Justia Landlord - Tenant Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Criminal Law
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In the case before the Supreme Court of Ohio, the issue concerned whether a landlord or landlord's agent can prohibit a person from entering leased premises, even if that person has received permission from a tenant. The case arose when Antonio Randolph was banned from an apartment complex by the property manager and was then later arrested and charged with criminal trespass after he was discovered in his uncle's apartment at the complex, which his uncle had invited him to. The trial court found Randolph guilty of criminal trespass. The Sixth District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's judgment, holding that the city had to prove that Randolph had entered the premises without privilege, and that his uncle's invitation to the apartment contradicted this.Upon review, the Supreme Court of Ohio agreed with the Sixth District's decision. The court held that a landlord or landlord's agent generally may not exclude a person from rented premises such that the excluded person is considered a trespasser when on the premises even if the person received permission to enter the premises from a tenant of the property. The court noted that Ohio law provides that a landlord cedes his or her possessory interests in leased property to the tenant and therefore may not prohibit the tenant from inviting guests onto the property.However, the court also highlighted that a landlord can maintain control over access to a property if the landlord so desires, provided that this authority is reserved in the lease agreement. In the absence of such a provision in the lease agreement, a tenant may invite onto the property a person whom the landlord has sought to ban from the premises. The judgment of the Sixth District Court of Appeals was affirmed. View "State v. Randolph" on Justia Law

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Between 2012 and 2014, three University of Michigan students (plaintiffs) rented rooms from Alawi, which collected $2550 in security deposits from the three. When they moved out, they received their security deposits back, minus small deductions for minor damages to the properties. Plaintiffs believed that Alawi had not complied with Michigan law, which requires landlords to deposit security deposits in a regulated financial institution and to provide the address of that institution to the tenant. The plaintiffs sued Alawi for $6.6 million on behalf of a putative class of six years’ worth of tenants, alleging violations of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and Michigan law; alleging that Alawi was not entitled to hold security deposits at all (given these alleged breaches of Michigan law), and that knowingly taking security deposits anyway constituted a pattern of federal wire, mail, and bank fraud. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal, finding that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the RICO claim. The complaint failed to articulate any concrete injury; its allegations were too vague to meet the particularity requirement of fraud allegations under Civil Rule 9(b). View "Wall v. Michigan Rental" on Justia Law

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Trenea Figgs was a participant in the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) Section 8 program, which was administered by the Boston Housing Authority. After the discovery by police officers of marijuana and a loaded firearm in Figgs’s apartment, the BHA notified Figgs of its intent to terminate her participation in the Section 8 program due to violations of her lease. A hearing officer concluded that termination of Figgs’s Section 8 housing subsidy was proper in light of her serious lease violation. The Housing Court reversed and ordered the BHA to reinstate Figgs’s Section 8 housing subsidy. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the judgment of the Housing Court, holding that, notwithstanding the enactment of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 94C, 32L, which decriminalized the possession of one ounce or less of marijuana, the hearing officer properly concluded that Figgs violated her lease based on evidence of other criminal activity in Figgs’s rental premises, and the violation warranted Figgs’s termination from the Section 8 program. View "Figgs v. Boston Housing Auth." on Justia Law

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Petitioner was a tenant in a New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA) public housing apartment. After Petitioner became employed, she failed to disclose her new earnings to her landlord, an omission that allowed her to pay a substantially lower rent than she would have had she revealed the income. After NYCHA discovered the misrepresentation, Petitioner was criminally charged for failing to report her income. Petitioner pleaded guilty to a reduced charge of petit larceny and received a conditional discharge upon her agreement to pay restitution to NYCHA. Thereafter, NYCHA ordered that Petitioner's tenancy be terminated. Petitioner subsequently challenged that determination, claiming that eviction might leave her and her children homeless. Supreme Court affirmed NYCHA's determination. The Appellate Division reversed and vacated the penalty of termination, concluding that the termination of tenancy was so disproportionate to the offense, in light of the circumstances, as to shock the judicial conscience. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the NYCHA's decision to terminate Petitioner's tenancy was not so disproportionate to her misconduct as to shock the judicial conscience. View "Perez v. Rhea" on Justia Law