Justia Landlord - Tenant Opinion Summaries

The case involves a dispute over possession and damages related to a residential property in Malibu. In 2019, the plaintiff filed an unlawful detainer action against several defendants, including the defendant, seeking possession of the property and damages. The defendant responded with an answer denying several key allegations, including the plaintiff’s ownership of the property and the claimed fair rental value. The plaintiff later obtained leave to file a first amended complaint, which reclassified the action and asserted new causes of action but relied on the same underlying facts as the original complaint. The defendant did not file a new answer to this amended complaint.The Los Angeles County Superior Court entered a default against the defendant after he failed to answer the amended complaint and subsequently entered a default judgment awarding significant damages. The defendant moved multiple times to set aside the default judgment. The court eventually denied his postjudgment motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (d), which allows courts to set aside void judgments. The defendant timely appealed these orders.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed whether the original answer sufficed to controvert the first amended complaint’s allegations and precluded entry of default. The appellate court held that because the defendant’s original answer denied essential factual allegations that remained central to the amended complaint—including ownership and valuation—the default judgment was improper. The court found that a defendant’s original answer stands as a response to reasserted facts in an amended complaint, and default cannot be entered on allegations previously denied. The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment and the trial court’s order denying the motion to set aside default, remanding with instructions to vacate the default and default judgment. View "Ammari v. Ammari" on Justia Law

In 2022, voters in a California city approved an initiative known as Measure H, which amended the city charter to establish rent control, just cause eviction protections, and an independent Rental Housing Board with significant regulatory authority over rental housing, rent increases, and evictions. The measure limited annual rent increases for certain multifamily units, prohibited evictions without just cause, and required the city council to appoint a supermajority of tenants to the Rental Housing Board. It also contained provisions for mandatory landlord-paid relocation assistance in certain circumstances and additional notice requirements prior to eviction for nonpayment of rent.After certification of the election results, a group of landlords and a rental housing trade association challenged the validity of Measure H in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. They alleged the measure constituted an impermissible revision of the city charter under the California Constitution, imposed unconstitutional property qualifications for public office, violated equal protection, and was preempted by various state laws. The superior court rejected most of these claims, holding that Measure H was a lawful charter amendment, did not violate constitutional protections regarding property qualifications or equal protection, and did not conflict with state law except in one respect: it partially severed language in the measure that imposed greater notice requirements than those mandated by state statutes for termination of tenancy.Upon review, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reversed in part. The court held that Measure H was a permissible charter amendment, not an impermissible revision; that restricting certain board seats to tenants with a leasehold interest did not violate the constitutional prohibition on property qualifications for office; and that the tenant-majority requirement did not violate equal protection under rational basis review. However, the court found that the relocation assistance provision for tenants displaced by lawful rent increases was preempted by the Costa-Hawkins Rental Housing Act, and that the additional notice requirement for evictions due to nonpayment of rent was preempted by the Unlawful Detainer Act. The preempted provisions were declared void, and the matter was remanded for the superior court to enter judgment consistent with these findings. View "California Apartment Assn. v. City of Pasadena" on Justia Law

Several tenants of a subdivided property in Los Angeles, each with separate oral lease agreements for individual units, were forced out of their homes after the landlord obtained a default unlawful detainer judgment against the tenant of a different unit. The landlord did not inform these tenants of the proceedings or provide proper notice. Although only the tenant of unit seven was behind on rent, the landlord sought and obtained possession of the entire property. The sheriff’s deputies, acting on the writ of possession, evicted all the tenants, leaving them homeless and unable to retrieve most of their belongings.The tenants filed suit in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, asserting claims such as wrongful eviction, breach of quiet enjoyment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, fraud, and violations of statutory and local ordinances. The landlord responded by filing a special motion to strike under California’s anti-SLAPP statute, arguing that the tenants’ claims arose from protected petitioning activity—the prosecution of the unlawful detainer action. The Superior Court granted the motion for ten of the eleven causes of action, concluding that the tenants’ claims were premised on the landlord’s protected activity in pursuing the unlawful detainer case.Upon review, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Four, held that the tenants’ claims did not arise from protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute. The appellate court found that the gravamen of the tenants’ complaint was the landlord’s improper termination of their tenancies without judicial process or notice—not the act of filing or prosecuting the unlawful detainer action against another tenant. Therefore, the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order granting the anti-SLAPP motion and directed the lower court to deny the motion. View "Noon v. Fuentes" on Justia Law

Two young children, ages four and two, suffered severe injuries after falling from a second-floor bedroom window in their apartment, which had recently undergone renovations. The property owner and manager had replaced the window without installing a fall prevention device, despite the window’s low sill height and significant drop to the ground. The children, through their guardian ad litem, sued the owner and manager for negligence, alleging both general negligence and negligence per se based on an alleged violation of the California Building Standards Code, which requires fall prevention devices on certain windows.The Superior Court of California, County of Alameda, heard the case. Before trial, the defendants sought summary adjudication and moved in limine to exclude expert testimony regarding the Building Code, arguing that the property was exempt from current requirements due to compliance with the code at the time of original construction and the use of “like-for-like” materials during renovation. The trial court denied these pretrial motions but, after plaintiffs presented their case at trial, granted a nonsuit on both negligence theories, finding no duty under general negligence and that the code exemption applied to the negligence per se claim.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. It affirmed the trial court’s ruling on general negligence, holding that the harm was not sufficiently foreseeable to impose a duty on the landlord under the circumstances. However, it reversed the nonsuit on negligence per se, holding that the trial court misinterpreted the Building Code: a window is not an “original material” exempt from current safety requirements. The appellate court remanded the case for retrial on the negligence per se claim. View "Jimenez v. Hayes Apartment Homes, LLC" on Justia Law

A developer purchased a property in Alameda that had previously been used by the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard as housing for military personnel and their families. The property, containing about 150 residential units, was vacant and in disrepair for over a decade before the developer acquired it in 2018. The developer extensively renovated the units and related infrastructure, spending significant sums, and obtained a new certificate of occupancy from the City in 2020. The developer then began renting the units to the general public.After the renovations, a dispute arose regarding whether the renovated units were subject to the City of Alameda’s Rent Control Ordinance. The City’s Rent Program Director determined that the units were not exempt from local rent control under the Costa-Hawkins Rental Housing Act, reasoning that the property had been used for residential purposes prior to the issuance of the new certificate of occupancy. An administrative hearing officer upheld this determination. The developer challenged this decision in the Superior Court of Alameda County, which ruled in favor of the developer, finding that the exemption applied and that the renovated property qualified as new residential housing stock.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court held that under the Costa-Hawkins Act, as interpreted by prior decisions such as NCR Properties, LLC v. City of Berkeley and Burien, LLC v. Wiley, the exemption from local rent control for properties with a certificate of occupancy issued after February 1, 1995, does not apply if the property had prior residential use. The court concluded that the extensive renovations and the period of vacancy did not transform the property into new housing for purposes of the exemption. The judgment of the trial court was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "CP VI Admirals Cove, LLC v. City of Alameda" on Justia Law

A tenant entered into a lease for the lower level of a residential property in Los Angeles in 2015. In 2016, the property was purchased by a new landlord, who made some improvements at the tenant’s request. In 2018, the landlord sought to reclaim the unit for personal use and offered the tenant compensation to vacate, but the tenant refused, alleging harassment and claiming entitlement to substantial back rent. Subsequently, city agencies issued and later rescinded orders regarding the legality of the unit, with the landlord providing documentation to resolve the issues. Despite this, the tenant stopped paying rent, citing the unit’s alleged illegality, and remained in possession for over a year without payment. The landlord attempted to evict the tenant, provided relocation payments, and ultimately the tenant vacated after cashing a relocation check.The tenant filed suit in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, asserting multiple claims including violation of statutory and municipal code provisions, unjust enrichment, and breach of contract. The landlord filed a cross-complaint for unpaid rent and related claims. After pretrial motions were resolved, the case proceeded to a jury trial, where the tenant’s claim focused on the alleged illegality of the unit and the landlord’s claim centered on breach of contract for unpaid rent. The jury found in favor of the landlord on both the tenant’s claim and the landlord’s cross-claim, awarding the landlord $14,700 in unpaid rent. The trial court denied the tenant’s motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court held that it was proper for the jury to determine the legality of the unit as a factual issue, and that the landlord was not precluded from contesting the unit’s legality or from introducing evidence from city agencies. The appellate court affirmed the judgment in favor of the landlord. View "Emmons v. Jesso" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, a long-term tenant of a triplex, entered into a lease in 1995 and was paying below-market rent. In 2020, the property was acquired by a new owner, Connie, LLC, which hired a property management company. The new owners and the management company misrepresented to their attorney that the plaintiff was a property manager receiving discounted rent, and, based on this misrepresentation, concluded that the rent control protections of the Tenant Protection Act of 2019 did not apply. Relying on this advice, they terminated the plaintiff’s supposed management role and raised his rent to market rate, which the plaintiff paid for 11 months. The plaintiff later learned that the rent increase was illegal under the Act and sued to recover the overpaid rent, asserting, among other claims, a cause of action under Penal Code section 496 for receiving stolen property.The Superior Court of Orange County conducted a jury trial. After the close of evidence, the court granted a directed verdict against the plaintiff on all claims except for breach of contract, finding that the evidence did not support a claim under section 496 because the defendants’ conduct was based on a mistake rather than theft. The court entered a nominal judgment in the plaintiff’s favor on the contract claim.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed whether the directed verdict on the section 496 claim was proper. The appellate court held that sufficient evidence existed for a jury to find that the defendants’ receipt of the illegally increased rent constituted receiving property obtained by false pretenses, as defined by section 496, and that the issue should have been submitted to the jury. The court reversed the judgment as to the section 496 claim and remanded for further proceedings, awarding the plaintiff his costs on appeal. View "Johnson v. Connie, LLC" on Justia Law

A mobilehome park owner challenged the constitutionality of Civil Code section 798.30.5, which limits annual rent increases for certain mobilehome parks located within the jurisdictions of two or more incorporated cities in California. The statute, effective from January 1, 2022, to January 1, 2030, restricts rent increases to the lower of 3 percent plus the percentage change in the cost of living, or 5 percent, and limits the number of rent increases within a 12-month period. The owner alleged that the statute is facially unconstitutional because it lacks a procedural mechanism for property owners to seek rent adjustments to ensure a fair return, arguing this omission violates due process and results in an uncompensated taking.The Superior Court of Orange County granted the owner’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, finding that the absence of a process to seek exceptions to the rent ceiling violated due process and rendered the statute unconstitutional. The court rejected the owner’s takings argument but concluded that the statute’s plain language was undisputed and denied the State’s request for leave to amend its answer, determining that any amendment would be futile.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The appellate court held that the owner failed to demonstrate that the statute is facially unconstitutional, clarifying that a fair return adjustment mechanism is not required for all rent control laws to be constitutional, but may be necessary only if the law is confiscatory in its application. The court also found that the State’s general denial in its answer placed the owner’s standing to sue at issue, precluding judgment on the pleadings. Accordingly, the appellate court reversed the judgment in favor of the owner. View "Anaheim Mobile Estates v. State" on Justia Law

In this residential landlord-tenant dispute, the tenants, Michael Gogal and Hildy Baumgartner-Gogal, entered into a lease with landlords, Xinhui Deng and Jianhua Wu. The lease included a clause that capped recoverable litigation costs and attorney’s fees at $1,000. After successfully suing the landlords for retaliatory eviction, the tenants were awarded a monetary judgment and attorney’s fees exceeding the $1,000 cap. They then sought to recover additional litigation costs under California Code of Civil Procedure section 1032(b). The landlords argued that the lease’s $1,000 cap barred any further cost recovery.The Superior Court of San Diego County initially ruled in favor of the landlords, enforcing the $1,000 cap. However, after further arguments from the tenants, the court reversed its decision, allowing the tenants to recover nearly $14,000 in costs. The court reasoned that enforcing the cap would contravene the public policy intent of California Civil Code section 1942.5, which aims to protect tenants from abusive landlord conduct.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The main issue was whether parties to a contract could waive their statutory right to recover litigation costs under section 1032(b) through a pre-dispute agreement. The appellate court concluded that section 1032(b) establishes a default rule allowing prevailing parties to recover costs but does not prohibit parties from waiving this right by agreement. The court found that such waivers are consistent with Civil Code section 3513, which allows the waiver of rights intended for private benefit. The appellate court reversed the lower court’s order, directing it to strike the tenants’ memorandum of costs, thereby enforcing the $1,000 cap stipulated in the lease. View "Gogal v. Deng" on Justia Law

Tenants Michael Gogal and Hildy Baumgartner-Gogal, a married couple, prevailed on a retaliatory eviction claim against their former landlords, Xinhui Deng and Jianhua Wu. Michael, a licensed attorney, represented the tenants for most of the lawsuit. Post-judgment, the tenants sought to recover half of Michael’s attorney’s fees, attributing them to his representation of Hildy. Despite declarations from the tenants indicating that Hildy believed she had retained Michael as her attorney, the trial court denied the request, applying the precedent set in Gorman v. Tassajara Development Corp., which held that fees are not awardable when spouses’ interests are joint and indivisible.The Superior Court of San Diego County ruled in favor of the tenants on their retaliatory eviction claim, awarding them compensatory and punitive damages. The court also ruled in their favor on most other claims and on the landlords’ cross-claims, resulting in a total judgment against the landlords. Subsequently, the tenants filed a motion to recover attorney’s fees under Civil Code section 1942.5, which mandates an award of reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing party in retaliatory eviction cases. The trial court granted the motion for fees billed by another attorney but denied it for Michael’s fees, citing the Gorman case.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, affirmed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court agreed with the trial court’s application of Gorman but emphasized the need for a nuanced analysis to determine whether a true attorney-client relationship existed between Hildy and Michael. The court concluded that the tenants failed to present sufficient evidence to establish such a relationship, as the record did not demonstrate that Hildy played a significant substantive role in the litigation or that her consultations with Michael were for the purpose of obtaining legal advice in his professional capacity. View "Gogal v. Deng" on Justia Law