Justia Landlord - Tenant Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, former tenants of the defendant, filed a complaint against their landlord, alleging various breaches and violations related to their tenancies. In response, the defendant filed two unlawful detainer actions against the plaintiffs for nonpayment of rent. These actions were later dismissed without prejudice. Subsequently, a jury found the defendant liable for certain claims, and the plaintiffs filed a new complaint, including a claim for malicious prosecution based on the unlawful detainer actions.The San Francisco Superior Court consolidated the cases and, after a bench trial, found in favor of the plaintiffs on their malicious prosecution claim. The court concluded that the defendant lacked probable cause to file the unlawful detainer actions and rejected the defendant's advice of counsel defense, determining that she did not rely on legal advice in good faith. The court entered judgment for the plaintiffs, and the defendant appealed.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that the defendant had asserted a valid advice of counsel defense. The defendant had consulted an attorney, disclosed all relevant facts, and acted on the attorney's advice in good faith. The court determined that the trial court erred in requiring the defendant to prove the attorney's competence and in shifting the burden of the attorney's legal research onto the defendant. Consequently, the appellate court vacated the judgment and remanded the case with instructions to enter a judgment of dismissal in favor of the defendant. The court declined to award costs as the respondents did not appear in the appeal. View "Ceron v. Liu" on Justia Law

Joseph Eshagian leased a residential unit in Van Nuys to Manuel Cepeda, who was required to pay $1,000 monthly rent. On December 20, 2022, Eshagian served Cepeda with a three-day notice to pay $8,000 in unpaid rent or quit. The notice did not specify the start date of the three-day period, nor did it clearly state that Cepeda would lose possession if he did not pay by a certain date. On December 27, 2022, Eshagian filed an unlawful detainer complaint seeking possession, unpaid rent, holdover damages, and attorney fees. Cepeda filed an answer denying the allegations and asserting affirmative defenses.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted Eshagian’s motion for terminating sanctions due to Cepeda’s failure to comply with discovery orders, struck Cepeda’s answer, and entered a default against him. A possession-only judgment was entered on May 3, 2023. Cepeda’s motion to vacate the judgment was denied, and he appealed to the appellate division of the superior court, which held the possession-only judgment was appealable and reversed the judgment, finding the three-day notice defective.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case to determine if a possession-only judgment in an unlawful detainer proceeding is appealable when the landlord’s damages claims are unresolved. The court concluded that such a judgment is not appealable because it does not resolve all rights of the parties. However, the court treated Cepeda’s appeal as a petition for writ of mandate due to the uncertainty of the law on appealability at the time of filing.The court found the three-day notice invalid for failing to specify when and how Cepeda had to pay the rent and that he would lose possession if he did not cure the default. Consequently, the complaint did not state a cause of action for unlawful detainer. The court dismissed the appeal, granted the petition, and directed the trial court to vacate the judgment in favor of Eshagian and enter a new judgment in favor of Cepeda. View "Eshagian v. Cepeda" on Justia Law

In 2019, the New York Legislature enacted the Housing Stability and Tenant Protection Act (HSTPA), expanding rent stabilization to all municipalities in the state. The City of Kingston declared a housing emergency on August 1, 2022, opting into the Emergency Tenant Protection Act (ETPA). Petitioners, a group of landlords, sought to invalidate Kingston's opt-in and two guidelines set by the Kingston New York Rent Guidelines Board (KRGB).The Supreme Court upheld Kingston's emergency declaration, finding the city's survey methodology reasonable. However, it vacated the KRGB guidelines, ruling that the fair market rent guideline required a case-by-case determination and that the rent adjustment guideline lacked statutory authority.The Appellate Division modified the Supreme Court's order, reinstating the KRGB guidelines. It held that the emergency declaration was based on a good faith study and that the fair market rent guideline did not require a case-by-case assessment. The rent adjustment guideline was also upheld, as the ETPA allows for rent adjustments without specifying that they must be upward.The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's decision. It found that the City's 2022 survey was reasonably reliable and relevant, supporting the emergency declaration. The court also upheld the fair market rent guideline, noting that it did not have an impermissibly retroactive effect, as no refunds were issued for periods before August 1, 2020. The challenge to the rent adjustment guideline was deemed unpreserved and not properly before the court. View "Matter of Hudson Val. Prop. Owners Assn. Inc. v City of Kingston" on Justia Law

A group of landlords and property owners in New York's Hudson Valley region challenged the constitutionality of the 2023 amendments to New York's rent stabilization law. These amendments, known as the Vacancy Provisions, allow municipalities to impose civil penalties on landlords who do not cooperate with vacancy surveys and to presume zero vacancies for nonresponsive landlords. The landlords argued that these provisions authorize warrantless searches of their records without an opportunity to challenge the searches' scope, violating the Fourth Amendment, and that they prevent landlords from contesting vacancy calculations, violating procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York denied the landlords' motion for a preliminary injunction and dismissed their complaint for failure to state a claim. The landlords appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. The court held that the Vacancy Provisions are facially valid under the Fourth Amendment because landlords have adequate pre-compliance review available under Article 78 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules. The court also found that the searches authorized by the Vacancy Provisions are not unreasonable in every situation, given the ample notice and minimal penalties involved. Additionally, the court held that the Vacancy Provisions do not violate procedural due process because landlords can contest vacancy calculations at public hearings before rent stabilization is adopted and through Article 78 after adoption. View "Hudson Shore v. State of New York" on Justia Law

Rajiv Sangha (landlord) rented a house to Jeremy Keen and Racheal Lomas (tenant) in 2021. In November 2023, the tenant stopped paying rent. In April 2024, the landlord served a 14-day notice to pay rent or vacate, but the tenant did not respond. In May 2024, the landlord commenced an unlawful detainer action, serving the tenant with a summons and complaint. The tenant faxed a written notice of appearance to the landlord, indicating their intention to be present at any court case or appearance. Despite this, the landlord moved for a default judgment due to the tenant's failure to file an answer by the specified date. The trial court granted the default judgment and issued a writ of restitution.The tenant received the motion for default and notice of hearing but was allegedly informed by the King County Superior Court Clerk’s Office that they did not need to attend the hearing. In July 2024, the trial court found the tenant in default for lack of answer and issued the default judgment and writ of restitution. The tenant retained counsel and moved to vacate the default judgment and quash the writ, arguing that default for an appearing tenant violated their statutory right to counsel and contradicted the statutory summons language requiring a show cause hearing. The trial court denied the motion, agreeing with the landlord that the Civil Rules required an answer and that the landlord had complied with statutory notice requirements.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the case. The court held that RCW 59.18.365(3) precludes a default judgment against a tenant who appears but does not submit a written answer in an unlawful detainer action. The tenant’s written notice of appearance constituted a response to the summons, and the trial court erred in entering a default judgment based on the tenant’s failure to answer. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s entry of default and remanded the case for further proceedings. The landlord's request for appellate attorney fees was denied. View "Sangha v. Keen" on Justia Law

Peter Farina has lived at the Victor Howell House, a group home for low-income individuals, since 1989. In 2000, the Janet Keenan Housing Corporation (JKHC), a non-profit, purchased the property to maintain it as affordable housing. Recently, JKHC attempted to sell the house to a private third party, leading to two tracks of litigation. The District of Columbia sued JKHC to halt the sale, arguing it violated JKHC’s charitable purposes. As the District and JKHC neared a settlement allowing the sale, Farina sought to intervene but was denied. Farina then filed his own lawsuit, claiming his rights under the Tenant Opportunity to Purchase Act (TOPA) and the Uniform Trust Code (UTC) were being violated.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia denied Farina’s motion to intervene in the District’s case, citing untimeliness and lack of standing. The court approved the settlement between the District and JKHC, which allowed the sale to proceed. In Farina’s separate lawsuit, the court ruled against him, stating his TOPA rights were extinguished by the court-approved settlement and that he lacked standing to bring his UTC claim.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. The court held that Farina’s TOPA rights were not extinguished by the settlement, as the sale was an arm’s-length transaction and not exempt under TOPA. Farina must be given the opportunity to purchase the property under TOPA. However, the court agreed with the lower court that Farina lacked standing to bring his UTC claim, as he was neither a settlor nor a special interest beneficiary of JKHC. The court affirmed the judgment in the District’s case but vacated the judgment in Farina’s case, remanding it for further proceedings to afford Farina his TOPA rights. View "Farina v. Janet Keenan Housing Corporation" on Justia Law

A landlord sought to terminate a rental agreement with a tenant due to extensive property damage caused by the tenant's guinea pigs. The landlord issued a 30-day termination notice stating that no cure opportunity was available because the damage was too extensive to repair while the tenant remained on the premises. The tenant did not vacate, leading the landlord to initiate an eviction action.The trial court ruled in favor of the landlord, finding that the termination notice complied with ORS 90.392(3)(c) because the repairs were too costly and extensive for the tenant to complete within the minimum 14-day cure period. The tenant appealed, arguing that the notice was invalid because it did not inform him of his right to cure the violation.The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that a landlord's termination notice need not state that a violation can be cured if the landlord determines that it is unreasonable to believe that any tenant could cure the violation within the prescribed time period.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that a termination notice under ORS 90.392 must state that a violation can be cured when, as a matter of law, the tenant has a right to cure the violation. The court concluded that a tenant has a right to cure all violations that can be the basis for termination under ORS 90.392, except for certain repeat violations described in ORS 90.392(5). Because the violation in this case was one that the tenant had a right to cure, the landlord's notice was invalid for failing to state that the violation could be cured. The case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "KKMH Properties, LLC v. Shire" on Justia Law

Shanda Yates was bitten by a pit bull named Yurk while visiting her friend Neah Friar, who rented a property from TLM Investments, LLC. Friar's lease had a no-pet provision, which she disregarded by keeping Yurk and concealing his presence from TLM. Yates filed a personal injury claim against both Friar and TLM, alleging negligence on TLM's part for allowing Yurk on the property and claiming protections under the lease.The Prentiss County Circuit Court denied TLM's motion for summary judgment, leading to an interlocutory appeal. TLM argued that it had no knowledge of Yurk's presence or his dangerous propensities, as Friar had intentionally concealed the dog. TLM also contended that Yates failed to establish herself as an intended third-party beneficiary under the lease.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case de novo and found that Yates did not provide evidence that TLM had actual or constructive knowledge of Yurk or his dangerous propensities. The court noted that the no-pet provision in the lease was not an admission that all dogs are dangerous but was intended to prevent property damage. Additionally, the court found that Yates did not have standing to claim protections under the lease as she was not a party to it and was not an intended third-party beneficiary.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reversed the trial court's denial of summary judgment, rendered summary judgment in favor of TLM, and remanded the case to the Prentiss County Circuit Court for any necessary further proceedings. The case against TLM was dismissed with prejudice. View "TLM Investments, LLC v. Yates" on Justia Law

Desean Hattix was convicted of attempted failure to register a firearm after police executed a search warrant at his home and found two unregistered handguns. Following his conviction, the District of Columbia Housing Authority (DCHA) sought to evict him from his federally subsidized housing unit, alleging that his possession of an unregistered firearm violated the federal "one-strike" provision in his lease, which prohibits tenants from engaging in criminal activity that threatens the health, safety, or peaceful enjoyment of the property. The trial court found that Mr. Hattix's unlawful possession of a firearm violated this provision and issued a nonredeemable judgment against him.The magistrate judge found that Mr. Hattix's possession of an unregistered firearm threatened the safety of other residents and issued a nonredeemable judgment against him. An associate judge of the Superior Court upheld this decision, finding that Mr. Hattix's gun possession posed both a per se and an individualized threat to the health and safety of other residents. The reviewing judge noted that the District's registration requirements were designed to ensure firearms were not in the hands of dangerous and untrained individuals, and by ignoring this law, Mr. Hattix placed the public at risk.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and disagreed with the lower courts. The court held that possession of an unregistered firearm does not constitute a per se threat to residents' health, safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of the property. The court also found that DCHA did not present sufficient evidence that Mr. Hattix's conduct posed an individualized threat to residents' health, safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of the property. Consequently, the judgment of the Superior Court was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Hattix v. District of Columbia Housing Authority" on Justia Law

A landlord argued that a case brought by the Los Angeles City Attorney to enforce California's Public Nuisance Law (PNL) violated Government Code section 53165.1, which bars local governments from penalizing tenants or landlords solely due to contact with law enforcement. The case involved a 116-unit apartment complex in North Hollywood, where the People alleged a gang-related public nuisance. The complaint sought abatement of the nuisance, a permanent injunction, and civil penalties.The Los Angeles County Superior Court granted a preliminary injunction requiring the defendants to implement several security measures, including proper lighting, video monitoring, and private security. The court also ordered criminal background checks on tenants. Defendants appealed, and a different panel of the Court of Appeal affirmed the preliminary injunction but directed the trial court to consider modifying it in light of section 53165.1. On remand, the trial court modified the injunction to remove the background check requirements but confirmed the validity of the rest of the injunction.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case and held that enforcing the PNL is not prohibited by section 53165.1 because the PNL is a state law, not a local ordinance, rule, policy, program, or regulation. The court also determined that the action brought by the city attorney on behalf of the People of the State of California is not an action by a "local government" within the meaning of section 53165.1. Additionally, the court found that the preliminary injunction did not penalize tenants or landlords solely due to contact with law enforcement. The order was affirmed. View "People ex rel. Soto v. Group IX BP Properties" on Justia Law