Justia Landlord - Tenant Opinion Summaries

A commercial tenant in Minneapolis, Seven Acquisition LLC, operated its business in a building owned by 700 Hennepin Holdings LLC and subject to a mortgage held by a bank. After the landlord failed to repair a leaking roof, Seven withheld rent, leading to an eviction action. Seven prevailed in arbitration against the landlord and was awarded damages. The landlord then defaulted on the mortgage, prompting the bank to initiate foreclosure proceedings and request the appointment of Gregg Williams as receiver. Despite claims of independence, Seven alleged Williams had significant prior business with the bank’s agent. As receiver, Williams controlled the property, but Seven alleged he refused necessary repairs and acted to evict them for the bank’s benefit.In response, Seven sought to have Williams removed as receiver, arguing he was not independent and failed in his duties, but the Hennepin County District Court denied this motion as untimely and unsupported by good cause. Seven then filed a separate lawsuit against Williams, asserting negligence and breach of fiduciary duty. The district court dismissed the negligence claim based on quasi-judicial immunity, but allowed the fiduciary duty claim to proceed, finding factual questions regarding Williams’s independence and actions.Williams appealed, and the Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed, holding that quasi-judicial immunity protected Williams from suit for all actions taken within the scope of his receivership, regardless of motive or alleged conspiracy with the bank. The Supreme Court of Minnesota affirmed this decision. The court held that quasi-judicial immunity shields a court-appointed receiver from lawsuits for actions taken within the scope of the appointment, even if the receiver is alleged to have acted at the direction of a party or with improper motive. The complaint’s allegations were found insufficient to defeat this immunity. The decision of the court of appeals was affirmed. View "Seven Acquisition LLC vs. Williams" on Justia Law

A tenant entered into a verbal lease agreement to rent a room, later alleging that the property was unsafe. After reporting conditions to the city, she claimed she was attacked by one of the landlords, involuntarily committed following alleged false statements by the landlords, and subsequently found her possessions removed from the property, forcing her to relocate. The tenant filed pro se civil claims against the landlords in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, and the landlords counterclaimed. Pro bono counsel entered an appearance for her, but withdrew after an arbitration panel ruled for the landlords on her claims and for her on the landlords’ counterclaims. The tenant later challenged the withdrawal, arguing counsel had not obtained leave of court, and after a series of motions, the trial court ultimately granted counsel’s motion to withdraw.Following the withdrawal order, the tenant filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. She then filed a notice of appeal, more than thirty days after the withdrawal order. The Superior Court quashed the appeal as untimely, explaining that appeals from collateral orders must be filed within thirty days and that neither a motion for reconsideration nor an order denying reconsideration tolls or resets the appeal period. The court also noted that the order denying reconsideration was not appealable.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed whether the appeal from the collateral order was timely. The Court held that a party must file a notice of appeal within thirty days from the entry of a collateral order or await a final order to appeal if the issue survives. Filing a motion for reconsideration or an order denying reconsideration does not affect this thirty-day deadline. The Court affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment. View "Khalil v. Mary Jane Home Enrich Center" on Justia Law

A veteran with post-traumatic stress disorder sought housing in Maine and contacted D&L Apartments about an available unit. During a phone conversation, the landlord, Darrell Sproul, stated that no dogs were allowed. When the prospective tenant specifically asked if the policy included service or “federally protected” dogs, Sproul again said no dogs and advised not to apply. The prospective tenant, who anticipated soon receiving a service dog, did not pursue the rental further. The Maine Human Rights Commission filed a complaint against D&L Apartments and Sproul, alleging unlawful disability discrimination under the Maine Human Rights Act (MHRA), based on three theories: refusal to permit a service animal, making a discriminatory statement, and refusing to rent because of disability.The Kennebec County Superior Court denied D&L’s motion for summary judgment and held a bench trial. The court found in favor of the Commission, concluding that D&L violated two provisions of the MHRA: (1) by refusing to permit the use of a service animal, in violation of 5 M.R.S. § 4582-A(3), and (2) by making a statement indicating a discriminatory limitation based on disability, in violation of 5 M.R.S. § 4581-A(1)(C). The court found it unnecessary to address the third theory. As remedies, the court ordered fair-housing training, the creation of a policy on assistance animals, and imposed a $10,000 civil penalty.On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment. It held that Sproul’s statements constituted an unlawful indication of a limitation or discrimination based on disability, and that the statutory protection against refusing the use of a service animal extends to prospective tenants, even if they do not yet possess the animal. The court found no error in the trial court’s interpretation or application of the MHRA and upheld the finding of liability and the remedies imposed. View "Maine Human Rights Commission v. D&L Apartments" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, a tenant at an apartment complex operated by a public housing authority, alleged that she was raped by a maintenance worker employed by the complex. According to her account, the worker initially contacted her in the course of his employment to respond to a maintenance request but subsequently began to harass her through calls, texts, and inappropriate conduct. The alleged sexual assault occurred when the worker entered her unlocked apartment without using his employer-issued master key, at a time when he was not scheduled to perform work in her unit.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado granted summary judgment in favor of the landlord and the maintenance worker on the plaintiff’s federal Fair Housing Act (FHA) claims. The district court found that the landlord was not directly liable because it had no notice of the employee’s conduct prior to the alleged assault and could not have taken action before the worker had already quit. The court also concluded that there was no vicarious liability because the worker was not acting within the scope of his employment and the plaintiff failed to establish a sufficient nexus between the worker’s employment and the assault under the aided-by-agency exception. The court sua sponte granted summary judgment in favor of the worker on the FHA claims and declined supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. It held that while the FHA incorporates common law agency principles, the aided-by-agency exception is narrowly construed and applies only when an employee exercises significant authority over the victim or uses a special privilege of employment to commit the tort. Here, there was no evidence the worker used such authority or privilege—he did not use his master key or any special access. The court further affirmed the grant of summary judgment to the worker and the district court’s refusal to retain supplemental jurisdiction. View "Trujillo v. Amity Plaza" on Justia Law

A commercial landlord leased a property to an individual, Sina, who stopped paying rent soon after the lease began, causing significant unpaid rent and property damage. The landlord regained possession of the property and found it had been gutted. The landlord sued Sina for breach of contract and prevailed at trial, but the initial judgment was reversed on appeal due to a change in parol evidence law. On retrial before a referee, the landlord again prevailed, with the referee finding substantial damages and the trial court adopting the referee’s decision, entering judgment for the landlord. This judgment was affirmed on appeal.After the second judgment, Sina and his wife filed for bankruptcy. During related bankruptcy proceedings, the landlord discovered new evidence revealing that Sina, his brothers, their wives, and a family-owned corporation, Amey, were all part of a longstanding “one-for-all” family partnership. The landlord moved in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County to amend the judgment to add these family members and Amey as judgment debtors, arguing that they were the true parties in interest and had been virtually represented in the litigation by Sina.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the trial court's decision to amend the judgment. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s order, holding that substantial evidence supported the findings that the family members and Amey were part of a partnership that controlled the litigation and benefited from it. The court held that under Code of Civil Procedure section 187, a court may amend a judgment to add parties who had sufficient control of the litigation and unity of interest with the original judgment debtor, even if traditional alter ego requirements are not strictly met. The court found no abuse of discretion and affirmed the addition of the individual partners and Amey as judgment debtors. View "8451 Melrose Property, LLC v. Akhtarzad" on Justia Law

The Maine Human Rights Commission filed a lawsuit in the Superior Court alleging that a landlord discriminated against his tenant based on sex, asserting claims under both the Maine Human Rights Act and the Fair Housing Act. After litigation began, the tenant requested a judicial settlement conference. The landlord did not attend the conference, but his attorney and daughter attended, allegedly with his authority to settle. After the conference, a record form stated that the parties had agreed to a full and final settlement, but disagreements arose during subsequent exchanges of draft settlement agreements, particularly over provisions related to an acknowledgment of antidiscrimination laws and certain “public-relief terms” such as fair-housing training and property management oversight.The Kennebec County Superior Court reviewed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement. Without holding an evidentiary hearing, the court found that the parties intended to be bound by an agreement reached at the settlement conference, as reflected in the settlement conference record form. The court identified five basic terms as the substance of the agreement, including a payment to the tenant and specific non-monetary provisions. The court ordered the parties to execute an agreement consistent with these terms, except for the acknowledgment provision, which it found was not part of the agreement.On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court found that the record was insufficient to support the Superior Court’s finding that the parties mutually assented to all material terms of a binding settlement agreement. The Supreme Judicial Court held that, in the absence of an evidentiary hearing or a sufficiently detailed record, the lower court erred in enforcing the settlement. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the Superior Court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the parties actually reached a binding agreement and, if so, its precise terms. View "Maine Human Rights Commission v. Larkin" on Justia Law

A property owner acquired a Chicago apartment building through foreclosure in February 2024, after the city’s ordinance requiring new owners of foreclosed rental properties to negotiate new 12-month leases with existing tenants and provide a $10,600 relocation fee to those who decline new leases went into effect. Upon acquisition, the owner notified more than 220 tenants of their rights, and at least five tenants declined to sign new leases, requesting the relocation assistance. The property owner filed suit against the City of Chicago, claiming that the ordinance’s relocation fee requirement constituted an unconstitutional taking under the Fifth Amendment.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois reviewed the owner’s complaint, which sought to enjoin enforcement of the ordinance. The court dismissed the complaint, concluding that the ordinance did not violate the Constitution, and the owner declined to amend its pleading before appealing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit considered whether the ordinance’s relocation assistance requirement amounted to a physical or regulatory taking, or imposed an unconstitutional condition. The court held that the ordinance, which regulates the landlord-tenant relationship and imposes financial obligations similar to permissible rent control schemes, is not a per se physical taking. Applying the Penn Central factors, the court found no regulatory taking, noting the property owner’s lack of allegations regarding economic infeasibility and that the acquisition occurred after the ordinance’s enactment. The court also determined that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine did not apply, as the ordinance directly mandates a fee rather than leveraging a permitting process. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal, holding that the ordinance does not violate the Takings Clause. View "BBLI Edison, LLC v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

A resident of an apartment complex for elderly and disabled individuals was injured when she stepped into an uncovered and unmarked trench near the trash-disposal area in the parking lot before sunrise. The apartment complex was managed by a company that had contracted with one entity to replace concrete (which created the trench) and another company to fill the trench, which was not completed until after the resident’s injury. The resident alleged that the management company breached its statutory duty under Michigan law to keep common areas fit for their intended use, and that the contractor who created the trench was negligent for failing to correct or adequately warn of the hazard. The contractor responsible for filling the trench was dismissed from the case and not part of the appeal.The Montcalm Circuit Court granted summary disposition to both the property management company and the concrete contractor. The court found that the trash-disposal area remained reasonably accessible and thus fit for its intended use, so the statutory covenant was not breached. The court further ruled that the resident’s claim against the contractor sounded in premises liability, and the contractor owed no duty because the hazard was open and obvious. On appeal, the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that neither defendant was liable: the trench posed only a “mere inconvenience,” and the contractor had not breached any duty under ordinary negligence principles.The Supreme Court of Michigan, reviewing the case, held that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the contractor breached its common-law duty to refrain from unreasonably endangering others, and whether the management company violated its statutory duty under MCL 554.139(1)(a) to keep common areas fit for their intended use. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision and remanded for further proceedings. The holding clarified that summary disposition was not appropriate because reasonable persons could differ on whether the uncovered, unmarked trench rendered the area unfit for elderly and disabled tenants and created an unreasonable risk of harm. View "Bowerman v. Red Oak Management Co. Inc." on Justia Law

A landlord leased a rental property unit to a tenant, who later filed a complaint with the Vermont Human Rights Commission (HRC), alleging discrimination in violation of the Vermont Fair Housing and Public Accommodations Act (VFHPAA). The HRC, acting on behalf of the tenant, filed suit against the landlord, seeking legal and equitable relief for these alleged violations. After the suit was filed, the landlord died. His wife, who jointly owned the property, then also passed away. Ownership of the rental property shifted by operation of law and through an enhanced life-estate deed to their four adult children. No estate was opened in the landlord’s name.After being notified of the landlord’s death, the HRC moved in the Vermont Superior Court, Washington Unit, Civil Division, to substitute the landlord’s four children and his wife’s estate as parties, intending to amend the complaint to impose liability on the new parties due to their receipt of the property. The trial court denied this motion, concluding the proper party for substitution under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 25 would be the decedent’s estate or those standing in its place, not unrelated individuals against whom new claims were sought. The court gave HRC an opportunity to file further pleadings to name a proper party but, when HRC declined, dismissed the case without prejudice.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court reviewed whether the trial court correctly interpreted Rule 25 in denying substitution. The Supreme Court held that, although the underlying remedial claim survived the landlord’s death, the HRC failed to demonstrate that the proposed substitute parties—the children and wife’s estate—were proper parties for substitution under Vermont law, as there was no evidence they were executors, heirs, devisees, or legatees of an estate. The Supreme Court therefore affirmed the trial court’s denial of the motion to substitute and upheld the dismissal. View "Human Rights Commission v. Durkee" on Justia Law

A coalition of trade associations, real estate brokerage firms, landlords, and related entities challenged New York City’s Fairness in Apartment Rental Expenses Act (FARE Act), passed in November 2024. The Act prohibits brokers from charging tenants fees for apartments where they have published listings with a landlord’s permission or agreed to work for the landlord, and prevents landlords from making rental conditional on prospective tenants hiring agents. The plaintiffs argued that the Act infringed their federal and state free speech rights, particularly by burdening their ability to publish listings and receive compensation, and violated the Contracts Clause of the U.S. Constitution by rendering certain existing agreements unenforceable.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York heard the case, with the City opposing injunctive relief and moving to dismiss the claims. The district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ First Amendment claims, finding the FARE Act to be content-neutral regulation of commercial speech that survived intermediate scrutiny under the Central Hudson test. The court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction on those claims. As for the Contracts Clause argument, the district court denied the City’s motion to dismiss, reasoning that factual issues remained, but denied a preliminary injunction after finding plaintiffs unlikely to succeed on the merits. The district court also rejected a state preemption claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the appeal, affirming the district court’s judgment. The Second Circuit held that the FARE Act regulates commercial speech in a content-neutral manner and is valid under the Central Hudson test. It also concluded that the Act does not violate the Contracts Clause, as plaintiffs failed to establish a substantial likelihood of success on that claim. The court thus affirmed denial of injunctive relief and dismissal of the constitutional claims. View "Real Estate Board of New York, Inc. v. The City of New York" on Justia Law