Justia Landlord - Tenant Opinion Summaries

Naomi Bermudez, a tenant in a federally subsidized housing complex managed by Mercy Housing Management Group Inc., faced eviction after Mercy Housing alleged she violated her lease by having an unauthorized guest who stayed beyond the allowed period, repaired vehicles on the property, and harassed another resident. Bermudez denied these allegations and requested a jury trial to resolve the factual disputes.The Denver County Court denied Bermudez's request for a jury trial, stating that there is no constitutional right to a jury trial in civil matters in Colorado. Bermudez then filed a petition with the Supreme Court of Colorado, arguing that she was entitled to a jury trial under the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure and the statutory framework governing forcible entry and detainer (FED) actions.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and held that Bermudez is entitled to a jury trial on the factual disputes in the FED-possession action. The court found that the right to a jury trial in such cases is rooted in the statutory framework and the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure, specifically C.R.C.P. 338(a), which provides for a jury trial in actions for the recovery of specific real property. The court also determined that the FED statute and C.R.C.P. 338(a) are compatible and that the statutory right to a jury trial applies to factual disputes in FED-possession actions.The court acknowledged concerns about the potential burden on the county courts but concluded that the limited nature of the jury-trial right would not prove unworkable. The court reversed the county court's denial of Bermudez's jury demand, made absolute the order to show cause, and remanded the case with instructions for the county court to schedule a jury trial on the factual issues related to the possession dispute. View "Mercy Housing Management Group Inc. v. Bermudez" on Justia Law

David Polkow rented a residential home from Frank Kahl under a written lease agreement that transitioned to a month-to-month basis after its initial term. In 2022, they signed a new three-year lease. Frank later transferred his interest in the property to the Frank J. Kahl Revocable Trust, with his son David Kahl managing the property as trustee after Frank's death. In January 2023, David Kahl filed an eviction action against Polkow, seeking possession of the property, damages for delinquent rent, and attorney fees.The Yellowstone County Justice Court awarded Kahl possession of the property and attorney fees but denied the request for delinquent rent. Kahl then sought additional damages for property damage, which led to a hearing where he claimed $128,644.07 in damages. The Justice Court awarded Kahl $58,753.73 in damages, plus interest and attorney fees, despite Polkow's objection that the amount exceeded the court's $15,000 jurisdictional limit. Polkow appealed to the Thirteenth Judicial District Court, which affirmed the Justice Court's decision, interpreting that the court had concurrent jurisdiction with the district court for landlord-tenant disputes.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and reversed the lower courts' decisions. The Supreme Court held that the Justice Court lacked jurisdiction to award damages exceeding the $15,000 limit imposed by § 3-10-301, MCA. The court clarified that the concurrent jurisdiction statutes did not override this limit. The case was remanded for the Justice Court to vacate the damages award and dismiss the claim for compensatory damages without prejudice, allowing Kahl to refile in District Court. The award of attorney fees and costs was affirmed. View "Kahl v. Polkow" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, former residents of a federally subsidized housing complex, alleged that the defendants, the complex's owner and management company, failed to maintain the property in a safe and habitable condition. They claimed the defendants delayed inspections, concealed hazards, and violated housing laws. The plaintiffs sought class certification for all residents from 2004 to 2019, citing issues like a 2019 sewage backup and systemic neglect.The Superior Court in Hartford, transferred to the Complex Litigation Docket, denied the motion for class certification. The court found that the proposed class did not meet the predominance and superiority requirements under Practice Book § 9-8 (3). It reasoned that determining whether each unit was uninhabitable required individualized proof, making a class action unsuitable. The court noted that while some claims might support class certification for specific events, the broad class definition over many years was too extensive.The Connecticut Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the proposed class was too broad and lacked generalized evidence for the entire period. It emphasized that the trial court had no obligation to redefine the class sua sponte. The plaintiffs did not request a narrower class definition, and the trial court was not required to do so on its own. The court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying class certification. View "Collier v. Adar Hartford Realty, LLC" on Justia Law

The plaintiff landlord initiated a summary process action to evict the defendant tenant from an apartment. The trial court ruled in favor of the defendant, who then sought attorney’s fees under a statute that allows consumers to recover such fees when a contract includes a unilateral attorney’s fees provision favoring the commercial party. The lease agreement in question capped the plaintiff’s recoverable attorney’s fees at $750. The trial court awarded the defendant $3500 in attorney’s fees, reasoning that limiting the defendant’s recovery to $750 would not achieve true parity between the parties, as intended by the statute.The plaintiff appealed, arguing that the trial court could only award the defendant up to $750 in attorney’s fees, as specified in the lease agreement. The plaintiff contended that the statute required the court to base the defendant’s award on the same terms governing the plaintiff’s fees, as long as it was practicable to do so.The Connecticut Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that trial courts have discretion to award a prevailing consumer reasonable attorney’s fees in excess of the contractual cap when it is not practicable to base the award on the contractual terms. The court determined that the term "practicable" means feasible under the circumstances, which are circumstances that achieve equity or fairness. The court emphasized that the equitable purpose of the statute is to rectify the imbalance of power between consumers and commercial parties in contract disputes.The court vacated the trial court’s award of $3500 in attorney’s fees and remanded the case for a new hearing. The trial court was directed to determine whether it was practicable to base the defendant’s award on the lease agreement’s terms and, if not, to award reasonable attorney’s fees consistent with the statute’s equitable purpose. View "Centrix Management Co., LLC v. Fosberg" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, a religious organization, sought to reclaim possession of a commercial property occupied by the defendants through a summary process action. The dispute arose after the founder and former president of the plaintiff, D, transferred his responsibilities to S in 2014. S took possession of the property and operated two companies from it, making regular mortgage payments until his relationship with D deteriorated, leading to a cessation of payments. D then ordered S to vacate the property and purported to remove him from his position. The parties agreed to resolve their disputes before a Bais Din, a rabbinical tribunal, which ruled that S would continue as the leader and make mortgage payments, while D retained ownership of the property for three years.The trial court, the Superior Court in the judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, initially denied the defendants' motion to dismiss the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction but ordered a stay to allow arbitration before the Bais Din. The court found that D had signed the arbitration agreement intending to bind the plaintiff and that the ownership issue was to be adjudicated by the Bais Din. However, after the stay period, the court denied the defendants' motion to stay the proceedings and compel arbitration, concluding that the plaintiff was not a party to any arbitration agreement and that the court would resolve the ownership and landlord-tenant issues.The Supreme Court of Connecticut reviewed the case and found that the trial court erred in failing to enforce the arbitration agreement. The court held that the plaintiff was bound by the arbitration agreement, as D signed it in a representative capacity with the intent to bind the plaintiff. The court noted that the arbitration agreement covered all disputes between the parties, including the issue of possession of the property. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case with direction to grant the defendants' motion to stay the proceedings and compel arbitration. View "Chabad Lubavitch of Western & Southern New England, Inc. v. Shemtov" on Justia Law

In May 2017, the City of Alameda leased residential property to Shelby Sheehan. Sheehan stopped paying rent in December 2020 and did not pay for over 17 months. On April 5, 2022, the City served Sheehan with a three-day notice to pay rent or vacate, specifying payment to be made to "City of Alameda c/o River Rock Real Estate Group." Sheehan neither paid nor vacated, prompting the City to file an unlawful detainer action.Sheehan moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing the notice was defective because it did not name a natural person as the payee and was ambiguous about the payment method. The trial court agreed, finding the notice invalid for not identifying a natural person and for being ambiguous about acceptable payment methods. Consequently, the court dismissed the action, and the City appealed.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case de novo. The court disagreed with the trial court's narrow interpretation of "person" under Code of Civil Procedure section 1161(2), holding that "person" includes corporations as well as natural persons. However, the court found the notice defective because it did not provide the correct and complete name of the corporation to whom rent should be paid, creating ambiguity and confusion. Therefore, the court affirmed the trial court's judgment in favor of Sheehan, concluding that the notice did not strictly comply with statutory requirements. The court did not address the trial court's finding of ambiguity based on payment method due to the notice's other deficiencies. View "City of Alameda v. Sheehan" on Justia Law

In 2022, the San Francisco Board of Supervisors passed an ordinance extending the notice period for landlords pursuing at-fault evictions. The San Francisco Apartment Association and Small Property Owners of San Francisco Institute sought a writ of mandate to prevent the City and County of San Francisco from enforcing the ordinance, arguing it was preempted by state law. The trial court partially granted the petition, finding the ordinance preempted only for nonpayment of rent evictions. Both parties appealed.The San Francisco Superior Court initially ruled that the ordinance conflicted with state law only regarding nonpayment of rent, citing a split in authority on notice periods for other fault-based evictions. The court referenced Tri County Apartment Association v. City of Mountain View, which invalidated extended notice periods, and Rental Housing Association of Northern Alameda County v. City of Oakland, which allowed them. The trial court felt bound by Rental Housing and limited its ruling to nonpayment of rent.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case and concluded that the entire ordinance was preempted by state law. The court found that the ordinance was procedural, not substantive, as it extended the state-mandated three-day notice period to a minimum of 13 days, conflicting with the Unlawful Detainer Act's timelines. The court determined that state law fully occupies the field of landlord-tenant notification timelines, making the local ordinance invalid.The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's judgment in part, ruling that the entire ordinance was preempted by state law, and directed the superior court to issue a writ of mandate preventing the City and County of San Francisco from enforcing the ordinance. The plaintiffs were awarded their costs on appeal. View "S.F. Apartment Assn. v. City & County of S.F." on Justia Law

Frank Hallberg rented an apartment from Steve Schmitz in Helena. Schmitz sent Hallberg a 30-day notice to vacate, and upon inspecting the apartment on July 12, 2021, Schmitz found 20-30 holes in the walls. Schmitz took photos and called the police, who also documented the damage. Hallberg was charged with Criminal Mischief Damage to Rental Property.The Municipal Court scheduled an omnibus hearing, which Hallberg attended without his attorney. The hearing was rescheduled multiple times, and neither Hallberg nor his attorney appeared at the final rescheduled hearing. Consequently, the court set a bench trial for April 15, 2022, which was held on December 14, 2022. The court found Hallberg guilty and ordered him to pay $1,226.45 in restitution. Hallberg appealed to the District Court, arguing he was denied a jury trial, the evidence was insufficient, and the restitution amount was incorrect. The District Court affirmed the Municipal Court's decision, stating Hallberg waived his right to a jury trial by not objecting and that the restitution amount was supported by Schmitz’s testimony.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. It held that Hallberg waived his right to a jury trial by failing to object to the bench trial. The court found sufficient evidence to support Hallberg’s conviction based on the testimonies and photographic evidence presented. The court also upheld the restitution amount, finding it was not clearly erroneous as it was supported by Schmitz’s testimony regarding repair costs. The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s decision. View "City of Helena v. Hallberg" on Justia Law

The case involves a landlord-tenant eviction action where the defendant, Jo-Ann Albanese, was ordered to vacate her apartment by August 1, 2021, by the plaintiff, Red Gate Motel, Inc. Ms. Albanese did not vacate the property and sent a rent payment for August, which was returned uncashed by Red Gate. Red Gate then filed an eviction complaint in District Court, which ruled in favor of Red Gate, awarding possession and damages. Ms. Albanese appealed to the Superior Court.In the Superior Court, Ms. Albanese filed several motions, including a motion to dismiss the eviction action, arguing that Red Gate accepted her rent payment without proper notice. The trial justice deferred ruling on this motion until all evidence was presented. The trial spanned five days, during which Ms. Albanese attempted to introduce a recording to support her retaliatory defense. On the final day of trial, Ms. Albanese was absent due to a medical emergency, and the trial justice rendered a bench decision in her absence, awarding possession and $6,000 in damages to Red Gate. Ms. Albanese's subsequent motions to vacate the judgment and to reconsider were denied by the trial justice.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and found no abuse of discretion by the trial justice. The court noted that Ms. Albanese failed to provide a complete transcript of the lower court proceedings, which limited the review. The trial justice's findings, including the decision to deny the motion to vacate based on Ms. Albanese's purposeful delay, were upheld. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment and orders of the Superior Court, concluding that Ms. Albanese was given a fair opportunity to present her case and that the trial justice did not overlook or misconceive material evidence. View "Red Gate Motel, Inc. v. Albanese" on Justia Law

The Washington State Attorney General filed a lawsuit against the city of Sunnyside and several of its officials, alleging that the city's crime-free rental housing program (CFRHP) was being used to evict tenants without due process and that these evictions disproportionately impacted Latinx renters, women-headed households, and families with minor children. The city argued that the Attorney General lacked the authority to bring this suit, as the scope of the Attorney General's authority under RCW 43.10.030(1) limits their ability to act to matters that impact more people than those affected by the CFRHP. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Washington reversed and remanded the case. The court held that the Attorney General did have the authority to bring the suit, as the case involved matters of public concern in which the state had an interest. The court also found that there were genuine disputes of material fact regarding whether the city's enforcement of the CFRHP had a disparate impact on protected classes, and whether the individual respondents were entitled to qualified immunity. However, the court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment on the Attorney General's claims under the Residential Landlord-Tenant Act, finding that the respondents were not landlords and therefore the Act did not apply to them. View "State v. City of Sunnyside" on Justia Law