Justia Landlord - Tenant Opinion Summaries

During the summer of 2018, housing advocates interacted with tenants at the Yale Park Apartment Complex in Omaha, documenting alleged building code violations and submitting complaints to the City. Based largely on this information, the City’s Chief Housing Inspector applied for and received an inspection warrant. Subsequent searches led to the closure of the complex, and tenants were forced to relocate. The City later provided AB Realty, LLC—the owner—and Kay and Janae Anderson with a list of violations and barred reopening until repairs were made. AB Realty attempted to challenge the closure through the Property Management Appeals Board and faced ongoing notices and prosecution for code violations. After completing repairs and reopening the complex in 2021, AB Realty and the Andersons initiated a lawsuit.The United States District Court for the District of Nebraska granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss in part and stayed proceedings pending the outcome of Kay Anderson’s criminal trial. After a state-court jury convicted Kay on a few counts but acquitted him of most, the district court dismissed the remaining claims against the City of Omaha and associated defendants.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The court held that the search warrant, even excluding disputed information, was supported by probable cause based on the complaints and evidence of violations. It further determined that violations of Nebraska state law regarding warrants did not sustain a federal constitutional claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court also found AB Realty’s procedural due process allegations insufficiently specific to identify constitutionally protected interests or responsible parties. Finally, the court ruled that AB Realty failed to plead either a per se or regulatory taking under the Fifth Amendment, as the City did not physically appropriate the property and the closure for code violations did not constitute a regulatory taking. All claims against all defendants were dismissed. View "AB Realty, LLC v. Lane" on Justia Law

The plaintiff entered into an oral lease agreement with the defendant for the rental of a dump trailer for seven days at a flat rate. During the lease period, the plaintiff was arrested while using the trailer, and the trailer was impounded by law enforcement. The defendant retrieved the trailer from the impound lot before the lease term ended. The plaintiff was released from custody before the lease expired and alleged that the defendant breached the contract by repossessing the trailer early and converted his property contained in the trailer, which he claimed to be valuable.The District Court of Cass County, East Central Judicial District, granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, Muddy Boyz Drywall LLC, dismissing the plaintiff’s claims. The court concluded there were no genuine issues of material fact regarding the alleged breach of contract and conversion. After procedural steps involving the dismissal of counterclaims and certification under Rule 54(b), the plaintiff appealed the certified judgment.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the case de novo. The Court held that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding the terms of the oral contract, whether its conditions were breached, whether the defendant’s performance was rendered impossible, and whether the plaintiff suffered damages. The Court also found that the plaintiff’s complaint sufficiently alleged a conversion claim and that factual disputes existed regarding ownership, value, and the defendant’s disposal of the plaintiff’s property. The Supreme Court of North Dakota reversed the judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s claims and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. View "Gum v. Muddy Boyz Drywall" on Justia Law

During the COVID-19 pandemic, an individual with heart disease and his family rented a property in Kauaʻi. The rental agreement required weekly cleanings by staff. Due to his health condition, the tenant requested an accommodation to waive the cleaning provision, fearing increased risk if exposed to the virus by non-family members. The landlord denied the request, suggesting instead that the tenant could leave during cleanings. After further correspondence and formal requests for accommodation, the landlord terminated the tenancy and withheld a portion of the security deposit for cleaning and repairs.After vacating the property, the tenants filed a complaint with the Hawaiʻi Civil Rights Commission (HCRC), alleging disability discrimination for failure to provide a reasonable accommodation and to engage in an interactive process. The HCRC found reasonable cause, issued a right to sue, and subsequently initiated an action in the Circuit Court of the Fifth Circuit. The circuit court granted the landlord’s motion to dismiss, finding the accommodation request was not sufficiently alleged as reasonable and necessary, and that Hawaiʻi’s fair housing law did not create standalone liability for failing to engage in an interactive process.On appeal, the Intermediate Court of Appeals vacated the circuit court’s judgment and remanded the case, concluding there were genuine issues of material fact regarding the “disability,” “necessary,” and “reasonable” factors. The landlord then sought review by the Supreme Court of the State of Hawaiʻi.The Supreme Court of Hawaiʻi affirmed the ICA’s judgment and remanded the case, clarifying the legal framework for evaluating disability accommodation requests under Hawaiʻi’s fair housing law. The court held that plaintiffs bear the initial burden to show an accommodation is both reasonable and necessary, after which the burden shifts to defendants to prove unreasonableness, including proposing alternatives. The court further held that neither Hawaiʻi’s fair housing statute nor its regulations impose standalone liability for failure to engage in an interactive process. View "Kawatachi v. The Parrish Collection, LLC" on Justia Law

A commercial law firm entered into a 66-month lease for office space in downtown Oakland, California, but quickly failed to make rent and other payments. After accumulating substantial arrears, the landlord initiated an unlawful detainer action. The parties settled, with the tenant agreeing to pay arrears and stipulating that if it defaulted again, the landlord could obtain a judgment for possession, unpaid rent, fees, and future rent. The tenant defaulted again, leading the landlord to seek and obtain judgment under the settlement’s terms.The Alameda County Superior Court held hearings on damages, including the landlord’s claim for future rent. The landlord presented expert testimony and evidence on market conditions, showing high vacancy rates and poor prospects for re-leasing the premises. The tenant did not present counter-evidence. The court found the tenant breached the settlement and awarded possession to the landlord, damages for unpaid rent and fees, and future rental damages for three years, reduced to present value, based on market evidence and the landlord's duty to mitigate.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court’s judgment. It held that substantial evidence supported the award of future rent, the stipulation for damages was not an unlawful penalty under California law, and the judgment did not result in a double recovery. The court applied the substantial evidence standard for factual findings and de novo review for legal issues. The judgment was affirmed, and the landlord was awarded costs on appeal. View "USPA City Center, LLC v. Law Offices of Jason W. Estavillo, P.C." on Justia Law

A landlord and a tenant, a ballet studio, entered into two lease agreements for suites in a shopping center. The leases contained provisions for indemnification, default, and attorney fees. After the ballet studio vacated the premises, alleging that the landlord failed to address mold issues that caused personal injuries to two individuals associated with the studio and damage to the studio’s property, the studio and the individuals filed a multi-count complaint against the landlord. The landlord counterclaimed for unpaid rent and sought defense and indemnity from the ballet studio for the claims made by the individuals.The Montgomery Circuit Court addressed a partial summary judgment motion filed by the landlord, which concerned only the claims between the landlord and the ballet studio, not the individuals’ personal injury claims. The ballet studio and the individuals filed a response to the summary judgment motion, but it was submitted one business day late. The trial court granted the landlord’s motion to strike the late response and, later, denied the plaintiffs’ attempt to resubmit the same response. The court then entered a partial summary judgment in favor of the landlord. Subsequently, the court certified this partial summary judgment as final under Rule 54(b), Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure, but also included language purporting to dismiss the entire case.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the trial court’s orders striking the untimely response and denying its resubmission, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. The Supreme Court also affirmed the certification of the partial summary judgment as final but reversed the dismissal of the entire case, noting that claims by the individuals against the landlord and the determination of damages owed to the landlord remained unresolved. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Commercial Properties, Inc. v. Charalambidou" on Justia Law

A tenant operating a restaurant entered into a five-year commercial lease with the landlord for retail space, which later continued as a month-to-month tenancy after the lease expired. In January 2023, the tenant withheld the rent, claiming entitlement to a previously discussed rent reduction due to pandemic-related difficulties. The tenant deducted the amount he believed he had overpaid from the rent for January and part of February 2023. Despite this, he paid full rent from March 2023 through February 2025. The landlord eventually served the tenant with a three-day notice to pay or quit in February 2025, demanding payment for the amount withheld in January and February 2023.After the tenant did not pay the amount demanded within three days, the landlord filed an unlawful detainer action in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, seeking possession and damages. The tenant demurred, arguing that the notice was invalid because it sought rent that had become due more than a year before the notice was served, in violation of California Code of Civil Procedure section 1161(2). The trial court overruled the demurrer and, following a bench trial, entered judgment for the landlord, awarding possession, unpaid rent, and holdover damages, reasoning that the lease required payments to be applied to the oldest obligation, thereby keeping the tenant in continual arrears.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reversed the judgment. It held that section 1161(2) requires a three-day notice to be served within one year after the rent becomes due, and the landlord’s notice, based solely on rent due more than a year prior, was void and could not support the unlawful detainer action or damages. The case was remanded for entry of judgment in favor of the tenant. View "Universal Shopping Plaza v. Hong" on Justia Law

A dispute arose between two parties over a residential lease agreement in Mountain Home, Idaho, which included an option to purchase the property after the underlying Wells Fargo mortgage was satisfied. The lessee paid $8,000 for the purchase option and began residing at the property. Eighteen months later, the lessee filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, listing the lessor as a creditor and rent as an expense but denying any legal or equitable interest in real property and failing to disclose the lease agreement or the purchase option in the bankruptcy schedules. The bankruptcy trustee closed the case without distributing any assets, and the lessee received a discharge of debts. Four years after discharge, the lessee attempted to exercise the purchase option, but the lessor refused.The lessee filed suit in the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, seeking specific performance and declaratory relief, while the lessor counterclaimed for breach of contract. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The district court initially denied both motions, finding factual disputes, and declined to apply judicial estoppel. Upon reconsideration, the district court ruled for the lessor, holding that the lessee’s claims were barred by judicial estoppel and, in the alternative, that the lessee lacked standing because the undisclosed purchase option remained property of the bankruptcy estate. The district court denied the lessee’s request to stay the proceedings to reopen the bankruptcy case.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that the lessee lacked standing to enforce the purchase option. The court reasoned that the purchase option was property of the bankruptcy estate, was not properly disclosed in the bankruptcy schedules, and thus remained with the estate after the bankruptcy case closed. Only the bankruptcy trustee, not the lessee, had standing to enforce the option. Costs on appeal were awarded to the lessor. View "Conger v. Clark" on Justia Law

Joan Peoples, a tenant, filed suit against her landlord, CIH Properties, alleging three main issues: breach of the warranty of habitability due to a persistent mice infestation that was not remedied despite maintenance requests; sexual assault by a CIH employee in the building’s elevator, with subsequent management response revealing that the security camera was fake; and race discrimination, asserting that her maintenance requests were ignored due to her race. She completed a standard two-page complaint form provided by the court, outlining her claims and requesting monetary damages.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia reviewed CIH’s motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), which argued that Ms. Peoples’s complaint was too vague and lacked the necessary factual allegations to support any legally viable claim. The court found the allegations regarding race discrimination, retaliation, sexual assault, and uninhabitable conditions to be conclusory and lacking sufficient detail, and dismissed the complaint with prejudice. Ms. Peoples’s subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the Superior Court’s decision de novo. The appellate court held that Ms. Peoples’s complaint sufficiently alleged facts to support claims for breach of the warranty of habitability, based on the mice infestation and her efforts to notify the landlord, and for sexual assault by a CIH employee under a respondeat superior theory. However, the appellate court agreed that the race discrimination claim was inadequately pled, as it lacked factual support showing discriminatory intent. Nevertheless, the appellate court determined that the claim should have been dismissed without prejudice, particularly because Ms. Peoples was pro se and had used a court-supplied form. The judgment was thus affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Peoples v. CIH Properties" on Justia Law

A commercial tenant in Minneapolis, Seven Acquisition LLC, operated its business in a building owned by 700 Hennepin Holdings LLC and subject to a mortgage held by a bank. After the landlord failed to repair a leaking roof, Seven withheld rent, leading to an eviction action. Seven prevailed in arbitration against the landlord and was awarded damages. The landlord then defaulted on the mortgage, prompting the bank to initiate foreclosure proceedings and request the appointment of Gregg Williams as receiver. Despite claims of independence, Seven alleged Williams had significant prior business with the bank’s agent. As receiver, Williams controlled the property, but Seven alleged he refused necessary repairs and acted to evict them for the bank’s benefit.In response, Seven sought to have Williams removed as receiver, arguing he was not independent and failed in his duties, but the Hennepin County District Court denied this motion as untimely and unsupported by good cause. Seven then filed a separate lawsuit against Williams, asserting negligence and breach of fiduciary duty. The district court dismissed the negligence claim based on quasi-judicial immunity, but allowed the fiduciary duty claim to proceed, finding factual questions regarding Williams’s independence and actions.Williams appealed, and the Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed, holding that quasi-judicial immunity protected Williams from suit for all actions taken within the scope of his receivership, regardless of motive or alleged conspiracy with the bank. The Supreme Court of Minnesota affirmed this decision. The court held that quasi-judicial immunity shields a court-appointed receiver from lawsuits for actions taken within the scope of the appointment, even if the receiver is alleged to have acted at the direction of a party or with improper motive. The complaint’s allegations were found insufficient to defeat this immunity. The decision of the court of appeals was affirmed. View "Seven Acquisition LLC vs. Williams" on Justia Law

A tenant entered into a verbal lease agreement to rent a room, later alleging that the property was unsafe. After reporting conditions to the city, she claimed she was attacked by one of the landlords, involuntarily committed following alleged false statements by the landlords, and subsequently found her possessions removed from the property, forcing her to relocate. The tenant filed pro se civil claims against the landlords in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, and the landlords counterclaimed. Pro bono counsel entered an appearance for her, but withdrew after an arbitration panel ruled for the landlords on her claims and for her on the landlords’ counterclaims. The tenant later challenged the withdrawal, arguing counsel had not obtained leave of court, and after a series of motions, the trial court ultimately granted counsel’s motion to withdraw.Following the withdrawal order, the tenant filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. She then filed a notice of appeal, more than thirty days after the withdrawal order. The Superior Court quashed the appeal as untimely, explaining that appeals from collateral orders must be filed within thirty days and that neither a motion for reconsideration nor an order denying reconsideration tolls or resets the appeal period. The court also noted that the order denying reconsideration was not appealable.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed whether the appeal from the collateral order was timely. The Court held that a party must file a notice of appeal within thirty days from the entry of a collateral order or await a final order to appeal if the issue survives. Filing a motion for reconsideration or an order denying reconsideration does not affect this thirty-day deadline. The Court affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment. View "Khalil v. Mary Jane Home Enrich Center" on Justia Law