Justia Landlord - Tenant Opinion Summaries

A mother and the Connecticut Fair Housing Center sued a company that provides tenant screening reports, alleging that its practices contributed to the denial of a housing application for the mother’s disabled son. The apartment manager used the defendant’s screening platform to review applicants’ criminal histories, and the son’s application was denied based on a flagged shoplifting charge. The mother later had the charge dismissed. She also sought a copy of her son’s screening report from the defendant, but was told she needed to provide a power of attorney. She instead submitted documentation of her conservatorship, but the defendant rejected it as facially invalid due to a missing court seal.The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut held a bench trial. It found that the Fair Housing Act (FHA) did not apply to the defendant because it was not the decision-maker on housing applications; only the housing provider made those determinations. The district court also found the defendant’s requirement for a valid conservatorship certificate reasonable and not discriminatory toward handicapped individuals. However, the district court found the defendant liable under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) for a period when it insisted on a power of attorney, making it impossible for the mother to obtain her son’s consumer file.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit concluded that the Connecticut Fair Housing Center lacked standing because its diversion of resources to address the defendant’s actions did not constitute a concrete injury. The court also held that, although the FHA does not exclude certain defendants, the defendant here was not the proximate cause of the housing denial, and the mother failed to establish a prima facie case of disparate-impact discrimination. Furthermore, because she never provided a facially valid conservatorship certificate, she could not show that the defendant’s documentation requirements prevented her from obtaining the report. The court vacated, affirmed, and reversed in part, dismissing the Center’s claims, affirming no FHA liability, and reversing FCRA liability. View "CFHC v. CoreLogic Rental Prop. Sols." on Justia Law

An individual entered into a lease to reside in an apartment within an assisted living community. The lease required the tenant to keep the apartment tidy and free of clutter, incorporating provisions from a resident handbook. After the landlord became concerned about the tenant’s compliance—specifically, the presence of unpacked boxes and general clutter—the parties executed a Negotiated Risk Agreement to address these issues. When conditions did not improve, the landlord issued written notices culminating in a 14-day discharge notice and ultimately filed a complaint for restitution of the premises when the tenant did not vacate.Initially, the County Court for Douglas County dismissed the landlord’s first complaint for restitution. Afterward, the landlord issued a new notice based on ongoing violations and filed a second complaint. Following a trial, the county court found the tenant had materially breached the lease and Nebraska law by failing to keep the apartment clean and safe, and entered judgment in favor of the landlord. The tenant appealed to the District Court for Douglas County, which affirmed the county court’s decision. The district court held that the landlord’s pleadings and notice were sufficient, waiver and res judicata did not bar relief, and although the supersedeas bond had been set too high, the issue was moot because the tenant had already been evicted following the failure to post the bond.Before the Nebraska Supreme Court, the tenant argued that various errors warranted reversal, including pleading defects, waiver, res judicata, and improper bond setting. The Nebraska Supreme Court held that the appeal was moot because the tenant had been removed from the apartment and no effective relief could be granted. The court also found that the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine did not apply to any of the issues raised. Accordingly, the Nebraska Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. View "Saint Joseph Tower Assisted Living v. Royce" on Justia Law

A law firm leased office space in downtown Washington, D.C. from a commercial landlord. In the spring of 2020, following the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic and in response to orders issued by the Mayor of the District of Columbia, the law firm curtailed most of its in-office operations and directed employees to work remotely. The firm subsequently invoked a rent abatement provision in its lease, arguing that the pandemic and the government’s orders constituted a force majeure event, which resulted in a material interference with its use and enjoyment of the premises due to an alleged interruption of the essential building service of “secure access” or “prompt access” to the building.The law firm filed a breach of contract suit in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia after the landlord denied the rent abatement request. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The Superior Court denied the law firm’s motion and granted summary judgment to the landlord. The court found that the contract was unambiguous, and that there was no interruption of “secure or prompt access” to the premises, as the building remained physically accessible and the landlord did not impede entry. The court also determined that the government’s orders did not amount to a force majeure “taking” as defined by the lease. The law firm appealed.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court held that under the plain meaning of the lease, “secure and prompt access” refers to physical ability to enter the premises, as provided by the landlord, and not to a generalized right to use the premises free from government restrictions. Because the law firm’s access to the building was never impeded by the landlord, the rent abatement provision was not triggered. View "Crowell & Moring, LLP v. Trea 1001 Pennsylvania Avenue Trust" on Justia Law

Two tenants rented a duplex in Iowa City and became frustrated by frequent showings of their rental unit by their landlord to prospective tenants for the next lease period. Although their lease allowed the landlord to enter with the tenants’ consent and required at least twenty-four hours’ notice, the landlord sometimes entered outside a scheduled window and, on a few occasions, without prior notice. The tenants objected to showings without notice and occasionally refused entry. They eventually filed a small claims action, alleging multiple instances of common law trespass and seeking damages and attorney fees.A magistrate in the Iowa District Court for Johnson County found that four trespasses occurred—two on the same day and two on separate days—and awarded damages equaling three days’ rent, but denied attorney fees, reasoning that the relevant statute only applied to rental deposit disputes. The district court affirmed most of the magistrate’s decision, slightly increasing the damages to three and a half days’ rent to account for the second trespass on the same day, but likewise denied attorney fees.On appeal, the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that consent, whether express or implied, negates trespass, and that the tenants’ actions reasonably led the landlord to believe entry was permitted for the contested showings. The court found no basis for additional trespass findings. It also concluded that the district court’s damages award was supported by the record and that Iowa Code section 562A.12(8) authorizes attorney fees only in rental deposit disputes, not in common law trespass actions. Thus, the denial of attorney fees was affirmed. View "Butter v. Midwest Property Management IC, LLC" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over possession and damages related to a residential property in Malibu. In 2019, the plaintiff filed an unlawful detainer action against several defendants, including the defendant, seeking possession of the property and damages. The defendant responded with an answer denying several key allegations, including the plaintiff’s ownership of the property and the claimed fair rental value. The plaintiff later obtained leave to file a first amended complaint, which reclassified the action and asserted new causes of action but relied on the same underlying facts as the original complaint. The defendant did not file a new answer to this amended complaint.The Los Angeles County Superior Court entered a default against the defendant after he failed to answer the amended complaint and subsequently entered a default judgment awarding significant damages. The defendant moved multiple times to set aside the default judgment. The court eventually denied his postjudgment motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (d), which allows courts to set aside void judgments. The defendant timely appealed these orders.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed whether the original answer sufficed to controvert the first amended complaint’s allegations and precluded entry of default. The appellate court held that because the defendant’s original answer denied essential factual allegations that remained central to the amended complaint—including ownership and valuation—the default judgment was improper. The court found that a defendant’s original answer stands as a response to reasserted facts in an amended complaint, and default cannot be entered on allegations previously denied. The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment and the trial court’s order denying the motion to set aside default, remanding with instructions to vacate the default and default judgment. View "Ammari v. Ammari" on Justia Law

A restaurant operated by PFPCO.’s Noble Pie Parlor leased space in the El Cortez Hotel in Reno, Nevada, which was owned by El Cortez Reno Holdings, LLC. After initially peaceful relations, the parties’ relationship deteriorated due to disputes over property maintenance and incidents such as a gas leak and a stolen camera. Tensions escalated when El Cortez locked Noble Pie out, resulting in litigation that ended largely in Noble Pie’s favor, with the judgment affirmed on appeal. Later, Noble Pie permanently closed its restaurant, prompting El Cortez to allege breach of the lease’s agreed-use provision and file a new complaint. Noble Pie moved to dismiss; the district court granted the motion but allowed El Cortez to amend its complaint. After further procedural exchanges, El Cortez filed an amended complaint, and Noble Pie again moved to dismiss.The Second Judicial District Court, Washoe County, presided by Judge Egan K. Walker, reviewed El Cortez’s late opposition to the motion to dismiss and its request for an extension of time. El Cortez’s request, based on “professional courtesy,” was submitted just before the deadline. The district court denied the extension, finding no good cause for the delay and noting El Cortez’s pattern of tardiness in filings. The court treated El Cortez’s failure to timely oppose the motion as an admission under DCR 13(3), granted the motion to dismiss with prejudice, denied leave to further amend, and awarded attorney fees to Noble Pie as the prevailing party under the lease.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Nevada considered whether the district court abused its discretion in denying the extension, granting the motion to dismiss, refusing leave to amend, and awarding attorney fees. The Supreme Court of Nevada held that the district court did not abuse its discretion or err in any of these rulings and affirmed the judgment, emphasizing the importance of adhering to procedural rules in litigation. View "El Cortez Reno Holdings, LLC v. PFPCO.'s Noble Pie Parlor" on Justia Law

In 2022, voters in a California city approved an initiative known as Measure H, which amended the city charter to establish rent control, just cause eviction protections, and an independent Rental Housing Board with significant regulatory authority over rental housing, rent increases, and evictions. The measure limited annual rent increases for certain multifamily units, prohibited evictions without just cause, and required the city council to appoint a supermajority of tenants to the Rental Housing Board. It also contained provisions for mandatory landlord-paid relocation assistance in certain circumstances and additional notice requirements prior to eviction for nonpayment of rent.After certification of the election results, a group of landlords and a rental housing trade association challenged the validity of Measure H in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. They alleged the measure constituted an impermissible revision of the city charter under the California Constitution, imposed unconstitutional property qualifications for public office, violated equal protection, and was preempted by various state laws. The superior court rejected most of these claims, holding that Measure H was a lawful charter amendment, did not violate constitutional protections regarding property qualifications or equal protection, and did not conflict with state law except in one respect: it partially severed language in the measure that imposed greater notice requirements than those mandated by state statutes for termination of tenancy.Upon review, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reversed in part. The court held that Measure H was a permissible charter amendment, not an impermissible revision; that restricting certain board seats to tenants with a leasehold interest did not violate the constitutional prohibition on property qualifications for office; and that the tenant-majority requirement did not violate equal protection under rational basis review. However, the court found that the relocation assistance provision for tenants displaced by lawful rent increases was preempted by the Costa-Hawkins Rental Housing Act, and that the additional notice requirement for evictions due to nonpayment of rent was preempted by the Unlawful Detainer Act. The preempted provisions were declared void, and the matter was remanded for the superior court to enter judgment consistent with these findings. View "California Apartment Assn. v. City of Pasadena" on Justia Law

The case involves an individual who left his Florida residence in August 2018 to care for his terminally ill brother, a tenant in a New York City Mitchell-Lama apartment. After the brother’s death in March 2020, the petitioner sought succession rights to the apartment, which required him to prove that the apartment was his primary residence for at least one year prior to his brother’s death. The petitioner submitted various documents, including income certifications, power of attorney forms, and certain public assistance records. However, some materials listed his Florida address, and much of his supporting documentation either fell outside the relevant one-year period or was not addressed to the apartment in question.The housing company denied his application, concluding that he failed to establish primary residency during the required time. The New York City Department of Housing Preservation and Development (HPD) upheld this decision after an administrative appeal, finding the evidence insufficient. The petitioner then challenged the agency’s determination through a CPLR article 78 proceeding. The Supreme Court annulled the agency’s decision and granted succession rights, ruling the denial irrational. On appeal, the Appellate Division reversed, holding that the agency’s denial had a rational basis, especially given the petitioner’s failure to supply certain key documents such as New York State tax returns or proof of exemption.The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision. The Court held that, under the applicable regulations, the agency’s determination that the petitioner failed to prove the apartment was his primary residence for the required period was supported by a rational basis. The Court emphasized that the agency’s decision was neither arbitrary nor capricious, and the evidence provided by the petitioner did not meet the burden required to establish primary residency for succession rights. The order dismissing the petition was affirmed. View "Matter of Mantilla v New York City Dept. of Hous. Preserv. & Dev." on Justia Law

Zakaria Allaf and Stephanie Crosby rented an apartment from Robb Crawford and later from Shoreline Holdings Five, LLC, with the lease requiring a $1,795 security deposit. The tenants experienced a persistent cockroach infestation and, after unsuccessful remediation attempts, agreed with Crawford to terminate the lease early in January 2022. Upon moving out, Allaf and Crosby were assured by Crawford’s agent that the security deposit would be addressed within thirty days, but no response was received. Eventually, Crawford’s attorney informed Crosby that the deposit was being withheld because Crawford did not consider the lease terminated.Allaf and Crosby filed a small claims action in the Maine District Court (Portland), alleging wrongful retention of the security deposit and breach of the implied warranty of habitability. After a trial, the District Court found in their favor, awarding $6,000 in damages (including double damages for the security deposit and damages for breach of habitability), plus attorney fees and costs. Shoreline appealed to the Cumberland County Superior Court, which affirmed the judgment. Shoreline then appealed to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting liability for wrongful retention and arguing that attorney fees should not be awarded in addition to the $6,000 statutory monetary limit for small claims actions.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment. It held that sufficient evidence supported the lower court’s finding that the lease had been terminated by agreement and that Shoreline failed to return the security deposit or provide a written explanation. The Court also held that attorney fees awarded under a fee-shifting statute such as 14 M.R.S. § 6034(2) are considered “costs” and are not included within the $6,000 small claims cap set by 14 M.R.S. § 7482. Thus, the award of attorney fees in addition to $6,000 in damages was proper. Judgment was affirmed. View "Allaf v. Shoreline Holdings Five, LLC" on Justia Law

Several tenants of a subdivided property in Los Angeles, each with separate oral lease agreements for individual units, were forced out of their homes after the landlord obtained a default unlawful detainer judgment against the tenant of a different unit. The landlord did not inform these tenants of the proceedings or provide proper notice. Although only the tenant of unit seven was behind on rent, the landlord sought and obtained possession of the entire property. The sheriff’s deputies, acting on the writ of possession, evicted all the tenants, leaving them homeless and unable to retrieve most of their belongings.The tenants filed suit in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, asserting claims such as wrongful eviction, breach of quiet enjoyment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, fraud, and violations of statutory and local ordinances. The landlord responded by filing a special motion to strike under California’s anti-SLAPP statute, arguing that the tenants’ claims arose from protected petitioning activity—the prosecution of the unlawful detainer action. The Superior Court granted the motion for ten of the eleven causes of action, concluding that the tenants’ claims were premised on the landlord’s protected activity in pursuing the unlawful detainer case.Upon review, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Four, held that the tenants’ claims did not arise from protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute. The appellate court found that the gravamen of the tenants’ complaint was the landlord’s improper termination of their tenancies without judicial process or notice—not the act of filing or prosecuting the unlawful detainer action against another tenant. Therefore, the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order granting the anti-SLAPP motion and directed the lower court to deny the motion. View "Noon v. Fuentes" on Justia Law