Justia Landlord - Tenant Opinion Summaries

The issue in this case was whether the parties' dispute over a provision in their lease for a shopping center store had to be resolved under the arbitration provision in the lease or whether it could have been resolved by a proceeding in district court. The disputed provision provided that landlord KWD River City Investments, L.P. would not alter the exterior of the shopping center without the consent of tenant Ross Dress for Less. KWD admitted that it allowed another tenant to alter the shopping center's exterior at that tenant's store location without Ross' consent. However, KWD maintained that Ross unreasonably withheld its consent in violation of the consent provision. KWD contended that the unreasonableness of Ross' refusal to consent was demonstrated by Ross conditioning its consent upon KWD making exterior alterations to benefit Ross. KWD then filed declaratory judgment action in district court to resolve the dispute. Ross filed a motion to compel arbitration. The trial court denied the motion to compel arbitration. On appeal, the Court of Civil Appeals reversed. KWD petitioned the Supreme Court to review the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals. Upon review, the Court vacated the Court of Civil Appeals opinion and affirmed the trial court's denial of the motion to compel arbitration. View "KWD River City Investments, LP v. Ross Dress for Less, Inc." on Justia Law

Developer and Tenant had done business for many years and had established a template for future transactions. A dispute arose when Tenant forwarded to Developer a commercial lease containing a material term that deviated from the parties' previous leases without specifically drawing Developer's attention to the change. Developer signed the lease without reading the proffered lease line by line. Years later, when Developer discovered the new term, it filed suit against Tenant. The district court, without passing on the merits of the dispute, entered summary judgment against Developer on the ground that the action was time-barred. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the district court appropriately determined that Developer's action was brought too late. View "Rared Manchester NH, LLC v. Rite Aid of N.H., Inc." on Justia Law

Landlord leased commercial real property to Tenant. Landlord granted Tenant permission to renovate the property on the condition that Tenant would pay for the renovations. Tenant thereafter contracted with Contractor to perform the work. When Tenant defaulted on its payments to Contractor, Contractor filed a lien against Landlord's property. Contractor thereafter filed a complaint against Landlord and Tenant, asserting various claims and seeking to foreclose on its lien. The district court granted Landlord's motion for summary judgment, concluding that, pursuant to Wyoming's lien statutes, a valid mechanic's lien did not exist because Landlord did not agree to pay for the renovations to the property and that Tenant was not acting as Landlord's agent in contracting for the improvements. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court correctly interpreted Wyo. Stat. Ann. 29-2-105(a)(ii) to require a finding of agency between the landlord and tenant before a mechanic's lien may attach to the landlord's property for work performed at the tenant's behest; and (2) in this case, that relationship did not exist.View "Redco Constr. v. Profile Props., LLC " on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Robert Shipley appealed a district court order which granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff-Appellee BNSF Railway Company. BNSF leased commercial property in Miles City, Montana, to Shipley. The lease provided that either party could terminate the lease upon 30 days written notice. Shipley failed to pay rent to BNSF for a number of years. This failure by Shipley resulted in overdue rent payments of $17,700. BNSF notified Shipley on January 7, 2011, that the Lease Agreement would be cancelled and terminated in 30 days, effective on February 10, 2011. The Lease Agreement also required that Shipley remove all improvements and personal property from the leased premises within the 30 days of the lease termination. Shipley failed to remove the items. BNSF provided Shipley with a 60 day extension to remove the items. Shipley again refused to remove the items. Shipley’s refusal prompted BNSF to file a complaint to quiet title to the improvements and personal property, a declaratory judgment that BNSF had terminated the lease validly, trespass, unlawful detainer, and claim for reasonable rent. Shipley acknowledged that he owed $17,700 in rent. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that no genuine issue of material fact existed and that the district court correctly granted summary judgment. View "BNSF v. Shipley" on Justia Law

Plaintiff corporation filed an action against Defendant, a resident of Nebraska, for damages related to the termination of an apartment lease in Iowa where Defendant formerly resided. Plaintiff attempted to serve notice under Iowa's long-arm statute by certified mail at a forwarding address provided by Defendant upon the termination of his tenancy in the apartment. The notice, however, was returned by postal authorities. Plaintiff took no further action to achieve service, and the district court entered a default judgment against Defendant. Based on the default judgment, Plaintiff sought to garnish Defendant's wages at his Nebraska employer. Defendant sought to quash the garnishment on the ground that Plaintiff failed to comply with the requirements of Iowa Code 617.3 in connection with the underlying action. The district court denied Defendant relief. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the underlying default judgment that gave rise to the garnishment in this case was void for lack of personal jurisdiction over Defendant as provided in section 617.3. Remanded with instructions to grant the motion to quash. View "L.F. Noll Inc. v. Eviglo" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs claimed that the City of New York was contractually obligated to pay rent subsidies to their landlords under the Advantage New York program until expiration of their leases. State and Federal reimbursement for two-thirds of the Advantage program's costs ended on April 1, 2011, causing the City to discontinue it as of that date. Both lower courts found that the City did not intend to enter into enforceable contracts with Plaintiffs or their landlords under the Advantage program. The Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal of the lawsuit, holding that the courts below did not err in finding that the City made no contractual commitment to continue the Advantage program through expiration of Plaintiffs' leases. View "Zheng v. City of New York" on Justia Law

After Tenants failed to pay rent for the last four months of living in a home owned by Landlord, Landlord commenced a forcible entry and detainer action against Tenants. Landlord did not respond to Tenants' request for a return of their security deposit. Tenants subsequently commenced a small claims action against Landlord seeking to recover double damages for their security deposit. Landlord, in turn, filed a small claims action against Tenants seeking damages for unpaid rent and late fees. The district court awarded Landlord four months of unpaid rent and late fees and awarded Tenants the amount of their security deposit. The superior court affirmed. Tenants appealed, contending, inter alia, that Landlord's competing small claims action should not have been permitted to proceed until she returned their security deposit. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because neither the security deposit statute nor the lease prohibited Landlord from bringing a separate claim for breach of other terms of the rental agreement, the district court did not err in considering Landlord's small claims action simultaneously with Tenants' claim; and (2) the district court did not err in refusing to impose double damages, attorney fees, and costs. View "Lyle v. Mangar" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review a Memorandum Opinion of the Court of Appeals and to address four issues stemming from a lawsuit by LensCrafters to enforce a noncompete provision against optometrist Dennis Kehoe after a sublease contract between the two parties ended. After review of the "complex, convoluted, and contentious eleven-year dispute," the Supreme Court held that (1) the district court properly dismissed LensCrafters' breach of contract claim on summary judgment because LensCrafters terminated the parties' contract as a matter of law and, with it, the contract's noncompete provision; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Kehoe's request to supplement his pleadings shortly before trial; and (3) summary judgment dismissing Kehoe's malicious abuse of process and tortious interference with contract counterclaims was proper because Kehoe did not demonstrate genuine issues of material fact. Because we hold that the noncompete provision was not in effect during any relevant time, the Court did not address Kehoe's fourth issue, whether the provision would have been contrary to public policy. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Memorandum Opinion of the Court of Appeals in part and reversed in part. View "Lenscrafters, Inc. v. Kehoe" on Justia Law

In late April 2006 Samuel Sengul leased a commercial storefront in downtown Juneau to Robert Manus, who was acting on behalf of CMS Franklin, Inc. The building was under construction when Sengul and CMS entered into the lease agreement, but the lease provided that Sengul would deliver the property to CMS in a specified improved condition by the time the lease commenced on June 1. The lease also included a rent abatement provision, which was at issue in this case. The building was not in improved condition until approximately June 8. Manus did not pay any rent, nor did he mention the rent abatement provision when he took possession of the building. Sengul finally demanded rent in late July, but Manus refused to pay, claiming abatement. In September, Manus had still not paid any rent, and Sengul put a lock on CMS's store door and placed signs demanding rent in the store windows. Manus had the lock cut off, but began to move the inventory out of the store, vacating it and returning the keys to Sengul two days after the lockout. Sengul then sued CMS and Manus for unpaid rent. The superior court determined that CMS had waived its right to rent abatement and owed Sengul unpaid rental amounts for the time that Manus had occupied the building. But the court also concluded that Sengul's lockout amounted to constructive eviction and awarded CMS damages as a refund for work performed on the premises that CMS was unable to benefit from after the constructive eviction. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with the superior court that Sengul's actions constituted constructive eviction, but the Court disagreed that CMS waived its entitlement to have the rent abated. The case was remanded for the superior court to recalculate the damages owed to CMS.View "Sengul v. CMS Franklin, Inc." on Justia Law

The Heins rented a house from Julia Benintendi and the Perkerwicz family (hereinafter B&P). B&P alleged the Heins caused considerable damage to the property when they vacated the premises. The Heins countered that B&P unlawfully retained their security deposit and refused to reimburse the Heins for home and lawn improvements. B&P sued and obtained a default judgment. The district court subsequently set aside the default judgment and held a jury trial. B&P were awarded damages but not attorney fees or costs. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying attorney fees to both parties; (2) the district court incorrectly required each party to bear its own costs because, as the prevailing party, B&P was entitled to its costs under Mont. Code Ann. 25-10-101; and (3) the district court did not manifestly abuse its discretion in setting aside the default judgment because it had good cause to do so. View "Benintendi v. Hein" on Justia Law