Justia Landlord - Tenant Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellants' action for a writ of prohibition against Appellees - Ashtabula County Court of Common Pleas Judge Marianne Sezon and Clerk of Court April Daniels - and denied Appellants' motion for oral argument, holding that Appellants failed to state a claim upon which a writ of prohibition could be granted.In a forcible entry and detainer action Judge Sezon ordered Appellants to vacate the premises at issue. The parties subsequently reached a settlement agreement, but Appellants did not vacate the premises by the agreed-upon date. The underlying plaintiff subsequently moved for a writ of restitution. Appellants filed a complaint for a writ of prohibition, arguing that the trial court lacked jurisdiction. The court of appeals denied and dismissed the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Judge Sezon did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction over the postjudgment proceedings before her. View "State ex rel. Allenbaugh v. Sezon" on Justia Law

Samsara rented San Francisco office space from Rreef for a ten-year term, to be in “delivery condition” by November 1, 2019. Samsara provided an $11,384,368.00 letter of credit as “collateral for the full performance.” In 2021, Samsara sued, asserting that in July 2019, after Rreef had certified “delivery condition,” Samsara discovered that the premises were contaminated with lead and asbestos and that after Samsara conducted testing, Rreef cut off its access to the premises. The next day, Rreef served Samsara a 5-day notice to pay rent or quit based on Samsara’s alleged failure to pay rent for August-September 2021 ($1,826,697.95). Rreef subsequently filed an unlawful detainer complaint, alleging that Samsara stopped paying rent and had created a pretext to avoid its lease obligations. In October 2021, Rreef sought a writ of attachment in the unlawful detainer action, seeking $3,796,175.51: the amount demanded in the 5-day notice and $1,784,477.53 for October-November.The court granted Rreef’s application. The court of appeal reversed and remanded. The court rejected Samsara’s arguments that the amount that Rreef sought to attach must be reduced under Code of Civil Procedure 483.015(b)(4) by the amount remaining on the letter of credit and that the trial court erroneously refused to consider Samsara’s affirmative defenses of waiver and estoppel. However, the trial court declined to consider Samsara’s retaliatory eviction defense and whether Rreef sought attachment for an improper purpose. View "Rreef America Reit II Corp, YYYY v. Samsara, Inc." on Justia Law

Under Colorado law, the required notice period for a landlord to give to a tenant before evicting the tenant was ten days. During the COVID-19 pandemic, however, Congress passed a law requiring a thirty-day-notice period for eviction from certain rental properties. The question this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court was whether that thirty-day-notice requirement was still in effect or whether it expired along with other aspects of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (“CARES Act”). Looking at the plain language of the CARES Act, the Supreme Court concluded the federal thirty-day-notice provision is still in effect for covered properties. View "Arvada Village Gardens v. Garate" on Justia Law

Elia Companies, LLC, filed suit against the University of Michigan Regents, alleging breach of contract; violations of Michigan’s anti-lockout statute; breach of covenant for quiet possession; constructive eviction; conversion; and unjust enrichment. In 2013, plaintiff entered into a 10-year lease with defendant to obtain space at the Michigan Union for establishing a coffee shop. In March 2017, defendant disclosed its plans to renovate the Union. Plaintiff’s complaint alleged that the parties’ lease required that they negotiate a relocation of the leased premises. However, defendant terminated the lease on April 20, 2018, based on plaintiff’s alleged default and ordered plaintiff to vacate the premises. Plaintiff filed this action in August 2018, and defendant, over plaintiff’s objection, filed a notice of transfer removing the case to the Court of Claims pursuant to MCL 600.6404(3) and MCL 600.6419(1) of the Court of Claims Act (the COCA). Defendant moved for summary disposition, arguing that plaintiff’s action had to be dismissed because plaintiff failed to comply with the notice and verification requirements of MCL 600.6431 of the COCA. The Court of Claims agreed and dismissed plaintiff’s case. Plaintiff appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part. The panel affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff’s ancillary claims on governmental-tort-immunity grounds but reversed the dismissal of plaintiff’s contract claim. The Michigan Supreme Court determined the Court of Appeals erred when it excused plaintiff’s failure to timely comply with MCL 600.6431. “All parties with claims against the state, except those exempted in MCL 600.6431 itself, must comply with the requirements of MCL 600.6431.” Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded to the Court of Claims for reinstatement of summary judgment granted in defendant’s favor. View "Elia Companies, LLC v. University Of Michigan Regents" on Justia Law

Plaintiff 65282 Two Bunch Palms Building LLC, (Two Bunch) orally leased an industrial building in Desert Hot Springs to Coastal Harvest II, LLC, (Coastal Harvest) for the indoor cultivation of cannabis. When, after two years of negotiations, the parties were unable to agree to a written lease and a master service agreement, Two Bunch served Coastal Harvest with a 30-day notice to quit. Coastal Harvest refused to vacate the property, so Two Bunch instituted this unlawful detainer action. After a one-day trial, the trial court entered a judgment of possession for Two Bunch and awarded it $180,000.13 in holdover damages. At trial court, Coastal Harvest unsuccessfully argued it operated a licensed cannabis operation on the property and, therefore, it could not be evicted because it was entitled to the presumption under California Civil Code section 1943 of a one-year tenancy for “agricultural . . . purposes” and the presumption of a one-year holdover tenancy for use of “agricultural lands” under Code of Civil Procedure section 1161(2). Assuming without deciding that Coastal Harvest’s cannabis operation constituted agriculture, Two Bunch rebutted the presumption under Civil Code section 1943 with evidence that the parties agreed that, unless they signed a written lease, the term of the oral lease was month-to-month. And, because this unlawful detainer action was not filed for failure to pay rent, Code of Civil Procedure section 1161(2) and its holdover presumption for “agricultural” tenants did not apply. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's judgment, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "65282 Two Bunch Palms Building LLC v. Coastal Harvest II, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Clearview Realty Ventures, LLC, JHM HIX Keene, LLC, VIDHI Hospitality, LLC, NAKSH Hospitality, LLC, 298 Queen City Hotel, LLC, ANSHI Hospitality, LLC, 700 Elm, LLC, Bedford-Carnevale, LLC, and Carnevale Holdings, LLC, owned commercial real estate on which they operated hotels, some of which offered restaurant services along with banquet or function facilities. They contended that the COVID-19 pandemic was a “natural disaster” and that their buildings were “damaged” within the meaning of RSA 76:21, I. Plaintiffs sought relief from the New Hampshire municipalities involved: the Cities of Laconia, Keene, and Manchester, and the Town of Bedford. After denial of their applications, they appealed to the superior court in the applicable county. Observing that there were thirteen separate lawsuits pending in six counties, they then filed an assented-to motion for interlocutory transfer without ruling and motion to consolidate to allow the coordinated transfer of the common questions of law to the New Hampshire Supreme Court. In this interlocutory transfer without ruling, the Supreme Court was asked to determine: (1) whether, for purposes of RSA 76:21, the COVID-19 pandemic constituted a “natural disaster”; and (2) if so, whether the buildings owned by the plaintiffs were “damaged” by COVID-19 such that they were “not able to be used for [their] intended use” within the meaning of RSA 76:21, I. The Court answered the second question in the negative. View "Clearview Realty Ventures, LLC v. City of Laconia; et al." on Justia Law

This appeal grew out of overpayments that lessee, Safeway Stores 46, Inc., made to its lessor, WY Plaza, L.C. The lease allowed Safeway to deduct construction costs from the payments to WY Plaza. But Safeway neglected to make these deductions for twelve years before demanding repayment. WY Plaza rejected the demand based on Safeway’s delay. Safeway responded by paying under protest and suing for restitution and a declaratory judgment. Both parties sought summary judgment. In its own motion, WY Plaza denied the availability of restitution because the parties’ obligations had been set out in a written contract. The district court agreed with WY Plaza. But the court went further, deciding sua sponte that Safeway’s delay prevented recovery under the doctrine of laches. So the court granted summary judgment to WY Plaza and denied Safeway’s motion. The Tenth Circuit disagreed as to both trial court rulings. Despite the lack of any laches argument in its motion, the district court relied on laches to grant summary judgment to WY Plaza on the claim for declaratory relief. The Tenth Circuit concluded the district court erroneously failed to notify Safeway before granting summary judgment to WY Plaza based on laches. Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit found that in granting WY Plaza’s motion for summary judgment, the district court relied on arguments that WY Plaza hadn’t raised. The district court also erroneously granted summary judgment to WY Plaza on the restitution claim: "The unilateral nature of Safeway’s mistake doesn’t prevent restitution." The Tenth Circuit held Safeway was entitled to summary judgment because WY Plaza failed to create a triable fact-issue, and Safeway was entitled to summary judgment on its claims for a declaratory judgment and restitution. View "Safeway Stores v. WY Plaza" on Justia Law

The Investigative Consumer Reporting Agencies Act (ICRAA, Civil Code, 1786) mandates certain disclosures for investigative consumer reports, which are often used by landlords to make decisions regarding consumers who apply for housing. ICRAA requires the adoption of “reasonable procedures” for providing consumer information “in a manner which is fair and equitable to the consumer," concerning the confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy, and proper utilization of their information. Any investigative consumer reporting agency or user of information that fails to comply with the requirements is liable to the affected consumer for any actual damages or $10,000, whichever sum is greater. Courts of appeal disagreed about the constitutionality and enforceability of ICRAA.In 2018, the California Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of ICRAA. Bernuy had filed one of 27 consolidated actions seeking damages against BPMC for its commission of ICRAA violations in 2017. Bernuy’s action was designated a “bellwether” case for adjudicating certain issues. The court of appeal held that the California Supreme Court’s 2018 decision did not constitute a subsequent change in the law that relieved BPMC of liability for its ICRAA violations. However, certain plaintiffs’ ICRAA claims are time-barred under the applicable two-year statute of limitations. The limitations period was not tolled by the pendency of a putative class action. View "Bernuy v. Bridge Property Management Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Sarah Spinette sought summer housing for herself and her minor child at the Redstone Apartments located on the campus of the University of Vermont and State Agricultural College (UVM). The Redstone Apartments were owned by Catamount/Redstone Apartments, LLC (Redstone), which leased the land from UVM. Catamount Commercial Services, Inc. (Catamount) managed the apartments. In March 2018, Catamount denied plaintiff’s application to sublet a two-bedroom apartment for herself and her daughter. Two years later, plaintiff filed a complaint against UVM, Redstone, and Catamount, alleging in relevant part that defendants violated the federal Fair Housing Act (FHA), and the Vermont Public Accommodations Act (VPAA), “by refusing to allow her to sublet an apartment because she intended to live in the apartment with her minor child.” In March 2021, following discovery, defendants moved for summary judgment, explaining that the Redstone Apartments were for students only and plaintiff’s housing application was denied because she intended to live with a nonstudent, not because she intended to live with her child. Defendants noted that student status was not a protected category under the FHA or VPAA. Plaintiff opposed the motion but did not identify any disputed material facts. She characterized defendants as arguing that the FHA and VPAA did not apply to their dwellings and claimed that this argument failed as a matter of law. Defendants' motion was granted, and Plaintiff appealed. But finding no reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "Spinette v. University of Vermont, et al." on Justia Law

Transform Operating Stores, LLC d/b/a Transformco Operating Stores LLC; Transform SR Brands LLC d/b/a Transformco d/b/a Kmart; and Transform KM LLC (collectively, “Transform”) appealed after a North Dakota district court entered an order awarding damages to Ted J. Boutrous, L.L.C. and The Boutrous Group, LLP and entered a [second] amended judgment of eviction. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the district court did not err finding a material breach of the lease and in exercising jurisdiction as a summary eviction. "While the court abused its discretion in bifurcating the eviction action, that error was harmless." The Court further concluded Transform failed to timely appeal the court’s contempt order for the untimely turnover of the property. View "Boutrous, et al. v. Transform Operating Stores, et al." on Justia Law