Justia Landlord - Tenant Opinion Summaries

A landlord operating a multi-family apartment complex in Montgomery County, Maryland, filed a summary ejectment action against a civilian tenant for unpaid rent. The landlord did not possess a residential rental license, as required by county regulations, but claimed exemption from those requirements because the apartment complex was located on land originally acquired by the United States in 1941 for military purposes. The complex primarily housed servicemembers assigned to a nearby military medical center, but also leased to civilians when units were available.The District Court of Maryland sitting in Montgomery County found that the landlord was exempt from local licensure requirements based on correspondence from the county’s housing authority and entered judgment for possession and unpaid rent against the tenant. On appeal, the Circuit Court for Montgomery County reversed, ruling that the landlord was required to obtain a local rental license, at least for units leased to civilians, and vacated the judgment for possession and unpaid rent.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed whether the Enclave Clause of the United States Constitution preempted Montgomery County’s licensure requirements for this property. The court held that for the United States to obtain exclusive jurisdiction under the Enclave Clause, the State must consent, cede jurisdiction, and the United States must formally accept that jurisdiction. The record showed that, although the United States acquired title with state consent and cession, there was no evidence that the United States ever formally accepted exclusive jurisdiction as required by federal law at the time of acquisition. Thus, the Enclave Clause did not apply, and the landlord failed to prove exemption from county licensure. The Supreme Court of Maryland affirmed judgment for the tenant, holding that the landlord could not bring a summary ejectment action without demonstrating compliance with, or exemption from, local licensing requirements. View "Ft. Detrick/W. Reed Army Med. Housing v. Wynn" on Justia Law

The case arose when a property owner initiated an eviction action against a tenant. The parties resolved the matter through a court-approved settlement, under which the tenant agreed to vacate the apartment by a specified date. The tenant complied with the settlement terms. Several months later, the tenant moved for expungement of the eviction record, relying on a recently amended Minnesota statute providing that courts must expunge eviction files if the case is settled and the defendant fulfills the terms of the settlement.A housing court referee recommended expungement pursuant to that statute, and the district court signed the expungement order. The property owner, Sela Investments, appealed to the Minnesota Court of Appeals, arguing that the statutory expungement provision was unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals agreed, holding that the statute was a facial violation of the separation of powers because it infringed on the judiciary’s inherent authority to manage its own records. The appellate court reversed the expungement and remanded for the district court to apply a discretionary balancing test instead.On review, the Supreme Court of Minnesota first considered whether Sela Investments had standing to challenge the constitutionality of the statute. The court held that to have standing for a constitutional challenge, a party must show the statute has disadvantaged or is about to disadvantage its legal interest or right. The Supreme Court found that Sela Investments had not been harmed by the expungement statute, as it retained its own knowledge of the tenant and did not lose any legal right or interest.Because Sela Investments lacked standing, the Supreme Court held that neither it nor the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to adjudicate the constitutional claim. The Supreme Court therefore vacated the decision of the Court of Appeals. View "Sela Investments, Ltd LLP vs. J.H." on Justia Law

The plaintiff landlord leased an apartment to the defendant tenant, offering a discounted rent with the understanding that the rent would increase after the first year. As the renewal approached, the landlord sought to raise the rent to the higher amount. The tenant filed a complaint with the Hartford Fair Rent Commission, alleging the increase was excessive. While the commission’s review was pending, the landlord attempted to collect the increased rent and, when the tenant continued paying the lower amount, initiated eviction proceedings for nonpayment. The commission ultimately ruled in the tenant’s favor, finding the increase unfair and that the eviction attempt was retaliatory. The commission ordered the landlord to maintain the lower rent and to cease and desist from the eviction.After the commission’s decision, the landlord began a summary process (eviction) action in the Superior Court and also filed an administrative appeal challenging the commission’s ruling. In the summary process action, the tenant raised defenses of retaliation and sought dismissal based on the commission’s order. The trial court, Housing Session of the Superior Court in Hartford, granted the tenant’s motion to stay the eviction action pending resolution of the administrative appeal. The landlord’s motion to reconsider was denied, prompting an interlocutory appeal to the Connecticut Supreme Court, certified as a matter of substantial public interest.The Connecticut Supreme Court held that the trial court had inherent authority to stay the summary process action, despite the expedited nature of such proceedings, because the commission’s findings about the proper rent and retaliation could directly affect the merits of the eviction case. The court concluded that the trial judge properly balanced the interests of both parties, the commission, and judicial efficiency, and did not abuse its discretion in granting the stay. The Supreme Court affirmed the stay order and declined to address the landlord’s constitutional challenges and other issues not yet decided by the trial court. View "TOV Realty, LLC v. Suarez" on Justia Law

A landlord served a residential tenant with an eviction notice for nonpayment of rent during a period when the governor had ordered a temporary ban on such notices due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The tenant responded by counterclaiming that the landlord violated the Wisconsin Consumer Act (WCA), specifically Wis. Stat. § 427.104(1)(j), which bars attempts to collect a debt under an “agreement to defer payment” when the right to collect does not exist. The tenant also alleged the lease was void under Wis. Stat. § 704.44(10) and Wis. Admin. Code § ATCP 134.08(10) because it permitted eviction for a crime committed in relation to the property but lacked the required notice of domestic abuse protections.The Marathon County Circuit Court dismissed the landlord’s eviction claim since the notice was issued during the moratorium. The court also held that the WCA did not apply to the lease and found the lease was not void under the cited statutes and regulations, concluding that the tenant was not entitled to damages or attorney fees. The tenant’s attorney was denied intervention for attorney fees but was later allowed to intervene to appeal that issue.The Court of Appeals reversed, holding for the first time that a residential lease with monthly rent payments is a “consumer transaction” and an “agreement to defer payment” under the WCA, and that serving the eviction notice violated the Act. The appellate court also found the lease void for omitting the required domestic abuse notice and allowed recovery of double damages and attorney fees.The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reversed the appellate court. It held that a typical residential lease with monthly rent payments is not an “agreement to defer payment” under Wis. Stat. § 427.104, so the WCA does not apply. Even if the lease were void, the tenant showed no pecuniary loss, precluding recovery of damages, costs, or attorney fees under Wis. Stat. § 100.20(5) or § 425.308(1). View "Koble Investments v. Marquardt" on Justia Law

A tenant leased a commercial space from a landlord beginning in December 2020. The landlord alleged that the tenant failed to pay rent during 2022 and 2023, leading to an ejectment action in early 2024 seeking both possession of the premises and damages for unpaid rent. After the court ordered rent escrow and the tenant failed to comply, the landlord obtained a writ of possession, and the tenant vacated the property. The remaining dispute centered on alleged rent arrearages. The tenant requested a jury trial and was allowed limited discovery. Prior to trial, the tenant sought continuances based on alleged inadequate discovery responses and personal health concerns, which were denied. The tenant failed to appear for jury draw, and the landlord moved for default judgment.The Vermont Superior Court, Orange Unit, Civil Division, granted default judgment to the landlord on the same day as the missed jury draw, without holding a separate hearing or providing the tenant with seven days’ notice. The court later entered judgment awarding the landlord damages and attorney’s fees. The tenant appealed, challenging the denial of continuances, discovery rulings, and the procedure used to enter default judgment.The Vermont Supreme Court held that, under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 55(c)(4), when a party has appeared in a case, the court must provide at least seven days’ written notice and hold a hearing before entering default judgment. The Court found that these requirements were not met because the hearing on default judgment occurred without notice and immediately after the tenant’s nonappearance. The Supreme Court vacated the default judgment and remanded for the trial court to provide the required notice and hearing before considering default judgment. The Court affirmed the lower court’s discovery rulings and declined to address inadequately briefed arguments. View "Westwardhos LLC v. Anatoly Glass LLC" on Justia Law

After the death of her husband, the plaintiff became the sole owner of certain residential property previously held in joint tenancy. The plaintiff, serving as executor of her late husband’s estate, leased the property to one of the defendants, her son, under an agreement that expired in 2020. The defendants, who are immediate family members, continued to occupy the property after the lease expired. In August 2021, the plaintiff, represented by counsel, served a notice to quit on the defendants, which identified her as “executor,” and then initiated a summary process action using that same designation.The case was brought in the Superior Court, Housing Session at Stamford-Norwalk, where the plaintiff moved to substitute herself in her individual capacity, as the owner, rather than as executor. The court granted the substitution without objection from the defendants. After a bench trial, the court found in favor of the plaintiff and issued a judgment of possession, rejecting the defendants’ claims of a life estate and other defenses. The defendants appealed to the Connecticut Appellate Court, arguing for the first time that the notice to quit was jurisdictionally defective because it was issued by the plaintiff as “executor,” although the estate never owned the property. The Appellate Court affirmed, finding the notice to quit sufficient under Connecticut General Statutes § 47a-23(a).Upon further appeal, the Connecticut Supreme Court disagreed that the notice to quit strictly complied with § 47a-23(a) due to the incorrect reference to the plaintiff as “executor.” However, the Court held that this was a circumstantial, not substantive, defect under General Statutes § 52-123. Since the notice conveyed all essential information and there was no prejudice or confusion to the defendants, the trial court retained subject matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Court. View "Freccia v. Freccia" on Justia Law

A tenant and her young son resided in a rental property owned by a landlord. The tenant failed to pay rent for August 2024, prompting the landlord to file an eviction action in the Rhode Island District Court for nonpayment. The District Court held a hearing, after which it awarded possession to the landlord and entered a damages judgment against the tenant. The tenant appealed to the Superior Court, raising an affirmative defense and counterclaim based on alleged uninhabitability of the premises due to plumbing problems and a sewage fly infestation.While the appeal was pending in the Superior Court, the landlord moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing that the tenant’s failure to pay a prorated portion of September rent (covering the period after judgment in District Court but before the next rent due date) mandated dismissal under the Residential Landlord and Tenant Act. The tenant conceded nonpayment of that portion but argued the statute only required payment of full rent due after the appeal was taken, which she had paid in October. The Superior Court agreed with the landlord and dismissed the appeal.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island granted certiorari and reviewed the statutory interpretation. The Court held that under the plain language of the relevant statutes, a tenant appealing an eviction judgment is obligated to pay rent only on the next scheduled due date after the appeal is filed, not a prorated portion for days between judgment and the next rent due date. The Court further held that after the tenant vacated the apartment, the case ceased to be an action for recovery of real property, and the statutory rent-payment requirement no longer applied. The Supreme Court quashed the Superior Court’s order of dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings on damages. View "Pioneer Investments, LLC v. McKiernan" on Justia Law

A tenant operating a restaurant under a commercial lease failed to provide written notice of its intent to renew the lease by the contractually required deadline. The lease allowed renewal for additional terms if the tenant gave written notice at least ninety days before the current term expired. In 2022, the tenant closed for renovations without the landlord’s written consent and remained closed for several months, citing purported structural issues. The landlord, finding this closure and unauthorized work to be defaults under the lease, initiated termination proceedings and provided notice of lease termination. Despite several communications and actions by both parties—including the landlord’s filing and dismissal of eviction actions—the tenant did not provide timely written notice of renewal.A magistrate in Johnson County entered judgment and an order of possession in favor of the landlord. The tenant appealed to the Iowa District Court for Johnson County, which affirmed the magistrate’s ruling. The tenant then sought further review, and the case was transferred to the Iowa Court of Appeals, which also affirmed the lower courts’ decisions.On discretionary review, the Iowa Supreme Court considered whether the lease had been orally modified to permit renewal without written notice, whether the landlord’s actions had revoked or excused the renewal option, and whether the landlord’s conduct constituted a repudiation of the lease. The court held that the lease’s written notice requirement for renewal was controlling and found insufficient evidence of a modification to permit oral renewal. The court also concluded that the landlord’s termination and eviction actions, taken in good faith in response to the tenant’s breach, did not revoke the renewal option or constitute repudiation. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the lower courts. View "MidWestOne Bank v. Short's Burger & Shine, LLC" on Justia Law

A dispute arose between a commercial landlord and tenant after government emergency orders during the COVID-19 pandemic required non-essential businesses in New York City to close. The tenant, operating a retail clothing store in Manhattan, stopped paying rent, arguing that the lease excused rent payments when government actions prevented it from operating its business. The landlord disagreed, terminated the lease for nonpayment, and sought damages for breach of contract. The tenant vacated the premises and counterclaimed, alleging the landlord wrongfully terminated the lease and wrongfully kept two payments made after termination.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted summary judgment in favor of the landlord, finding that the government’s orders did not constitute a “taking” under the lease because the tenant was not fully deprived of the use or occupancy of the premises. The district court also rejected the tenant’s counterclaims for breach of contract and unjust enrichment, holding that the notice-and-cure provision applied and that the unjust enrichment claim was duplicative. The court awarded damages to the landlord, though the landlord cross-appealed, asserting the award was insufficient.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the district court misinterpreted the lease’s takings provision, which excused the tenant from paying rent when it was unable to operate its business due to government orders. The appellate court reversed the summary judgment for the landlord on its breach of contract claim and concluded the tenant was entitled to summary judgment on both its own breach of contract counterclaim and its claim that the landlord improperly terminated the lease. The court further vacated the judgment on the unjust enrichment counterclaim and remanded for further proceedings. The landlord’s cross-appeal on damages was dismissed as moot. View "Delshah 60 Ninth, LLC v. Free People of PA LLC" on Justia Law

The case involves a tenant, Ms. Craig, who uses a wheelchair and lived in an apartment managed and owned by the appellants. Her rent was paid through a D.C. housing voucher, but she was responsible for utilities and parking. The appellants sought to evict her after alleging she failed to pay these additional charges. At the eviction hearing in the Landlord and Tenant Branch (L&T) of the Superior Court, the appellants claimed to have served Ms. Craig through her brother, but the affidavit described her brother instead of Ms. Craig. Despite this, the L&T court found service sufficient and entered a default judgment against her, resulting in her eviction.After her eviction, Ms. Craig filed motions in the L&T court to vacate the default judgment and for emergency relief, but did not receive prompt action. She then filed a separate complaint and sought a preliminary injunction in the Civil Division of the Superior Court, arguing improper service and irreparable harm. The Civil Division granted a preliminary injunction restoring her to the apartment, pending the L&T court’s decision on her motion to vacate. Subsequently, the L&T court vacated the default judgment and dismissed the eviction action, and Ms. Craig was returned to her apartment.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals addressed whether the Civil Division could grant temporary injunctive relief from the L&T court’s default judgment while a motion to vacate was pending. The court held that, under limited circumstances where a litigant first seeks relief in the issuing court, a collateral court may grant temporary relief to prevent irreparable harm while awaiting the issuing court’s decision. The court affirmed the Civil Division’s preliminary injunction, holding that such temporary relief does not contravene Rule 60 or res judicata when properly limited. View "Bozzuto Management Co. v. Craig" on Justia Law