Justia Landlord - Tenant Opinion Summaries

This case involves a dispute between Melissa Sanchez, a tenant, and Chris and Jennifer Pickering, her landlords, over the terms of a lease agreement for a mobile home owned by the Pickerings. Sanchez believed the agreement was a lease-to-own contract, while the Pickerings asserted it was a lease with a purchase option contract. After the Pickerings initiated an eviction action due to Sanchez's alleged violations of the agreement, Sanchez caused extensive damage to the home.The Pickerings sued Sanchez for waste, claiming she caused $40,000 in damages and sought treble damages. Sanchez counterclaimed, alleging violation of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act (ICPA), breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and retaliatory eviction. The district court found Sanchez liable for damages to the residence and awarded treble damages. It also determined that there was no deception on the Pickerings' part to sustain Sanchez's ICPA claim, the agreement was unenforceable due to a lack of mutual understanding, and that the Pickerings were unjustly enriched by the $10,000 down payment and offset the Pickerings' damages award by this amount. The remaining claims were dismissed.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Idaho affirmed the district court's decision. The court found substantial and competent evidence supporting the district court's decision that the Pickerings did not engage in a deceptive act under the ICPA. The court also rejected Sanchez's contention that the district court's damages award should have been reduced to reflect an insurance payment received by the Pickerings as Sanchez failed to provide an adequate record for review. Finally, the court upheld the district court's unjust enrichment award, finding that Sanchez had not demonstrated an abuse of discretion. The Pickerings were awarded attorney fees for having to respond to the collateral source issue. View "Pickering v. Sanchez" on Justia Law

In a case concerning subsidized low-income housing, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, ruled that tenants in such housing developments have standing to sue a property management company under the unfair competition law (UCL) if their tenancies are terminated prematurely due to legally deficient notices. The plaintiffs, who lived in housing managed by FPI Management, Inc., claimed that their tenancies were terminated after FPI provided just three days’ notice, instead of the legally required 30 days’ notice. The trial court granted summary judgment to FPI, deciding that the plaintiffs did not suffer an injury that would confer standing under the UCL. The appellate court, however, held that the plaintiffs were prematurely deprived of property rights and subjected to imminent legal peril due to FPI's legally deficient termination notices. This amounted to an injury sufficient to confer standing under the UCL. The appellate court also noted a distinction between the plaintiffs who lived in housing subsidized by the HOME Investment Partnerships Program (HOME plaintiffs) and those living in housing subsidized by section 8 of the United States Housing Act of 1937 (Section 8 plaintiffs). The Section 8 plaintiffs failed to demonstrate their legal entitlement to 30 days’ notice, leading the court to affirm the trial court's summary judgment in favor of FPI regarding the Section 8 plaintiffs' UCL claim. The court also affirmed the trial court's denial of the plaintiffs' motion for summary adjudication, but reversed the judgment and post-judgment order on costs, rendering the cost order moot. View "Campbell v. FPI Management, Inc." on Justia Law

The Investigative Consumer Reporting Agencies Act (ICRAA, Civil Code, 1786) mandates certain disclosures for investigative consumer reports, which are often used by landlords to make decisions regarding consumers who apply for housing. ICRAA requires the adoption of “reasonable procedures” for providing consumer information “in a manner which is fair and equitable to the consumer," concerning the confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy, and proper utilization of their information. Any investigative consumer reporting agency or user of information that fails to comply with the requirements is liable to the affected consumer for any actual damages or $10,000, whichever sum is greater. Courts of appeal disagreed about the constitutionality and enforceability of ICRAA.In 2018, the California Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of ICRAA. Bernuy had filed one of 27 consolidated actions seeking damages against BPMC for its commission of ICRAA violations in 2017. Bernuy’s action was designated a “bellwether” case for adjudicating certain issues. The court of appeal held that the California Supreme Court’s 2018 decision did not constitute a subsequent change in the law that relieved BPMC of liability for its ICRAA violations. However, certain plaintiffs’ ICRAA claims are time-barred under the applicable two-year statute of limitations. The limitations period was not tolled by the pendency of a putative class action. View "Bernuy v. Bridge Property Management Co." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals held that when a landlord attempts to collect unpaid rent from a tenant during a period when the landlord was unlicensed a tenant may have a claim under the Maryland Consumer Debt Collection Act (MCDCA) and the Maryland Consumer Protection Act (MCPA) to the extent that the landlord's unlawful collection activity caused the tenant to suffer damages, including any rent payments made responding to the landlord's attempts to collect unpaid rent.Specifically, the the Court of Appeals held (1) a tenant who voluntarily paid rent to a landlord who lacked a rental license may not bring a private action under the MCPA or MCDCA to recover restitution of rent based upon the landlord's lack of licensure pursuant to the Baltimore City Code, Art. 13, 5-4; and (2) when a municipality or county enacts a rental license law conditioning the performance of a residential lease upon the issuance of a rental license a landlord may not file an action against a tenant to recover unpaid rent attributable to the period when the property was not licensed. View "Assanah-Carroll v. Law Offices of Maher" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed in part and affirmed in part the judgment of the court of special appeals dismissing an amended complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, holding that Petitioners' amended complaint adequately set forth a cause of action under Md. Code Real Prop. (RP) 7-113.Petitioners, occupants of residential property that they owned or leased, brought this action against Respondents, a mortgage servicer and a real estate broker, after Respondents posted eviction notices on Petitioners' properties in an attempt to gain possession of the properties without a court order. Petitioners claimed that Respondents violated RP 7-113 and the Maryland Consumer Protection Act (MCPA), Md. Code Comm. Law 13-101 et seq. The circuit court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed in part, holding (1) Petitioners set forth a cause of action under RP 7-113; and (2) this Court has not established a more demanding standard for pleading damages in private actions brought under the MCPA. View "Wheeling v. Selene Finance LP" on Justia Law

In a fifth amended class action complaint, plaintiffs Kelly Peviani, Judy Rudolph, and Zachary Rudolph, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, sued defendants Arbors at California Oaks Property Owner, LLC and JRK Residential Group, Inc. Plaintiffs alleged “Defendants advertise with colorful brochures and promising language that the Property is a safe, habitable, and luxurious place to live, with numerous amenities including a playground, cabanas and lounges, tennis and basketball courts, a rock climbing wall, gym, and pools and heated spas. But the Property is nothing of the kind. Instead, the Property is littered with used condoms, drug use, broken security gates, violence, is devoid of security patrols, and police are called to the complex on a regular basis. The pools are dirty, and the fitness equipment is broken. The complex is unsafe for tenants, especially children, and does not deliver on its material promises.” The complaint included eight causes of action: (1) false advertising; (2) breach of the implied warranty of habitability; (3) nuisance; (4) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (5) bad faith retention of security deposits; and (6) three causes of action for unfair competition. Plaintiffs moved for certification of two classes, but the trial court denied the motion. Plaintiffs contended on appeal the trial court erred by denying their class certification motion. In regard to the false advertising claim, the trial court denied class certification due to a lack of commonality that would, in turn, cause the class to be unmanageable. After review of the trial court record, the Court of Appeal determined the trial court's commonality finding was flawed, making its related conclusion pertaining to manageability unreliable. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Peviani v. Arbors at California Oaks Property Owner" on Justia Law

Sixty-nine current and former residents of mobilehome park Terrace View Mobile Home Estates filed a lawsuit against the park's owners, Terrace View Partners, LP, Thomas Tatum, Jeffrey Kaplan, and management company, Mobile Community Management Company (collectively, defendants). The operative first amended complaint, styled as a class action, included 12 causes of action based on allegations that defendants' failure to maintain the park in "good working order and condition" created a nuisance that, along with unreasonably high space rent increases, made it difficult or impossible for park residents to sell their mobilehomes. After the court denied plaintiffs' motion for class certification, the parties and the court agreed to try the case in phases, with the first phase involving 16 residents living in 10 spaces in Terrace View. A first-phase jury returned a special verdict finding defendants liable and awarded the individual plaintiffs economic and noneconomic damages for: intentional interference with property rights, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, nuisance (based on substantially failing to enforce the park's rules and regulations), breach of contract/breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment, and negligence/negligence per se. The jury found defendants were not liable for nuisance based on failing to provide and maintain the park's common facilities and physical improvements in good working order and condition, and were not liable for elder financial abuse against five plaintiffs. After the jury was discharged, the court issued an order on plaintiffs' cause of action alleging defendants violated Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq., the "unfair competition law" (UCL). The court ruled that a "catch-up" provision in defendants' long-term leases that could greatly increase rent at the end of a lease term was unfair in violation of the UCL. The judgment also reflected the court's rulings at the beginning of trial that certain other provisions in the parties' lease agreements violated California's Mobilehome Residency Law or were otherwise unlawful. Defendants appealed. The Court of Appeal concluded the jury's award of compensatory damages and punitive damages had to be reversed. Although the jury's award of economic damages may have included unspecified amounts that could be upheld on appeal if the special verdict form had segregated them, "it is clear from the record that the vast majority of the economic damages awarded represented reimbursement for overpayment of rent and diminution in value of homes caused by high rent. Because the award of such damages cannot be sustained under any of the theories of liability presented to the jury and it is impossible to sever any properly awarded damages from improperly awarded damages." The Court therefore reversed the entire award of compensatory damages and the attendant awards of punitive damages and attorney fees and costs to plaintiffs. View "Bevis v. Terrace View Partners, LP" on Justia Law

West Virginia’s consumer credit protection statute does not regulate the residential rental fees a landlord may charge a tenant pursuant to a lease for residential real property.The Attorney General filed a civil action against Defendant Landlord, one of the largest residential lessors in the state, alleging that Landlord’s residential leases included fees and charges that violated the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act (CCPA), W.Va. Code 46A-1-101 et seq. Landlord filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the CCPA does not apply to residential leases. The circuit court denied the motion. Thereafter, the circuit court certified to the Supreme Court the question of whether the CCPA applies to the relationship between a landlord and tenant under a residential lease. The Supreme Court answered the question in the negative. View "State ex rel. Morrisey v. Copper Beech Townhome Communities Twenty-Six, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendant, the law firm representing plaintiff's landlord in a suit for unpaid rent, alleging violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692e. Plaintiff claimed that the law firm had violated the act by swearing to an affidavit without personal knowledge of the facts. The court concluded that, absent an allegation that he actually did not owe rent, plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that the defendant's practice misled the state court in any meaningful way. In this case, plaintiff's complaint only indicates that a trial was had in which the state court received evidence before rendering a judgment on the underlying rent issue. Because plaintiff has not alleged a plausible violation of the FDCPA and his class claims were properly dismissed, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Janson v. Katharyn B. Davis, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were tenants in apartment complexes owned or managed by the corporate defendants. Plaintiffs' leases included a provision providing that, if attorneys' service were required due to the tenant's failure to pay rent, then the tenant must pay $400 in attorneys' fees if a court appearance was required and $200 if the matter was resolved without a court appearance. The tenant was also required to pay actual attorneys' fees in excess of $400. Eviction actions were brought against each plaintiff for the non-payment of rent. Plaintiffs filed a complaint against the corporate defendants and the individual defendant alleging violations of the Anti-Eviction Act, violations of the Consumer Fraud Act (CFA), and negligence. The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court in this case was the sufficiency of plaintiffs' pleading as it related to claims against corporate and individual defendants for consumer fraud and negligence based on lease provisions that imposed fixed attorneys’ fees on tenants that were unrelated to in-house counsel’s actual fee to evict. Applying the indulgent standard used to review motions for dismissal under Rule 4:6-2(e), the Supreme Court concluded plaintiffs alleged sufficient facts to state causes of action against the corporate defendants for consumer fraud and negligence. Plaintiffs have not, however, alleged sufficient facts to support a consumer fraud or negligence claim against the individual defendant. View "Green v. Morgan Properties" on Justia Law