Justia Landlord - Tenant Opinion Summaries

The South Carolina Supreme Court granted review of a court of appeals' decision affirming a trial court's finding that Respondents Fred's, Inc. (Fred's) and Wildevco, LLC (Wildevco) were entitled to equitable indemnification from Petitioner Tippins-Polk Construction, Inc. (Tippins-Polk). Respondent Fred's was a Tennessee corporation that operated a chain of discount general merchandise stores in several states, including South Carolina. Respondent Wildevco is a South Carolina limited liability company that owned a tract of undeveloped commercial property in Williston, South Carolina. In February 2005, Wildevco and Fred's entered into a lease agreement in which Wildevco agreed to construct a 16,000-square-foot commercial space located in Williston, South Carolina, according to Fred's conceptual design specifications. In turn, Fred's agreed to lease the property for ten years. In April 2005, Wildevco entered into a contract with general contractor Tippins-Polk for the construction of the Fred's store and adjoining strip center. Pursuant to the lease agreement between Wildevco and Fred's, Wildevco was the party responsible for "keep[ing] and repair[ing] the exterior of the [] Premises, including the parking lot, parking lot lights, entrance and exits, sidewalks, ramps, curbs," and various other exterior elements. Fred's was responsible for maintenance of the interior of the premises. Five years after the Fred's store opened, on a sunny day in March, Martha Fountain went to the Williston Fred's to purchase light bulbs. Her toe caught the sloped portion of the ramp at the entrance of the store, causing her to trip and fall. Fountain sustained serious injuries to her hand, wrist, and arm and has undergone five surgeries to alleviate her pain and injuries. Fountain and her husband filed a premises liability suit against Fred's and Wildevco, alleging Respondents breached their duty to invitees by failing to maintain and inspect the premises and failing to discover and make safe or warn of unreasonable risks. Pertinent to this appeal, Tippins-Polk argued the court of appeals erred in finding a special relationship existed between it and Fred's and in finding Respondents proved they were without fault as to the Fountain premises liability claim. Because the Supreme Court found Respondents failed to establish they were without fault in the underlying action, judgment was reversed. View "Fountain v. Fred's, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals held that a loft unit located in an interim multiple dwelling covered by the provisions of the Loft Law but exempt from the rent regulations of the Loft Law, Multiple Dwelling Law article 7-C, by operation of a sale of the prior tenant's rights and improvements is not otherwise subject to rent stabilization.The Appellate Division affirmed the decision of the Housing Court granting summary judgment to Tenant in this holdover proceeding to recover possession and terminate Tenant's occupancy, determining that the loft unit at issue remained subject to rent regulation. On appeal, Landlord argued that the loft unit was not subject to rent regulation due to the prior owner's purchase of the protected tenant's Loft Law rights. The Court of Appeals agreed, holding that a unit covered by the Loft Law, exempted from that statute's rent stabilization regime by operation of a sale of a prior tenant's rights and improvements is not subject to the rent stabilization provisions of the Emergency Tenant Protection Act. View "Aurora Associates LLC v. Locatelli" on Justia Law

Li Meng ("Tenant") leased a commercial property from the Plaintiffs, Mohammad Rahimi and Tahereh Dinpajooh ("Landlords") in August, 2019 for the sole purpose of operating a massage business for a two year term. The parties specifically agreed in the written lease that Tenant use of the commercial space was for the sole purpose of conducting a massage business and Tenant was prohibited from using the space for any other purpose. The Landlords prohibited any use of the leased premises which could endanger life. The Landlords noted that even though Tenant was prohibited from any use of the premises which violated public law or governmental rule, the lease specified there would be no abatement of rent even if there was a loss of business arising from some future law. Landlords argued that Tenant's obligation to pay rent was not excused because of these lease provisions. In January, 2020, approximately five months after the parties executed the lease, the first case of the COVID-19 virus was reported within the United States and soon thereafter in Oklahoma. In March, the Oklahoma governor declared a state of emergency due to COVID-19 and businesses that were not part of critical infrastructure were ordered to close for a period of time. Tenant stated that she closed the business on March 19, 2020 after she and her sole employee became ill with symptoms of the COVID-19 virus. Tenant did not pay rent after March 2020, and she never re-opened her business. By June 2020, Landlords filed this action against the Tenant for past due rent and eviction. Tenant argued that rent was not due from April through August because performance of the contract had become impossible in light of the public health risk with massage which temporarily excused the payment of rent under the doctrine of frustration of purpose or impracticability. The court stated that the defense of impracticability was not a legitimate excuse for the nonpayment of rent and did not allow Tenant to present any evidence in support of this defense. The trial court awarded Landlords $6,400 in past due rent and granted them possession. The Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed the trial court, finding that the trial court erred when it did not allow Tenant to present evidence in support of the affirmative defense. View "Meng v. Rahimi" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs challenged, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, Oakland’s Uniform Residential Tenant Relocation Ordinance, which requires landlords re-taking occupancy of their homes upon the expiration of a lease to pay tenants a relocation payment. Plaintiffs alleged that the relocation fee is an unconstitutional physical taking of their money for a private rather than public purpose, without just compensation. Alternatively, they claimed that the fee constitutes an unconstitutional exaction of their Oakland home and an unconstitutional seizure of their money under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. Although in certain circumstances money can be the subject of a physical (per se) taking, the relocation fee required by the Ordinance was a regulation of the landlord-tenant relationship, not an unconstitutional taking of a specific and identifiable property interest. Because there was no taking, the court did not address whether the relocation fee was required for a public purpose or what just compensation would be. The court rejected an assertion that Oakland placed an unconstitutional condition (an exaction), on their preferred use of their Oakland home. The plaintiffs did not establish a cognizable theory of state action; Oakland did not participate in the monetary exchange between plaintiffs and their tenants. View "Ballinger v. City of Oakland" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the circuit court granting Landlord's motion for summary judgment on each claim brought by Tenant, holding that the circuit court did not err.Tenant's minor son was attacked by a neighbor's dog near her home in Landlord's trailer court. Tenant brought this action against Landlord alleging two negligence theories and a breach of contract claim. The circuit court concluded that Landlord owed no legal duty to the child and, in any event, had no knowledge of the dog's alleged dangerous propensities. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the dog's attack on the child was not actionable as to Landlord because there was no duty that would subject it to liability. View "Burgi v. East Winds Court, Inc." on Justia Law

The Costa Hawkins Rental Housing Act, Civil Code section 1954.50, generally exempts newly constructed residential units, single-family homes, and condominiums from local rent increase limitations. The San Francisco Rent Ordinance acknowledges these exemptions in sections 37.3(d) and (g). Costa Hawkins expressly preserves local authority to “regulate or monitor the grounds for eviction” on all residential rental properties, including properties exempt from local rent control.Landlords challenged a measure that amended the city’s rent ordinance to make it unlawful for a landlord to seek to recover possession of a rental unit that is exempt from rent control by means of a rental increase that is imposed in bad faith to coerce the tenant to vacate the unit in circumvention of the city’s eviction laws, claiming that the amendment is preempted by Costa Hawkins because it seeks to regulate the rent a landlord may charge on exempt properties. The trial court and court of appeal rejected the challenge. The amendment is a valid exercise of the city’s authority to regulate evictions and is designed to deter landlords from attempting to avoid local eviction rules by imposing artificially high rents in bad faith. View "San Francisco Apartment Association v. City & County of San Francisco" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court concluding that the lease of property in this case did not violate Appellants' first refusal to purchase the property, holding that the district court did not err.John and Melanie Lennon leased property owned by the Larry Lee Luckinbill Living Trust for a 125-year term. Thereafter, Appellants - Anne Holding and the Crandall Creek Ranch Company - brought suit against the Lennons and the trust's trustee, seeking a declaratory judgment stating that the lease violated their right of first refusal. The district court concluded that the right of first refusal remained in effect but that the lease did not trigger that right. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the lease did not trigger Appellants' right of first refusal. View "Holding v. Luckinbill" on Justia Law

Ralph Fischer appealed from an order denying his request for attorney’s fees under N.D.C.C. 27-08.1-04. In February 2018, Fischer and Darin Hoyt executed a Cattle Share Lease. Under the terms of the lease, Fischer rented pasture land to Hoyt. In July 2019, Fischer sued Hoyt in small claims court arguing he was entitled to $15,000 for Hoyt’s failure to pay pasture rent in 2018. Hoyt removed the case to district court and filed an answer and counterclaim, asserting Fischer breached terms of the agreement. Fischer answered the counterclaim and requested attorney’s fees under N.D.C.C. 27-08.1-04. In February 2020, Fischer received leave of court to amend his complaint and increased his alleged damages to $25,000. After a bench trial, the district court found both parties breached the lease in different respects. Pertinent here, the district court found Hoyt breached the lease by failing to pay rent in 2018. The district court denied Fischer’s request for attorney’s fees, finding "the claims and counterclaims in this matter were far too complex for small claims court and would have been dismissed without prejudice to refile in district court." To the North Dakota Supreme Court, Fischer argues the district court erred in denying his request because he is the prevailing plaintiff after removal from small claims court. Fischer also argued he was entitled to attorney’s fees incurred in this appeal. The Supreme Court agreed, and reversed and remanded for an award of Fischer’s attorney’s fees in the district court action and on appeal. View "Fischer v. Hoyt" on Justia Law

J&A, a tenant of real party in interest, TTP, filed suit alleging that TTP failed to honor its right of first refusal when TTP entered an agreement to sell property to a third party, Adventure Church. J&A initiated legal action in the Fresno County Superior Court and filed a notice of pendency of action, commonly known as a lis pendens, to provide notice to interested parties of the litigation; TTP moved to expunge the lis pendens; and the trial court granted the motion. J&A then petitioned for writ of mandate challenging the trial court's ruling.The Court of Appeal granted the writ of mandate, concluding that the order expunging the lis pendens was flawed in several respects. The court found that the trial court's ruling expunging the lis pendens was based on erroneous legal rulings and factual findings not supported by substantial evidence. In this case, J&A has shown the probable validity of its real property claims and is entitled to the continued recordation of the lis pendens pending the outcome of litigation. The court ordered and entered a new order denying the motion to expunge the lis pendens. The court also concluded that J&A, as the prevailing party on the motion to expunge and in the writ proceeding, is entitled to recover its reasonable attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 405.38. The court also directed the trial court to hold further proceedings to calculate and award those attorney's fees and costs. View "J&A Mash & Barrel, LLC v. Superior Court of Fresno County" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court granting Plaintiffs' motion to certify three classes for a class action lawsuit, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.Plaintiffs were former tenants of residential apartments owned and managed by Defendant. Plaintiffs brought a class action lawsuit alleging violations of the North Carolina Residential Rental Agreements Act and the North Carolina Debt Collection Act. Plaintiffs moved to certify three class of certain fellow tenants, and the trial court granted the motion as to all three classes. Defendant appealed, pointing to three alleged errors in the trial court's class certification order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in certifying the three classes for a class action lawsuit. View "McMillan v. Blue Ridge Cos." on Justia Law