Justia Landlord - Tenant Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a forest ranger at Yosemite National Park, filed suit against defendant, a public entity, after he was injured by a grease fire from a skillet in his rental unit. Defendant provided plaintiff and other tenants with fire extinguishers, but one was not available for plaintiff at the time of the grease fire. Plaintiff filed suit against defendant for damages for the injuries he suffered, alleging that the absence of a fire extinguisher in the residence constituted a dangerous condition of public property. The trial court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that the trial court properly applied the immunity statute by determining that liability was precluded by the immunity accorded to a public entity for failing to provide or maintain fire protection facilities or equipment. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Puskar v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco" on Justia Law

Husband and wife (who did not speak English) entered into a written one-year lease, took possession of the apartment, and tendered the security deposit and first month’s rent. Ten days into the lease, they received “an official 30 days notice” of eviction, stating that “[c]onstruction begins June 10,” and that they did not qualify for an unspecified “new program.” Several additional efforts to force the family to move followed; their tender of rent was refused. They purportedly sought legal advice and were told that the landlord could not unilaterally terminate the lease. They reported feeling discriminated against and harassed; they were confused, depressed, and anxious. Demolition began while the family was occupying the apartment. Husband allegedly told wife that he could not tolerate the situation any longer. The following day, he committed suicide in the apartment. Wife sought damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress, wrongful eviction, breach of contract; under the Wrongful Death Act; and under the survival statute. The trial court dismissed the wrongful death and related survival actions, finding that “wrongful death via suicide” is not cognizable in Illinois. The Illinois Supreme Court agreed. Despite an ostensible connection between severe emotional distress and suicide, suicide may result from a complex combination of factors. It is “rare” that suicide would not break the chain of causation and bar a wrongful death action, even where the plaintiff alleges the defendant inflicted severe emotional distress. Husband’s suicide was not a reasonably foreseeable result of defendant’s alleged conduct in breaking the lease and pressuring the family to vacate. View "Turcios v. DeBruler Co." on Justia Law

After a late night out, Jillian Groh brought a group of friends back to a room she rented at the Westin Hotel. Security guards confronted the group about the noise level in the room, and ultimately evicted them, even though Groh and her companions advised the guards they were drunk and could not drive. On the way out, one of the friends asked if the group could wait in the lobby for a taxi (because it was cold outside). The guard blocked the door. Seven people then got into Groh's car, with a drunk driver behind the wheel. Fifteen miles away they rear-ended another vehicle, resulting in a crash that killed one man and left Groh in a persistent vegetative state with traumatic brain injuries. Groh's parents sued the Westin for their daughter's injuries, because of the manner in which the security guards evicted her. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was one of first impression: what duty of care, if any, does a hotel owe a guest during a lawful eviction? A divided appellate panel held that the hotel had a duty to evict a guest "in a reasonable manner," noting that this precludes ejecting a guest into a "foreseeably dangerous circumstance" that result from either the guest's condition or the environment. It also held that the Colorado Dram Shop Act did not apply because the hotel did not serve Groh alcohol. The Supreme Court agreed with the appellate court's analysis, and affirmed. View "Westin Operator, LLC v. Groh" on Justia Law

Petitioner Barbara Jordan sued respondent Panorama Orthopedics and Spine Center, PC for negligence and premises liability. After receiving medical treatment at the Center, Jordan tripped over uneven sidewalk slabs near Panorama's main entrance. She fell and suffered a concussion and an orbital fracture. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether the Colorado pRemises Liability Act (PLA) applied to a commercial tenant defendant for injuries plaintiff sustained in a common area. Specifically, the case turned on whether the tenant qualified as a "landowner" under the PLA. A jury ultimately found in favor of petitioner. The clinic appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed. After its review, the Supreme Court agreed with the appellate court, concluding that because the clinic neither was in possession of the sidewalk where petitioner fell, it was not legally responsible for the condition of the sidewalk or for the activities conducted or circumstances existing there, so it was not a landowner as defined by the PLA. View "Jordan v. Panorama Orthopedics & Spine Ctr., PC" on Justia Law

In 2004 and 2007, two fires broke out in two separate buildings of the Village Green Apartments. Plaintiffs, tenants of the apartment complex, filed suit against the apartment complex’s landlords, claiming that the buildings had been negligently constructed. The landlords were found liable. The jury awarded compensatory damages of $582,146, punitive damages of $2,000,000, and attorney fees of $1,040,000. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme court affirmed with respect to all issues except the award of punitive damages, holding (1) the amount of punitive damages exceeded the limit prescribed by Ohio Rev. Code 2315.21(D)(2)(a); (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the issue of punitive damages to go to the jury; and (3) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the jury to determine that the landlords had failed to comply with Ohio Rev. Code 5321.04 for failure to correct defects occurring in electrical wiring. View "Sivit v. Village Green of Beachwood, L.P." on Justia Law

Wright was a correctional officer and lived on the San Quentin premises, in a unit he rented from his employer, the state. Living on the grounds was not mandatory and he paid market rate rent. Wright was injured when he fell in the course of his lengthy walk from his home to his actual place of work and received workers’ compensation. He then sued the state, which moved for summary judgment on the ground that workers’ compensation was Wright’s exclusive remedy, based on the “premises line” rule, which provides that the employment relationship commences once the employee enters the employer’s premises. The trial court agreed and granted the motion. The court of appeal reversed, concluding that there were triable issues of fact as to whether Wright’s injury arose out of and in the course of his employment. That the State did not intend its workers’ compensation policy would insure Wright for all injuries suffered on San Quentin grounds, even at or near the home where he lived, is evidenced by the terms of Wright’s lease agreement, which required Wright to obtain a “broad policy of comprehensive coverage of public liability insurance, naming the State as the insured.” View "Wright v. State of Cal." on Justia Law

Gail and Scott Helm filed a personal injury action against Gallo Realty, Inc., one of its real estate agents, and 206 Massachusetts Ave, LLC (owner of the property). The Helms rented a beach house at 206 Massachusetts Avenue in Lewes for a week in 2010. As Gail descended the stairs, she fell and sustained injuries. Gail sought to recover damages based on claims of negligence and breach of contract; Scott claimed loss of consortium. The Superior Court granted defendants' motions for summary judgment, dismissing the Helms' claims. The Helms appealed, arguing: (1) the Superior Court erred in granting defendants' motion for summary judgment on the issue of primary risk assumption and comparative negligence as a matter of law; (2) the Superior Court erred in holding that an indemnification clause provision in the lease protected defendants from liability; and (3) the Superior Court erred in granting summary judgment on the contract claims. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the Superior Court applied both the doctrine of primary assumption of risk and the doctrine of comparative negligence incorrectly. The record reflected that the Superior Court never specifically based its decision on the indemnification clause. The Superior Court's initial ruling in favor of defendants was only on the negligence claims. Furthermore, the Supreme Court found that the record reflected that the Superior Court's dismissive rulings on the Helms' contract claim was "cursory and inextricably intertwined" with its erroneous rulings on the negligence claims. As such, the Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Helm v. 206 Massachusetts Avenue,LLC" on Justia Law

Keystone-Texas Property Holding Corporation owned the Rivercenter Mall and the ground beneath the San Antonio Marriott Riverwalk hotel. Keystone leased the hotel land to Petitioners, who owned and operated the hotel. In 2004, Keystone put the two properties up for sale. After Keystone found a prospective buyer, Petitioners informed Keystone they were interested in buying the land and were not ready to waive their rights under the lease. The deal to sell the properties fell through, and Keystone sued Petitioners for actions Keystone believed scuttled the deal. A jury found for Keystone on all issues and awarded damages for slander of title and tortious interference with a contract. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was no evidence Petitioners caused any damages to Keystone. View "HMC Hotel Props. II Ltd. P’ship v. Keystone-Texas Prop. Holding Corp." on Justia Law

In 2004, Paula Bratton and Daniel Hills and their children (“the Brattons”), moved into a house that they rented from Halsey McDonough. In 2008, the Department of Health and Human Services notified McDonough that he was required to relocate the Brattons because of numerous lead hazards throughout the rental property. The Brattons subsequently filed twelve-count complaint against McDonough. The trial court granted McDonough’s motion for judgment as a matter of law as to some of the Brattons’ claims and in favor of McDonough based on a jury verdict on the remaining claims. The Supreme Court vacated the jury’s verdict and remanded the case for a new trial, holding (1) the trial court clearly erred in excluding the Brattons’ qualified expert witness; (2) the trial court erred in entering judgment as a matter of law for McDonough on the negligence claims of the two older children, as well as the intentional infliction of emotional distress and punitive damages claims of all three children; (3) the trial court improperly shifted the burden of proof onto the Brattons to disprove McDonough’s independent causation theories and erred in refusing to give the jury a proper and requested instruction; and (4) the trial court’s errors created a fundamentally unfair trial. View "Bratton v. McDonough" on Justia Law

Plaintiff resided in an apartment from approximately 1997 until 2003. A corporation owned the building during Plaintiff’s occupancy until shortly before Plaintiff vacated the premises. In 2004, Plaintiff sued the corporation, the building’s current landlord, and other parties, alleging that she developed health problems due to mold and other harmful substances in the apartment. The corporation and landlord sought to dismiss the complaint to the extent that Plaintiff alleged mold-induced personal injuries, arguing that Plaintiff was unable to prove either general or specific causation. Supreme Court dismissed all of Plaintiff’s causes of action except those for property damage and breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment. The Appellate Division reversed and reinstated the complaint, concluding that the standard of scientific reliability set forth in Frye v. United States was satisfied in this case. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Plaintiff did not demonstrate on the record a cause-and-effect relationship between exposure to indoor mold and the kinds of injuries she alleged. View "Cornell v. 360 W. 51st St. Realty, LLC" on Justia Law