Justia Landlord - Tenant Opinion Summaries

The Federal Grant and Cooperative Agreement Act, 31 U.S.C. 6301, states that an executive agency must use: “a procurement contract . . . when . . . the principal purpose … is to acquire … property or services for the direct benefit or use” of the government and must adhere to the Competition in Contracting Act and the Federal Acquisition Regulation However, an “agency shall use a cooperative agreement . . . when . . . the principal purpose … is to transfer a thing of value … to carry out a public purpose of support or stimulation … instead of acquiring . . . property or service” and can avoid procurement laws. Under Section 8 of the Housing Act, HUD provides rental assistance, including entering Housing Assistance Program (HAP) contracts and paying subsidies directly to private landlords. A 1974 amendment gave HUD the option of entering an Annual Contributions Contract (ACC) with a Public Housing Agency (PHA), which would enter into HAP contracts with owners and pay subsidies with HUD funds. In 1983, HUD’s authority was amended. HUD could administer existing HAP contracts, and enter into new HAP contracts for existing Section 8 dwellings by engaging a PHA if possible, 42 U.S.C. 1437f(b)(1). Later, HUD began outsourcing services and initiated a competition to award a performance-based ACC to a PHA in each state, with the PHA to assume “all contractual rights and responsibilities of HUD.” After making an award, HUD chose to re-compete, seeking greater savings, expressly referring to “cooperative agreements,” outside the scope of procurement law. The Government Accountability Office agreed with protestors that the awards were procurement contracts. HUD disregarded that recommendation. The Claims Court denied a request to set aside the award. The Federal Circuit reversed, finding that the awards are procurement contracts, not cooperative agreements.View "CMS Contract Mgmt. Servs. v. United States" on Justia Law

The Miks sued the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), claiming that they were unlawfully evicted from their rental home after their landlord defaulted on her mortgage and the property was sold at a foreclosure sale. The district court dismissed, under the Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act of 2009 (12 U.S.C. 5220), which imposes certain requirements on successors in interest to foreclosed properties in order to protect tenants, but which does not provide a private right of action. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part, agreeing that the PTFA does not provide a private right of action. The PTFA does, however, preempt less protective state laws, and requires that successors in interest to foreclosed properties provide bona fide tenants with 90 days’ notice to vacate and to allow them to occupy the premises until the end of their lease term unless certain conditions are met. While tenants may not bring a federal cause of action for violations of the PTFA, they may use such violations to establish the elements of a state law cause of action. Under state law, the Miks stated a claim for wrongful eviction but did not state claims for denial of due process and outrageous infliction of emotional distress. View "Mik v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, four landlords, challenged the constitutionality of the City's Rent Escrow Account Program (REAP). The Housing Department places property into REAP when a landlord fails to repair habitability violations and tenants pay a reduced rent. The court concluded that placing plaintiffs' property into REAP did not violate plaintiffs' substantive due process rights where REAP served legitimate governmental goals and was rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose; plaintiffs' procedural challenge could not support an as-applied substantive due process claim; and denial of leave to amend the complaint was not an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint. View "Sylvia Landfield Trust v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were five limited partnerships that owned multifamily housing rental projects in Maine. Plaintiffs entered into housing assistance payments (HAP) contracts with the Maine State Housing Authority (MaineHousing) in order to participate in the Section 8 program. The program is administered by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) in conjunction with state and local public housing agencies. Landlords participating in the program receive partial rent from their tenants and the remainder of the rent from the relevant public housing agency, who is, in turn, reimbursed by HUD. Payments from state and local agencies to the Section 8 landlords are adjusted periodically according to guidelines promulgated by HUD. In 2009, Plaintiffs sued MaineHousing in federal district court for breach of contract, alleging that MaineHousing had wrongfully refused to grant them certain annual increases in their Section 8 payments. MaineHousing impleaded HUD. The district court granted summary judgment for MaineHousing and HUD. The First Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that each of the housing assistance payments contracts at issue allowed MaineHousing to withhold automatic annual adjustments on contract rents where MaineHousing determines that further adjustments would result in material differences between contract rents and market rates. View "One & Ken Valley Housing Group v. Me. State Housing Auth." on Justia Law

The issue in two consolidated cases concerned a public housing authority and three of its tenants.  Bennington Housing Authority (BHA) appealed two trial court decisions dismissing ejectment claims against tenants, and granting summary judgment to tenants on two counterclaims: (1) that BHA failed to properly advise tenants of their right to request a grievance hearing when it billed them for repairs and fines; and (2) that BHA’s policy of fining tenants for open windows in the winter is prohibited under federal regulations. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that that BHA violated federal regulations for insufficient notice of the grievance procedure in both the termination of lease notices and the bills for maintenance and repair costs sent to tenants. The Court agreed with the trial court that BHA’s window-fine policy was prohibited by federal regulations.  BHA’s ejectment claims were thus dismissed, and the trial court’s grant of summary judgment on tenants’ counterclaims was affirmed. View "Bennington Housing Authority v. Lake" on Justia Law