Justia Landlord - Tenant Opinion Summaries

A woman who receives a housing voucher due to her disability applied to rent an apartment in a complex owned by a property management company. The monthly rent for the unit was $1,590, and her voucher would have covered $1,464, leaving her responsible for $126 per month. Her only other income was $841 per month in supplemental security income. The property owner applied its standard policy, requiring all applicants to demonstrate monthly income at least 2.5 times the full rent, aggregating all sources of income, including voucher subsidies. The applicant’s combined income and voucher fell short of the $3,975 threshold, so her application was denied.After the Maryland Commission on Civil Rights found no probable cause for her discrimination claim, the applicant sued in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, alleging that the owner’s minimum-income requirement constituted impermissible source-of-income discrimination under Maryland’s Housing Opportunities Made Equal (HOME) Act, which prohibits discrimination based on “source of income” in housing. The owner moved for summary judgment, arguing its policy was facially neutral and applied equally to all sources of income. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the owner, finding that the policy did not discriminate based on the source of income, only the amount.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case. The Court agreed with the circuit court that the owner was entitled to summary judgment on the disparate treatment claim, as the policy was facially neutral and applied equally. However, the Supreme Court of Maryland held that the owner was not entitled to summary judgment on the disparate impact claim. The Court explained that a facially neutral policy may still violate the HOME Act if it disproportionately affects voucher holders without a legitimate business justification. The judgment of the circuit court was vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Hare v. David S. Brown Enterprises" on Justia Law

In 2020, the Maryland General Assembly passed the Housing Opportunities Made Equal (HOME) Act, which added "source of income" to the list of prohibited considerations in housing rental or sale. The appellant, a housing voucher recipient, applied to rent an apartment in the appellee's complex. The appellee applied a minimum-income requirement, combining all sources of income to determine if the total exceeded 2.5 times the full gross rent. The appellant's combined income, including her voucher, did not meet this threshold, leading to the rejection of her application. The appellant sued, claiming the minimum-income requirement constituted source-of-income discrimination under § 20-705.The Circuit Court for Baltimore County granted summary judgment to the appellee, finding that the appellee's policy did not discriminate based on the source of income but rather on the amount of income. The court ruled that the appellee neutrally applied its income qualification criteria and rejected the appellant based on the amount of her income, not its source.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case and held that the appellee's counting of voucher income in the same manner as other income sources did not entitle it to summary judgment. The court found that this approach did not resolve the appellant's disparate impact claim, which asserts that a facially neutral policy has a disparate impact on a protected group without a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. The court vacated the judgment of the circuit court and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion, emphasizing the need to address the disparate impact analysis. View "Hare v. David S. Brown Enterprises" on Justia Law

Copinol Restaurant, Inc. ("Copinol") and 26 North Market LLC ("North Market") entered into a commercial lease agreement for a property in Frederick, Maryland, with a term ending on March 31, 2032. Copinol failed to pay rent on time in May 2023, prompting North Market to terminate the lease and demand that Copinol vacate the premises. When Copinol did not vacate, North Market filed a tenant holding over action in the District Court of Maryland, seeking possession of the property and damages.The District Court of Maryland ruled in favor of North Market, granting it possession of the property. Copinol appealed to the Circuit Court for Frederick County, which initially ruled in Copinol's favor, stating that the tenant holding over statute did not apply because the lease had not expired. However, after North Market filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment, the circuit court reversed its decision and affirmed the District Court's judgment, awarding possession to North Market.Copinol then filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which the Supreme Court of Maryland granted. The Supreme Court of Maryland held that the tenant holding over statute, RP § 8-402, does not apply where a tenant is in possession of property pursuant to a lease that has not expired by lapse of time. The Court further held that a landlord cannot contractually modify the statutory meaning of the phrase "expiration of a lease" to avail itself of the tenant holding over statute in a manner inconsistent with its plain language. The Court reversed the circuit court's judgment and remanded the case for entry of judgment in favor of Copinol. View "Copinol Restaurant v. 26 N. Market" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Maryland has ruled that the term "rent" under Real Property § 8-401, as applied to residential leases, refers to the fixed, periodic payments a tenant is required to make for use or occupancy of a rented premises. This definition excludes additional charges such as late fees, attorney’s fees, and court costs. The court also ruled that any provision in a residential lease that allows a landlord to allocate payments of "rent" to other obligations, thereby subjecting a tenant to eviction proceedings based on failure to pay "rent", violates Real Property § 8-208(d)(2). Further, penalties for late payment of rent, capped at 5% of the monthly amount of rent due, are inclusive of any costs of collection other than court-awarded costs. Finally, the court ruled that the Circuit Court erred in declining to review the merits of the tenants’ second renewed motion for class certification. The case has been remanded for further proceedings in line with these holdings. View "Westminster Management v. Smith" on Justia Law