Justia Landlord - Tenant Opinion Summaries

A landlord leased a rental property unit to a tenant, who later filed a complaint with the Vermont Human Rights Commission (HRC), alleging discrimination in violation of the Vermont Fair Housing and Public Accommodations Act (VFHPAA). The HRC, acting on behalf of the tenant, filed suit against the landlord, seeking legal and equitable relief for these alleged violations. After the suit was filed, the landlord died. His wife, who jointly owned the property, then also passed away. Ownership of the rental property shifted by operation of law and through an enhanced life-estate deed to their four adult children. No estate was opened in the landlord’s name.After being notified of the landlord’s death, the HRC moved in the Vermont Superior Court, Washington Unit, Civil Division, to substitute the landlord’s four children and his wife’s estate as parties, intending to amend the complaint to impose liability on the new parties due to their receipt of the property. The trial court denied this motion, concluding the proper party for substitution under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 25 would be the decedent’s estate or those standing in its place, not unrelated individuals against whom new claims were sought. The court gave HRC an opportunity to file further pleadings to name a proper party but, when HRC declined, dismissed the case without prejudice.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court reviewed whether the trial court correctly interpreted Rule 25 in denying substitution. The Supreme Court held that, although the underlying remedial claim survived the landlord’s death, the HRC failed to demonstrate that the proposed substitute parties—the children and wife’s estate—were proper parties for substitution under Vermont law, as there was no evidence they were executors, heirs, devisees, or legatees of an estate. The Supreme Court therefore affirmed the trial court’s denial of the motion to substitute and upheld the dismissal. View "Human Rights Commission v. Durkee" on Justia Law

A coalition of trade associations, real estate brokerage firms, landlords, and related entities challenged New York City’s Fairness in Apartment Rental Expenses Act (FARE Act), passed in November 2024. The Act prohibits brokers from charging tenants fees for apartments where they have published listings with a landlord’s permission or agreed to work for the landlord, and prevents landlords from making rental conditional on prospective tenants hiring agents. The plaintiffs argued that the Act infringed their federal and state free speech rights, particularly by burdening their ability to publish listings and receive compensation, and violated the Contracts Clause of the U.S. Constitution by rendering certain existing agreements unenforceable.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York heard the case, with the City opposing injunctive relief and moving to dismiss the claims. The district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ First Amendment claims, finding the FARE Act to be content-neutral regulation of commercial speech that survived intermediate scrutiny under the Central Hudson test. The court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction on those claims. As for the Contracts Clause argument, the district court denied the City’s motion to dismiss, reasoning that factual issues remained, but denied a preliminary injunction after finding plaintiffs unlikely to succeed on the merits. The district court also rejected a state preemption claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the appeal, affirming the district court’s judgment. The Second Circuit held that the FARE Act regulates commercial speech in a content-neutral manner and is valid under the Central Hudson test. It also concluded that the Act does not violate the Contracts Clause, as plaintiffs failed to establish a substantial likelihood of success on that claim. The court thus affirmed denial of injunctive relief and dismissal of the constitutional claims. View "Real Estate Board of New York, Inc. v. The City of New York" on Justia Law

The case involved a dispute over a residential property in Trego, Montana, formerly owned by Florence Tosch. Tosch had divorced her husband Jack McCafferty and, per their decree, was given the right to occupy the property, with the agreement that it would be sold and proceeds divided. Tosch rented the home to Edward and Catherine Kahle under a one-year lease in 2017, which converted to a month-to-month tenancy. After Tosch’s death in 2021, her estate, managed by her daughter Korrie, sought to sell the property. The Kahles remained as tenants and, when faced with eviction proceedings, produced a purported 2019 lease with an option to purchase, allegedly signed by Tosch.The Nineteenth Judicial District Court in Lincoln County held an evidentiary hearing and found that the 2019 lease/option was a forgery. Expert testimony showed the document was not authentic, and the court found the Kahles’ explanations unconvincing while crediting testimony from the estate’s representatives. The court concluded that the Kahles had engaged in actual fraud and slander of title by recording a subsequent document with Jack’s signature to cloud the estate’s title. The court granted possession to the estate, awarded damages for lost opportunity and costs, and found the estate properly followed Montana’s landlord-tenant statutes in handling the Kahles’ abandoned property. The court also awarded attorney’s fees to the estate.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the lower court’s judgment. The Supreme Court held that the estate proved by clear and convincing evidence the Kahles committed actual fraud under Montana law by forging the lease/option and slandering the estate’s title. The Court found the estate acted lawfully under the Montana Residential Landlord Tenant Act, the damages determination was supported by substantial evidence, and the award of attorney’s fees was proper and not an abuse of discretion. The judgment was affirmed. View "Estate of Tosch v. Kahle" on Justia Law

A commercial landlord leased space to a tenant operating a beer and wine store. Under the lease, the tenant was responsible for base rent plus a variety of other charges—such as utilities, real estate taxes, late fees, and attorneys’ fees—which were defined as “Additional Rent.” The lease also included a provision waiving the tenant’s statutory right to redeem the property after a judgment for possession. The tenant fell behind on some of the additional charges but remained current on base rent. The landlord filed a summary ejectment action, seeking repossession based on the unpaid additional charges.The District Court of Maryland for Frederick County found that the tenant was not liable for some claimed costs but determined that the tenant owed certain unpaid additional charges, including utilities, real estate taxes, attorneys’ fees, and late fees. Relying on the lease’s waiver clause, the court entered judgment for the landlord for possession of the premises without a right of redemption. The tenant appealed to the Circuit Court for Frederick County, which vacated the judgment and remanded for recalculation of attorneys’ fees, finding that not all claimed fees were properly due. The circuit court also held that the waiver of redemption was unenforceable in this context, reasoning that the tenant had not received proper notice of some charges and that enforcing the waiver would violate public policy.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case. It held that in a nonresidential lease, a waiver of the statutory right of redemption is not against Maryland public policy and is enforceable absent other contract defenses. The court also held that the statutory pre-suit notice requirement applies only to residential tenants, but that a landlord may only seek possession for rent charges about which the tenant had prior notice and an opportunity to pay, as defined by the lease. The Supreme Court vacated the circuit court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Kapneck 14-16 v. Breezy's Speakeasy" on Justia Law

The plaintiff landlord leased an apartment to the defendant tenant with a concession addendum allowing a reduced monthly rent. After the landlord sought to raise the rent, the tenant filed a fair rent complaint with the Middletown Fair Rent Commission (MFRC), alleging excessive rent and deteriorating conditions. Following the complaint, the landlord returned rent checks and served a notice to quit, claiming nonpayment and other grounds. The tenant filed additional complaints alleging retaliation, and the MFRC found the landlord’s actions retaliatory, ordering the landlord to cease eviction proceedings and accept the reduced rent. The MFRC also imposed fines for violations of its orders. The landlord filed administrative appeals in the Superior Court from the MFRC’s decisions, which remained pending.The landlord then initiated a summary process action in the Superior Court, Middlesex Housing Session at Middletown, seeking eviction on grounds including nonpayment of rent. The MFRC filed a motion to intervene in the summary process action, citing its interest in enforcing its orders and protecting its statutory authority. The trial court, after reviewing arguments, granted the MFRC’s motion to intervene, finding the commission had a substantial institutional interest and that intervention would not unduly delay or prejudice the proceedings. The court considered the overlap of issues between the summary process action and the pending administrative appeals.The Connecticut Supreme Court reviewed the trial court’s decision upon public interest certification. It held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting permissive intervention to the MFRC. The Supreme Court emphasized that rules governing permissive intervention should be liberally construed for governmental agencies seeking to protect their statutory powers and enforcement authority. The court affirmed the trial court’s order, concluding the MFRC had sufficient legal interest to intervene and that the intervention was appropriate under established standards. View "Kosel Equity, LLC v. MacGregor" on Justia Law

A landlord operating a multi-family apartment complex in Montgomery County, Maryland, filed a summary ejectment action against a civilian tenant for unpaid rent. The landlord did not possess a residential rental license, as required by county regulations, but claimed exemption from those requirements because the apartment complex was located on land originally acquired by the United States in 1941 for military purposes. The complex primarily housed servicemembers assigned to a nearby military medical center, but also leased to civilians when units were available.The District Court of Maryland sitting in Montgomery County found that the landlord was exempt from local licensure requirements based on correspondence from the county’s housing authority and entered judgment for possession and unpaid rent against the tenant. On appeal, the Circuit Court for Montgomery County reversed, ruling that the landlord was required to obtain a local rental license, at least for units leased to civilians, and vacated the judgment for possession and unpaid rent.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed whether the Enclave Clause of the United States Constitution preempted Montgomery County’s licensure requirements for this property. The court held that for the United States to obtain exclusive jurisdiction under the Enclave Clause, the State must consent, cede jurisdiction, and the United States must formally accept that jurisdiction. The record showed that, although the United States acquired title with state consent and cession, there was no evidence that the United States ever formally accepted exclusive jurisdiction as required by federal law at the time of acquisition. Thus, the Enclave Clause did not apply, and the landlord failed to prove exemption from county licensure. The Supreme Court of Maryland affirmed judgment for the tenant, holding that the landlord could not bring a summary ejectment action without demonstrating compliance with, or exemption from, local licensing requirements. View "Ft. Detrick/W. Reed Army Med. Housing v. Wynn" on Justia Law

The case arose when a property owner initiated an eviction action against a tenant. The parties resolved the matter through a court-approved settlement, under which the tenant agreed to vacate the apartment by a specified date. The tenant complied with the settlement terms. Several months later, the tenant moved for expungement of the eviction record, relying on a recently amended Minnesota statute providing that courts must expunge eviction files if the case is settled and the defendant fulfills the terms of the settlement.A housing court referee recommended expungement pursuant to that statute, and the district court signed the expungement order. The property owner, Sela Investments, appealed to the Minnesota Court of Appeals, arguing that the statutory expungement provision was unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals agreed, holding that the statute was a facial violation of the separation of powers because it infringed on the judiciary’s inherent authority to manage its own records. The appellate court reversed the expungement and remanded for the district court to apply a discretionary balancing test instead.On review, the Supreme Court of Minnesota first considered whether Sela Investments had standing to challenge the constitutionality of the statute. The court held that to have standing for a constitutional challenge, a party must show the statute has disadvantaged or is about to disadvantage its legal interest or right. The Supreme Court found that Sela Investments had not been harmed by the expungement statute, as it retained its own knowledge of the tenant and did not lose any legal right or interest.Because Sela Investments lacked standing, the Supreme Court held that neither it nor the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to adjudicate the constitutional claim. The Supreme Court therefore vacated the decision of the Court of Appeals. View "Sela Investments, Ltd LLP vs. J.H." on Justia Law

The plaintiff landlord leased an apartment to the defendant tenant, offering a discounted rent with the understanding that the rent would increase after the first year. As the renewal approached, the landlord sought to raise the rent to the higher amount. The tenant filed a complaint with the Hartford Fair Rent Commission, alleging the increase was excessive. While the commission’s review was pending, the landlord attempted to collect the increased rent and, when the tenant continued paying the lower amount, initiated eviction proceedings for nonpayment. The commission ultimately ruled in the tenant’s favor, finding the increase unfair and that the eviction attempt was retaliatory. The commission ordered the landlord to maintain the lower rent and to cease and desist from the eviction.After the commission’s decision, the landlord began a summary process (eviction) action in the Superior Court and also filed an administrative appeal challenging the commission’s ruling. In the summary process action, the tenant raised defenses of retaliation and sought dismissal based on the commission’s order. The trial court, Housing Session of the Superior Court in Hartford, granted the tenant’s motion to stay the eviction action pending resolution of the administrative appeal. The landlord’s motion to reconsider was denied, prompting an interlocutory appeal to the Connecticut Supreme Court, certified as a matter of substantial public interest.The Connecticut Supreme Court held that the trial court had inherent authority to stay the summary process action, despite the expedited nature of such proceedings, because the commission’s findings about the proper rent and retaliation could directly affect the merits of the eviction case. The court concluded that the trial judge properly balanced the interests of both parties, the commission, and judicial efficiency, and did not abuse its discretion in granting the stay. The Supreme Court affirmed the stay order and declined to address the landlord’s constitutional challenges and other issues not yet decided by the trial court. View "TOV Realty, LLC v. Suarez" on Justia Law

A landlord served a residential tenant with an eviction notice for nonpayment of rent during a period when the governor had ordered a temporary ban on such notices due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The tenant responded by counterclaiming that the landlord violated the Wisconsin Consumer Act (WCA), specifically Wis. Stat. § 427.104(1)(j), which bars attempts to collect a debt under an “agreement to defer payment” when the right to collect does not exist. The tenant also alleged the lease was void under Wis. Stat. § 704.44(10) and Wis. Admin. Code § ATCP 134.08(10) because it permitted eviction for a crime committed in relation to the property but lacked the required notice of domestic abuse protections.The Marathon County Circuit Court dismissed the landlord’s eviction claim since the notice was issued during the moratorium. The court also held that the WCA did not apply to the lease and found the lease was not void under the cited statutes and regulations, concluding that the tenant was not entitled to damages or attorney fees. The tenant’s attorney was denied intervention for attorney fees but was later allowed to intervene to appeal that issue.The Court of Appeals reversed, holding for the first time that a residential lease with monthly rent payments is a “consumer transaction” and an “agreement to defer payment” under the WCA, and that serving the eviction notice violated the Act. The appellate court also found the lease void for omitting the required domestic abuse notice and allowed recovery of double damages and attorney fees.The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reversed the appellate court. It held that a typical residential lease with monthly rent payments is not an “agreement to defer payment” under Wis. Stat. § 427.104, so the WCA does not apply. Even if the lease were void, the tenant showed no pecuniary loss, precluding recovery of damages, costs, or attorney fees under Wis. Stat. § 100.20(5) or § 425.308(1). View "Koble Investments v. Marquardt" on Justia Law

A tenant leased a commercial space from a landlord beginning in December 2020. The landlord alleged that the tenant failed to pay rent during 2022 and 2023, leading to an ejectment action in early 2024 seeking both possession of the premises and damages for unpaid rent. After the court ordered rent escrow and the tenant failed to comply, the landlord obtained a writ of possession, and the tenant vacated the property. The remaining dispute centered on alleged rent arrearages. The tenant requested a jury trial and was allowed limited discovery. Prior to trial, the tenant sought continuances based on alleged inadequate discovery responses and personal health concerns, which were denied. The tenant failed to appear for jury draw, and the landlord moved for default judgment.The Vermont Superior Court, Orange Unit, Civil Division, granted default judgment to the landlord on the same day as the missed jury draw, without holding a separate hearing or providing the tenant with seven days’ notice. The court later entered judgment awarding the landlord damages and attorney’s fees. The tenant appealed, challenging the denial of continuances, discovery rulings, and the procedure used to enter default judgment.The Vermont Supreme Court held that, under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 55(c)(4), when a party has appeared in a case, the court must provide at least seven days’ written notice and hold a hearing before entering default judgment. The Court found that these requirements were not met because the hearing on default judgment occurred without notice and immediately after the tenant’s nonappearance. The Supreme Court vacated the default judgment and remanded for the trial court to provide the required notice and hearing before considering default judgment. The Court affirmed the lower court’s discovery rulings and declined to address inadequately briefed arguments. View "Westwardhos LLC v. Anatoly Glass LLC" on Justia Law