Justia Landlord - Tenant Opinion Summaries

In 2010, Pacific Grove authorized “transient use of residential property for remuneration,” subject to licensing. One-year “STR” Licenses were subject to revocation for cause. In 2016, the city capped the number of short-term rental licenses citywide at 250 and established a density cap of “15 [percent] per block.” In 2017, the city prohibited more than one license per parcel and required a 55-foot buffer zone between licensed properties. The changes provided that a license could be withdrawn, suspended, or revoked for any reason and that renewal was not guaranteed. The city resolved to “sunset” certain licenses using a random lottery. In 2018, Pacific Grove voters approved Measure M, to prohibit and phase out, over an 18-month sunset period, all existing short-term rentals in residential districts, except in the “Coastal Zone,” as defined by the California Coastal Act. Measure M did not restrict short-term rentals in nonresidential districts or otherwise modify existing rules.The court of appeal affirmed the dismissal of a suit by licensees. The Plaintiffs’ economic interest in renting their homes for transient visitors was not an entitlement subject to state or federal constitutional protection. The curtailment of short-term rental licenses is related to legitimate state interests. View "Hobbs v. City of Pacific Grove" on Justia Law

Ramirez, a self-employed contractor, was hired by a shopping center’s tenant to remove an exterior sign after the tenant vacated its space. While searching for the sign’s electrical box, he entered a cupola on the shopping center’s roof and fell through an opening built into the cupola’s floor, sustaining serious injuries. In a suit against Kimco, which owns and operates the shopping center, the trial court granted Kimco summary judgment based on the Privette doctrine, which creates “a strong presumption under California law that a hirer of an independent contractor delegates to the contractor all responsibility for workplace safety[,] . . . mean[ing] that a hirer is typically not liable for injuries sustained by an independent contractor or its workers while on the job.”The court of appeal reversed and remanded. Kimco did not hire its tenant or Ramirez to perform the work. Kimco did not delegate its own responsibility for the roof’s condition to Ramirez through an employment relationship, as contemplated by Privette. Nor did Kimco delegate such responsibility by virtue of its landlord-tenant relationship. The court acknowledged “the strong possibility that Kimco will prevail under general principles of premises liability. “ View "Ramirez v. PK I Plaza 580 SC LP" on Justia Law

In November 2019, Landlords served Tenants with a 120-Day Notice of Termination of Tenancy and half of the relocation assistance due under the San Francisco Rent Ordinance. Both Tenants then claimed disability status; Landlord provided one-half of the additional relocation assistance payment for disabled tenants. Landlords filed a Notice of Intent to Withdraw Residential Units from the Rental Market with the Residential Rent Stabilization and Arbitration Board and served Tenants with Notice to Tenant of Filing of Notice of Intent to Withdraw Residential Units from the Rental Market. Tenants exercised their right under the Act to a one-year extension of the withdrawal date based on their claimed disabilities; they did not vacate the premises by November 15, 2020. Landlords filed an unlawful detainer suit, Ellis Act, Gov. Code 7060. Tenants argued that the termination notice was defective in quoting a superseded version of the ordinance as the ground for eviction and therefore not properly advising them concerning relocation assistance payments.The court of appeal affirmed judgment in favor of Tenants, rejecting arguments that the Act preempts the ordinance, that Tenants cannot assert a defense under the Act for purported failure to comply with the ordinance, that the trial court improperly found that the notice of termination had to strictly comply with the ordinance, and that Landlords should be allowed to amend their complaint to state a claim for ejectment. View "2710 Sutter Ventures, LLC v. Millis" on Justia Law

Northfield issued a policy to insure an apartment complex. The coverage excludes liability for violations of the insured’s duty to maintain habitable premises; this exclusion also encompasses coverage for “any claim or ‘suit’ ” that also alleges habitability claims. Tenants sued the insured, alleging multiple habitability claims and other causes of action that were arguably not based on habitability. Northfield declined to defend the tenants’ lawsuit. After settling the underlying action, the insured sued Northfield for breach of its duty to defend. The trial court concluded the case presented a “mixed” action containing both potentially covered and uncovered claims, and that Northfield was obliged to provide a defense.The court of appeal reversed. The policy exclusion is plain and clear. The court rejected arguments that claims for retaliation, conversion, and trespass to chattels did not arise from the duty to provide habitable premises. The retaliation concerned complaints about habitable conditions and the claims are alleged in a suit that also alleges habitability claims. View "24th & Hoffman Investors, LLC v. Northfield Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Appellant appealed the order denying his motion to vacate the judgment entered against him for $251,200.13 after he failed to pay $30,000 as required pursuant to a stipulation for entry of judgment. Appellant contends the trial court erred because the judgment is an unenforceable penalty and is therefore void.   The Second Appellate disagreed with Appellant and affirmed the order denying the motion to vacate the $251,200.13 judgment. Here, the $251,200.13 damage provision in the stipulation for entry of judgment is not arbitrarily drawn from thin air. It is the actual and stipulated amount of damages. This is not a penalty or a liquidated damage provision. The court explained it cannot delete the terms of the stipulated judgment calling for monthly payments and it cannot add a provision to the terms of the stipulated judgment allowing a seven-year moratorium on monthly payments. Money has value over time. Appellant has had the use of the money for seven years. Respondent has been deprived of the use of the money for seven years. Respondent’s “more than reasonable” settlement terms should not be used against it to show “liquidated damages” or a “penalty.” View "Creditors Adjustment Bureau v. Imani" on Justia Law

Shao Yan Chen, Han Lin Liu, Zhi Hua Mo, Yuk Yee Cheng, Hui Zhen Hu, Ruizhao Wu, and Qi Di Wu (collectively, tenants) had a dispute with Valstock Ventures, LLC and 371 Broadway Street, LLC (together, Valstock) over which of two documents was the operative lease governing the tenants’ tenancies in two of Valstock’s apartment buildings. The tenants filed suit against Valstock seeking a declaratory judgment on this question, alleging a civil conspiracy, and stating claims for violations of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), Unfair Competition Law (UCL), and section 37.10B of the San Francisco Rent Ordinance. The trial court awarded the tenants approximately $1.1 million in attorney’s fees under Civil Code section 1717 after granting their motion for summary adjudication of the sole cause of action on the contract in this case, before trial or disposition of the remaining non-contract causes of action. The defendants appealed, arguing the award of attorney’s fees was premature because the litigation as a whole had not yet ended. To this the Court of Appeal agreed and therefore reversed. View "Chen v. Valstock Ventures, LLC" on Justia Law

The co-tenancy provision in the parties’ lease required a shopping center to have either: (1) three anchor tenants; or (2) 60 percent of the space leased, and, if it did not, Tenant-respondent JoAnn Stores, LLC was permitted to pay “Substitute Rent.” In 2018, Jo-Ann informed JJD it intended to start paying Substitute Rent effective July 1, 2018, because the co-tenancy provision was not met after two anchor tenants closed. Landlord-appellant JJD-HOV Elk Grove, LLC (JJD) responded that the co-tenancy provision was an unenforceable penalty under the holding in Grand Prospect Partners, L.P. v. Ross Dress for Less, Inc., 232 Cal.App.4th 1332 (2015). Jo-Ann contended Grand Prospect was distinguishable and the co-tenancy provision was enforceable. JJD and Jo-Ann filed competing complaints for declaratory relief and cross-motions for summary judgment. The trial court found the co-tenancy provision was enforceable, and thus granted Jo- Ann’s motion, denied JJD’s, and entered judgment accordingly. JJD appealed. The Court of Appeal declined to follow the rule announced in Grand Prospect here, and instead held that this case was governed by the general rule that courts enforce contracts as written. The Court therefore agreed with the trial court’s conclusion that the co-tenancy provision at issue in this case was enforceable, and affirmed the judgment. View "JJD-HOV Elk Grove, LLC v. Jo-Ann Stores" on Justia Law

The Costa Hawkins Rental Housing Act, Civil Code section 1954.50, generally exempts newly constructed residential units, single-family homes, and condominiums from local rent increase limitations. The San Francisco Rent Ordinance acknowledges these exemptions in sections 37.3(d) and (g). Costa Hawkins expressly preserves local authority to “regulate or monitor the grounds for eviction” on all residential rental properties, including properties exempt from local rent control.Landlords challenged a measure that amended the city’s rent ordinance to make it unlawful for a landlord to seek to recover possession of a rental unit that is exempt from rent control by means of a rental increase that is imposed in bad faith to coerce the tenant to vacate the unit in circumvention of the city’s eviction laws, claiming that the amendment is preempted by Costa Hawkins because it seeks to regulate the rent a landlord may charge on exempt properties. The trial court and court of appeal rejected the challenge. The amendment is a valid exercise of the city’s authority to regulate evictions and is designed to deter landlords from attempting to avoid local eviction rules by imposing artificially high rents in bad faith. View "San Francisco Apartment Association v. City & County of San Francisco" on Justia Law

J&A, a tenant of real party in interest, TTP, filed suit alleging that TTP failed to honor its right of first refusal when TTP entered an agreement to sell property to a third party, Adventure Church. J&A initiated legal action in the Fresno County Superior Court and filed a notice of pendency of action, commonly known as a lis pendens, to provide notice to interested parties of the litigation; TTP moved to expunge the lis pendens; and the trial court granted the motion. J&A then petitioned for writ of mandate challenging the trial court's ruling.The Court of Appeal granted the writ of mandate, concluding that the order expunging the lis pendens was flawed in several respects. The court found that the trial court's ruling expunging the lis pendens was based on erroneous legal rulings and factual findings not supported by substantial evidence. In this case, J&A has shown the probable validity of its real property claims and is entitled to the continued recordation of the lis pendens pending the outcome of litigation. The court ordered and entered a new order denying the motion to expunge the lis pendens. The court also concluded that J&A, as the prevailing party on the motion to expunge and in the writ proceeding, is entitled to recover its reasonable attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 405.38. The court also directed the trial court to hold further proceedings to calculate and award those attorney's fees and costs. View "J&A Mash & Barrel, LLC v. Superior Court of Fresno County" on Justia Law

Kremerman sued his former tenant, White. After a registered process server filed three non-service reports, Kremerman unsuccessfully sought to accomplish service by publication. In the subsequent proof of service, the process server stated that he left a copy of the summons and complaint with “a competent member of the household (at least 18 years of age) at the dwelling house or usual place of abode of the party” and identified said person as Plowden, an “authorized employee” at the Postal Annex where White maintained a private mailbox. The process server “thereafter mailed (by first-class, postage prepaid) copies of the documents” to the “authorized employee at ‘Postal Annex’.” The trial court entered a default judgment against White. White unsuccessfully moved to vacate the default judgment, alleging she was never effectively served with the summons and complaint.The court of appeal reversed. Under Code of Civil Procedure section 473 (d), and section 473.5, the trial court never acquired personal jurisdiction over White because service of summons was defective. Kremerman did not undertake diligent efforts to serve White. With respect to substituted service, the Postal Annex is not White’s household or usual place of abode, nor was Plowden a competent member of White’s household. Kremerman was aware that White had another address, as he included that address on the security deposit itemization. View "Kremerman v. White" on Justia Law