Justia Landlord - Tenant Opinion Summaries

After Tenants failed to pay rent for the last four months of living in a home owned by Landlord, Landlord commenced a forcible entry and detainer action against Tenants. Landlord did not respond to Tenants' request for a return of their security deposit. Tenants subsequently commenced a small claims action against Landlord seeking to recover double damages for their security deposit. Landlord, in turn, filed a small claims action against Tenants seeking damages for unpaid rent and late fees. The district court awarded Landlord four months of unpaid rent and late fees and awarded Tenants the amount of their security deposit. The superior court affirmed. Tenants appealed, contending, inter alia, that Landlord's competing small claims action should not have been permitted to proceed until she returned their security deposit. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because neither the security deposit statute nor the lease prohibited Landlord from bringing a separate claim for breach of other terms of the rental agreement, the district court did not err in considering Landlord's small claims action simultaneously with Tenants' claim; and (2) the district court did not err in refusing to impose double damages, attorney fees, and costs. View "Lyle v. Mangar" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review a Memorandum Opinion of the Court of Appeals and to address four issues stemming from a lawsuit by LensCrafters to enforce a noncompete provision against optometrist Dennis Kehoe after a sublease contract between the two parties ended. After review of the "complex, convoluted, and contentious eleven-year dispute," the Supreme Court held that (1) the district court properly dismissed LensCrafters' breach of contract claim on summary judgment because LensCrafters terminated the parties' contract as a matter of law and, with it, the contract's noncompete provision; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Kehoe's request to supplement his pleadings shortly before trial; and (3) summary judgment dismissing Kehoe's malicious abuse of process and tortious interference with contract counterclaims was proper because Kehoe did not demonstrate genuine issues of material fact. Because we hold that the noncompete provision was not in effect during any relevant time, the Court did not address Kehoe's fourth issue, whether the provision would have been contrary to public policy. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Memorandum Opinion of the Court of Appeals in part and reversed in part. View "Lenscrafters, Inc. v. Kehoe" on Justia Law

In late April 2006 Samuel Sengul leased a commercial storefront in downtown Juneau to Robert Manus, who was acting on behalf of CMS Franklin, Inc. The building was under construction when Sengul and CMS entered into the lease agreement, but the lease provided that Sengul would deliver the property to CMS in a specified improved condition by the time the lease commenced on June 1. The lease also included a rent abatement provision, which was at issue in this case. The building was not in improved condition until approximately June 8. Manus did not pay any rent, nor did he mention the rent abatement provision when he took possession of the building. Sengul finally demanded rent in late July, but Manus refused to pay, claiming abatement. In September, Manus had still not paid any rent, and Sengul put a lock on CMS's store door and placed signs demanding rent in the store windows. Manus had the lock cut off, but began to move the inventory out of the store, vacating it and returning the keys to Sengul two days after the lockout. Sengul then sued CMS and Manus for unpaid rent. The superior court determined that CMS had waived its right to rent abatement and owed Sengul unpaid rental amounts for the time that Manus had occupied the building. But the court also concluded that Sengul's lockout amounted to constructive eviction and awarded CMS damages as a refund for work performed on the premises that CMS was unable to benefit from after the constructive eviction. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with the superior court that Sengul's actions constituted constructive eviction, but the Court disagreed that CMS waived its entitlement to have the rent abated. The case was remanded for the superior court to recalculate the damages owed to CMS.View "Sengul v. CMS Franklin, Inc." on Justia Law

The Heins rented a house from Julia Benintendi and the Perkerwicz family (hereinafter B&P). B&P alleged the Heins caused considerable damage to the property when they vacated the premises. The Heins countered that B&P unlawfully retained their security deposit and refused to reimburse the Heins for home and lawn improvements. B&P sued and obtained a default judgment. The district court subsequently set aside the default judgment and held a jury trial. B&P were awarded damages but not attorney fees or costs. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying attorney fees to both parties; (2) the district court incorrectly required each party to bear its own costs because, as the prevailing party, B&P was entitled to its costs under Mont. Code Ann. 25-10-101; and (3) the district court did not manifestly abuse its discretion in setting aside the default judgment because it had good cause to do so. View "Benintendi v. Hein" on Justia Law

The Belangers rented a trailer from John Mulholland. The Belangers informed Mulholland about problems with their running water and toilet, but no repairs were made. When the Belangers were eventually evicted from their trailer, they had lived there without running water for nine months and without a functioning toilet for five months. The Belangers sued Mulholland for breach of the implied warranty of habitability. The trial court ruled in favor of the Belangers and awarded the Belangers five months' rent. The Belangers appealed, contending that they were entitled to damages for an additional four-month period when they lacked running water but still had a functioning toilet. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment as modified, holding that the Belangers were entitled to damages for an additional four months because, by itself, the lack of running water in the Belangers' trailer for four months rendered the trailer unfit for human habitation.View "Belanger v. Mulholland" on Justia Law

David Caron purchased a majority membership in Goodhall's Chrysler-Plymouth-Dodge-Jeep-Eagle, LLC without having obtained the written consent of Goodhall's, Inc. (Goodhall's), in violation of Goodhall's lease with Goodhall's Chrysler-Plymouth-Dodge-Jeep-Eagle. The lease idenitified Goodhall's as the landlord and Goodhall's Chrysler-Plymouth-Dodge-Jeep-Eagle as the tenant. After a dispute arose concerning the party responsible for remediating certain environmental conditions on the property, Plaintiffs, David Caron and David Caron Chrysler Motors, filed suit against Defendants, Goodhall's and others, claiming that Defendants had violated provisions of its lease regarding Goodhall's responsibility for preexisting environmental conditions and Goodhall's warranty of fitness and habitability. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Defendants, concluding that no contract existed between the parties to this action because the assignment of the majority interest in the tenant to Caron was invalid. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the appellate court improperly failed to consider Plaintiffs' claim that the trial court had improperly concluded that no contract existed between David Caron Chrysler Motors and Goodhall's; and (2) the trial court was incorrect in finding that, because Goodhall's did not consent to the assignment, there was no contract between David Caron Chrysler Motors and Goodhall's. View "David Caron Chrysler Motors, LLC v. Goodhall's, Inc." on Justia Law

A group of residential tenants (collectively, Tenants) alleged claims of negligence against Canyon Cover Properties, LLC and Apartment Management Consultants, LLC (collectively, AMC). AMC argued that it was relieved from liability because Tenants signed a residential lease agreement (Agreement) that included a limited liability provision (Exculpatory Clause) waiving the right to bring an action for negligence against AMC. The district court concluded that the Agreement and Exculpatory Clause did not violate public policy and were therefore valid and enforceable, and accordingly, granted summary judgment for AMC. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because AMC failed to respond meaningfully to Tenants' claim that the Exculpatory Clause was unenforceable because it violated public policy, AMC's brief was rejected and Tenants' claim was accepted that the Exculpatory Clause in the Agreement was unenforceable. Remanded. View "Broderick v. Apartment Mgmt. Consultants, LLC" on Justia Law

Tenant fell behind in its monthly rental payments to Landlord, after which Landlord obtained a summary eviction order in justice court. Landlord subsequently filed a complaint in district court against Tenant for damages for breach of the parties' lease agreement. Tenant filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that Landlord's claim for damages was precluded by the doctrine of claim preclusion and arguing that Landlord was required to seek summary eviction in unison with its claim for damages. The district court denied Tenant's motion. Tenant then petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus directing the district court to vacate its order denying Tenant's motion for summary judgment. The Court denied the petition, holding that the summary eviction scheme provided in Nev. Rev. Stat. 40.253 allows for an exception to claim preclusion in cases such as this one in that it permits a landlord to bring a summary eviction proceeding in justice court and subsequently bring a damages claim in district court.View "G.C. Wallace, Inc. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Petitioner Joel Harrington appealed a superior court order in favor of Respondent Metropolis Property Management Group, Inc. (Metropolis). On May 27, 2005, Petitioner entered into a residential lease for an apartment at Hollis Commons Apartments in Concord. The lease agreement required the petitioner to pay a security deposit of $875 to be held "until the termination of Lessee's occupancy." Petitioner entered into two lease renewals, the first in May 2006 renewing the lease for one year, and another in June 2007. The second renewal called for a term commencing on July 1, 2007, and ending "60 days after written notice has been given." The original lease agreement and both lease renewals identified "Hollis Commons Apartments, LLC" as the lessor. The parties had a dispute over the lease agreement and return of the security deposit. Petitioner argued that the trial court erred in finding that Metropolis was not a party to the lease agreement, and in dismissing his contract claims. Although the lease agreement and renewals all show "Hollis Commons Apartments, LLC" as the lessor and either Petitioner or the Petitioner and his wife as the lessees, Petitioner contended that Metropolis must be considered a party to the agreement. Upon review of the trial court record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision to dismiss Petitioner's case.View "Harrington v. Metropolis Property Management Group, Inc." on Justia Law

Two appeals between MPQ, Inc. (d/b/a Freedom Enterprises) and Birmingham Realty Company were consolidated by the Supreme Court for the purposes of this opinion. The parties entered into a commercial lease agreement. Birmingham Realty filed suit against MPQ for unpaid rent in circuit court. MPQ filed a counterclaim. Birmingham Realty filed a separate unlawful-detainer action against MPQ in district court. The district court dismissed the detainer action, reasoning that the simultaneous actions in the district and circuit courts violated Alabama's abatement statute. Birmingham Realty appealed the district court's dismissal to the circuit court and filed a motion to dismiss MPQ's counterclaim. The circuit court conducted a hearing on all pending motions. It then entered an order affirming the district court's dismissal of the unlawful-detainer action and dismissed MPQ's counterclaims in the rent action. The court suggested that Birmingham Realty move to dismiss the rent action without prejudice so it could refile its unlawful-detainer action in the district court and then later refile an action in circuit court to seek the unpaid rent. Birmingham Realty took the court's advice and filed the suggested motions. MPQ filed a motion to alter, amend or vacate the court's decision in its counterclaim. The circuit court did not rule on either motion. The parties appealed to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court found Birmingham Realty's appeal from the district court to the circuit court was not timely, and as such, the court did not have jurisdiction over the appeal. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and cross-appeal with regard to the unlawful-detainer action and remanded the remaining issues for further proceedings.View "MPQ, Inc. v. Birmingham Realty Co." on Justia Law