Justia Landlord - Tenant Opinion Summaries

A California company repurposed decommissioned military bunkers in South Dakota as survival shelters, offering them for sale or long-term lease. In 2020, an individual entered into a 99-year lease with the company for one of these bunkers, paying $35,000 upfront. The lease agreement incorporated a set of community rules, which the company reserved the right to modify with 30 days’ written notice. In 2021, the company amended the rules to expressly prohibit the brandishing of firearms except in designated areas. In 2023, the lessee was alleged to have brandished a firearm during an altercation, prompting the company to issue notices to vacate and, ultimately, to file a forcible entry and detainer action when the lessee secured the bunker but refused to return possession.The Circuit Court of the Seventh Judicial Circuit in Fall River County granted summary judgment in favor of the lessee. The court reasoned that the lease was illusory because the company could unilaterally modify the rules at any time, leaving the lessee with no recourse. The court concluded that this rendered the entire lease void and unenforceable, thereby preventing the company from evicting the lessee under the lease.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reversed the circuit court’s summary judgment order. The Supreme Court held that the lease agreement was supported by valid consideration and was not illusory merely because the company retained the right to modify community rules, as such modifications were constrained by requirements of reasonableness and good faith. The Court ruled that the ability to modify rules, when exercised subject to notice and implied duties of good faith and fair dealing, does not make the underlying contract unenforceable. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Vivos Xpoint v. Sindorf" on Justia Law

A nonprofit organization representing manufactured home community owners and a mobilehome park owner challenged the City of Santa Rosa’s enforcement of California Penal Code section 396 during a multi-year wildfire state of emergency. Section 396 prohibits increasing the rental price of mobilehome spaces by more than 10 percent during a declared emergency. The plaintiffs argued that, under Santa Rosa’s rent control ordinance, park owners should be able to impose annual increases according to the ordinance’s Consumer Price Index (CPI) formula, even if those increases cumulatively exceeded the 10 percent cap in section 396. Alternatively, they sought to “reset” post-emergency rents as if the suppressed CPI increases during the emergency had been implemented.The Sonoma County Superior Court denied the plaintiffs’ motions for summary judgment and granted the City’s, finding that section 396’s 10 percent cap was fixed at the rent authorized when the emergency began and that owners could not recoup lost increases after the emergency ended. The court reasoned that allowing such recoupment would defeat the statute’s purpose to protect consumers from excessive rent hikes during emergencies. The court entered judgment for the City after the plaintiffs’ third cause of action was dismissed by stipulation.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case de novo. The appellate court held that section 396’s cap applies to the rent authorized at the start of the emergency and lasts for its duration, regardless of local rent control provisions. The court further ruled that nothing in section 396 or the local ordinance entitles park owners to recoup suppressed rent increases once the emergency ends. The court affirmed the trial court’s judgment in favor of the City and awarded costs to the City. View "Western Manufactured Housing Cmty. Assn. v. City of Santa Rosa" on Justia Law

A tenant who lived in an apartment complex for twelve years experienced severe habitability problems, including lack of heat for seven years, no functioning toilet for at least a year, no refrigerator for two years, a collapsed ceiling, and frequent mice infestations. The tenant sued his landlord, requesting only monetary damages, and later alleged that the landlord attempted to force him out by cutting off his electricity. The landlord argued it had offered relocation assistance or money to persuade the tenant to move out so renovations could be completed.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia found that the landlord breached the implied warranty of habitability, as the record showed the apartment was uninhabitable and the landlord did not contest the poor conditions. However, the court reduced the damages award to $7,500, reasoning that the tenant failed to mitigate his damages by refusing to vacate the apartment when offered relocation. The court also ordered the tenant to vacate within seven days, though the propriety of this order was not challenged on appeal.On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that a tenant does not have a duty to mitigate damages by vacating a rental unit in response to a landlord’s request for renovation unless the landlord first complies with D.C. Code § 42-3505.01(f)(1). This statute requires landlords to follow a specific process involving notice and approval by the Rent Administrator before temporarily recovering possession for renovations. The appellate court found no evidence the landlord had complied with this process. It reversed the trial court’s reduced damages award and remanded for a recalculation, directing that the tenant must be awarded at least $22,788. View "Woodley v. Woodberry Village Apartment" on Justia Law

Two former tenants sued the owner and manager of a residential apartment complex, alleging that they were charged unlawful rental application fees and excessive lock change fees, in violation of the Massachusetts security deposit statute and consumer protection laws. They sought to represent a statewide class of similarly situated tenants. After contentious discovery, the Superior Court sanctioned the defendants, precluding them from contesting certain liability facts. The court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs on the security deposit claims but denied summary judgment on the consumer protection claims. Before trial, the parties reached a proposed class action settlement that established a fund for class members, with unclaimed funds to be distributed partly to charities and partly returned to the defendants.The Superior Court, after scrutiny and required revisions, approved the settlement. The court capped the amount of unclaimed funds that could revert to the defendants and required that a portion go to designated charities. However, the Massachusetts IOLTA Committee, a nonparty potentially entitled to notice under Mass. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(3), was not notified prior to settlement approval. After final approval and claims processing, the committee received notice for the first time and objected to the final distribution of unclaimed funds, arguing that the lack of timely notice violated the rule and that final judgment should be set aside. The motion judge agreed there was a violation but declined to vacate the settlement, finding no prejudice.On direct appellate review, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the IOLTA Committee had standing to appeal the denial of its procedural right to notice and an opportunity to be heard on the disposition of residual funds, but lacked standing to challenge the overall fairness or structure of the settlement. Assuming a violation of the rule occurred, the Court found no prejudice because the committee ultimately received the opportunity to be heard before judgment entered. The judgment was affirmed. View "Ortins v. Lincoln Property Company" on Justia Law

Two individuals who stayed at a San Dimas hotel challenged the hotel’s practice of enforcing a maximum 28-day stay policy. Under this policy, guests were required to check out and completely vacate the property for at least three days before being permitted to re-register, a practice the hotel’s management acknowledged was intended to avoid creating landlord-tenant relationships. The plaintiffs, who stayed at the hotel multiple times between June and November 2022, brought a putative class action alleging violations of California Civil Code section 1940.1 and other related claims, arguing that the hotel’s policy was designed to circumvent tenant protections for those using the hotel as a primary residence.The plaintiffs moved to certify a class consisting of all individuals who stayed at the hotel for at least 28 consecutive days but fewer than 31 days, from late 2018 to the present. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County found the class was numerous, ascertainable, and that the plaintiffs’ claims were typical, but denied class certification. The trial court reasoned that individualized questions predominated, because it believed section 1940.1 required proof that each class member used the hotel as their “primary residence” for the hotel to qualify as a “residential hotel” under the statute.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the order. The appellate court held that the trial court erred by interpreting section 1940.1 to require individualized proof that each guest used the hotel as their primary residence. The court clarified that whether a hotel is a “residential hotel” under section 1940.1 is a question that focuses on the overall character and intended use of the hotel, not on each individual guest’s circumstances. The order denying class certification was reversed, and the matter was remanded for the trial court to revisit the class certification question under the correct legal standard. View "Aerni v. RR San Dimas" on Justia Law

An assisted living residence operated by the defendant charged new residents a one-time “community fee” upon admission. The agreement stated that this fee was intended to cover upfront staff administrative costs, the resident’s initial service coordination plan, move-in assistance, and to establish a reserve for building improvements. The plaintiff, acting as executor of a former resident’s estate and representing a class, alleged that this community fee violated the Massachusetts security deposit statute, which limits the types of upfront fees a landlord may charge tenants. The complaint further claimed that charging the fee was an unfair and deceptive practice under state consumer protection law.The Superior Court initially dismissed the case, finding that the security deposit statute did not apply to assisted living residences, which are governed by their own regulatory scheme. On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts previously held in a related decision that the statute does apply to such residences when acting as landlords, but does not prohibit upfront fees for services unique to assisted living facilities. The court remanded the case for further factual development to determine whether the community fee corresponded to such services. After discovery and class certification, both parties moved for summary judgment. The Superior Court judge ruled for the plaintiffs, finding that the community fees were not used solely for allowable services because they were deposited into a general account used for various expenses, including non-allowable capital improvements.On direct appellate review, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reversed. The court held that the defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because uncontradicted evidence showed that the community fees corresponded to costs for assisted living-specific intake services that exceeded the amount of the fees collected. The court emphasized that the statute does not require the fees to be segregated or tracked dollar-for-dollar, and ordered judgment in favor of the defendant. View "Ryan v. Mary Ann Morse Healthcare Corp." on Justia Law

The dispute arose after a tenant leased a residential property from a management company in West Fargo, North Dakota. After a disagreement involving a pet-related charge, the tenant failed to pay October rent. The management company served a notice to vacate and subsequently obtained a judgment of eviction, which included an early termination fee as specified in the lease. The tenant vacated the property before the end of the lease term and returned the keys. Later, the landlord sent an itemized list of damages and sought recovery for property repairs, as well as rent for the months following the tenant’s departure, despite having received the early termination fee.Upon commencement of a small claims action by the landlord for damages, the tenant removed the case to the District Court of Cass County, East Central Judicial District. The tenant sought summary judgment, arguing that the landlord could not recover both an early termination fee and additional rent, and also contended that the landlord’s failure to timely provide the itemized list of damages should bar recovery. The district court denied summary judgment, held a bench trial, and ultimately ruled that the landlord could not recover both the early termination fee and post-eviction rent. However, the court allowed recovery for property damage, finding that the landlord had reasonable justification to withhold the security deposit despite the untimely itemization, since damages exceeded the deposit. The court awarded damages for repairs as well as attorney’s fees, as the tenant had removed the case from small claims court.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the case. It affirmed the district court’s rulings, holding that the landlord’s failure to timely provide an itemized statement of damages did not bar recovery, as the tenant was not prejudiced. The court also concluded that the tenant’s arguments regarding unconscionability and attorney’s fees were not properly preserved for appeal. The case was remanded solely for determination of additional attorney’s fees on appeal. View "Meridian Property Management v. Cordie" on Justia Law

A tenant and her adult son rented a house in Arlington, Virginia, for a year. Several months into the lease, they noticed water leaking through a skylight and informed the landlord. The landlord and a contractor inspected the skylight and confirmed it was leaking, but no repairs were made. After a period of snow and rain, the tenant slipped on water that had accumulated from the leak, suffering significant injuries. She then sued the landlord, alleging breach of contract for failing to complete repairs as required by the lease and state law, and common-law negligence in failing to take steps to prevent injury from the leak.The landlord removed the case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, which treated the landlord’s demurrer as a motion to dismiss. The district court dismissed the negligence claim, finding the complaint did not allege that the landlord or contractor undertook repairs or performed any negligent acts—only that they inspected and confirmed the leak. The court concluded Virginia law does not impose a tort duty on landlords for failing to repair, but only for negligent acts in the course of repair. The breach of contract claim survived the motion to dismiss, but the parties later stipulated to voluntarily dismiss it to allow an immediate appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit first determined it had appellate jurisdiction, accepting the tenant's binding representation that she was abandoning the contract claim with prejudice. The court then affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the negligence claim. It held that, under Virginia law, a landlord is not liable in tort for failing to make repairs unless the landlord undertakes repairs and does so negligently. Because the complaint did not allege any negligent repair or positive act, only nonfeasance, the negligence claim failed as a matter of law. View "Metz v. McCarthy" on Justia Law

A married couple leased a commercial property from a landlord for use as a salon. As their lease approached expiration in March 2020, one of the tenants decided to retire, and the COVID-19 pandemic led to a state-issued stay-at-home order. The tenants left their salon equipment on the premises at the landlord’s repeated assurances not to worry about it. One day before the lease expired, the tenants paid an amount equivalent to one month’s rent with a note indicating the payment was a gesture of support during the pandemic. Three months later, they made a smaller payment. There was no discussion or agreement to continue the tenancy month-to-month. Several months after returning the keys, the landlord demanded rent for the months following lease expiration, asserting that the initial payment created a month-to-month tenancy under California Civil Code section 1945.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County held a bench trial and found the tenants credible, particularly regarding the nature of the payment as a gift rather than rent. The court concluded the statutory presumption of a renewed month-to-month tenancy was rebutted by the parties’ actions and lack of communication about continuing the tenancy. The court found no contract existed after the lease expired and entered judgment for the tenants. The landlord’s motion to vacate the judgment was denied.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, affirmed the judgment. The appellate court held that the trial court did not err in its application of section 1945, finding no contract arose after the lease expired. The court emphasized that the presumption of a month-to-month tenancy is rebuttable by objective evidence showing the parties did not mutually agree to continue the lease. The judgment in favor of the tenants was affirmed. View "Ashirwad, LLC v. Bradbury" on Justia Law

A mother and the Connecticut Fair Housing Center sued a company that provides tenant screening reports, alleging that its practices contributed to the denial of a housing application for the mother’s disabled son. The apartment manager used the defendant’s screening platform to review applicants’ criminal histories, and the son’s application was denied based on a flagged shoplifting charge. The mother later had the charge dismissed. She also sought a copy of her son’s screening report from the defendant, but was told she needed to provide a power of attorney. She instead submitted documentation of her conservatorship, but the defendant rejected it as facially invalid due to a missing court seal.The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut held a bench trial. It found that the Fair Housing Act (FHA) did not apply to the defendant because it was not the decision-maker on housing applications; only the housing provider made those determinations. The district court also found the defendant’s requirement for a valid conservatorship certificate reasonable and not discriminatory toward handicapped individuals. However, the district court found the defendant liable under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) for a period when it insisted on a power of attorney, making it impossible for the mother to obtain her son’s consumer file.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit concluded that the Connecticut Fair Housing Center lacked standing because its diversion of resources to address the defendant’s actions did not constitute a concrete injury. The court also held that, although the FHA does not exclude certain defendants, the defendant here was not the proximate cause of the housing denial, and the mother failed to establish a prima facie case of disparate-impact discrimination. Furthermore, because she never provided a facially valid conservatorship certificate, she could not show that the defendant’s documentation requirements prevented her from obtaining the report. The court vacated, affirmed, and reversed in part, dismissing the Center’s claims, affirming no FHA liability, and reversing FCRA liability. View "CFHC v. CoreLogic Rental Prop. Sols." on Justia Law