Justia Landlord - Tenant Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellants' action for a writ of prohibition against Appellees - Ashtabula County Court of Common Pleas Judge Marianne Sezon and Clerk of Court April Daniels - and denied Appellants' motion for oral argument, holding that Appellants failed to state a claim upon which a writ of prohibition could be granted.In a forcible entry and detainer action Judge Sezon ordered Appellants to vacate the premises at issue. The parties subsequently reached a settlement agreement, but Appellants did not vacate the premises by the agreed-upon date. The underlying plaintiff subsequently moved for a writ of restitution. Appellants filed a complaint for a writ of prohibition, arguing that the trial court lacked jurisdiction. The court of appeals denied and dismissed the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Judge Sezon did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction over the postjudgment proceedings before her. View "State ex rel. Allenbaugh v. Sezon" on Justia Law

Defendant is a landlord, who allegedly terminated a lease based on Tenants' family status. The United States brought a claim against Defendant under the Fair Housing Act (FHA). A jury awarded Tenants $14,400 in compensatory damages and $60,000 in punitive damages. Defendant landlord filed post-trial motions, which were denied.Defendant appealed, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding that there was sufficient evidence that Defendant landlord acted with at least reckless indifference and the district court did not err in submitting the punitive damages issue to the jury. The Eighth Circuit also held that the award was not unconstitutionally excessive View "United States v. Louis Rupp, II" on Justia Law

Samsara rented San Francisco office space from Rreef for a ten-year term, to be in “delivery condition” by November 1, 2019. Samsara provided an $11,384,368.00 letter of credit as “collateral for the full performance.” In 2021, Samsara sued, asserting that in July 2019, after Rreef had certified “delivery condition,” Samsara discovered that the premises were contaminated with lead and asbestos and that after Samsara conducted testing, Rreef cut off its access to the premises. The next day, Rreef served Samsara a 5-day notice to pay rent or quit based on Samsara’s alleged failure to pay rent for August-September 2021 ($1,826,697.95). Rreef subsequently filed an unlawful detainer complaint, alleging that Samsara stopped paying rent and had created a pretext to avoid its lease obligations. In October 2021, Rreef sought a writ of attachment in the unlawful detainer action, seeking $3,796,175.51: the amount demanded in the 5-day notice and $1,784,477.53 for October-November.The court granted Rreef’s application. The court of appeal reversed and remanded. The court rejected Samsara’s arguments that the amount that Rreef sought to attach must be reduced under Code of Civil Procedure 483.015(b)(4) by the amount remaining on the letter of credit and that the trial court erroneously refused to consider Samsara’s affirmative defenses of waiver and estoppel. However, the trial court declined to consider Samsara’s retaliatory eviction defense and whether Rreef sought attachment for an improper purpose. View "Rreef America Reit II Corp, YYYY v. Samsara, Inc." on Justia Law

Under Colorado law, the required notice period for a landlord to give to a tenant before evicting the tenant was ten days. During the COVID-19 pandemic, however, Congress passed a law requiring a thirty-day-notice period for eviction from certain rental properties. The question this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court was whether that thirty-day-notice requirement was still in effect or whether it expired along with other aspects of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (“CARES Act”). Looking at the plain language of the CARES Act, the Supreme Court concluded the federal thirty-day-notice provision is still in effect for covered properties. View "Arvada Village Gardens v. Garate" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the summary judgment of the district court concluding that a condominium owner-landlord owed no duty of care with respect to a downspout that discharged water directly onto a shared driveway, holding that the owner-landlord had no common law, contractual, or statutory duty to keep the driveway clear.The condominiums at issue in this case were subject to a horizontal property regime pursuant to Iowa Code ch. 449B, which, in turn, was governed by a document referred to as the declaration. Shelly and Cameron Barnes leased a condominium unit from CDM Rentals, LLC. After Shelly fell on ice on the shared driveway the Barneses brought this negligence lawsuit. The district court granted summary judgment for CDM on the ground that CDM lacked control over the common areas. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) regarding premises liability, CDM lacked control of the driveway and downspout under the declaration; and (2) the district court correctly concluded that the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, Iowa Code ch. 562A, requires landlords to maintain common areas but only to the extent the landlord has control over those areas. View "Barnes v. CDM Rentals, LLC" on Justia Law

Elia Companies, LLC, filed suit against the University of Michigan Regents, alleging breach of contract; violations of Michigan’s anti-lockout statute; breach of covenant for quiet possession; constructive eviction; conversion; and unjust enrichment. In 2013, plaintiff entered into a 10-year lease with defendant to obtain space at the Michigan Union for establishing a coffee shop. In March 2017, defendant disclosed its plans to renovate the Union. Plaintiff’s complaint alleged that the parties’ lease required that they negotiate a relocation of the leased premises. However, defendant terminated the lease on April 20, 2018, based on plaintiff’s alleged default and ordered plaintiff to vacate the premises. Plaintiff filed this action in August 2018, and defendant, over plaintiff’s objection, filed a notice of transfer removing the case to the Court of Claims pursuant to MCL 600.6404(3) and MCL 600.6419(1) of the Court of Claims Act (the COCA). Defendant moved for summary disposition, arguing that plaintiff’s action had to be dismissed because plaintiff failed to comply with the notice and verification requirements of MCL 600.6431 of the COCA. The Court of Claims agreed and dismissed plaintiff’s case. Plaintiff appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part. The panel affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff’s ancillary claims on governmental-tort-immunity grounds but reversed the dismissal of plaintiff’s contract claim. The Michigan Supreme Court determined the Court of Appeals erred when it excused plaintiff’s failure to timely comply with MCL 600.6431. “All parties with claims against the state, except those exempted in MCL 600.6431 itself, must comply with the requirements of MCL 600.6431.” Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded to the Court of Claims for reinstatement of summary judgment granted in defendant’s favor. View "Elia Companies, LLC v. University Of Michigan Regents" on Justia Law

Plaintiff 65282 Two Bunch Palms Building LLC, (Two Bunch) orally leased an industrial building in Desert Hot Springs to Coastal Harvest II, LLC, (Coastal Harvest) for the indoor cultivation of cannabis. When, after two years of negotiations, the parties were unable to agree to a written lease and a master service agreement, Two Bunch served Coastal Harvest with a 30-day notice to quit. Coastal Harvest refused to vacate the property, so Two Bunch instituted this unlawful detainer action. After a one-day trial, the trial court entered a judgment of possession for Two Bunch and awarded it $180,000.13 in holdover damages. At trial court, Coastal Harvest unsuccessfully argued it operated a licensed cannabis operation on the property and, therefore, it could not be evicted because it was entitled to the presumption under California Civil Code section 1943 of a one-year tenancy for “agricultural . . . purposes” and the presumption of a one-year holdover tenancy for use of “agricultural lands” under Code of Civil Procedure section 1161(2). Assuming without deciding that Coastal Harvest’s cannabis operation constituted agriculture, Two Bunch rebutted the presumption under Civil Code section 1943 with evidence that the parties agreed that, unless they signed a written lease, the term of the oral lease was month-to-month. And, because this unlawful detainer action was not filed for failure to pay rent, Code of Civil Procedure section 1161(2) and its holdover presumption for “agricultural” tenants did not apply. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's judgment, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "65282 Two Bunch Palms Building LLC v. Coastal Harvest II, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2014 the Los Angeles City Council passed a resolution directing various City departments and officials to prepare and execute the necessary approvals and agreements to convey the property to Childhelp in exchange for Childhelp’s agreement to continue using the property to provide services for victims of child abuse. Ultimately, however, the City decided not to transfer the property to Childhelp. Childhelp filed this action against the City for, among other things, declaratory relief, writ of mandate, and promissory estoppel, and the City filed an unlawful detainer action against Childhelp. After the trial court consolidated the two actions, the court granted the City’s motion for summary adjudication on Childhelp’s cause of action for promissory estoppel, sustained without leave to amend the City’s demurrer to Childhelp’s causes of action for declaratory relief and writ of mandate, and granted the City’s motion for summary judgment on its unlawful detainer complaint. Childhelp appealed the ensuing judgment.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that Childhelp had occupied the property for almost 30 years and had an expectation it would eventually own the property. The 2014 resolution certainly suggested the City was seriously considering selling the property to Childhelp. But it was undisputed the parties never completed the transaction in accordance with the City Charter. While Childhelp cites cases reciting general principles of promissory estoppel, it does not cite any cases where the plaintiff successfully invoked promissory estoppel against a municipality in these circumstances. The trial court did not err in granting the City’s motion for summary adjudication on Childhelp’s promissory estoppel cause of action. View "Childhelp, Inc. v. City of L.A." on Justia Law

Moses attended a gathering at a condominium Roger-McKeever rented. Two years later, Moses filed suit for injuries. Moses alleged that, upon her arrival, she mentioned to Roger-McKeever that the entryway was dark. Roger-McKeever “was apologetic indicating that there was an electrical problem” and explained that her landlord had not been responsive in repairing the light. A photograph depicted three steps leading up from a street sidewalk, to a short walkway that ended at a door to Roger-McKeever’s condominium. Moses stated that when she was leaving, she could not see the second step and fell. She provided a declaration from a mechanical engineer that the steps were non-compliant with the building code and that the absence of a handrail and the riser heights were probable causes of the accident. Roger-McKeever submitted a declaration and the depositions of two individuals who attended the meeting, indicating that the walkway was not noticeably dark that night.The court granted Roger-McKeever summary judgment, finding that Roger-McKeever was a tenant who did not have control over the steps or the outside lighting and had no duty to maintain or repair that area. Roger-McKeever did not have a duty to warn Moses because she did not have prior notice that the steps were a “non-obvious” dangerous condition. The court of appeal affirmed. Moses did not raise a triable issue of material fact as to whether Roger-McKeever owed her a duty of care to protect her against the allegedly dangerous condition of the walkway. View "Moses v. Roger-McKeever" on Justia Law

The landlord is a four-member LLC with a single asset--a building in downtown Napa. The tenant, Stone Brewing, a large beer brewing and retail corporation, operates a brewpub in the building. Stone Brewing did not pay rent for several months during the pandemic. The landlord sued for unlawful detainer. Stone argued it was excused from paying rent because COVID-19 regulations and business interruptions triggered a force majeure provision in its lease.The trial court granted the landlord summary judgment, finding that the force majeure provision only excused performance if the claiming party was unable to meet its obligations due to factors outside its control; the tenant admitted during discovery it had the financial resources to pay rent during the period of the COVID-19 regulations but simply refused to do so. The court of appeal affirmed. The force majeure provision does not apply where the tenant had the ability to meet its contractual obligations but chooses not to perform due to financial constraints. The plain meaning of the force majeure provision does not support an interpretation that ties a party’s obligation to pay rent to its profitability or revenue stream instead of a delay or interruption caused by the force majeure event itself. View "West Pueblo Partners, LLC v. Stone Brewing Co., LLC" on Justia Law