Justia Landlord - Tenant Opinion Summaries

The plaintiff, a tenant, brought a personal injury action against the defendants, his landlords, under the Oregon Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (ORLTA). The plaintiff sought damages for injuries sustained when a plastic cover of a light fixture fell from the ceiling of a shared, exterior hallway outside his apartment and struck him on the head. The plaintiff argued that the landlords were liable for his injuries due to their failure to maintain the premises in a habitable condition as required by ORS 90.320(1).The landlords moved for summary judgment, arguing that their habitability obligations under ORS 90.320(1) applied only to the interior of the tenant’s dwelling unit and not to common areas like the hallway. The trial court granted the landlords' motion for summary judgment, agreeing with their interpretation of the statute. The plaintiff appealed, and the Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that the landlords' habitability obligations did not extend to areas outside the tenant’s dwelling unit.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court held that a landlord’s habitability obligations under ORS 90.320(1) do extend to common areas of an apartment building that are adjacent to a tenant’s apartment and used by the tenant to access the apartment. The court concluded that conditions in these common areas can render a dwelling unit unhabitable. The case was remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings consistent with this interpretation. View "Jackson v. KA-3 Associates, LLC" on Justia Law

The case involves MP PPH, LLC, the owner of the Marbury Plaza apartment complex in Washington, D.C., which was found in contempt by the Superior Court of the District of Columbia for failing to comply with a consent order. The consent order was designed to address severe housing code violations, including pest infestations, mold, broken air conditioning, lack of heat, unsecured doors, leaks, and major plumbing issues. The trial court ordered a 50% rent abatement for all tenants, retroactive to the latest possible date by which MP PPH had agreed to complete the consent order’s requirements.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia initially denied the District of Columbia’s motion for contempt, finding that MP PPH had made good faith efforts to comply. However, upon a renewed motion, the court held a three-day evidentiary hearing and found MP PPH in contempt, citing extensive noncompliance with the consent order. The court noted that MP PPH had failed to conduct proper mold assessments, complete necessary repairs, and provide pest control services, among other violations. The court imposed sanctions, including a 50% rent abatement for all tenants, increasing to 60% and then 75% if compliance was not achieved within specified timeframes.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court’s contempt finding and sanctions. The appellate court found that the evidence of MP PPH’s contempt was overwhelming and that the trial court was not required to follow a three-step contempt process as argued by MP PPH. The court also held that the trial court’s sanctions did not interfere with the discretion of courts presiding over related landlord-tenant cases and that any improper reference to the wealth of MP PPH’s principal was harmless. The appellate court concluded that MP PPH had forfeited many of its arguments on appeal by not raising them in a timely manner before the trial court. View "MP PPH, LLC v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law

Copinol Restaurant, Inc. ("Copinol") and 26 North Market LLC ("North Market") entered into a commercial lease agreement for a property in Frederick, Maryland, with a term ending on March 31, 2032. Copinol failed to pay rent on time in May 2023, prompting North Market to terminate the lease and demand that Copinol vacate the premises. When Copinol did not vacate, North Market filed a tenant holding over action in the District Court of Maryland, seeking possession of the property and damages.The District Court of Maryland ruled in favor of North Market, granting it possession of the property. Copinol appealed to the Circuit Court for Frederick County, which initially ruled in Copinol's favor, stating that the tenant holding over statute did not apply because the lease had not expired. However, after North Market filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment, the circuit court reversed its decision and affirmed the District Court's judgment, awarding possession to North Market.Copinol then filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which the Supreme Court of Maryland granted. The Supreme Court of Maryland held that the tenant holding over statute, RP § 8-402, does not apply where a tenant is in possession of property pursuant to a lease that has not expired by lapse of time. The Court further held that a landlord cannot contractually modify the statutory meaning of the phrase "expiration of a lease" to avail itself of the tenant holding over statute in a manner inconsistent with its plain language. The Court reversed the circuit court's judgment and remanded the case for entry of judgment in favor of Copinol. View "Copinol Restaurant v. 26 N. Market" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, former tenants of the defendant, filed a complaint against their landlord, alleging various breaches and violations related to their tenancies. In response, the defendant filed two unlawful detainer actions against the plaintiffs for nonpayment of rent. These actions were later dismissed without prejudice. Subsequently, a jury found the defendant liable for certain claims, and the plaintiffs filed a new complaint, including a claim for malicious prosecution based on the unlawful detainer actions.The San Francisco Superior Court consolidated the cases and, after a bench trial, found in favor of the plaintiffs on their malicious prosecution claim. The court concluded that the defendant lacked probable cause to file the unlawful detainer actions and rejected the defendant's advice of counsel defense, determining that she did not rely on legal advice in good faith. The court entered judgment for the plaintiffs, and the defendant appealed.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that the defendant had asserted a valid advice of counsel defense. The defendant had consulted an attorney, disclosed all relevant facts, and acted on the attorney's advice in good faith. The court determined that the trial court erred in requiring the defendant to prove the attorney's competence and in shifting the burden of the attorney's legal research onto the defendant. Consequently, the appellate court vacated the judgment and remanded the case with instructions to enter a judgment of dismissal in favor of the defendant. The court declined to award costs as the respondents did not appear in the appeal. View "Ceron v. Liu" on Justia Law

Joseph Eshagian leased a residential unit in Van Nuys to Manuel Cepeda, who was required to pay $1,000 monthly rent. On December 20, 2022, Eshagian served Cepeda with a three-day notice to pay $8,000 in unpaid rent or quit. The notice did not specify the start date of the three-day period, nor did it clearly state that Cepeda would lose possession if he did not pay by a certain date. On December 27, 2022, Eshagian filed an unlawful detainer complaint seeking possession, unpaid rent, holdover damages, and attorney fees. Cepeda filed an answer denying the allegations and asserting affirmative defenses.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted Eshagian’s motion for terminating sanctions due to Cepeda’s failure to comply with discovery orders, struck Cepeda’s answer, and entered a default against him. A possession-only judgment was entered on May 3, 2023. Cepeda’s motion to vacate the judgment was denied, and he appealed to the appellate division of the superior court, which held the possession-only judgment was appealable and reversed the judgment, finding the three-day notice defective.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case to determine if a possession-only judgment in an unlawful detainer proceeding is appealable when the landlord’s damages claims are unresolved. The court concluded that such a judgment is not appealable because it does not resolve all rights of the parties. However, the court treated Cepeda’s appeal as a petition for writ of mandate due to the uncertainty of the law on appealability at the time of filing.The court found the three-day notice invalid for failing to specify when and how Cepeda had to pay the rent and that he would lose possession if he did not cure the default. Consequently, the complaint did not state a cause of action for unlawful detainer. The court dismissed the appeal, granted the petition, and directed the trial court to vacate the judgment in favor of Eshagian and enter a new judgment in favor of Cepeda. View "Eshagian v. Cepeda" on Justia Law

In 2019, the New York Legislature enacted the Housing Stability and Tenant Protection Act (HSTPA), expanding rent stabilization to all municipalities in the state. The City of Kingston declared a housing emergency on August 1, 2022, opting into the Emergency Tenant Protection Act (ETPA). Petitioners, a group of landlords, sought to invalidate Kingston's opt-in and two guidelines set by the Kingston New York Rent Guidelines Board (KRGB).The Supreme Court upheld Kingston's emergency declaration, finding the city's survey methodology reasonable. However, it vacated the KRGB guidelines, ruling that the fair market rent guideline required a case-by-case determination and that the rent adjustment guideline lacked statutory authority.The Appellate Division modified the Supreme Court's order, reinstating the KRGB guidelines. It held that the emergency declaration was based on a good faith study and that the fair market rent guideline did not require a case-by-case assessment. The rent adjustment guideline was also upheld, as the ETPA allows for rent adjustments without specifying that they must be upward.The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's decision. It found that the City's 2022 survey was reasonably reliable and relevant, supporting the emergency declaration. The court also upheld the fair market rent guideline, noting that it did not have an impermissibly retroactive effect, as no refunds were issued for periods before August 1, 2020. The challenge to the rent adjustment guideline was deemed unpreserved and not properly before the court. View "Matter of Hudson Val. Prop. Owners Assn. Inc. v City of Kingston" on Justia Law

A group of landlords and property owners in New York's Hudson Valley region challenged the constitutionality of the 2023 amendments to New York's rent stabilization law. These amendments, known as the Vacancy Provisions, allow municipalities to impose civil penalties on landlords who do not cooperate with vacancy surveys and to presume zero vacancies for nonresponsive landlords. The landlords argued that these provisions authorize warrantless searches of their records without an opportunity to challenge the searches' scope, violating the Fourth Amendment, and that they prevent landlords from contesting vacancy calculations, violating procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York denied the landlords' motion for a preliminary injunction and dismissed their complaint for failure to state a claim. The landlords appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. The court held that the Vacancy Provisions are facially valid under the Fourth Amendment because landlords have adequate pre-compliance review available under Article 78 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules. The court also found that the searches authorized by the Vacancy Provisions are not unreasonable in every situation, given the ample notice and minimal penalties involved. Additionally, the court held that the Vacancy Provisions do not violate procedural due process because landlords can contest vacancy calculations at public hearings before rent stabilization is adopted and through Article 78 after adoption. View "Hudson Shore v. State of New York" on Justia Law

Rajiv Sangha (landlord) rented a house to Jeremy Keen and Racheal Lomas (tenant) in 2021. In November 2023, the tenant stopped paying rent. In April 2024, the landlord served a 14-day notice to pay rent or vacate, but the tenant did not respond. In May 2024, the landlord commenced an unlawful detainer action, serving the tenant with a summons and complaint. The tenant faxed a written notice of appearance to the landlord, indicating their intention to be present at any court case or appearance. Despite this, the landlord moved for a default judgment due to the tenant's failure to file an answer by the specified date. The trial court granted the default judgment and issued a writ of restitution.The tenant received the motion for default and notice of hearing but was allegedly informed by the King County Superior Court Clerk’s Office that they did not need to attend the hearing. In July 2024, the trial court found the tenant in default for lack of answer and issued the default judgment and writ of restitution. The tenant retained counsel and moved to vacate the default judgment and quash the writ, arguing that default for an appearing tenant violated their statutory right to counsel and contradicted the statutory summons language requiring a show cause hearing. The trial court denied the motion, agreeing with the landlord that the Civil Rules required an answer and that the landlord had complied with statutory notice requirements.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the case. The court held that RCW 59.18.365(3) precludes a default judgment against a tenant who appears but does not submit a written answer in an unlawful detainer action. The tenant’s written notice of appearance constituted a response to the summons, and the trial court erred in entering a default judgment based on the tenant’s failure to answer. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s entry of default and remanded the case for further proceedings. The landlord's request for appellate attorney fees was denied. View "Sangha v. Keen" on Justia Law

Peter Farina has lived at the Victor Howell House, a group home for low-income individuals, since 1989. In 2000, the Janet Keenan Housing Corporation (JKHC), a non-profit, purchased the property to maintain it as affordable housing. Recently, JKHC attempted to sell the house to a private third party, leading to two tracks of litigation. The District of Columbia sued JKHC to halt the sale, arguing it violated JKHC’s charitable purposes. As the District and JKHC neared a settlement allowing the sale, Farina sought to intervene but was denied. Farina then filed his own lawsuit, claiming his rights under the Tenant Opportunity to Purchase Act (TOPA) and the Uniform Trust Code (UTC) were being violated.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia denied Farina’s motion to intervene in the District’s case, citing untimeliness and lack of standing. The court approved the settlement between the District and JKHC, which allowed the sale to proceed. In Farina’s separate lawsuit, the court ruled against him, stating his TOPA rights were extinguished by the court-approved settlement and that he lacked standing to bring his UTC claim.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. The court held that Farina’s TOPA rights were not extinguished by the settlement, as the sale was an arm’s-length transaction and not exempt under TOPA. Farina must be given the opportunity to purchase the property under TOPA. However, the court agreed with the lower court that Farina lacked standing to bring his UTC claim, as he was neither a settlor nor a special interest beneficiary of JKHC. The court affirmed the judgment in the District’s case but vacated the judgment in Farina’s case, remanding it for further proceedings to afford Farina his TOPA rights. View "Farina v. Janet Keenan Housing Corporation" on Justia Law

A landlord sought to terminate a rental agreement with a tenant due to extensive property damage caused by the tenant's guinea pigs. The landlord issued a 30-day termination notice stating that no cure opportunity was available because the damage was too extensive to repair while the tenant remained on the premises. The tenant did not vacate, leading the landlord to initiate an eviction action.The trial court ruled in favor of the landlord, finding that the termination notice complied with ORS 90.392(3)(c) because the repairs were too costly and extensive for the tenant to complete within the minimum 14-day cure period. The tenant appealed, arguing that the notice was invalid because it did not inform him of his right to cure the violation.The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that a landlord's termination notice need not state that a violation can be cured if the landlord determines that it is unreasonable to believe that any tenant could cure the violation within the prescribed time period.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that a termination notice under ORS 90.392 must state that a violation can be cured when, as a matter of law, the tenant has a right to cure the violation. The court concluded that a tenant has a right to cure all violations that can be the basis for termination under ORS 90.392, except for certain repeat violations described in ORS 90.392(5). Because the violation in this case was one that the tenant had a right to cure, the landlord's notice was invalid for failing to state that the violation could be cured. The case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "KKMH Properties, LLC v. Shire" on Justia Law