Justia Landlord - Tenant Opinion Summaries

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A landlord, MIMG CLXXII Retreat on 6th, LLC, owns an apartment building in Cedar Rapids, Iowa. Mackenzie Miller, a tenant, entered a one-year lease in June 2022. The lease required rent to be paid by the first of each month, with a three-day notice period for nonpayment before the landlord could terminate the tenancy and pursue eviction. In December 2022, Miller failed to pay rent, and the landlord served a three-day notice. When the rent remained unpaid, the landlord filed a forcible entry and detainer (FED) action in the small claims division of the Linn County District Court.The small claims court dismissed the FED action, ruling that the Federal CARES Act required a thirty-day notice before eviction, which preempted Iowa's three-day notice law. The landlord appealed to the Iowa District Court for Linn County, arguing that the thirty-day notice requirement was time-limited to the 120-day moratorium period specified in the CARES Act. The district court upheld the small claims court's decision, stating that the plain language of the CARES Act did not include an expiration date for the thirty-day notice requirement.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the thirty-day notice requirement in the CARES Act applies only to rent defaults that occurred during the 120-day moratorium period. The court reasoned that the statute must be read in context with the surrounding provisions, which were temporary measures related to the COVID-19 pandemic. The court also noted the presumption against preemption of state law, particularly in areas traditionally governed by state law, such as landlord-tenant relationships. The Iowa Supreme Court reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "MIMG CLXXII Retreat on 6th, LLC v. Miller" on Justia Law

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Eric Woolard and Breonna Hall, residents of Greenhouse Condominiums, were involved in a physical altercation with their neighbors, Eric Smith and Stacy Thorne, in December 2019. Smith and Thorne sued Woolard, Hall, and Regent Real Estate Services, Inc. (Regent), the management company, for negligence and other claims. Woolard and Hall filed a cross-complaint against Regent and Greenhouse Community Association (Greenhouse), alleging negligence and other claims, asserting that Regent and Greenhouse failed to address ongoing harassment by neighbors, which led to the altercation.The Superior Court of Orange County granted summary judgment in favor of Regent and Greenhouse, finding no duty of care owed by them to intervene in the neighbor dispute or prevent the altercation. Woolard and Hall's motions to disqualify the trial judge were denied, and they did not seek writ review of these rulings.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the summary judgment, agreeing that Regent and Greenhouse had no duty to intervene in the neighbor dispute or prevent the altercation. The court found that Woolard and Hall failed to establish a legal duty of care breached by Regent and Greenhouse. Additionally, the court noted that claims of housing discrimination were not supported by evidence and were not properly raised as a separate cause of action. The court also held that the disqualification motions were not reviewable on appeal. The judgment in favor of Regent and Greenhouse was affirmed, and they were entitled to their costs on appeal. View "Woolard v. Regent Real Estate Services" on Justia Law

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A landlord, JJD-HOV Elk Grove, LLC (JJD), owns a shopping center in Elk Grove, California, and leased space to Jo-Ann Stores, LLC (Jo-Ann). The lease included a cotenancy provision allowing Jo-Ann to pay reduced rent if the number of anchor tenants or overall occupancy fell below a specified threshold. When two anchor tenants closed, Jo-Ann invoked this provision and paid reduced rent for about 20 months until the occupancy threshold was met again.The Sacramento County Superior Court ruled in favor of Jo-Ann, finding the cotenancy provision to be an alternative performance rather than a penalty. The Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District affirmed this decision, distinguishing the case from a previous ruling in Grand Prospect Partners, L.P. v. Ross Dress For Less, Inc., which found a similar provision to be an unenforceable penalty.The Supreme Court of California reviewed the case to determine the validity of the cotenancy provision. The court held that the provision was a valid form of alternative performance, allowing JJD a realistic choice between accepting lower rent or taking steps to increase occupancy. The court found that the provision did not constitute an unreasonable penalty under California Civil Code section 1671, nor did it result in a forfeiture under section 3275. The court emphasized that contracts should be enforced as written, especially when negotiated by sophisticated parties.The Supreme Court of California affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeal, upholding the cotenancy provision as a valid and enforceable part of the lease agreement. View "JJD-HOV Elk Grove, LLC v. Jo-Ann Stores, LLC" on Justia Law

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A property owner sought to deregulate certain Manhattan apartments under the luxury deregulation provisions of the Rent Stabilization Law (RSL). The Division of Housing and Community Renewal (DHCR) issued deregulation orders for these apartments, but the leases did not expire until after the Housing Stability and Tenant Protection Act of 2019 (HSTPA) repealed luxury deregulation. The property owner argued that the apartments should still be deregulated despite the repeal.The Supreme Court dismissed the property owner's proceeding, holding that DHCR's interpretation of the HSTPA was reasonable. The court found that the apartments did not become deregulated because their leases had not expired before the HSTPA took effect. The Appellate Division affirmed this decision, agreeing that DHCR's interpretation was correct and that there was no improper delay by DHCR in processing the deregulation applications.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that DHCR properly interpreted the HSTPA as eliminating luxury deregulation for apartments whose leases expired after the statute's effective date. The court found that the statutory language and legislative intent supported DHCR's interpretation. Additionally, the court rejected the property owner's argument that DHCR caused undue delay in processing the deregulation applications, finding no evidence of negligence or willfulness by DHCR. The court concluded that the apartments remained subject to rent stabilization under the HSTPA. View "Matter of 160 E. 84th St. Assoc. LLC v New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal" on Justia Law

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James Javonte Crite appealed the Daviess Circuit Court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a search of his apartment. Crite was convicted of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, resulting in a two-year sentence and shock probation. He argued that his landlord had no right to enter his apartment without an emergency and lacked authority to grant police entry, making the search and seizure of the firearm illegal.The Daviess Circuit Court denied Crite's motion to suppress, finding that the landlord had the right to enter the apartment under the "emergency entry" clause of the lease due to significant electrical damage that posed a danger to the tenants. The court also concluded that the police entry was reasonable to ensure the safety of the landlord and the electrician, given the information that Crite was a schizophrenic off his medication, had acted irrationally, and there was a firearm in the apartment.The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, agreeing that the landlord's entry was justified by the emergency and that the police entry did not violate the Fourth Amendment as they were facilitating the landlord's legitimate interest in addressing the emergency.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The Court held that the landlord's entry was justified under the lease's emergency entry clause due to the electrical damage posing a risk to the tenants. The police entry was deemed reasonable and necessary to ensure the safety of the landlord and the electrician. The Court also held that the seizure of the AR-15 rifle was lawful under the plain view doctrine, as the officers were lawfully present and the incriminating nature of the firearm was immediately apparent. View "CRITE V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY" on Justia Law

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Active Spine Physical Therapy, LLC (Active Spine) and its owners, Sara and Nicholas Muchowicz, were sued by 132 Ventures, LLC (Ventures) for breach of contract and personal guarantee after failing to pay rent and common area maintenance (CAM) charges under a lease agreement. Ventures had purchased the property in a foreclosure sale and sought damages for unpaid rent and CAM charges from June 2020 to February 2021. Active Spine argued that the lease was invalid due to fraudulent inducement and that they were under a COVID-19-related rent abatement.The district court initially ordered restitution of the premises to Ventures and denied Active Spine's request for a temporary injunction. A separate bench trial found Active Spine and the Muchowiczes liable for breach of contract. On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the restitution order but reversed the breach of contract judgment, remanding for a jury trial.At the jury trial, Ventures presented evidence of unpaid rent and CAM charges, while Active Spine argued that Ventures failed to provide notice of budgeted direct expenses, a condition precedent to their obligation to pay CAM charges. The jury found in favor of Ventures, awarding $593,723.82 in damages. Active Spine and the Muchowiczes moved for a new trial or judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), arguing errors in the jury's damage calculations and the lack of notice of budgeted direct expenses.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the exhibits as business records and not summaries under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-1006. The court also held that Active Spine and the Muchowiczes failed to preserve their arguments for appeal regarding the costs of new tenancy, COVID-19 abatement, and the amended lease. The court affirmed the district court's denial of the motion for new trial or JNOV, concluding that the jury's verdict was supported by sufficient evidence. View "132 Ventures v. Active Spine Physical Therapy" on Justia Law

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Naomi Bermudez, a tenant in a federally subsidized housing complex managed by Mercy Housing Management Group Inc., faced eviction after Mercy Housing alleged she violated her lease by having an unauthorized guest who stayed beyond the allowed period, repaired vehicles on the property, and harassed another resident. Bermudez denied these allegations and requested a jury trial to resolve the factual disputes.The Denver County Court denied Bermudez's request for a jury trial, stating that there is no constitutional right to a jury trial in civil matters in Colorado. Bermudez then filed a petition with the Supreme Court of Colorado, arguing that she was entitled to a jury trial under the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure and the statutory framework governing forcible entry and detainer (FED) actions.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and held that Bermudez is entitled to a jury trial on the factual disputes in the FED-possession action. The court found that the right to a jury trial in such cases is rooted in the statutory framework and the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure, specifically C.R.C.P. 338(a), which provides for a jury trial in actions for the recovery of specific real property. The court also determined that the FED statute and C.R.C.P. 338(a) are compatible and that the statutory right to a jury trial applies to factual disputes in FED-possession actions.The court acknowledged concerns about the potential burden on the county courts but concluded that the limited nature of the jury-trial right would not prove unworkable. The court reversed the county court's denial of Bermudez's jury demand, made absolute the order to show cause, and remanded the case with instructions for the county court to schedule a jury trial on the factual issues related to the possession dispute. View "Mercy Housing Management Group Inc. v. Bermudez" on Justia Law

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David Polkow rented a residential home from Frank Kahl under a written lease agreement that transitioned to a month-to-month basis after its initial term. In 2022, they signed a new three-year lease. Frank later transferred his interest in the property to the Frank J. Kahl Revocable Trust, with his son David Kahl managing the property as trustee after Frank's death. In January 2023, David Kahl filed an eviction action against Polkow, seeking possession of the property, damages for delinquent rent, and attorney fees.The Yellowstone County Justice Court awarded Kahl possession of the property and attorney fees but denied the request for delinquent rent. Kahl then sought additional damages for property damage, which led to a hearing where he claimed $128,644.07 in damages. The Justice Court awarded Kahl $58,753.73 in damages, plus interest and attorney fees, despite Polkow's objection that the amount exceeded the court's $15,000 jurisdictional limit. Polkow appealed to the Thirteenth Judicial District Court, which affirmed the Justice Court's decision, interpreting that the court had concurrent jurisdiction with the district court for landlord-tenant disputes.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and reversed the lower courts' decisions. The Supreme Court held that the Justice Court lacked jurisdiction to award damages exceeding the $15,000 limit imposed by § 3-10-301, MCA. The court clarified that the concurrent jurisdiction statutes did not override this limit. The case was remanded for the Justice Court to vacate the damages award and dismiss the claim for compensatory damages without prejudice, allowing Kahl to refile in District Court. The award of attorney fees and costs was affirmed. View "Kahl v. Polkow" on Justia Law

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The plaintiffs, former residents of a federally subsidized housing complex, alleged that the defendants, the complex's owner and management company, failed to maintain the property in a safe and habitable condition. They claimed the defendants delayed inspections, concealed hazards, and violated housing laws. The plaintiffs sought class certification for all residents from 2004 to 2019, citing issues like a 2019 sewage backup and systemic neglect.The Superior Court in Hartford, transferred to the Complex Litigation Docket, denied the motion for class certification. The court found that the proposed class did not meet the predominance and superiority requirements under Practice Book § 9-8 (3). It reasoned that determining whether each unit was uninhabitable required individualized proof, making a class action unsuitable. The court noted that while some claims might support class certification for specific events, the broad class definition over many years was too extensive.The Connecticut Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the proposed class was too broad and lacked generalized evidence for the entire period. It emphasized that the trial court had no obligation to redefine the class sua sponte. The plaintiffs did not request a narrower class definition, and the trial court was not required to do so on its own. The court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying class certification. View "Collier v. Adar Hartford Realty, LLC" on Justia Law

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The plaintiff landlord initiated a summary process action to evict the defendant tenant from an apartment. The trial court ruled in favor of the defendant, who then sought attorney’s fees under a statute that allows consumers to recover such fees when a contract includes a unilateral attorney’s fees provision favoring the commercial party. The lease agreement in question capped the plaintiff’s recoverable attorney’s fees at $750. The trial court awarded the defendant $3500 in attorney’s fees, reasoning that limiting the defendant’s recovery to $750 would not achieve true parity between the parties, as intended by the statute.The plaintiff appealed, arguing that the trial court could only award the defendant up to $750 in attorney’s fees, as specified in the lease agreement. The plaintiff contended that the statute required the court to base the defendant’s award on the same terms governing the plaintiff’s fees, as long as it was practicable to do so.The Connecticut Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that trial courts have discretion to award a prevailing consumer reasonable attorney’s fees in excess of the contractual cap when it is not practicable to base the award on the contractual terms. The court determined that the term "practicable" means feasible under the circumstances, which are circumstances that achieve equity or fairness. The court emphasized that the equitable purpose of the statute is to rectify the imbalance of power between consumers and commercial parties in contract disputes.The court vacated the trial court’s award of $3500 in attorney’s fees and remanded the case for a new hearing. The trial court was directed to determine whether it was practicable to base the defendant’s award on the lease agreement’s terms and, if not, to award reasonable attorney’s fees consistent with the statute’s equitable purpose. View "Centrix Management Co., LLC v. Fosberg" on Justia Law