Justia Landlord - Tenant Opinion Summaries

Two young children, ages four and two, suffered severe injuries after falling from a second-floor bedroom window in their apartment, which had recently undergone renovations. The property owner and manager had replaced the window without installing a fall prevention device, despite the window’s low sill height and significant drop to the ground. The children, through their guardian ad litem, sued the owner and manager for negligence, alleging both general negligence and negligence per se based on an alleged violation of the California Building Standards Code, which requires fall prevention devices on certain windows.The Superior Court of California, County of Alameda, heard the case. Before trial, the defendants sought summary adjudication and moved in limine to exclude expert testimony regarding the Building Code, arguing that the property was exempt from current requirements due to compliance with the code at the time of original construction and the use of “like-for-like” materials during renovation. The trial court denied these pretrial motions but, after plaintiffs presented their case at trial, granted a nonsuit on both negligence theories, finding no duty under general negligence and that the code exemption applied to the negligence per se claim.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. It affirmed the trial court’s ruling on general negligence, holding that the harm was not sufficiently foreseeable to impose a duty on the landlord under the circumstances. However, it reversed the nonsuit on negligence per se, holding that the trial court misinterpreted the Building Code: a window is not an “original material” exempt from current safety requirements. The appellate court remanded the case for retrial on the negligence per se claim. View "Jimenez v. Hayes Apartment Homes, LLC" on Justia Law

A developer purchased a property in Alameda that had previously been used by the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard as housing for military personnel and their families. The property, containing about 150 residential units, was vacant and in disrepair for over a decade before the developer acquired it in 2018. The developer extensively renovated the units and related infrastructure, spending significant sums, and obtained a new certificate of occupancy from the City in 2020. The developer then began renting the units to the general public.After the renovations, a dispute arose regarding whether the renovated units were subject to the City of Alameda’s Rent Control Ordinance. The City’s Rent Program Director determined that the units were not exempt from local rent control under the Costa-Hawkins Rental Housing Act, reasoning that the property had been used for residential purposes prior to the issuance of the new certificate of occupancy. An administrative hearing officer upheld this determination. The developer challenged this decision in the Superior Court of Alameda County, which ruled in favor of the developer, finding that the exemption applied and that the renovated property qualified as new residential housing stock.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court held that under the Costa-Hawkins Act, as interpreted by prior decisions such as NCR Properties, LLC v. City of Berkeley and Burien, LLC v. Wiley, the exemption from local rent control for properties with a certificate of occupancy issued after February 1, 1995, does not apply if the property had prior residential use. The court concluded that the extensive renovations and the period of vacancy did not transform the property into new housing for purposes of the exemption. The judgment of the trial court was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "CP VI Admirals Cove, LLC v. City of Alameda" on Justia Law

A tenant entered into a lease for the lower level of a residential property in Los Angeles in 2015. In 2016, the property was purchased by a new landlord, who made some improvements at the tenant’s request. In 2018, the landlord sought to reclaim the unit for personal use and offered the tenant compensation to vacate, but the tenant refused, alleging harassment and claiming entitlement to substantial back rent. Subsequently, city agencies issued and later rescinded orders regarding the legality of the unit, with the landlord providing documentation to resolve the issues. Despite this, the tenant stopped paying rent, citing the unit’s alleged illegality, and remained in possession for over a year without payment. The landlord attempted to evict the tenant, provided relocation payments, and ultimately the tenant vacated after cashing a relocation check.The tenant filed suit in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, asserting multiple claims including violation of statutory and municipal code provisions, unjust enrichment, and breach of contract. The landlord filed a cross-complaint for unpaid rent and related claims. After pretrial motions were resolved, the case proceeded to a jury trial, where the tenant’s claim focused on the alleged illegality of the unit and the landlord’s claim centered on breach of contract for unpaid rent. The jury found in favor of the landlord on both the tenant’s claim and the landlord’s cross-claim, awarding the landlord $14,700 in unpaid rent. The trial court denied the tenant’s motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court held that it was proper for the jury to determine the legality of the unit as a factual issue, and that the landlord was not precluded from contesting the unit’s legality or from introducing evidence from city agencies. The appellate court affirmed the judgment in favor of the landlord. View "Emmons v. Jesso" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, a long-term tenant of a triplex, entered into a lease in 1995 and was paying below-market rent. In 2020, the property was acquired by a new owner, Connie, LLC, which hired a property management company. The new owners and the management company misrepresented to their attorney that the plaintiff was a property manager receiving discounted rent, and, based on this misrepresentation, concluded that the rent control protections of the Tenant Protection Act of 2019 did not apply. Relying on this advice, they terminated the plaintiff’s supposed management role and raised his rent to market rate, which the plaintiff paid for 11 months. The plaintiff later learned that the rent increase was illegal under the Act and sued to recover the overpaid rent, asserting, among other claims, a cause of action under Penal Code section 496 for receiving stolen property.The Superior Court of Orange County conducted a jury trial. After the close of evidence, the court granted a directed verdict against the plaintiff on all claims except for breach of contract, finding that the evidence did not support a claim under section 496 because the defendants’ conduct was based on a mistake rather than theft. The court entered a nominal judgment in the plaintiff’s favor on the contract claim.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed whether the directed verdict on the section 496 claim was proper. The appellate court held that sufficient evidence existed for a jury to find that the defendants’ receipt of the illegally increased rent constituted receiving property obtained by false pretenses, as defined by section 496, and that the issue should have been submitted to the jury. The court reversed the judgment as to the section 496 claim and remanded for further proceedings, awarding the plaintiff his costs on appeal. View "Johnson v. Connie, LLC" on Justia Law

A mobilehome park owner challenged the constitutionality of Civil Code section 798.30.5, which limits annual rent increases for certain mobilehome parks located within the jurisdictions of two or more incorporated cities in California. The statute, effective from January 1, 2022, to January 1, 2030, restricts rent increases to the lower of 3 percent plus the percentage change in the cost of living, or 5 percent, and limits the number of rent increases within a 12-month period. The owner alleged that the statute is facially unconstitutional because it lacks a procedural mechanism for property owners to seek rent adjustments to ensure a fair return, arguing this omission violates due process and results in an uncompensated taking.The Superior Court of Orange County granted the owner’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, finding that the absence of a process to seek exceptions to the rent ceiling violated due process and rendered the statute unconstitutional. The court rejected the owner’s takings argument but concluded that the statute’s plain language was undisputed and denied the State’s request for leave to amend its answer, determining that any amendment would be futile.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The appellate court held that the owner failed to demonstrate that the statute is facially unconstitutional, clarifying that a fair return adjustment mechanism is not required for all rent control laws to be constitutional, but may be necessary only if the law is confiscatory in its application. The court also found that the State’s general denial in its answer placed the owner’s standing to sue at issue, precluding judgment on the pleadings. Accordingly, the appellate court reversed the judgment in favor of the owner. View "Anaheim Mobile Estates v. State" on Justia Law

In this residential landlord-tenant dispute, the tenants, Michael Gogal and Hildy Baumgartner-Gogal, entered into a lease with landlords, Xinhui Deng and Jianhua Wu. The lease included a clause that capped recoverable litigation costs and attorney’s fees at $1,000. After successfully suing the landlords for retaliatory eviction, the tenants were awarded a monetary judgment and attorney’s fees exceeding the $1,000 cap. They then sought to recover additional litigation costs under California Code of Civil Procedure section 1032(b). The landlords argued that the lease’s $1,000 cap barred any further cost recovery.The Superior Court of San Diego County initially ruled in favor of the landlords, enforcing the $1,000 cap. However, after further arguments from the tenants, the court reversed its decision, allowing the tenants to recover nearly $14,000 in costs. The court reasoned that enforcing the cap would contravene the public policy intent of California Civil Code section 1942.5, which aims to protect tenants from abusive landlord conduct.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The main issue was whether parties to a contract could waive their statutory right to recover litigation costs under section 1032(b) through a pre-dispute agreement. The appellate court concluded that section 1032(b) establishes a default rule allowing prevailing parties to recover costs but does not prohibit parties from waiving this right by agreement. The court found that such waivers are consistent with Civil Code section 3513, which allows the waiver of rights intended for private benefit. The appellate court reversed the lower court’s order, directing it to strike the tenants’ memorandum of costs, thereby enforcing the $1,000 cap stipulated in the lease. View "Gogal v. Deng" on Justia Law

Tenants Michael Gogal and Hildy Baumgartner-Gogal, a married couple, prevailed on a retaliatory eviction claim against their former landlords, Xinhui Deng and Jianhua Wu. Michael, a licensed attorney, represented the tenants for most of the lawsuit. Post-judgment, the tenants sought to recover half of Michael’s attorney’s fees, attributing them to his representation of Hildy. Despite declarations from the tenants indicating that Hildy believed she had retained Michael as her attorney, the trial court denied the request, applying the precedent set in Gorman v. Tassajara Development Corp., which held that fees are not awardable when spouses’ interests are joint and indivisible.The Superior Court of San Diego County ruled in favor of the tenants on their retaliatory eviction claim, awarding them compensatory and punitive damages. The court also ruled in their favor on most other claims and on the landlords’ cross-claims, resulting in a total judgment against the landlords. Subsequently, the tenants filed a motion to recover attorney’s fees under Civil Code section 1942.5, which mandates an award of reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing party in retaliatory eviction cases. The trial court granted the motion for fees billed by another attorney but denied it for Michael’s fees, citing the Gorman case.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, affirmed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court agreed with the trial court’s application of Gorman but emphasized the need for a nuanced analysis to determine whether a true attorney-client relationship existed between Hildy and Michael. The court concluded that the tenants failed to present sufficient evidence to establish such a relationship, as the record did not demonstrate that Hildy played a significant substantive role in the litigation or that her consultations with Michael were for the purpose of obtaining legal advice in his professional capacity. View "Gogal v. Deng" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, former tenants of the defendant, filed a complaint against their landlord, alleging various breaches and violations related to their tenancies. In response, the defendant filed two unlawful detainer actions against the plaintiffs for nonpayment of rent. These actions were later dismissed without prejudice. Subsequently, a jury found the defendant liable for certain claims, and the plaintiffs filed a new complaint, including a claim for malicious prosecution based on the unlawful detainer actions.The San Francisco Superior Court consolidated the cases and, after a bench trial, found in favor of the plaintiffs on their malicious prosecution claim. The court concluded that the defendant lacked probable cause to file the unlawful detainer actions and rejected the defendant's advice of counsel defense, determining that she did not rely on legal advice in good faith. The court entered judgment for the plaintiffs, and the defendant appealed.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that the defendant had asserted a valid advice of counsel defense. The defendant had consulted an attorney, disclosed all relevant facts, and acted on the attorney's advice in good faith. The court determined that the trial court erred in requiring the defendant to prove the attorney's competence and in shifting the burden of the attorney's legal research onto the defendant. Consequently, the appellate court vacated the judgment and remanded the case with instructions to enter a judgment of dismissal in favor of the defendant. The court declined to award costs as the respondents did not appear in the appeal. View "Ceron v. Liu" on Justia Law

Joseph Eshagian leased a residential unit in Van Nuys to Manuel Cepeda, who was required to pay $1,000 monthly rent. On December 20, 2022, Eshagian served Cepeda with a three-day notice to pay $8,000 in unpaid rent or quit. The notice did not specify the start date of the three-day period, nor did it clearly state that Cepeda would lose possession if he did not pay by a certain date. On December 27, 2022, Eshagian filed an unlawful detainer complaint seeking possession, unpaid rent, holdover damages, and attorney fees. Cepeda filed an answer denying the allegations and asserting affirmative defenses.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted Eshagian’s motion for terminating sanctions due to Cepeda’s failure to comply with discovery orders, struck Cepeda’s answer, and entered a default against him. A possession-only judgment was entered on May 3, 2023. Cepeda’s motion to vacate the judgment was denied, and he appealed to the appellate division of the superior court, which held the possession-only judgment was appealable and reversed the judgment, finding the three-day notice defective.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case to determine if a possession-only judgment in an unlawful detainer proceeding is appealable when the landlord’s damages claims are unresolved. The court concluded that such a judgment is not appealable because it does not resolve all rights of the parties. However, the court treated Cepeda’s appeal as a petition for writ of mandate due to the uncertainty of the law on appealability at the time of filing.The court found the three-day notice invalid for failing to specify when and how Cepeda had to pay the rent and that he would lose possession if he did not cure the default. Consequently, the complaint did not state a cause of action for unlawful detainer. The court dismissed the appeal, granted the petition, and directed the trial court to vacate the judgment in favor of Eshagian and enter a new judgment in favor of Cepeda. View "Eshagian v. Cepeda" on Justia Law

A landlord argued that a case brought by the Los Angeles City Attorney to enforce California's Public Nuisance Law (PNL) violated Government Code section 53165.1, which bars local governments from penalizing tenants or landlords solely due to contact with law enforcement. The case involved a 116-unit apartment complex in North Hollywood, where the People alleged a gang-related public nuisance. The complaint sought abatement of the nuisance, a permanent injunction, and civil penalties.The Los Angeles County Superior Court granted a preliminary injunction requiring the defendants to implement several security measures, including proper lighting, video monitoring, and private security. The court also ordered criminal background checks on tenants. Defendants appealed, and a different panel of the Court of Appeal affirmed the preliminary injunction but directed the trial court to consider modifying it in light of section 53165.1. On remand, the trial court modified the injunction to remove the background check requirements but confirmed the validity of the rest of the injunction.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case and held that enforcing the PNL is not prohibited by section 53165.1 because the PNL is a state law, not a local ordinance, rule, policy, program, or regulation. The court also determined that the action brought by the city attorney on behalf of the People of the State of California is not an action by a "local government" within the meaning of section 53165.1. Additionally, the court found that the preliminary injunction did not penalize tenants or landlords solely due to contact with law enforcement. The order was affirmed. View "People ex rel. Soto v. Group IX BP Properties" on Justia Law