Justia Landlord - Tenant Opinion Summaries

Md. Code Ann., Real Prop. 8-402.1(a)(1)(i) requires that before a landlord may file a breach of lease action, the tenant must breach the lease, the notice requirement must expire, and the tenant must refuse to comply with the notice to vacate.Here, the circuit court determined that Landlord did not need to wait for the fourteen-day notice period to expire before it filed a complaint for breach of lease. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the circuit court erred in its construction of section 8;402.1(a)(1)(i)(2)(b) when it concluded that Landlord was not required to exhaust the notice requirement prior to filing a complaint for possession; and (2) Landlord’s notice to vacate was not issued in accordance with the terms of the lease with Tenant, and this deficiency could not be cured by the subsequently filed complaint. View "Hunter v. Broadway Overlook" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether a lease clause requiring a remainderman that leased real estate from a life tenant for one year ending on October 31, 2015 to pay unspecified real estate taxes made her liable for 2015 taxes that became due and payable on December 31. The life tenant died in August. The county court determined that the lease agreements controlled the lessor’s and lessee’s respective obligations to pay taxes, found the leases to be ambiguous, and ordered the life tenant’s Estate to reimburse the remaindermen. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that, because the Estate did not own the property on December 31, 2015, and the leases did not obligate the decedent to pay taxes that had not yet become due, the county court erred in ordering the estate to reimburse the remaindermen for the real estate taxes they paid. View "In re Estate of Karmazin" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether a lease clause requiring a remainderman that leased real estate from a life tenant for one year ending on October 31, 2015 to pay unspecified real estate taxes made her liable for 2015 taxes that became due and payable on December 31. The life tenant died in August. The county court determined that the lease agreements controlled the lessor’s and lessee’s respective obligations to pay taxes, found the leases to be ambiguous, and ordered the life tenant’s Estate to reimburse the remaindermen. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that, because the Estate did not own the property on December 31, 2015, and the leases did not obligate the decedent to pay taxes that had not yet become due, the county court erred in ordering the estate to reimburse the remaindermen for the real estate taxes they paid. View "In re Estate of Karmazin" on Justia Law

In this landlord-tenant dispute, Landlord complied with the requirements of the Montana Residential Tenants’ Security Deposits Act prior to deducting costs of cleaning from the vacating Tenant’s security deposit, and therefore, Tenant was entitled to a return of her security deposit.Tenant filed an action in justice court asserting that Landlord improperly withheld a portion of her security deposit that the Landlord spent to clean the vacated property, in violation of Mont. Code Ann. 70-25-201(3). The justice court found that Landlord had violated the statute by failing to provide Tenant written notice of cleaning deficiencies or twenty-four hours to clean or fix any issues found during the inspection. The district court reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Landlord complied with the requirements of state law before deducing the cost of cleaning from Tenant’s security deposit. View "Hines v. Topher Realty LLC" on Justia Law

This case provided the Supreme Court an opportunity to provide guidance on what happens if one of multiple losing parties wishes to appeal from a general district court (GDC) judgment involving consolidated claims by several parties.The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s award of sanctions against Landlord and award of damages in favor of Tenants in this dispute over holdover rent and property damages. Landlord filed a warrant in debt against Tenants. Tenants filed a counterclaim. The GDC ruled against both parties and dismissed all claims. Landlord appealed to the circuit court but later withdrew its appeal. The circuit court awarded sanctions against Landlord and awarded damages in favor of Tenants on their unappealed counterclaim without hearing evidence on the matter. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the circuit court abused its discretion by applying a rationale for a sanctions award that finds no support in either the text of Va. Code 8.01-271.1 or this court’s opinions applying it; and (2) the circuit court erred in adjudicating Tenants’ counterclaim. View "Robert & Bertha Robinson Family, LLC v. Allen" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against their landlord for alleged negligence after a fire in an upstairs apartment caused injuries to several tenants. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment for the landlord, holding that defendant met his initial burden of presenting prima facie evidence that plaintiffs would not be able to establish the element of causation. The court also held that plaintiffs' reference to the discrepancy in the declaration of an expert fire investigator without evidence to establish the significance thereof on the issue of causation, was insufficient to create a triable issue of material fact; plaintiffs never properly alleged a cause of action based on a failure to warn theory; potential inferences that arguably arose under the evidence offered by defendant were not sufficient to create a triable issue of fact; and plaintiffs' 11th-hour spoliation claim was properly disregarded by the trial court under the circumstances. View "Leyva v. Garcia" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against their landlord for alleged negligence after a fire in an upstairs apartment caused injuries to several tenants. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment for the landlord, holding that defendant met his initial burden of presenting prima facie evidence that plaintiffs would not be able to establish the element of causation. The court also held that plaintiffs' reference to the discrepancy in the declaration of an expert fire investigator without evidence to establish the significance thereof on the issue of causation, was insufficient to create a triable issue of material fact; plaintiffs never properly alleged a cause of action based on a failure to warn theory; potential inferences that arguably arose under the evidence offered by defendant were not sufficient to create a triable issue of fact; and plaintiffs' 11th-hour spoliation claim was properly disregarded by the trial court under the circumstances. View "Leyva v. Garcia" on Justia Law

Aponte moved into his mother's one-bedroom New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA)-owned apartment and cared for her until she died in 2012. Two requests for Aponte to be granted permanent permission to live with his mother were denied. After she died, Aponte requested to be allowed to lease her apartment as a "remaining family member." NYCHA denied his request, finding that Aponte lacked permanent permission to reside in the apartment; management properly denied such permission because Aponte's presence would have violated occupancy rules for overcrowding. A person lacking permanent permission to reside in an apartment is not eligible for RFM status. The Court of Appeals upheld the denial. Under its rules, NYCHA could not have granted Aponte permanent permission to reside in his mother's apartment, and thus could not have granted his request for RFM status. NYCHA's rules contemplate that a tenant may require a live-in home-care attendant, either for a transient illness or the last stages of life, and expressly allow for such an attendant as a temporary resident, even if that permission will result in "overcrowding," regardless of whether the attendant is related to the tenant. NYCHA's policy is not arbitrary and capricious for not allowing Aponte to bypass the 250,000-household waiting line as a reward for enduring an "overcrowded" living situation while caring for his mother. View "Aponte v Olatoye" on Justia Law

Aponte moved into his mother's one-bedroom New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA)-owned apartment and cared for her until she died in 2012. Two requests for Aponte to be granted permanent permission to live with his mother were denied. After she died, Aponte requested to be allowed to lease her apartment as a "remaining family member." NYCHA denied his request, finding that Aponte lacked permanent permission to reside in the apartment; management properly denied such permission because Aponte's presence would have violated occupancy rules for overcrowding. A person lacking permanent permission to reside in an apartment is not eligible for RFM status. The Court of Appeals upheld the denial. Under its rules, NYCHA could not have granted Aponte permanent permission to reside in his mother's apartment, and thus could not have granted his request for RFM status. NYCHA's rules contemplate that a tenant may require a live-in home-care attendant, either for a transient illness or the last stages of life, and expressly allow for such an attendant as a temporary resident, even if that permission will result in "overcrowding," regardless of whether the attendant is related to the tenant. NYCHA's policy is not arbitrary and capricious for not allowing Aponte to bypass the 250,000-household waiting line as a reward for enduring an "overcrowded" living situation while caring for his mother. View "Aponte v Olatoye" on Justia Law

In 2016, San Francisco barred no-fault evictions (for owner move-in, condominium conversion, permanent removal of the unit from housing use, capital improvements, or substantial rehabilitation) of families with children and educators during the school year. The trial court concluded state law preempted this ordinance. The court of appeal reversed. The purpose of the unlawful detainer statutes is procedural; they implement the landlord’s property rights by permitting him to recover possession once the consensual basis for the tenant’s occupancy ends. The ordinance is a limitation upon the landlord’s property rights under the police power, giving rise to a substantive ground of defense in unlawful detainer proceedings. The ordinance does not specify an amount of notice required to terminate a tenancy but only establishes a permissible substantive defense to eviction that (like some other substantive defenses to eviction) impacts when landlords may evict. It regulates in an area within the municipality’s police powers and does not conflict with a state statute, its incidental impact on the timing of landlord-tenant relations does not alone render it preempted. View "San Francisco Apartment Association. v. City and County of San Francisco" on Justia Law