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Lloyd Copenbarger, as Trustee of the Hazel I. Maag Trust (the Maag Trust), sued Morris Cerullo World Evangelism, Inc. (MCWE) for declaratory relief and breach of a settlement agreement made to resolve various disputes, including an unlawful detainer action. MCWE was the lessee of a 50-year ground lease (the Ground Lease) of real property (the Property) in Newport Beach. The Property was improved with an office building and marina (the Improvements). The Ground Lease was set to terminate on December 1, 2018. In 2004, MCWE subleased the Property and sold all of the Improvements to NHOM (the Sublease). Starting in 2009, NHOM experienced cash flow problems due to “a shortage of rents.” In June 2011, MCWE commenced an unlawful detainer action against NHOM based on allegations NHOM failed to maintain and undertake required repairs to the Improvements. Six months later, the Maag Trust intervened in the UD Action as a party defendant under the theory that if NHOM were evicted and the Sublease terminated, then the Maag Trust’s security interest created by the Maag Deed of Trust would be destroyed. In August 2012, MCWE, Plaza del Sol, and the Maag Trust entered into a settlement agreement (the Settlement Agreement). The Maag Trust alleged MCWE breached the settlement agreement by failing to dismiss with prejudice the unlawful detainer action and sought, as damages, attorney fees incurred in that action from the date of the settlement agreement to the date on which MCWE did dismiss the action. Following a bench trial, the trial court found MCWE had breached the settlement agreement by not timely dismissing with prejudice the unlawful detainer action. As damages, the court awarded the Maag Trust attorney fees it claimed to have incurred during the relevant time period. On appeal, MCWE did not challenge the finding that its failure to dismiss the unlawful detainer action constituted a breach of the settlement agreement. Instead, MCWE made a number of arguments challenging the damages awarded. After review, the Court of Appeal reversed the judgment against MCWE because there was a wholesale failure of proof of the amount of damages on the part of the Maag Trust. Therefore, the Court reversed with directions to enter judgment in favor of MCWE on the Maag Trust’s complaint. View "Copenbarger v. Morris Cerullo World Evangelism, Inc." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed an order of a single justice of this Court dismissing without prejudice Petitioner’s petition pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 for failure to pay the filing fee or to file a proper affidavit of indigency, holding that the petition was now moot and that the single justice did not err in dismissing the petition. Petitioner filed her petition seeking review of an interlocutory ruling of the trial court denying her late request for a jury trial on a summary process action brought against her. The single justice denied the petition. Thereafter, Petitioner petitioned for review pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3. The single justice dismissed the petition. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the petition has become moot because the underlying case proceeded to a final judgment, and the eviction has occurred; (2) the single justice did not err in dismissing the petition for failure to execute a proper affidavit of indigency or infringe on Petitioner’s right of access to the courts in doing so; and (3) Petitioner was unable to demonstrate the unavailability of adequate alternative means of obtaining appellate review. View "Anderson v. Panagiotopoulos" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court ruling that IOC Realty Specialist Inc. and its sole shareholder, Bernard Tompkins, violated the Disposition of Personal Property Landlord and Tenant Act by knowingly retaining personal property belonging to Samuel Pan, a former tenant, and awarding Pan damages and attorney fees. In his complaint, Pan alleged that IOC, his former landlord, refused to return his personal property that remained on the leased premises after Pan had ended his tenancy. The trial court entered judgment against IOC and Tompkins for the wrongful retention of property pursuant to the Act. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Act applies in commercial lease cases; (2) the district court did not clearly err when it held that IOC violated the Act by refusing to return Pan’s property upon his request; and (3) there was sufficient evidence to support the court’s award of damages and attorney fees under the Act. View "Pan v. IOC Realty Specialist Inc." on Justia Law

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In 2010, the Utah Department of Transportation (UDOT) condemned an access point from Bangerter Highway to the West Point Shopping Center. At the time of the condemnation, the shopping center was owned by FPA West Point, LLC. FPA leased buildings in the shopping center to a number of businesses, including K MART Corporation (Kmart). Both FPA and Kmart entered the condemnation proceedings, asserting rights to just compensation. The first appeal (Utah Department of Transportation v. FPA West Point, LLC) addressed valuation methods in the context of a condemnation award determination. In that case, the Utah Supreme Court held that courts must use the aggregate-of-interests approach (which determines the value of properties with divided ownership interests by assessing the value of each property interest separately) in deciding the amount of a condemnation award. In this appeal the issue presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether the district court erred by granting a condemnation award to Kmart, a lessee, even though Kmart’s lease contained a clause terminating its leasehold interest in the event of a condemnation. The Court held that it did: because the termination clause extinguished all of Kmart’s compensable property interests, Kmart was not entitled to compensation. Accordingly, the district court’s grant of a condemnation award to Kmart was reversed. View "UDOT v. Kmart Corp." on Justia Law

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William Nelson appealed a judgment ordering the sale of real property, removing him from the property, ordering him to pay past rent, and awarding Steven Nelson and Gail Nelson-Hom attorney fees for defending against his frivolous pleadings. The North Dakota Supreme Court found the district court erred in granting partial summary judgment on William Nelson's claims of undue influence and lack of mental capacity involving the execution of the quitclaim deed to the property and reversed and remanded for trial on those issues. The Supreme Court reversed the award of costs and attorney fees and remanded for reconsideration. View "Nelson v. Nelson" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs filed suit challenging a mobile home park's policy requiring all occupants to provide documentation evidencing legal status in the United States to renew their leases as violating the Fair Housing Act (FHA). The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment for the mobile home park, holding that plaintiffs have made a prima facie case that the policy disparately impacted Latinos in violation of the FHA, satisfying step one of the disparate impact analysis, and that the district court therefore erred in concluding otherwise. The court also held that the district court seriously misconstrued the robust causality requirement described in Tex. Dep't of Housing & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2513 (2015), and erroneously rejected plaintiffs' prima facie claim that the policy disparately impacted Latinos. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Giron de Reyes v. Waples Mobile Home Park LP" on Justia Law

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Vorchheimer suffers from pulmonary hypertension and other disabilities and must use a rolling walker to get around. She owned a condominium in The Philadelphian and had a reserved parking space in front of the building. Vorchheimer used her walker to get from her condo to the lobby and then used her cane from the lobby to her car. She could neither lift her walker, nor fold it, nor put it into her car, so she began leaving her walker in the lobby. The building managers refused to allow her to continue to do so, but offered her alternatives that involved having staff members take and store the walker or storing the walker in the building’s indoor garage. She sued under the Fair Housing Amendments Act, 42 U.S.C. 3604(f), claiming that her preferred accommodation was necessary to equally enjoy her home. The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of her complaint, holding that she had not plausibly pleaded necessity. For a housing accommodation to be “necessary” under the Act, it must be required for that person to achieve equal housing opportunity, taking into account available alternatives. Leaving the walker in the lobby was her preference but given the four alternatives offered she did not plausibly plead that it was necessary. View "Vorchheimer v. Philadelphian Owners Association" on Justia Law

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The Hayes family is a low-income family whose rent is subsidized by enhanced voucher assistance under the Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. 1437f(t) (Section 8). Enhanced vouchers exist to enable residents to “choose” to continue renting the “dwelling unit in which they currently reside.”because an ordinary voucher does not cover a tenant’s rent to the extent that it exceeds the applicable payment standard, and, following a valid opt-out, property owners are no longer subject to limitations on what they may charge for rent. The Hayes family's eligibility to receive enhanced vouchers is contingent upon their continued tenancy in a unit currently owned by Harvey. Harvey notified the Hayes family that he would not renew their lease. The Hayes family refused to vacate, arguing that as enhanced-voucher tenants, they have an enforceable “right to remain” in their unit as long as it is offered for rental housing. The district court granted Harvey summary judgment. The Third Circuit initially affirmed. On rehearing, the Third Circuit reversed. The statute’s plain language and history indicate that enhanced voucher holders may not be evicted absent good cause, even at the end of a lease term. The court remanded so that the district court may consider whether Harvey has good cause to evict. View "Hayes v. Harvey" on Justia Law

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Coyne's San Francisco property includes a building with three apartments and a free-standing, three-bedroom cottage. De Leo, age 81, had resided in the cottage since 1989. In 2012, Coyne decided to move into the cottage. Martin asked De Leo to move to the lower unit for a reduced rent. De Leo initially agreed. Martin paid that tenant $10,000 to vacate and painted the lower unit. De Leo’s son expressed concerns that no caregiver would have a place to stay if De Leo moved to the lower unit. Martin explained that he could invoke the Ellis Act to evict the tenants. De Leo refused to vacate. Martin transferred ownership to trusts, executed a tenancy in common agreement, and filed a “Notice of Intent to Withdraw Residential Units from the Rental Market” with the Residential Rent Stabilization and Arbitration Board, listing himself as the occupant of the upper unit, although he did not then reside there. Esclamado, a Coyne employee, was listed as the lower unit occupant, but no rent was listed; lower and upper units the as “owner-occupied.” After extensions, the Board recorded notices that the units would be withdrawn from the rental market (Gov. Code, 7060.2). Ultimately, Coyne obtained a judgment of possession. The court of appeal reversed. The trial court abused its discretion excluding De Leo’s evidence on the key factual issue of whether Martin had a bona fide intent to withdraw the Property from the residential rental market--evidence that Martin sold Esclamado a sham ownership interest. View "Coyne v. De Leo" on Justia Law

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Brittany Creech appealed her eviction from her from property in Williams County, North Dakota owned by Louis Tornabeni. Creech argued: (1) Tornabeni's notice of intent to evict was deficient; (2) the summary eviction proceeding violated her right to due process; (3) the district court abused its discretion in excluding certain exhibits; (4) the court's findings of fact were clearly erroneous; and (5) the delivery of the deed was defective and prevented Tornabeni from obtaining ownership of the property. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. View "Tornabeni v. Creech" on Justia Law