Justia Landlord - Tenant Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in California Courts of Appeal
USPA City Center, LLC v. Law Offices of Jason W. Estavillo, P.C.
A commercial law firm entered into a 66-month lease for office space in downtown Oakland, California, but quickly failed to make rent and other payments. After accumulating substantial arrears, the landlord initiated an unlawful detainer action. The parties settled, with the tenant agreeing to pay arrears and stipulating that if it defaulted again, the landlord could obtain a judgment for possession, unpaid rent, fees, and future rent. The tenant defaulted again, leading the landlord to seek and obtain judgment under the settlement’s terms.The Alameda County Superior Court held hearings on damages, including the landlord’s claim for future rent. The landlord presented expert testimony and evidence on market conditions, showing high vacancy rates and poor prospects for re-leasing the premises. The tenant did not present counter-evidence. The court found the tenant breached the settlement and awarded possession to the landlord, damages for unpaid rent and fees, and future rental damages for three years, reduced to present value, based on market evidence and the landlord's duty to mitigate.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court’s judgment. It held that substantial evidence supported the award of future rent, the stipulation for damages was not an unlawful penalty under California law, and the judgment did not result in a double recovery. The court applied the substantial evidence standard for factual findings and de novo review for legal issues. The judgment was affirmed, and the landlord was awarded costs on appeal. View "USPA City Center, LLC v. Law Offices of Jason W. Estavillo, P.C." on Justia Law
Universal Shopping Plaza v. Hong
A tenant operating a restaurant entered into a five-year commercial lease with the landlord for retail space, which later continued as a month-to-month tenancy after the lease expired. In January 2023, the tenant withheld the rent, claiming entitlement to a previously discussed rent reduction due to pandemic-related difficulties. The tenant deducted the amount he believed he had overpaid from the rent for January and part of February 2023. Despite this, he paid full rent from March 2023 through February 2025. The landlord eventually served the tenant with a three-day notice to pay or quit in February 2025, demanding payment for the amount withheld in January and February 2023.After the tenant did not pay the amount demanded within three days, the landlord filed an unlawful detainer action in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, seeking possession and damages. The tenant demurred, arguing that the notice was invalid because it sought rent that had become due more than a year before the notice was served, in violation of California Code of Civil Procedure section 1161(2). The trial court overruled the demurrer and, following a bench trial, entered judgment for the landlord, awarding possession, unpaid rent, and holdover damages, reasoning that the lease required payments to be applied to the oldest obligation, thereby keeping the tenant in continual arrears.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reversed the judgment. It held that section 1161(2) requires a three-day notice to be served within one year after the rent becomes due, and the landlord’s notice, based solely on rent due more than a year prior, was void and could not support the unlawful detainer action or damages. The case was remanded for entry of judgment in favor of the tenant. View "Universal Shopping Plaza v. Hong" on Justia Law
8451 Melrose Property, LLC v. Akhtarzad
A commercial landlord leased a property to an individual, Sina, who stopped paying rent soon after the lease began, causing significant unpaid rent and property damage. The landlord regained possession of the property and found it had been gutted. The landlord sued Sina for breach of contract and prevailed at trial, but the initial judgment was reversed on appeal due to a change in parol evidence law. On retrial before a referee, the landlord again prevailed, with the referee finding substantial damages and the trial court adopting the referee’s decision, entering judgment for the landlord. This judgment was affirmed on appeal.After the second judgment, Sina and his wife filed for bankruptcy. During related bankruptcy proceedings, the landlord discovered new evidence revealing that Sina, his brothers, their wives, and a family-owned corporation, Amey, were all part of a longstanding “one-for-all” family partnership. The landlord moved in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County to amend the judgment to add these family members and Amey as judgment debtors, arguing that they were the true parties in interest and had been virtually represented in the litigation by Sina.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the trial court's decision to amend the judgment. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s order, holding that substantial evidence supported the findings that the family members and Amey were part of a partnership that controlled the litigation and benefited from it. The court held that under Code of Civil Procedure section 187, a court may amend a judgment to add parties who had sufficient control of the litigation and unity of interest with the original judgment debtor, even if traditional alter ego requirements are not strictly met. The court found no abuse of discretion and affirmed the addition of the individual partners and Amey as judgment debtors. View "8451 Melrose Property, LLC v. Akhtarzad" on Justia Law
Western Manufactured Housing Cmty. Assn. v. City of Santa Rosa
A nonprofit organization representing manufactured home community owners and a mobilehome park owner challenged the City of Santa Rosa’s enforcement of California Penal Code section 396 during a multi-year wildfire state of emergency. Section 396 prohibits increasing the rental price of mobilehome spaces by more than 10 percent during a declared emergency. The plaintiffs argued that, under Santa Rosa’s rent control ordinance, park owners should be able to impose annual increases according to the ordinance’s Consumer Price Index (CPI) formula, even if those increases cumulatively exceeded the 10 percent cap in section 396. Alternatively, they sought to “reset” post-emergency rents as if the suppressed CPI increases during the emergency had been implemented.The Sonoma County Superior Court denied the plaintiffs’ motions for summary judgment and granted the City’s, finding that section 396’s 10 percent cap was fixed at the rent authorized when the emergency began and that owners could not recoup lost increases after the emergency ended. The court reasoned that allowing such recoupment would defeat the statute’s purpose to protect consumers from excessive rent hikes during emergencies. The court entered judgment for the City after the plaintiffs’ third cause of action was dismissed by stipulation.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case de novo. The appellate court held that section 396’s cap applies to the rent authorized at the start of the emergency and lasts for its duration, regardless of local rent control provisions. The court further ruled that nothing in section 396 or the local ordinance entitles park owners to recoup suppressed rent increases once the emergency ends. The court affirmed the trial court’s judgment in favor of the City and awarded costs to the City. View "Western Manufactured Housing Cmty. Assn. v. City of Santa Rosa" on Justia Law
Aerni v. RR San Dimas
Two individuals who stayed at a San Dimas hotel challenged the hotel’s practice of enforcing a maximum 28-day stay policy. Under this policy, guests were required to check out and completely vacate the property for at least three days before being permitted to re-register, a practice the hotel’s management acknowledged was intended to avoid creating landlord-tenant relationships. The plaintiffs, who stayed at the hotel multiple times between June and November 2022, brought a putative class action alleging violations of California Civil Code section 1940.1 and other related claims, arguing that the hotel’s policy was designed to circumvent tenant protections for those using the hotel as a primary residence.The plaintiffs moved to certify a class consisting of all individuals who stayed at the hotel for at least 28 consecutive days but fewer than 31 days, from late 2018 to the present. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County found the class was numerous, ascertainable, and that the plaintiffs’ claims were typical, but denied class certification. The trial court reasoned that individualized questions predominated, because it believed section 1940.1 required proof that each class member used the hotel as their “primary residence” for the hotel to qualify as a “residential hotel” under the statute.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the order. The appellate court held that the trial court erred by interpreting section 1940.1 to require individualized proof that each guest used the hotel as their primary residence. The court clarified that whether a hotel is a “residential hotel” under section 1940.1 is a question that focuses on the overall character and intended use of the hotel, not on each individual guest’s circumstances. The order denying class certification was reversed, and the matter was remanded for the trial court to revisit the class certification question under the correct legal standard. View "Aerni v. RR San Dimas" on Justia Law
Ashirwad, LLC v. Bradbury
A married couple leased a commercial property from a landlord for use as a salon. As their lease approached expiration in March 2020, one of the tenants decided to retire, and the COVID-19 pandemic led to a state-issued stay-at-home order. The tenants left their salon equipment on the premises at the landlord’s repeated assurances not to worry about it. One day before the lease expired, the tenants paid an amount equivalent to one month’s rent with a note indicating the payment was a gesture of support during the pandemic. Three months later, they made a smaller payment. There was no discussion or agreement to continue the tenancy month-to-month. Several months after returning the keys, the landlord demanded rent for the months following lease expiration, asserting that the initial payment created a month-to-month tenancy under California Civil Code section 1945.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County held a bench trial and found the tenants credible, particularly regarding the nature of the payment as a gift rather than rent. The court concluded the statutory presumption of a renewed month-to-month tenancy was rebutted by the parties’ actions and lack of communication about continuing the tenancy. The court found no contract existed after the lease expired and entered judgment for the tenants. The landlord’s motion to vacate the judgment was denied.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, affirmed the judgment. The appellate court held that the trial court did not err in its application of section 1945, finding no contract arose after the lease expired. The court emphasized that the presumption of a month-to-month tenancy is rebuttable by objective evidence showing the parties did not mutually agree to continue the lease. The judgment in favor of the tenants was affirmed. View "Ashirwad, LLC v. Bradbury" on Justia Law
Ammari v. Ammari
The case involves a dispute over possession and damages related to a residential property in Malibu. In 2019, the plaintiff filed an unlawful detainer action against several defendants, including the defendant, seeking possession of the property and damages. The defendant responded with an answer denying several key allegations, including the plaintiff’s ownership of the property and the claimed fair rental value. The plaintiff later obtained leave to file a first amended complaint, which reclassified the action and asserted new causes of action but relied on the same underlying facts as the original complaint. The defendant did not file a new answer to this amended complaint.The Los Angeles County Superior Court entered a default against the defendant after he failed to answer the amended complaint and subsequently entered a default judgment awarding significant damages. The defendant moved multiple times to set aside the default judgment. The court eventually denied his postjudgment motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (d), which allows courts to set aside void judgments. The defendant timely appealed these orders.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed whether the original answer sufficed to controvert the first amended complaint’s allegations and precluded entry of default. The appellate court held that because the defendant’s original answer denied essential factual allegations that remained central to the amended complaint—including ownership and valuation—the default judgment was improper. The court found that a defendant’s original answer stands as a response to reasserted facts in an amended complaint, and default cannot be entered on allegations previously denied. The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment and the trial court’s order denying the motion to set aside default, remanding with instructions to vacate the default and default judgment. View "Ammari v. Ammari" on Justia Law
California Apartment Assn. v. City of Pasadena
In 2022, voters in a California city approved an initiative known as Measure H, which amended the city charter to establish rent control, just cause eviction protections, and an independent Rental Housing Board with significant regulatory authority over rental housing, rent increases, and evictions. The measure limited annual rent increases for certain multifamily units, prohibited evictions without just cause, and required the city council to appoint a supermajority of tenants to the Rental Housing Board. It also contained provisions for mandatory landlord-paid relocation assistance in certain circumstances and additional notice requirements prior to eviction for nonpayment of rent.After certification of the election results, a group of landlords and a rental housing trade association challenged the validity of Measure H in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. They alleged the measure constituted an impermissible revision of the city charter under the California Constitution, imposed unconstitutional property qualifications for public office, violated equal protection, and was preempted by various state laws. The superior court rejected most of these claims, holding that Measure H was a lawful charter amendment, did not violate constitutional protections regarding property qualifications or equal protection, and did not conflict with state law except in one respect: it partially severed language in the measure that imposed greater notice requirements than those mandated by state statutes for termination of tenancy.Upon review, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reversed in part. The court held that Measure H was a permissible charter amendment, not an impermissible revision; that restricting certain board seats to tenants with a leasehold interest did not violate the constitutional prohibition on property qualifications for office; and that the tenant-majority requirement did not violate equal protection under rational basis review. However, the court found that the relocation assistance provision for tenants displaced by lawful rent increases was preempted by the Costa-Hawkins Rental Housing Act, and that the additional notice requirement for evictions due to nonpayment of rent was preempted by the Unlawful Detainer Act. The preempted provisions were declared void, and the matter was remanded for the superior court to enter judgment consistent with these findings. View "California Apartment Assn. v. City of Pasadena" on Justia Law
Noon v. Fuentes
Several tenants of a subdivided property in Los Angeles, each with separate oral lease agreements for individual units, were forced out of their homes after the landlord obtained a default unlawful detainer judgment against the tenant of a different unit. The landlord did not inform these tenants of the proceedings or provide proper notice. Although only the tenant of unit seven was behind on rent, the landlord sought and obtained possession of the entire property. The sheriff’s deputies, acting on the writ of possession, evicted all the tenants, leaving them homeless and unable to retrieve most of their belongings.The tenants filed suit in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, asserting claims such as wrongful eviction, breach of quiet enjoyment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, fraud, and violations of statutory and local ordinances. The landlord responded by filing a special motion to strike under California’s anti-SLAPP statute, arguing that the tenants’ claims arose from protected petitioning activity—the prosecution of the unlawful detainer action. The Superior Court granted the motion for ten of the eleven causes of action, concluding that the tenants’ claims were premised on the landlord’s protected activity in pursuing the unlawful detainer case.Upon review, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Four, held that the tenants’ claims did not arise from protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute. The appellate court found that the gravamen of the tenants’ complaint was the landlord’s improper termination of their tenancies without judicial process or notice—not the act of filing or prosecuting the unlawful detainer action against another tenant. Therefore, the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order granting the anti-SLAPP motion and directed the lower court to deny the motion. View "Noon v. Fuentes" on Justia Law
Jimenez v. Hayes Apartment Homes, LLC
Two young children, ages four and two, suffered severe injuries after falling from a second-floor bedroom window in their apartment, which had recently undergone renovations. The property owner and manager had replaced the window without installing a fall prevention device, despite the window’s low sill height and significant drop to the ground. The children, through their guardian ad litem, sued the owner and manager for negligence, alleging both general negligence and negligence per se based on an alleged violation of the California Building Standards Code, which requires fall prevention devices on certain windows.The Superior Court of California, County of Alameda, heard the case. Before trial, the defendants sought summary adjudication and moved in limine to exclude expert testimony regarding the Building Code, arguing that the property was exempt from current requirements due to compliance with the code at the time of original construction and the use of “like-for-like” materials during renovation. The trial court denied these pretrial motions but, after plaintiffs presented their case at trial, granted a nonsuit on both negligence theories, finding no duty under general negligence and that the code exemption applied to the negligence per se claim.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. It affirmed the trial court’s ruling on general negligence, holding that the harm was not sufficiently foreseeable to impose a duty on the landlord under the circumstances. However, it reversed the nonsuit on negligence per se, holding that the trial court misinterpreted the Building Code: a window is not an “original material” exempt from current safety requirements. The appellate court remanded the case for retrial on the negligence per se claim. View "Jimenez v. Hayes Apartment Homes, LLC" on Justia Law