Justia Landlord - Tenant Opinion Summaries

A company leased 24 properties from a landlord under separate agreements that included options to renew the leases for additional terms, provided the tenant gave written notice 120 days before expiration. The tenant successfully renewed twice, but in 2021, failed to send the required renewal notice to the landlord by the deadline. The landlord notified the tenant that the leases would terminate, and after unsuccessful negotiations for new leases, the tenant sought a court declaration that its late renewal was still effective, citing the significant value of improvements made to the properties.The Franklin County Court of Common Pleas ruled in favor of the tenant, finding that equity could forgive the tenant’s “honest mistake” in missing the deadline and prevent forfeiture of the improvements. The court also found that the landlord’s acceptance of rent after the expiration of a tolling agreement estopped the landlord from terminating the leases. The Tenth District Court of Appeals affirmed, relying on prior Ohio appellate decisions that allowed equitable relief for honest mistakes or even negligence if forfeiture would result and the landlord was not prejudiced.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and reversed the Tenth District’s judgment. The court held that while equity may excuse a failure to comply with a lease renewal option in cases of fraud, accident, or mistake, it does not extend to negligence. The court clarified that “mistake” refers to a misapprehension of a basic assumption at contract formation, not a negligent failure to act. Because the tenant’s failure to timely exercise the renewal option was due to negligence, equitable relief was not warranted. The case was remanded to the Tenth District Court of Appeals to consider the landlord’s remaining arguments regarding equitable estoppel. View "Ashland Global Holdings, Inc. v. SuperAsh Remainderman, Ltd. Partnership" on Justia Law

A Michigan landlord who owns several rental properties in Oak Park challenged the city’s housing code, specifically its requirement that landlords consent to property inspections as a condition for obtaining a rental license. The city’s code mandates that landlords apply for a license and certificate of compliance, which involves an initial inspection and periodic re-inspections. The landlord refused to sign the consent form for inspections, resulting in the city withholding his license and issuing fines for renting without one. Despite these penalties, he continued to rent out his properties.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granted summary judgment in favor of the city. The district court found that the landlord lacked standing to bring a Fourth Amendment claim because there had been no warrantless, nonconsensual inspection. It also ruled that the city’s licensing and inspection regime did not violate the Fourth Amendment or impose unconstitutional conditions, and that the landlord’s Equal Protection claim was without merit.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the landlord did have standing to challenge the licensing scheme under the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine, as the denial of a license for refusing to consent to inspections constituted a cognizable injury. However, the court concluded that the city’s requirement of consent to an initial inspection as a condition of licensing was reasonable and did not violate the Fourth Amendment, drawing on Supreme Court precedent distinguishing between reasonable conditions for public benefits and coercive mandates. The court also found that the city’s inspection requirements for one- and two-family rentals did not violate the Equal Protection Clause, as the classification was rationally related to legitimate public health and safety goals. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Herschfus v. City of Oak Park" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, former tenants of apartments owned and managed by the defendants, filed a putative class action alleging that the defendants violated Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 186, Section 15B (4) (iii) by deducting charges for "reasonable wear and tear" from tenants' security deposits. The plaintiffs also claimed that the defendants included lease provisions requiring tenants to have the premises professionally cleaned at the end of the lease, which they argued was a violation of the same statute.The case was initially filed in the Superior Court and later removed to the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The plaintiffs moved for class certification, and both parties moved for summary judgment. The Federal judge denied these motions without prejudice and certified two questions to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts regarding the interpretation of the statute.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that a tenant's reasonable use of a property as a residence is expected to result in gradual deterioration, such as the need for painting, carpet repair, or similar refurbishment at the end of a lease. Deductions from a security deposit for such reasonable wear and tear violate the statute. Whether damage constitutes "reasonable wear and tear" is a fact-specific question depending on various circumstances, including the nature and cause of the damage, the condition of the property at the start of the lease, and the length of the occupancy.The court also held that a lease provision requiring a tenant to have the premises professionally cleaned at the end of the lease, on penalty of bearing the costs of repairs regardless of whether the damage is reasonable wear and tear, conflicts with the statute. Such a provision is void and unenforceable under Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 186, Section 15B (8). View "Peebles v. JRK Property Holdings, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2020, the Maryland General Assembly passed the Housing Opportunities Made Equal (HOME) Act, which added "source of income" to the list of prohibited considerations in housing rental or sale. The appellant, a housing voucher recipient, applied to rent an apartment in the appellee's complex. The appellee applied a minimum-income requirement, combining all sources of income to determine if the total exceeded 2.5 times the full gross rent. The appellant's combined income, including her voucher, did not meet this threshold, leading to the rejection of her application. The appellant sued, claiming the minimum-income requirement constituted source-of-income discrimination under § 20-705.The Circuit Court for Baltimore County granted summary judgment to the appellee, finding that the appellee's policy did not discriminate based on the source of income but rather on the amount of income. The court ruled that the appellee neutrally applied its income qualification criteria and rejected the appellant based on the amount of her income, not its source.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case and held that the appellee's counting of voucher income in the same manner as other income sources did not entitle it to summary judgment. The court found that this approach did not resolve the appellant's disparate impact claim, which asserts that a facially neutral policy has a disparate impact on a protected group without a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. The court vacated the judgment of the circuit court and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion, emphasizing the need to address the disparate impact analysis. View "Hare v. David S. Brown Enterprises" on Justia Law

John Schutt, as an agent for the J.E. Schutt & M.A. Schutt Family Trust, leased a residential property to Sherri Foster. Foster agreed to pay $1,900 per month in rent, with a late charge of $20 per day for any rent paid after the due date. Foster missed rent payments for July, August, and September 2020. Schutt filed a forcible detainer petition seeking unpaid rent and late fees. Foster countersued for money owed for construction services she performed for Schutt. The district court found Foster owed Schutt $5,700 in unpaid rent and awarded Schutt $21,240 in late fees, calculated at $20 per day for 1,062 days. After offsetting judgments, the court ruled Schutt owed Foster $544.98.Foster appealed to the Kansas Court of Appeals, arguing for the first time that the late-fee provision was unconscionable. The Court of Appeals reached the merits of Foster's unconscionability claim, despite it not being raised in the district court, and concluded that the late fees were unconscionable under the Residential Landlord and Tenant Act. The panel reversed the district court's award of late fees exceeding $2,460, the amount due for the 123 days between Foster's first missed payment and the date she vacated the property.The Kansas Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court held that appellants must brief exceptions to the preservation rule in their opening brief, as required by Kansas Supreme Court Rule 6.02(a)(5). Foster failed to comply with this requirement, as she first invoked exceptions to the preservation rule in her reply brief. The court concluded that the Court of Appeals erred by relying on these exceptions to reach the merits of Foster's unconscionability claim. Consequently, the Kansas Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and vacated its opinion, affirming the district court's judgment. View "Schutt v. Foster " on Justia Law

In this residential landlord-tenant dispute, the tenants, Michael Gogal and Hildy Baumgartner-Gogal, entered into a lease with landlords, Xinhui Deng and Jianhua Wu. The lease included a clause that capped recoverable litigation costs and attorney’s fees at $1,000. After successfully suing the landlords for retaliatory eviction, the tenants were awarded a monetary judgment and attorney’s fees exceeding the $1,000 cap. They then sought to recover additional litigation costs under California Code of Civil Procedure section 1032(b). The landlords argued that the lease’s $1,000 cap barred any further cost recovery.The Superior Court of San Diego County initially ruled in favor of the landlords, enforcing the $1,000 cap. However, after further arguments from the tenants, the court reversed its decision, allowing the tenants to recover nearly $14,000 in costs. The court reasoned that enforcing the cap would contravene the public policy intent of California Civil Code section 1942.5, which aims to protect tenants from abusive landlord conduct.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The main issue was whether parties to a contract could waive their statutory right to recover litigation costs under section 1032(b) through a pre-dispute agreement. The appellate court concluded that section 1032(b) establishes a default rule allowing prevailing parties to recover costs but does not prohibit parties from waiving this right by agreement. The court found that such waivers are consistent with Civil Code section 3513, which allows the waiver of rights intended for private benefit. The appellate court reversed the lower court’s order, directing it to strike the tenants’ memorandum of costs, thereby enforcing the $1,000 cap stipulated in the lease. View "Gogal v. Deng" on Justia Law

Tenants Michael Gogal and Hildy Baumgartner-Gogal, a married couple, prevailed on a retaliatory eviction claim against their former landlords, Xinhui Deng and Jianhua Wu. Michael, a licensed attorney, represented the tenants for most of the lawsuit. Post-judgment, the tenants sought to recover half of Michael’s attorney’s fees, attributing them to his representation of Hildy. Despite declarations from the tenants indicating that Hildy believed she had retained Michael as her attorney, the trial court denied the request, applying the precedent set in Gorman v. Tassajara Development Corp., which held that fees are not awardable when spouses’ interests are joint and indivisible.The Superior Court of San Diego County ruled in favor of the tenants on their retaliatory eviction claim, awarding them compensatory and punitive damages. The court also ruled in their favor on most other claims and on the landlords’ cross-claims, resulting in a total judgment against the landlords. Subsequently, the tenants filed a motion to recover attorney’s fees under Civil Code section 1942.5, which mandates an award of reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing party in retaliatory eviction cases. The trial court granted the motion for fees billed by another attorney but denied it for Michael’s fees, citing the Gorman case.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, affirmed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court agreed with the trial court’s application of Gorman but emphasized the need for a nuanced analysis to determine whether a true attorney-client relationship existed between Hildy and Michael. The court concluded that the tenants failed to present sufficient evidence to establish such a relationship, as the record did not demonstrate that Hildy played a significant substantive role in the litigation or that her consultations with Michael were for the purpose of obtaining legal advice in his professional capacity. View "Gogal v. Deng" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, a tenant, brought a personal injury action against the defendants, his landlords, under the Oregon Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (ORLTA). The plaintiff sought damages for injuries sustained when a plastic cover of a light fixture fell from the ceiling of a shared, exterior hallway outside his apartment and struck him on the head. The plaintiff argued that the landlords were liable for his injuries due to their failure to maintain the premises in a habitable condition as required by ORS 90.320(1).The landlords moved for summary judgment, arguing that their habitability obligations under ORS 90.320(1) applied only to the interior of the tenant’s dwelling unit and not to common areas like the hallway. The trial court granted the landlords' motion for summary judgment, agreeing with their interpretation of the statute. The plaintiff appealed, and the Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that the landlords' habitability obligations did not extend to areas outside the tenant’s dwelling unit.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court held that a landlord’s habitability obligations under ORS 90.320(1) do extend to common areas of an apartment building that are adjacent to a tenant’s apartment and used by the tenant to access the apartment. The court concluded that conditions in these common areas can render a dwelling unit unhabitable. The case was remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings consistent with this interpretation. View "Jackson v. KA-3 Associates, LLC" on Justia Law

The case involves MP PPH, LLC, the owner of the Marbury Plaza apartment complex in Washington, D.C., which was found in contempt by the Superior Court of the District of Columbia for failing to comply with a consent order. The consent order was designed to address severe housing code violations, including pest infestations, mold, broken air conditioning, lack of heat, unsecured doors, leaks, and major plumbing issues. The trial court ordered a 50% rent abatement for all tenants, retroactive to the latest possible date by which MP PPH had agreed to complete the consent order’s requirements.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia initially denied the District of Columbia’s motion for contempt, finding that MP PPH had made good faith efforts to comply. However, upon a renewed motion, the court held a three-day evidentiary hearing and found MP PPH in contempt, citing extensive noncompliance with the consent order. The court noted that MP PPH had failed to conduct proper mold assessments, complete necessary repairs, and provide pest control services, among other violations. The court imposed sanctions, including a 50% rent abatement for all tenants, increasing to 60% and then 75% if compliance was not achieved within specified timeframes.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court’s contempt finding and sanctions. The appellate court found that the evidence of MP PPH’s contempt was overwhelming and that the trial court was not required to follow a three-step contempt process as argued by MP PPH. The court also held that the trial court’s sanctions did not interfere with the discretion of courts presiding over related landlord-tenant cases and that any improper reference to the wealth of MP PPH’s principal was harmless. The appellate court concluded that MP PPH had forfeited many of its arguments on appeal by not raising them in a timely manner before the trial court. View "MP PPH, LLC v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law

Copinol Restaurant, Inc. ("Copinol") and 26 North Market LLC ("North Market") entered into a commercial lease agreement for a property in Frederick, Maryland, with a term ending on March 31, 2032. Copinol failed to pay rent on time in May 2023, prompting North Market to terminate the lease and demand that Copinol vacate the premises. When Copinol did not vacate, North Market filed a tenant holding over action in the District Court of Maryland, seeking possession of the property and damages.The District Court of Maryland ruled in favor of North Market, granting it possession of the property. Copinol appealed to the Circuit Court for Frederick County, which initially ruled in Copinol's favor, stating that the tenant holding over statute did not apply because the lease had not expired. However, after North Market filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment, the circuit court reversed its decision and affirmed the District Court's judgment, awarding possession to North Market.Copinol then filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which the Supreme Court of Maryland granted. The Supreme Court of Maryland held that the tenant holding over statute, RP § 8-402, does not apply where a tenant is in possession of property pursuant to a lease that has not expired by lapse of time. The Court further held that a landlord cannot contractually modify the statutory meaning of the phrase "expiration of a lease" to avail itself of the tenant holding over statute in a manner inconsistent with its plain language. The Court reversed the circuit court's judgment and remanded the case for entry of judgment in favor of Copinol. View "Copinol Restaurant v. 26 N. Market" on Justia Law