Justia Landlord - Tenant Opinion Summaries

The case involves Edward A. Cianci and Raymond Frechette, who purchased a foreclosed property and initiated a summary process action in the Housing Court against the occupants, including Elizabeth D'Andrea. The Housing Court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs for possession. D'Andrea appealed and sought to waive the appeal bond due to her indigency. The Housing Court found D'Andrea to be indigent and waived her appeal bond, but required her to make monthly use and occupancy payments of $1,275 to the plaintiffs to maintain her appeal. D'Andrea appealed this order to the Appeals Court, which reported questions of law to the Supreme Judicial Court.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that use and occupancy payments required of an indigent party under G. L. c. 239, § 5 (e), may not be waived, substituted, or paid by the Commonwealth under the indigency statute because use and occupancy payments are not an "extra fee or cost" as defined in the indigency statute. The court further concluded that the order setting use and occupancy payments in this case did not violate D'Andrea's constitutional rights, even if the order requires her to make payments that potentially exceed her ability to pay. The court reasoned that the summary process statute reasonably imposes a fair balancing of interests between the owner of the property and the party in possession, and the Housing Court performed the fair balancing required. View "Frechette v. D'Andrea" on Justia Law

The case pertains to an appeal by plaintiff William J. Papp, III, against the decision of a single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court denying his request for declaratory relief, a stay of eviction, and relief in the nature of certiorari in relation to a housing dispute. The dispute centered around Papp's objection to the transfer of his case against the defendant landlord from the Superior Court to the Central Division of the Housing Court Department, which he alleged was in violation of G. L. c. 185C, § 20 and deprived him of due process.The Supreme Judicial Court upheld the single justice's decision, affirming that Papp had failed to adequately demonstrate that other remedies were not available to him. The court noted that Papp could have sought interlocutory review of the transfer order from a single justice of the Appeals Court, as per G. L. c. 231, § 118, first par. Additionally, he could have appealed the transfer order as part of an appeal from the final judgment of the Housing Court. Therefore, since Papp could not establish the absence or inadequacy of other remedies, the single justice had not erred or abused her discretion in denying Papp's claims for relief. View "Papp v. Westborough Gardens LLC" on Justia Law

In a case before the Supreme Judicial Court, the Attorney General of Massachusetts initiated a civil action in the Superior Court alleging housing discrimination by the defendant, Mark Davidson, on behalf of two complainants. The defendant transferred the case to the Housing Court, after which the Attorney General unsuccessfully sought to have the matter transferred back to the Superior Court, arguing that the Housing Court lacked jurisdiction over a discrimination claim in this procedural posture. The complainants had initially filed an administrative complaint with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination, alleging that the defendant had terminated their lease upon learning that one of the complainants was pregnant, allegedly to avoid having to comply with the lead containment or abatement statute. The defendant chose to have the matter heard in court rather than by the commission.The Supreme Judicial Court held that, based on the language of G. L. c. 151B, § 5, the Superior Court is the proper court for actions such as this one, and that the Housing Court lacks jurisdiction. The court reasoned that the language of § 5 unambiguously indicates that the Superior Court is the proper court for such actions. The court also noted that the Legislature's use of the word "shall" suggests a command to commence the action in the Superior Court, and not elsewhere, and the phrase "commence and maintain" is a clear directive that such actions brought by the Attorney General, once initiated, are to remain in the Superior Court. Therefore, the order of the single justice of the Appeals Court was affirmed, and the stay of any proceedings in the Superior Court was vacated. The case must be returned to the Superior Court. View "Commonwealth v. Davidson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the housing court's entry of judgment in favor of Landlord in this landlord-tenant dispute and the denial of Tenant's motion to revise, revoke, or vacate that judgment, holding that Landlord could seek to enforce the parties' voluntary stipulation following mediation and attempt to recover possession of the leased premises.Following mediation in early 2020, Tenant entered into a stipulation to voluntarily dismiss all claims against Landlord. Tenant further agreed to vacate Landlord's apartment. Because of an emergency eviction moratorium imposed pursuant to COVID-19, Landlord was unable to seek judgment on the stipulation and execution on such judgment until October 2020. The housing court judge entered judgment in favor of Landlord. Tenant filed a motion to revise, revoke, or vacate the judgment, which the housing court denied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the judge had the authority to award possession of the premises to Landlord under the circumstances of this case. View "Dacey v. Burgess" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the county court denying, without a hearing, Petitioner's petition for relief under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3, holding that the single justice did not err or abuse any discretion in denying relief.Petitioner was a defendant in a summary process action commenced by his landlord. The trial judge awarded possession to the later. When Petitioner appealed the trial judge set an appeal bond and ordered Petitioner to make use and occupancy payments. The appeals court affirmed the appeal bond. Petitioner then filed his Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 petition. A single justice denied relief on the ground that Petitioner had an adequate alternative remedy. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that Petitioner had an alternative means to seek a stay pending appeal, and therefore, relief was properly denied. View "Scott v. WM Oak Grove Village, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the underlying judgment of the Housing Court in this summary process eviction action awarding possession to Landlord, holding that Tenant's appeals regarding his requests for disabilities accommodations in the Appeals Court and in the single justice session were moot.After a bench trial the Housing Court judge awarded possession to Landlord but granted Tenant a reasonable accommodation in the form of a limited stay of execution. On appeal, Tenant requested disabilities accommodations from the Appeals Court, some of which were granted. Tenant also filed a petition in the county court pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3, which a single justice denied. The appeals were consolidated. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that Tenant's claims arising from the denial of requested disabilities accommodations in the Appeals Court and in the single justice session of this Court were moot. View "Saipe v. Sullivan & Co., Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the determination that time of entry into a lot rental agreement does not render the renters dissimilar under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 140, 32L(2), holding that the requirement that renters pay ninety-six dollars per month in additional rent for essentially the same lots was a violation of the statute.Defendants, the new owners of a manufactured home community, charged those who had rented their lots after Defendants purchased the community ninety-six dollars per month more for lot rent than those who had rented their lots before the change in ownership, despite the lots being essentially the same. A group of people brought suit, and a class was certified. A housing court judge determined that Defendants violated section 32L(2). The Supreme Court affirmed but reversed and remanded the case for reconsideration of a different judge's class certification decisions, holding that the judge erred in requiring class members to opt in. The Court further held that the judge who conducted a trial on damages considered improper factors, and therefore, the subclassifications for damages calculations also required reconsideration. View "Blake v. Hometown America Communities, Inc." on Justia Law

In this personal injury action, the Supreme Judicial Court held that Tenant was not entitled to personal injury damages based on Landlord's failure keep the driveway reasonably free of snow and ice.Tenant was severely injured when he slipped and fell on ice in the driveway adjacent to the premises he rented. A jury found Landlords negligent for failing to exercise reasonable care in keeping the driveway free of ice. However, the jury rendered a verdict of no liability, finding that Tenant was comparatively negligent and more responsible for the injury than Landlords. Based on the jury's finding, the judge found Landlords not liable on Tenant's additional claims alleging breach of the common-law implied warranty of habitability and violation of the statutory covenant of quiet enjoyment. Tenant appealed, arguing that he should recover personal injury damages on his remaining claims because the jury found Landlords negligent. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) a tenant may not be awarded personal injury damagers on a claim for breach of the implied warranty of habitability arising from a landlord's failure to keep common areas reasonably free of snow and ice; and (2) in this case, Tenant may not recover personal injury damages under the statutory covenant of quiet enjoyment. View "Goreham v. Martins" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the single justice of the court denying Plaintiffs' complaint for relief in the nature of mandamus and for extraordinary relief pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3, holding that the single justice correctly denied relief on all of Plaintiffs' claims.Each plaintiff is or was a defendant in a post-foreclosure summary process action. After an adverse judgment, each plaintiff was required to post an appeal bond or to make periodic use and occupancy payments during the pendency of each plaintiff's summary process appeal. The appellate division affirmed the bond or use and occupancy order in each case. Plaintiffs then collectively filed this complaint for relief in the nature of mandamus and for extraordinary relief under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 seeking relief from the bond and use and occupancy orders. The single justice denied all substantive relief sought. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs did not demonstrate the absence of an adequate and effective alternative remedy. View "Bigelow v. Massachusetts Courts Promulgator of Official Forms" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the judgment of the Housing Court for Landlord on its summary process complaint and affirmed the denial of relief on Tenants' counterclaims, holding that Landlord's summary process complaint must be dismissed because the summons and complaint were served within fourteen days of Tenants' receipt of the notice to quit.Landlord brought this summary process action against Tenants seeking to recover possession of the premises at issue and damages for unpaid rent. Tenants filed several counterclaims. The judge ordered judgment for Tenants on two counterclaims and awarded nominal damages. The parties later filed cross appeals. The Appeals Court dismissed Tenants' appeal on timeliness grounds. The Supreme Judicial Court granted further appellate review and held (1) Tenants' appeal was timely; (2) because the summary process proceeding was commenced before the fourteen-day deadline had come and gone, judgment must enter for Tenants; and (3) the judge did not err in denying relief on Tenants' counterclaims. View "Youghal, LLC v. Entwistle" on Justia Law