Justia Landlord - Tenant Opinion Summaries

Shelby Roberts rented an apartment from Ansley at Roberts Lake Apartments. After a dispute over the lease termination, Ansley retained her $500 security deposit and sent her an invoice for $791.14 for additional damages. Roberts believed these charges were fabricated and refused to pay. Ansley referred the debt to Carter-Young, a collection agency, which reported the debt to credit reporting agencies. Roberts disputed the debt, but Carter-Young only confirmed the debt with Ansley without further investigation. Roberts sued Carter-Young for failing to conduct a reasonable investigation under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA).The United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina dismissed Roberts' claim, stating that her dispute involved legal, not factual, matters, and thus did not require Carter-Young to investigate under the FCRA. The court held that the FCRA did not mandate investigations into legal disputes.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that to state a claim under the FCRA, a plaintiff must allege facts showing that the information in their credit report is inaccurate or incomplete and that this inaccuracy is objectively and readily verifiable by the furnisher. The court found that both legal and factual disputes could form the basis of a claim if they meet this standard. The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine if Roberts' allegations met the new standard of being objectively and readily verifiable. View "Roberts v. Carter-Young, Inc." on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Shalome Kaushansky, retained Stonecroft Attorneys, APC, to represent her in a legal action against her landlord due to various issues during her tenancy, including water leaks, mold, electrical problems, and harassment. Stonecroft filed a complaint but failed to advance the case, conduct discovery, or respond to the landlord's discovery requests. Shortly before the trial, Stonecroft withdrew from the case, leading Kaushansky to settle for $2,500.Kaushansky then sued Stonecroft for professional negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and unfair competition. The Los Angeles County Superior Court found in favor of Kaushansky, awarding her $91,734.29 for professional negligence and $25,000 for breach of fiduciary duty, totaling $116,734.29. The court found Stonecroft failed to plead all applicable causes of action, conduct discovery, and protect Kaushansky from foreseeable prejudice upon withdrawal. However, the court ruled in favor of Stonecroft on the unfair competition claim and declined to award punitive damages.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court reversed the $91,734.29 award for professional negligence, finding no substantial evidence that Kaushansky could have collected this amount from her landlord. The court noted that Kaushansky failed to prove the landlord's solvency or the collectibility of a hypothetical judgment. However, the court affirmed the $25,000 award for breach of fiduciary duty, finding substantial evidence that Stonecroft's withdrawal constituted intentional misconduct, justifying emotional distress damages. The judgment was affirmed in part and reversed in part, with each party bearing its own costs on appeal. View "Kaushansky v. Stonecroft Attorneys, APC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Clifford Osborne and Deborah Olsen sued their former landlord, Kevin Belton, for disability discrimination and retaliation under the Fair Housing Act (FHA) and the Louisiana Equal Housing Opportunity Act (LEHOA). The dispute arose when Belton, who initially allowed the plaintiffs to keep a dog temporarily, later prohibited the dog and threatened eviction. Despite Osborne providing a letter from his physician stating the need for a service dog due to mental health issues, Belton refused to accept it and proceeded with eviction, which was granted by a Louisiana justice of the peace court.In early 2020, Osborne and Olsen filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana. They moved for summary judgment, which Belton did not oppose, leading the district court to grant the motion in August 2022. Belton subsequently filed a Rule 60(b) motion for relief from the judgment nearly a year later, which the district court denied. He then filed a Rule 59(e) motion for reconsideration of the denial of his Rule 60(b) motion, which was also denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court determined that it had jurisdiction to review only the order denying Belton’s Rule 60(b) motion, as the notice of appeal was timely for this order but not for the underlying summary judgment. The Fifth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Rule 60(b) motion, as Belton failed to establish grounds for relief such as excusable neglect, newly discovered evidence, fraud, or a void judgment. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Belton’s Rule 60(b) motion. View "Osborne v. Belton" on Justia Law

DCA Capitol Hill LTAC, LLC and DCA Capitol Hill SNF, LLC (collectively, “DCA”) leased a property from Capitol Hill Group (“CHG”) in Northeast Washington, DC, to operate a long-term acute care hospital and skilled nursing facility. In 2015, DCA began withholding rent payments, claiming dissatisfaction with CHG’s installation of a new HVAC system and generator. CHG sued for breach of contract, and DCA counterclaimed for declaratory relief, breach of contract, and fraud, alleging misrepresentations by CHG.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia granted summary judgment to CHG on DCA’s fraud counterclaims related to pre-lease representations, citing the lease’s integration clauses. After a bench trial, the court ruled in favor of CHG on its breach-of-contract claim and DCA’s counterclaims, finding that CHG had fulfilled its obligations regarding the HVAC system and generator work. The court also awarded CHG attorneys’ fees based on a provision in the lease.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s rulings. The appellate court held that DCA’s fraud claims related to pre-lease representations failed as a matter of law because DCA’s reliance on the alleged misrepresentations was unreasonable. The court also concluded that CHG had not breached the lease, as the term “new HVAC system” did not include distribution components, and CHG had fulfilled its generator-related obligations by replacing one generator. The court upheld the trial court’s award of attorneys’ fees to CHG, finding no abuse of discretion.The case was remanded to the trial court to consider whether to award CHG attorneys’ fees associated with the appeal. View "DCA Capitol Hill LTAC, LLC v. Capitol Hill Group" on Justia Law

Kimberly Deramos lived in an apartment complex owned by Anderson Communities. While returning from a walk with her Shih Tzu, Princess, they were attacked by a pit bull allegedly owned by a neighboring tenant. Princess died, and Deramos sustained injuries requiring surgery and counseling. Deramos sued Anderson Communities, claiming they negligently failed to maintain a safe environment for tenants.The Jefferson Circuit Court granted Anderson Communities' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, relying on the strict liability dog-bite rule in Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 258.235(4). The court concluded that Anderson Communities was not an "owner" under KRS 258.095(5) and thus could not be held strictly liable. Deramos did not cite this statute in her complaint but instead alleged general negligence. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, agreeing that Anderson Communities was not an "owner" under the statute and did not address Deramos's negligence claim.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and reversed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that the strict liability dog-bite statute was inapplicable to Deramos's negligence claim. The court emphasized that negligence and strict liability are distinct legal concepts, and Deramos's complaint sufficiently alleged negligence. The court concluded that the circuit court erred in dismissing the negligence claim based on strict liability principles. The case was remanded to the Jefferson Circuit Court for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "Deramos v. Anderson Communities, Inc." on Justia Law

Angela Knight and her two children lived in a rental unit managed by the King County Housing Authority. In January 2023, the Housing Authority served a three-day notice to vacate due to alleged nuisance and criminal conduct, including unauthorized guests, excessive garbage, and activities leading to police reports involving shootings and stolen property. Despite previous warnings and a transfer to another unit, the issues persisted. When the Knights did not vacate, the Housing Authority filed for an unlawful detainer.A commissioner of the King County Superior Court ruled that the property fell under the CARES Act's 30-day notice requirement for evictions, as the Knights were given only three days' notice. Consequently, the unlawful detainer petition was denied, and the eviction action was dismissed without prejudice. The Housing Authority appealed this decision.The Washington Court of Appeals, Division One, held that the 30-day notice requirement under the CARES Act applies only to evictions for nonpayment of rent, disagreeing with Division Two's broader interpretation in a similar case. Andre Knight sought discretionary review from the Washington Supreme Court to resolve this conflict.The Washington Supreme Court held that § 9058(c) of the CARES Act requires a 30-day notice only for evictions due to nonpayment of rent. The court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision, clarifying that the CARES Act's notice provision does not extend to all types of evictions. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Hous. Auth. v. Knight" on Justia Law

James Smith Jr. initiated a civil action against Rufus and Merle Rivers in magistrates court, claiming to be their landlord and seeking their eviction. The Rivers contended that Smith did not own the property where they resided. The magistrates court sided with Smith and ordered the Rivers' eviction. The Rivers appealed, and the circuit court upheld the eviction order. However, the court of appeals reversed the decision, citing a South Carolina Code provision that barred the magistrates court from handling the eviction due to the Rivers' challenge to Smith's property title.The magistrates court initially ruled in favor of Smith, determining that he was the lawful owner and that a landlord-tenant relationship existed. The Rivers filed motions for reconsideration, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction due to a pending circuit court case challenging Smith's ownership. The magistrates court denied these motions, and the Rivers appealed to the circuit court. The circuit court affirmed the magistrates court's decision, finding no evidence to dispute Smith's ownership and confirming the landlord-tenant relationship.The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the court of appeals' decision. The Supreme Court held that the magistrates court had the authority to conduct the eviction proceeding because it had determined that a landlord-tenant relationship existed between Smith and the Rivers. The court emphasized that the existence of such a relationship precludes the tenant from challenging the landlord's title in an eviction proceeding. Consequently, the Supreme Court reinstated the magistrates court's eviction order. View "Rivers v. Smith" on Justia Law

The Garretts owned 5,200 acres of farmland in Sully County and faced financial difficulties, leading them to sell the property to the Stocks. The Stocks agreed to lease the land back to the Garretts for five years, with an option for the Garretts to repurchase it. The Garretts failed to make timely lease payments, prompting the Stocks to initiate an eviction action. The Stocks alleged that the Garretts had not only failed to pay rent but also committed waste on the property.The Circuit Court of the Sixth Judicial Circuit in Sully County held a two-day trial, where the jury found in favor of the Stocks, granting them immediate possession of the farmland. The Garretts appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in denying their motion to dismiss, their motion for judgment as a matter of law, and their motion for a new trial. They also contended that the court erred in denying their proposed jury instructions.The Supreme Court of South Dakota reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court's decisions. The court held that the Stocks had complied with the three-day notice to quit requirement and that the mandatory mediation provisions did not apply as the relationship was that of lessor and lessee, not creditor and borrower. The court also found that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Garretts' proposed jury instructions, as the instructions given adequately covered the applicable law. Finally, the court concluded that the jury's verdict was supported by sufficient evidence, and the circuit court did not err in denying the Garretts' motions for judgment as a matter of law or for a new trial. The Supreme Court also awarded the Stocks $5,000 in appellate attorney fees. View "Stock v. Garrett" on Justia Law

VOR, Inc. and the Grand Valley Hutterite Brethren (Colony) initiated an eviction action against Paul O’Farrell and Skyline Cattle Co. (Skyline) under South Dakota’s forcible entry and detainer (FED) statutes. Paul moved to dismiss the suit, arguing that the eviction should have been a compulsory counterclaim in his pending undue influence suit against his brother Kelly, the Colony, and the Raymond and Victoria O’Farrell Living Trust. The circuit court denied Paul’s motion to dismiss, and after a court trial, granted the eviction, ordering Paul to vacate the property within ten days and allowing the Colony to keep any of Paul’s personal property abandoned after the ten days expired. Paul appealed.The Circuit Court of the Third Judicial Circuit denied Paul’s motion to dismiss, his request for a jury trial, and his request for a continuance. The court proceeded with a court trial and granted the eviction in favor of the Landlords. The court also ordered that any personal property left by Paul after ten days would be considered abandoned and could be kept by the Colony. Additionally, the court awarded attorney’s fees to the Landlords.The Supreme Court of South Dakota reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court’s decision in part and reversed it in part. The court held that the FED statutes did not allow for pre-answer motions to extend the time for filing an answer and that the eviction action was not a compulsory counterclaim in Paul’s undue influence lawsuit. The court also held that Paul’s demand for a jury trial was untimely and that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying the request for a continuance or in excluding evidence of undue influence. However, the Supreme Court found that the circuit court erred in ordering the forfeiture of Paul’s personal property and remanded the case to revise the judgment accordingly. The court awarded VOR and the Colony combined appellate attorney fees of $9,000. View "Vor, Inc. v. Estate of O'Farrell" on Justia Law

A landlord, MIMG CLXXII Retreat on 6th, LLC, owns an apartment building in Cedar Rapids, Iowa. Mackenzie Miller, a tenant, entered a one-year lease in June 2022. The lease required rent to be paid by the first of each month, with a three-day notice period for nonpayment before the landlord could terminate the tenancy and pursue eviction. In December 2022, Miller failed to pay rent, and the landlord served a three-day notice. When the rent remained unpaid, the landlord filed a forcible entry and detainer (FED) action in the small claims division of the Linn County District Court.The small claims court dismissed the FED action, ruling that the Federal CARES Act required a thirty-day notice before eviction, which preempted Iowa's three-day notice law. The landlord appealed to the Iowa District Court for Linn County, arguing that the thirty-day notice requirement was time-limited to the 120-day moratorium period specified in the CARES Act. The district court upheld the small claims court's decision, stating that the plain language of the CARES Act did not include an expiration date for the thirty-day notice requirement.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the thirty-day notice requirement in the CARES Act applies only to rent defaults that occurred during the 120-day moratorium period. The court reasoned that the statute must be read in context with the surrounding provisions, which were temporary measures related to the COVID-19 pandemic. The court also noted the presumption against preemption of state law, particularly in areas traditionally governed by state law, such as landlord-tenant relationships. The Iowa Supreme Court reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "MIMG CLXXII Retreat on 6th, LLC v. Miller" on Justia Law