Justia Landlord - Tenant Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Colorado Supreme Court
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Naomi Bermudez, a tenant in a federally subsidized housing complex managed by Mercy Housing Management Group Inc., faced eviction after Mercy Housing alleged she violated her lease by having an unauthorized guest who stayed beyond the allowed period, repaired vehicles on the property, and harassed another resident. Bermudez denied these allegations and requested a jury trial to resolve the factual disputes.The Denver County Court denied Bermudez's request for a jury trial, stating that there is no constitutional right to a jury trial in civil matters in Colorado. Bermudez then filed a petition with the Supreme Court of Colorado, arguing that she was entitled to a jury trial under the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure and the statutory framework governing forcible entry and detainer (FED) actions.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and held that Bermudez is entitled to a jury trial on the factual disputes in the FED-possession action. The court found that the right to a jury trial in such cases is rooted in the statutory framework and the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure, specifically C.R.C.P. 338(a), which provides for a jury trial in actions for the recovery of specific real property. The court also determined that the FED statute and C.R.C.P. 338(a) are compatible and that the statutory right to a jury trial applies to factual disputes in FED-possession actions.The court acknowledged concerns about the potential burden on the county courts but concluded that the limited nature of the jury-trial right would not prove unworkable. The court reversed the county court's denial of Bermudez's jury demand, made absolute the order to show cause, and remanded the case with instructions for the county court to schedule a jury trial on the factual issues related to the possession dispute. View "Mercy Housing Management Group Inc. v. Bermudez" on Justia Law

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In this case from the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado, petitioner Claire E. Miller and respondent Jesse A. Amos were involved in a dispute related to eviction proceedings. Miller was a tenant who lived in a home owned and occupied by Amos. Their arrangement was an oral tenancy agreement where Miller agreed to provide pet care and light housekeeping services instead of paying rent. After six months, Amos served Miller with a notice to quit, alleging breach of their oral agreement. Miller refused to move out, and Amos filed a forcible entry and detainer (FED) complaint seeking eviction. Miller contended that her eviction was due to her refusal to engage in sexual acts with Amos, which she stated was a form of sex discrimination and retaliation under the Colorado Fair Housing Act (CFHA).The county court ruled in favor of Amos, stating that a landlord can serve a notice to quit for “no reason or any reason,” dismissing the CFHA violation claim as an affirmative defense for eviction. The district court affirmed this decision.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado reversed the lower court's ruling. The court held that a tenant can assert a landlord’s alleged violation of the CFHA as an affirmative defense to an FED eviction. The court noted that the purpose of the CFHA is to prevent discriminatory practices, and therefore, a tenant must be able to use it as a shield against a discriminatory eviction. The court also emphasized that a tenant's right to due process must be preserved even in eviction proceedings, which are intended to be expedited. This decision allows tenants in Colorado to assert discrimination or retaliation under the CFHA as a defense in eviction cases. View "Miller v. Amos" on Justia Law

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Under Colorado law, the required notice period for a landlord to give to a tenant before evicting the tenant was ten days. During the COVID-19 pandemic, however, Congress passed a law requiring a thirty-day-notice period for eviction from certain rental properties. The question this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court was whether that thirty-day-notice requirement was still in effect or whether it expired along with other aspects of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (“CARES Act”). Looking at the plain language of the CARES Act, the Supreme Court concluded the federal thirty-day-notice provision is still in effect for covered properties. View "Arvada Village Gardens v. Garate" on Justia Law