renovation. The trial court denied these pretrial motions but, after plaintiffs presented their case at trial, granted a nonsuit on both negligence theories, finding no duty under general negligence and that the code exemption applied to the negligence per se claim.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. It affirmed the trial court’s ruling on general negligence, holding that the harm was not sufficiently foreseeable to impose a duty on the landlord under the circumstances. However, it reversed the nonsuit on negligence per se, holding that the trial court misinterpreted the Building Code: a window is not an “original material” exempt from current safety requirements. The appellate court remanded the case for retrial on the negligence per se claim. View "Jimenez v. Hayes Apartment Homes, LLC" on Justia Law

The plaintiff resided at an apartment complex with his son, who was arrested for aggravated armed robbery by the local police department. After the arrest, the police informed the apartment management, which then evicted both the plaintiff and his son based on a lease provision prohibiting criminal conduct. The plaintiff sought information about his son’s arrest from the city and police department under the Texas Public Information Act, but his request was denied after the city consulted the Texas Attorney General and invoked a law-enforcement exception.In the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, the plaintiff filed suit against the city, the police department, the apartment complex, a debt collection agency, and the Texas Attorney General, alleging violations of the U.S. Constitution, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, and Texas law. All defendants either appeared, filed answers, or moved to dismiss. The plaintiff moved for default judgment against each defendant, but the district court denied those motions and granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss. On appeal, the plaintiff only challenged the denial of default judgment, as he did not brief arguments regarding the dismissals and thus forfeited them.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed only the denial of default judgment for abuse of discretion. The court held that default judgment was not warranted because the city, police department, and debt collector had all appeared or answered, and the Attorney General had not been properly served. The court also found that arguments regarding attorney conflict and judicial bias were either forfeited or unsupported. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of default judgment. View "Clark v. City of Pasadena" on Justia Law

In February 2021, a contract for deed was executed between a property owner and a purchaser for two properties in Gladstone, North Dakota. The contract stipulated that the purchaser would receive title upon full and timely performance. The purchaser failed to make the required payments, prompting the owner to serve and publish a notice of cancellation in accordance with North Dakota law, which provided a six-month period to cure the default. The purchaser did not cure the default or file any affidavit asserting counterclaims or defenses during this period. After the cure period expired, the owner recorded a notice of cancellation and subsequently served the purchaser with a three-day notice of eviction when he remained in possession of the properties.The owner initiated separate eviction actions for each property in the District Court of Stark County, Southwest Judicial District. The court heard the matters together but did not consolidate them. After a hearing, the district court found that the owner had complied with statutory requirements for cancellation, that the purchaser had failed to cure the default, and that the purchaser was wrongfully retaining possession. The court excluded over 1,100 pages of evidence offered by the purchaser, finding it lacked foundation and was not relevant to the limited scope of an eviction action, which was solely to determine the right to possession. The court ordered the purchaser to vacate the properties.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the district court’s findings for clear error and its evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court held that service of process was proper, the exclusion of evidence was within the district court’s discretion, and the eviction was appropriate because the contract for deed had been canceled by operation of law. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s judgment of eviction. View "Cache Private Capital Diversified Fund v. Braddock" on Justia Law

A commercial landlord and tenant entered into a lease for office space, which was later amended to include a limited personal guaranty by an officer of the tenant. The guaranty, often referred to as a "good guy" guaranty, stated that the guarantor would be liable for the tenant’s monetary obligations under the lease up to the date the tenant and its affiliates had completely vacated and surrendered the premises, provided the landlord was given at least thirty days’ notice. The tenant stopped paying rent and utilities in 2020, notified the landlord of its intent to vacate, and surrendered the premises at the end of November 2020.The landlord sued both the tenant and the guarantor in the Supreme Court, New York County, seeking unpaid rent and expenses from before and after the surrender, as well as attorneys’ fees. The Supreme Court initially granted summary judgment to the landlord for pre-vacatur damages but denied summary judgment for post-vacatur damages pending further discovery. Upon reargument, the Supreme Court granted summary judgment for post-vacatur damages as well, holding both the tenant and guarantor jointly and severally liable. The Appellate Division, First Department, affirmed, reasoning that the guaranty required the landlord’s written acceptance of the surrender for the guarantor’s liability to end.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and reversed the lower courts’ decisions. The Court of Appeals held that, under the terms of the guaranty, the guarantor’s liability ended when the tenant vacated and surrendered the premises, and that liability was not conditioned on the landlord’s acceptance of the surrender. The court found that the language of the guaranty was clear and did not require the landlord’s written acceptance, and that interpreting it otherwise would render key provisions superfluous. The court denied the landlord’s motions for summary judgment on post-vacatur damages. View "1995 CAM LLC v. West Side Advisors, LLC" on Justia Law

A tenant rented a space on a landlord’s farm to park and live in her recreational vehicle (RV). The site lacked a sewage disposal system, and the tenant connected her RV’s wastewater port to a pipe that discharged raw sewage onto the ground. After the county health department cited the landlord for this violation, the landlord notified the tenant of lease termination for cause and initiated a forcible entry and detainer (FED) action to evict her. The tenant argued that her obligation to keep the premises clean and sanitary depended on the landlord’s duty to provide a sewage system. She also counterclaimed for damages, alleging the landlord failed to provide both a sewage system and safe drinking water.The Umatilla County Circuit Court ruled in favor of the landlord on both the eviction and the tenant’s counterclaims, awarding possession to the landlord. The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the landlord’s failure to provide a sewage system did not excuse the tenant’s duty to keep the premises sanitary, and that the tenant failed to prove her counterclaims, particularly because she did not notify the landlord of the problems.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reviewed the case. It held that the landlord’s failure to provide a sewage disposal system violated his statutory obligation to maintain the premises in a habitable condition. However, this did not excuse the tenant from her independent obligation to refrain from dumping sewage onto the ground. The tenant’s continued discharge of sewage constituted a violation that justified termination of the tenancy and eviction. Regarding the counterclaims, the court found the tenant could recover damages for the lack of a sewage system because the landlord already knew of the deficiency, but not for unsafe drinking water, as there was no evidence the landlord knew or should have known of that issue. The court affirmed in part and reversed in part, remanding for further proceedings. View "Jared v. Harmon" on Justia Law

A tenant entered into a lease for an apartment in Minneapolis that was subsidized under the Section 8 project-based voucher program, with the local public housing authority paying most or all of the rent directly to the landlord. After the tenant fell behind on utility payments, her electricity was disconnected, and she and her boyfriend broke into the building’s utility closet to restore power, inadvertently affecting other units. The landlord learned of this breach but continued to accept three months of rental payments from the public housing authority on the tenant’s behalf. Later, the landlord filed an eviction action based on the tenant’s breach of the lease.The Hennepin County District Court dismissed the tenant’s counterclaim regarding the utility shutoff and, following the Minnesota Court of Appeals’ decision in Westminster Corp. v. Anderson, held that the common law doctrine of waiver by acceptance of rent did not apply to rental payments made by a public housing agency. The district court found the tenant had materially breached the lease and did not address her retaliation defense. The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s rulings on the waiver and breach issues but remanded for consideration of the retaliation defense.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed only the waiver issue. It overruled Westminster, holding that the common law rule—whereby a landlord who accepts rent with knowledge of a tenant’s breach waives the right to evict for that breach—applies equally to private and publicly subsidized tenancies. The court clarified that whether a landlord has accepted rent for purposes of this doctrine is a factual question, to be determined by the totality of the circumstances, including the landlord’s conduct after payment. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and remanded for further proceedings. View "Hook & Ladder Apartments, L.P. v. Nalewaja" on Justia Law

Several residents of a recreational vehicle park in Oregon brought a class action lawsuit against the park’s owners and managers, alleging that the park’s utility billing practices violated the Oregon Residential Landlord Tenant Act (ORLTA). Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that they were charged for electricity at rates higher than the actual cost and were improperly assessed meter reading fees. The plaintiffs sought to certify a class covering a ten-year period prior to the filing of the complaint, arguing that the statute of limitations should be tolled until tenants discovered or reasonably should have discovered the alleged violations.The Marion County Circuit Court agreed with the plaintiffs, holding that the one-year statute of limitations in ORS 12.125 incorporated a discovery rule. The court certified a class including tenants who paid the disputed charges during the ten years before the complaint was filed, provided they did not or should not have discovered the facts giving rise to their claims more than one year before filing. The court later granted partial summary judgment for the plaintiffs, found the defendants liable, and awarded substantial damages and attorney fees.On appeal, the Oregon Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s class certification and related rulings, holding that ORS 12.125 does not include a discovery rule and that the one-year limitations period is not tolled by a plaintiff’s lack of knowledge of the claim. The plaintiffs sought review of this issue.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision. The court held that ORS 12.125 does not incorporate a discovery rule; the one-year statute of limitations begins to run when the alleged violation or breach occurs, not when the plaintiff discovers it. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Hathaway v. B & J Property Investments, Inc." on Justia Law

The Housing Authority of the City of Pittsburgh leased a unit in the Northview Heights Complex to Darlene Nash. On January 9, 2021, Nash hosted a birthday party at her unit, which was attended by numerous people, including a juvenile known as “Shooter.” During the party, after Nash asked another guest, Blake Green, to leave, Green was shot and killed inside Nash’s unit. Shooter was identified as the main suspect, though no charges or arrests were made. The Housing Authority served Nash with a notice to terminate her lease, citing the shooting as a violation of lease provisions prohibiting criminal activity and the discharge of deadly weapons by any “Covered Person,” which includes guests and other persons under the tenant’s control.The Magisterial District Court granted the Housing Authority possession of the unit, permitting eviction. Nash appealed to the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, where a non-jury trial was held. The trial court found that Shooter was not an unauthorized occupant or a guest, but was an “Other Person Under the Tenant’s Control” (OPTC) due to Nash’s “open house” invitation. The court concluded Nash violated the lease and awarded possession to the Housing Authority. Nash’s post-trial motion was denied, and she appealed to the Commonwealth Court.The Commonwealth Court reversed, reasoning that an invitation to the unit was not the same as an invitation to the premises, and the Housing Authority had not established that Shooter was on the premises due to Nash’s invitation. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the lease and relevant law de novo, holding that an invitation to a unit is an invitation to the premises, and Shooter was an OPTC at the time of the shooting. The Supreme Court reversed the Commonwealth Court’s decision, holding that the Housing Authority may evict Nash for the criminal act committed by Shooter in her unit. View "Housing Authority v. Nash" on Justia Law

A woman who receives a housing voucher due to her disability applied to rent an apartment in a complex owned by a property management company. The monthly rent for the unit was $1,590, and her voucher would have covered $1,464, leaving her responsible for $126 per month. Her only other income was $841 per month in supplemental security income. The property owner applied its standard policy, requiring all applicants to demonstrate monthly income at least 2.5 times the full rent, aggregating all sources of income, including voucher subsidies. The applicant’s combined income and voucher fell short of the $3,975 threshold, so her application was denied.After the Maryland Commission on Civil Rights found no probable cause for her discrimination claim, the applicant sued in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, alleging that the owner’s minimum-income requirement constituted impermissible source-of-income discrimination under Maryland’s Housing Opportunities Made Equal (HOME) Act, which prohibits discrimination based on “source of income” in housing. The owner moved for summary judgment, arguing its policy was facially neutral and applied equally to all sources of income. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the owner, finding that the policy did not discriminate based on the source of income, only the amount.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case. The Court agreed with the circuit court that the owner was entitled to summary judgment on the disparate treatment claim, as the policy was facially neutral and applied equally. However, the Supreme Court of Maryland held that the owner was not entitled to summary judgment on the disparate impact claim. The Court explained that a facially neutral policy may still violate the HOME Act if it disproportionately affects voucher holders without a legitimate business justification. The judgment of the circuit court was vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Hare v. David S. Brown Enterprises" on Justia Law

A developer purchased a property in Alameda that had previously been used by the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard as housing for military personnel and their families. The property, containing about 150 residential units, was vacant and in disrepair for over a decade before the developer acquired it in 2018. The developer extensively renovated the units and related infrastructure, spending significant sums, and obtained a new certificate of occupancy from the City in 2020. The developer then began renting the units to the general public.After the renovations, a dispute arose regarding whether the renovated units were subject to the City of Alameda’s Rent Control Ordinance. The City’s Rent Program Director determined that the units were not exempt from local rent control under the Costa-Hawkins Rental Housing Act, reasoning that the property had been used for residential purposes prior to the issuance of the new certificate of occupancy. An administrative hearing officer upheld this determination. The developer challenged this decision in the Superior Court of Alameda County, which ruled in favor of the developer, finding that the exemption applied and that the renovated property qualified as new residential housing stock.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court held that under the Costa-Hawkins Act, as interpreted by prior decisions such as NCR Properties, LLC v. City of Berkeley and Burien, LLC v. Wiley, the exemption from local rent control for properties with a certificate of occupancy issued after February 1, 1995, does not apply if the property had prior residential use. The court concluded that the extensive renovations and the period of vacancy did not transform the property into new housing for purposes of the exemption. The judgment of the trial court was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "CP VI Admirals Cove, LLC v. City of Alameda" on Justia Law