Justia Landlord - Tenant Opinion Summaries

On October 18, 2000, Tenant leased Landlord's billboard for fifteen years, commencing on December 1, 2000 and ending September 30, 2015. The lease obligated Tenant to pay the full annual basic rent for 2007 to Landlord on January 1, 2007. Tenant later terminated the lease, effective January 8, 2007, and gave Landlord a check representing rent for the period of January 1, 2007 through January 8, 2007. Landlord filed suit against Tenant seeking the balance of the basic rent for 2007. Tenant moved for summary judgment, suggesting that Landlord agreed to pro-rate rent for 2007 during an oral communication. Supreme Court granted summary judgment for Tenant. The Appellate Division reversed and granted summary judgment for Landlord. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Tenant was obligated to pay the full annual basic rent for the calendar year 2007, the parties did not agree in the lease to apportion rent post-termination except in specified circumstances not relevant here, and Tenant's claim that the parties orally agreed to such apportionment was barred by the lease's "no oral modification" clause. View "Eujoy Realty Corp. v. Van Wagner Commc'ns, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Thomas Kellogg owned a house and land in Bethel.  In 1999, he entered into a rent-to-own agreement with William Oren whereby Oren would pay over time for the property, at which point ownership would be transferred to him. Beginning in 2000 and then from 2001 onwards, defendant Cindy Shushereba began to occupy the house with Oren in a romantic relationship. By August 2004, it was contemplated that defendant would co-own the property.  Plaintiff indicated that he wished to come to an agreement to sell the property to defendant and Oren. To that end, defendant liquidated her savings and paid plaintiff for a downpayment on the house.  Plaintiff credited Oren and defendant with the amount Oren had paid in rent.  These two contributions left roughly $98,721 to be paid to reach the purchase price.  The parties agreed orally that the balance would be paid monthly over fifteen years. No written purchase and sale agreement was ever prepared, but the parties intended that Oren and defendant would receive title immediately and give a mortgage secured by a promissory note for the installments. Plaintiff delivered a signed warranty deed to defendant, but defendant never signed the promissory note or the mortgage.  Because defendant could not pay the property transfer tax that would be due on recording, she never recorded the warranty deed.  Plaintiff testified that, at the time, he considered himself the mortgage holder only. Ultimately, the relationship between Oren and defendant dissolved, and, in May 2008, Oren moved out. A couple of months later, plaintiff and defendant became sexually involved.  During this time, plaintiff sought neither rent nor the purchase installments from defendant, and she made no payments. At some point in 2010, plaintiff began seeking rent from defendant, and she did make between two and four monthly rental payments of $650. Plaintiff paid the property taxes on the property throughout the time that defendant lived by herself in the house. Oren then sued plaintiff and defendant, seeking to be declared half-owner of the property along with defendant, from whom he sought a partition and accounting.  In September 2009, the superior court rejected Oren's claims. Defendant counterclaimed, contending that she owned the property or, in the alternative, that plaintiff had been unjustly enriched by defendant’s payments to him.  Prior to trial, the court dismissed as res judicata defendant’s claim that she owned the property, leaving the unjust-enrichment claim in her counterclaim. After a bench trial, the trial court ruled in favor of plaintiff’s claims for back rent and property taxes. However, the trial court ruled in favor of defendant with regard to her unjust enrichment claims for the return of the downpayment on the purchase price and several of her alleged capital and repair contributions. Both parties appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the contract between plaintiff and defendant was a contract for deed; the trial court erred in concluding it was a landlord-tenant relationship. Because the agreement between plaintiff and defendant was a contract for deed, the amount of $833 per month that defendant had agreed to pay plaintiff went entirely toward the purchase price plus interest. When the periodic payments were complete, defendant would become the owner of the property, free and clear of any interest of plaintiff, without a further payment. There was not an agreement to pay rent; the $833 monthly payment was not part of a rental agreement between plaintiff and defendant. View "Kellogg v. Shushereba" on Justia Law

In 1999, I-4 leased Florida land to Lazy Days, with an option to purchase, prohibiting assignment without written consent. In 2008, Lazy Days notified I-4 of its intention to file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy and assign the lease to LDRV. The parties negotiated a settlement agreement in 2009. I-4 consented to assignment. Lazy Days agreed not to “argue against the Bankruptcy Court abstaining from consideration of Lease interpretation issues ... except to the extent necessary in connection with the assumption and assignment of the Lease.” The agreement provided that “there is no intent to, nor is the Lease modified in any respect,” but did not state whether the purchase option survived. The Bankruptcy Court confirmed a reorganization plan incorporating the agreement and closed the case in 2010. In 2011, LDRV attempted to exercise the option. The parties each filed state court lawsuits and LDRV moved to reopen in Bankruptcy Court, which held that the anti-assignment provision was unenforceable and that refusal to honor the option violated the agreement. The district court vacated. The Third Circuit reversed, holding that the Bankruptcy Court properly exercised jurisdiction; the agreement’s exception applied because the proceeding was “in connection with ... assignment of the Lease.” The court rejected arguments that the parties agreed to waive application of 11 U.S.C. 365(f)(3) and that the Bankruptcy Court committed an unconstitutional taking and denied I-4 due process. View "In Re: Lazy Days' RV Ctr., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs owned a house trailer on a leased lot in Defendants' trailer park. Plaintiffs desired to sell their trailer to a third party, which required a transfer of the lot lease to the purchaser. Defendants refused to approve the lease transfer unless Plaintiffs agreed to pay for the removal of an abandoned oil tank on the leasehold. Plaintiffs filed this action for damages and injunctive relief, contending Defendants' demands violated the lease agreement. More than one year after Plaintiffs served discovery requests, Defendants moved to dismiss the action with prejudice for failure to prosecute. The Court of Chancery granted the motion, holding that because Plaintiffs declined the opportunity to go forward, the case was dismissed with prejudice. View "Valdes v. MCH Mariner's Cove, LLC" on Justia Law

Landlord and Tenant signed a lease agreement for a rental property that required Tenant to obtain a liability and renter's insurance policy at his expense. Tenants obtained a renter's protection policy of insurance. The house was later damaged by fire caused by a child using a lighter. Landlord's insurer (Insurer) paid for the loss. This subrogation action was brought against Tenants in Landlord's name. The district court dismissed the action, concluding (1) the lease provision requiring Tenant to obtain renter's insurance did not permit Landlord or Insurer to bring a subrogation action against Tenants; and (2) Tenants were coinsureds under Landlord's fire insurance policy, and Insurer could not subrogate against its coinsureds. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the terms of the lease did not overcome the presumption that Tenant was coinsured under Landlord's fire insurance policy, Landlord and Insurer could not bring a subrogation action against Tenants. View "Beveridge v. Savage" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were five limited partnerships that owned multifamily housing rental projects in Maine. Plaintiffs entered into housing assistance payments (HAP) contracts with the Maine State Housing Authority (MaineHousing) in order to participate in the Section 8 program. The program is administered by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) in conjunction with state and local public housing agencies. Landlords participating in the program receive partial rent from their tenants and the remainder of the rent from the relevant public housing agency, who is, in turn, reimbursed by HUD. Payments from state and local agencies to the Section 8 landlords are adjusted periodically according to guidelines promulgated by HUD. In 2009, Plaintiffs sued MaineHousing in federal district court for breach of contract, alleging that MaineHousing had wrongfully refused to grant them certain annual increases in their Section 8 payments. MaineHousing impleaded HUD. The district court granted summary judgment for MaineHousing and HUD. The First Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that each of the housing assistance payments contracts at issue allowed MaineHousing to withhold automatic annual adjustments on contract rents where MaineHousing determines that further adjustments would result in material differences between contract rents and market rates. View "One & Ken Valley Housing Group v. Me. State Housing Auth." on Justia Law

Landlord and Tenant entered into a twelve-year lease for commercial space. The lease required a separate guaranty agreement to be executed by Guarantor. Tenant stopped making rent payments a couple of years later, and thereafter, Landlord reentered and took possession of the premises, thereby terminating the lease. Landlord subsequently filed suit against Tenant and Guarantor for damages arising from the breach of contract. The superior court granted summary judgment to Landlord as to liability and awarded damages in the amount of $1,092,653, for which Tenant and Guarantor were jointly liable. The appeals court affirmed in part and vacated the judgment assessing damages and remanded. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the part of the judgment finding Tenant liable for breach of the lease and assessing damages for the period before termination of the lease in the amount of $37,276 plus prejudgment interest; and (2) vacated the part of the judgment assessing damages for the period following termination of the lease and awarding attorney's fees. View "275 Washington St. Corp. v. Hudson River Int'l, LLC" on Justia Law

This case involved a commercial lease dispute governed by Minnesota law. Annex filed suit against TNS seeking unpaid rent and penalties owed under a lease for July, August, September, and October 2011. The district court held that TNS's July 7th letter together with its earlier email were sufficient to terminate the holdover lease effective August 31, 2011. Therefore, the district court entered judgment for the rent owing for July and August, but not for September and October. Annex appealed, arguing that the July 7th letter was not the notice of termination required by Minn. Stat. 504B.135 as construed by the Supreme Court of Minnesota, and therefore TNS continued to be bound by the terms of the unterminated lease. The court disagreed with the district court's reading of Minnesota precedents, concluding that Annex was entitled to the relief requested in this lawsuit for four months' rent. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded for further proceedings. View "Annex Properties, LLC v. TNS Research Int'l" on Justia Law

Tenant rented a house pursuant to a lease agreement with Landlord. Tenant later lease another of Landlord's properties pursuant to a lease agreement. For both properties, Landlord charged Tenant additional monthly "appliance fees" in excess of the stated rent amounts. Tenant brought this action against Landlord for noncompliance with the terms of her two lease agreements and for failure to return her security deposit. Landlord counterclaimed for damages. After a bench trial, judgment was entered in favor of Tenant. Tenant was represented by senior certified law students operating under the supervision of an attorney who was the director of the general civil practice clinic at Creighton University School of Law. Landlord argued that attorney fees could not be covered because Tenant's attorneys were working pro bono. The district court disagreed and awarded statutory fees. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment in favor of Tenant but modified the designee of the attorney fee award, directing the district court to amend its order so as to award the attorney fees directly to the legal services provider. View "Black v. Brooks" on Justia Law

Heidi Schumacher signed a renewed lease with Meadowland Apartments. Meadowland later filed an eviction action against Schumacher, alleging that she was in material non-compliance with the lease because Schumacher kept a disruptive dog in her apartment. The magistrate court found that Schumacher's conduct constituted sufficient grounds for termination of the lease. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the magistrate court (1) did not abuse its discretion in denying Schumacher's motion for a continuance, as Schumacher was given a reasonable opportunity to secure evidence on her behalf; (2) did not abuse its discretion in considering evidence of incidents that occurred prior to the term of Schumacher's most recent lease with Meadowland; and (3) did not err in finding that Meadowland provided reasonable accommodations for Schumacher's disability as required under the Fair Housing Amendments Act.View "Meadowland Apartments v. Schumacher" on Justia Law