Justia Landlord - Tenant Opinion Summaries

James Smith Jr. initiated a civil action against Rufus and Merle Rivers in magistrates court, claiming to be their landlord and seeking their eviction. The Rivers contended that Smith did not own the property where they resided. The magistrates court sided with Smith and ordered the Rivers' eviction. The Rivers appealed, and the circuit court upheld the eviction order. However, the court of appeals reversed the decision, citing a South Carolina Code provision that barred the magistrates court from handling the eviction due to the Rivers' challenge to Smith's property title.The magistrates court initially ruled in favor of Smith, determining that he was the lawful owner and that a landlord-tenant relationship existed. The Rivers filed motions for reconsideration, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction due to a pending circuit court case challenging Smith's ownership. The magistrates court denied these motions, and the Rivers appealed to the circuit court. The circuit court affirmed the magistrates court's decision, finding no evidence to dispute Smith's ownership and confirming the landlord-tenant relationship.The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the court of appeals' decision. The Supreme Court held that the magistrates court had the authority to conduct the eviction proceeding because it had determined that a landlord-tenant relationship existed between Smith and the Rivers. The court emphasized that the existence of such a relationship precludes the tenant from challenging the landlord's title in an eviction proceeding. Consequently, the Supreme Court reinstated the magistrates court's eviction order. View "Rivers v. Smith" on Justia Law

The Garretts owned 5,200 acres of farmland in Sully County and faced financial difficulties, leading them to sell the property to the Stocks. The Stocks agreed to lease the land back to the Garretts for five years, with an option for the Garretts to repurchase it. The Garretts failed to make timely lease payments, prompting the Stocks to initiate an eviction action. The Stocks alleged that the Garretts had not only failed to pay rent but also committed waste on the property.The Circuit Court of the Sixth Judicial Circuit in Sully County held a two-day trial, where the jury found in favor of the Stocks, granting them immediate possession of the farmland. The Garretts appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in denying their motion to dismiss, their motion for judgment as a matter of law, and their motion for a new trial. They also contended that the court erred in denying their proposed jury instructions.The Supreme Court of South Dakota reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court's decisions. The court held that the Stocks had complied with the three-day notice to quit requirement and that the mandatory mediation provisions did not apply as the relationship was that of lessor and lessee, not creditor and borrower. The court also found that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Garretts' proposed jury instructions, as the instructions given adequately covered the applicable law. Finally, the court concluded that the jury's verdict was supported by sufficient evidence, and the circuit court did not err in denying the Garretts' motions for judgment as a matter of law or for a new trial. The Supreme Court also awarded the Stocks $5,000 in appellate attorney fees. View "Stock v. Garrett" on Justia Law

VOR, Inc. and the Grand Valley Hutterite Brethren (Colony) initiated an eviction action against Paul O’Farrell and Skyline Cattle Co. (Skyline) under South Dakota’s forcible entry and detainer (FED) statutes. Paul moved to dismiss the suit, arguing that the eviction should have been a compulsory counterclaim in his pending undue influence suit against his brother Kelly, the Colony, and the Raymond and Victoria O’Farrell Living Trust. The circuit court denied Paul’s motion to dismiss, and after a court trial, granted the eviction, ordering Paul to vacate the property within ten days and allowing the Colony to keep any of Paul’s personal property abandoned after the ten days expired. Paul appealed.The Circuit Court of the Third Judicial Circuit denied Paul’s motion to dismiss, his request for a jury trial, and his request for a continuance. The court proceeded with a court trial and granted the eviction in favor of the Landlords. The court also ordered that any personal property left by Paul after ten days would be considered abandoned and could be kept by the Colony. Additionally, the court awarded attorney’s fees to the Landlords.The Supreme Court of South Dakota reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court’s decision in part and reversed it in part. The court held that the FED statutes did not allow for pre-answer motions to extend the time for filing an answer and that the eviction action was not a compulsory counterclaim in Paul’s undue influence lawsuit. The court also held that Paul’s demand for a jury trial was untimely and that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying the request for a continuance or in excluding evidence of undue influence. However, the Supreme Court found that the circuit court erred in ordering the forfeiture of Paul’s personal property and remanded the case to revise the judgment accordingly. The court awarded VOR and the Colony combined appellate attorney fees of $9,000. View "Vor, Inc. v. Estate of O'Farrell" on Justia Law

A landlord, MIMG CLXXII Retreat on 6th, LLC, owns an apartment building in Cedar Rapids, Iowa. Mackenzie Miller, a tenant, entered a one-year lease in June 2022. The lease required rent to be paid by the first of each month, with a three-day notice period for nonpayment before the landlord could terminate the tenancy and pursue eviction. In December 2022, Miller failed to pay rent, and the landlord served a three-day notice. When the rent remained unpaid, the landlord filed a forcible entry and detainer (FED) action in the small claims division of the Linn County District Court.The small claims court dismissed the FED action, ruling that the Federal CARES Act required a thirty-day notice before eviction, which preempted Iowa's three-day notice law. The landlord appealed to the Iowa District Court for Linn County, arguing that the thirty-day notice requirement was time-limited to the 120-day moratorium period specified in the CARES Act. The district court upheld the small claims court's decision, stating that the plain language of the CARES Act did not include an expiration date for the thirty-day notice requirement.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the thirty-day notice requirement in the CARES Act applies only to rent defaults that occurred during the 120-day moratorium period. The court reasoned that the statute must be read in context with the surrounding provisions, which were temporary measures related to the COVID-19 pandemic. The court also noted the presumption against preemption of state law, particularly in areas traditionally governed by state law, such as landlord-tenant relationships. The Iowa Supreme Court reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "MIMG CLXXII Retreat on 6th, LLC v. Miller" on Justia Law

Eric Woolard and Breonna Hall, residents of Greenhouse Condominiums, were involved in a physical altercation with their neighbors, Eric Smith and Stacy Thorne, in December 2019. Smith and Thorne sued Woolard, Hall, and Regent Real Estate Services, Inc. (Regent), the management company, for negligence and other claims. Woolard and Hall filed a cross-complaint against Regent and Greenhouse Community Association (Greenhouse), alleging negligence and other claims, asserting that Regent and Greenhouse failed to address ongoing harassment by neighbors, which led to the altercation.The Superior Court of Orange County granted summary judgment in favor of Regent and Greenhouse, finding no duty of care owed by them to intervene in the neighbor dispute or prevent the altercation. Woolard and Hall's motions to disqualify the trial judge were denied, and they did not seek writ review of these rulings.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the summary judgment, agreeing that Regent and Greenhouse had no duty to intervene in the neighbor dispute or prevent the altercation. The court found that Woolard and Hall failed to establish a legal duty of care breached by Regent and Greenhouse. Additionally, the court noted that claims of housing discrimination were not supported by evidence and were not properly raised as a separate cause of action. The court also held that the disqualification motions were not reviewable on appeal. The judgment in favor of Regent and Greenhouse was affirmed, and they were entitled to their costs on appeal. View "Woolard v. Regent Real Estate Services" on Justia Law

A landlord, JJD-HOV Elk Grove, LLC (JJD), owns a shopping center in Elk Grove, California, and leased space to Jo-Ann Stores, LLC (Jo-Ann). The lease included a cotenancy provision allowing Jo-Ann to pay reduced rent if the number of anchor tenants or overall occupancy fell below a specified threshold. When two anchor tenants closed, Jo-Ann invoked this provision and paid reduced rent for about 20 months until the occupancy threshold was met again.The Sacramento County Superior Court ruled in favor of Jo-Ann, finding the cotenancy provision to be an alternative performance rather than a penalty. The Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District affirmed this decision, distinguishing the case from a previous ruling in Grand Prospect Partners, L.P. v. Ross Dress For Less, Inc., which found a similar provision to be an unenforceable penalty.The Supreme Court of California reviewed the case to determine the validity of the cotenancy provision. The court held that the provision was a valid form of alternative performance, allowing JJD a realistic choice between accepting lower rent or taking steps to increase occupancy. The court found that the provision did not constitute an unreasonable penalty under California Civil Code section 1671, nor did it result in a forfeiture under section 3275. The court emphasized that contracts should be enforced as written, especially when negotiated by sophisticated parties.The Supreme Court of California affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeal, upholding the cotenancy provision as a valid and enforceable part of the lease agreement. View "JJD-HOV Elk Grove, LLC v. Jo-Ann Stores, LLC" on Justia Law

A property owner sought to deregulate certain Manhattan apartments under the luxury deregulation provisions of the Rent Stabilization Law (RSL). The Division of Housing and Community Renewal (DHCR) issued deregulation orders for these apartments, but the leases did not expire until after the Housing Stability and Tenant Protection Act of 2019 (HSTPA) repealed luxury deregulation. The property owner argued that the apartments should still be deregulated despite the repeal.The Supreme Court dismissed the property owner's proceeding, holding that DHCR's interpretation of the HSTPA was reasonable. The court found that the apartments did not become deregulated because their leases had not expired before the HSTPA took effect. The Appellate Division affirmed this decision, agreeing that DHCR's interpretation was correct and that there was no improper delay by DHCR in processing the deregulation applications.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that DHCR properly interpreted the HSTPA as eliminating luxury deregulation for apartments whose leases expired after the statute's effective date. The court found that the statutory language and legislative intent supported DHCR's interpretation. Additionally, the court rejected the property owner's argument that DHCR caused undue delay in processing the deregulation applications, finding no evidence of negligence or willfulness by DHCR. The court concluded that the apartments remained subject to rent stabilization under the HSTPA. View "Matter of 160 E. 84th St. Assoc. LLC v New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal" on Justia Law

James Javonte Crite appealed the Daviess Circuit Court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a search of his apartment. Crite was convicted of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, resulting in a two-year sentence and shock probation. He argued that his landlord had no right to enter his apartment without an emergency and lacked authority to grant police entry, making the search and seizure of the firearm illegal.The Daviess Circuit Court denied Crite's motion to suppress, finding that the landlord had the right to enter the apartment under the "emergency entry" clause of the lease due to significant electrical damage that posed a danger to the tenants. The court also concluded that the police entry was reasonable to ensure the safety of the landlord and the electrician, given the information that Crite was a schizophrenic off his medication, had acted irrationally, and there was a firearm in the apartment.The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, agreeing that the landlord's entry was justified by the emergency and that the police entry did not violate the Fourth Amendment as they were facilitating the landlord's legitimate interest in addressing the emergency.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The Court held that the landlord's entry was justified under the lease's emergency entry clause due to the electrical damage posing a risk to the tenants. The police entry was deemed reasonable and necessary to ensure the safety of the landlord and the electrician. The Court also held that the seizure of the AR-15 rifle was lawful under the plain view doctrine, as the officers were lawfully present and the incriminating nature of the firearm was immediately apparent. View "CRITE V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY" on Justia Law

Active Spine Physical Therapy, LLC (Active Spine) and its owners, Sara and Nicholas Muchowicz, were sued by 132 Ventures, LLC (Ventures) for breach of contract and personal guarantee after failing to pay rent and common area maintenance (CAM) charges under a lease agreement. Ventures had purchased the property in a foreclosure sale and sought damages for unpaid rent and CAM charges from June 2020 to February 2021. Active Spine argued that the lease was invalid due to fraudulent inducement and that they were under a COVID-19-related rent abatement.The district court initially ordered restitution of the premises to Ventures and denied Active Spine's request for a temporary injunction. A separate bench trial found Active Spine and the Muchowiczes liable for breach of contract. On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the restitution order but reversed the breach of contract judgment, remanding for a jury trial.At the jury trial, Ventures presented evidence of unpaid rent and CAM charges, while Active Spine argued that Ventures failed to provide notice of budgeted direct expenses, a condition precedent to their obligation to pay CAM charges. The jury found in favor of Ventures, awarding $593,723.82 in damages. Active Spine and the Muchowiczes moved for a new trial or judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), arguing errors in the jury's damage calculations and the lack of notice of budgeted direct expenses.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the exhibits as business records and not summaries under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-1006. The court also held that Active Spine and the Muchowiczes failed to preserve their arguments for appeal regarding the costs of new tenancy, COVID-19 abatement, and the amended lease. The court affirmed the district court's denial of the motion for new trial or JNOV, concluding that the jury's verdict was supported by sufficient evidence. View "132 Ventures v. Active Spine Physical Therapy" on Justia Law

Naomi Bermudez, a tenant in a federally subsidized housing complex managed by Mercy Housing Management Group Inc., faced eviction after Mercy Housing alleged she violated her lease by having an unauthorized guest who stayed beyond the allowed period, repaired vehicles on the property, and harassed another resident. Bermudez denied these allegations and requested a jury trial to resolve the factual disputes.The Denver County Court denied Bermudez's request for a jury trial, stating that there is no constitutional right to a jury trial in civil matters in Colorado. Bermudez then filed a petition with the Supreme Court of Colorado, arguing that she was entitled to a jury trial under the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure and the statutory framework governing forcible entry and detainer (FED) actions.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and held that Bermudez is entitled to a jury trial on the factual disputes in the FED-possession action. The court found that the right to a jury trial in such cases is rooted in the statutory framework and the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure, specifically C.R.C.P. 338(a), which provides for a jury trial in actions for the recovery of specific real property. The court also determined that the FED statute and C.R.C.P. 338(a) are compatible and that the statutory right to a jury trial applies to factual disputes in FED-possession actions.The court acknowledged concerns about the potential burden on the county courts but concluded that the limited nature of the jury-trial right would not prove unworkable. The court reversed the county court's denial of Bermudez's jury demand, made absolute the order to show cause, and remanded the case with instructions for the county court to schedule a jury trial on the factual issues related to the possession dispute. View "Mercy Housing Management Group Inc. v. Bermudez" on Justia Law