Justia Landlord - Tenant Opinion Summaries

Linus and Raymond Poitra appeal the district court judgment of eviction. The Poitras argue the district court erred by exercising jurisdiction over this matter, and by sending a North Dakota law enforcement officer onto the reservation to evict tribal members from property within the Turtle Mountain Reservation. The North Dakota Supreme Court determined the Poitras did not meet their burden under either "Montana" exception, and did not explain how a district court was divested of subject matter jurisdiction to grant a judgment of eviction. The district court judgment was therefore affirmed. View "Gustafson v. Poitra, et al." on Justia Law

Willis Swenson appealed, and Kyle Mahlum cross-appealed dismissal of Swenson’s claims against Mahlum and Mahlum’s claims against Carol Hodgerson, Gerard Swenson, Lee Alan Swenson, and Mary Ann Vig (“third-party defendants”). This suit arose over the ownership and leasing of real property in Burke County, North Dakota. Willis Swenson (“Swenson”) and the third-party defendants are the children of Robert and Junietta Swenson. In 2004, Robert and Junietta conveyed the property to their children as joint tenants, reserving a life estate for themselves. In 2005, Robert died and Junietta became the sole life tenant. In 2008, Junietta leased the property to Swenson. Swenson agreed to rental payments of $20,016 per year, due in installments. In December 2009, Swenson leased the property to Mahlum for $31,022.50 per year. The Swenson-Mahlum lease became effective in March 2010 and stated it would expire in October 2019. In November 2011, Swenson signed a new lease with Junietta, beginning in 2012 and ending in 2022. The lease permitted Swenson to assign or sublet the property to any person. In July 2012, Lee Swenson was appointed guardian and conservator for Junietta. In January 2013, Lee Swenson, as guardian and conservator, leased the same property to Mahlum that Willis Swenson already was leasing to Mahlum in the December 2009 lease. The new lease required Mahlum to pay Junietta $31,122.50 each year. Junietta died in November 2013. Mary Vig, as personal representative of Junietta’s estate, informed Mahlum that future rental payments should be split and made to each of Junietta’s children in equal amounts. In January 2017, Willis and his daughter, Dayna Johnson, sued Mahlum for unpaid rent. Swenson alleged Mahlum was required to pay him under the 2009 lease, and Mahlum failed to pay any rent in 2013, 2014, 2015, and 2016. Mahlum answered and filed a third-party complaint, suing the third-party defendants for unjust enrichment. He alleged in 2013 he paid Junietta under the terms of the 2013 lease. He also alleged in 2014, 2015, and 2016 he paid rent to each of Junietta children. Mahlum claimed that the third-party defendants have been unjustly enriched, and that the third-party defendants be ordered to pay Mahlum any amounts the court finds he owed Swenson if Swenson obtained a judgment against him. After review of the circumstances of this case, the North Dakota Supreme Court determined the trial court erred in its findings, and reversed dismissal of Swenson’s breach of contract claim. On remand, the court must decide the amount of damages Swenson was entitled to recover for his breach of contract claim against Mahlum for unpaid rent in 2013, including whether Swenson failed to mitigate those damages. In addition, the court must decide Mahlum’s claims against the third-party defendants. View "Swenson, et al. v. Mahlum, et al." on Justia Law

Watford City Lodging LLC (“WCL”) appealed the denial of its motion to amend a judgment vacating a default eviction judgment. WCL argued the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the eviction proceedings, exceeded its jurisdiction by making extraneous findings and conclusions of law, and abused its discretion by denying WCL’s motion to amend the judgment. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the district court misapplied the law and abused its discretion by denying WCL’s motion to amend the judgment. View "Watford City Lodging LLC v. Miskin" on Justia Law

Debra Heitkamp, the personal representative of the Estate of Nick Lyons, appealed a district court judgment in favor of Kevin Kabella following cross-motions for summary judgment, alleging the district court improperly determined the parties’ agreement was invalid because it fell within the limitation on the length of agricultural leases provided by N.D.C.C. 47-16-02. Kabella and Lyons entered into an agreement pertaining to farmland on March 29, 2007. The agreement gave Lyons possession and use of the property “in perpetuity.” In addition to receiving the property in perpetuity, the agreement stated Kabella could sell the property subject to Lyons’ right to purchase the property. Prior to the 2012 farming season, Kabella attempted to lease the property to Kermit Anderson Jr. Lyons refused to vacate the property asserting he was entitled to the use and possession of the property pursuant to his agreement with Kabella. Anderson brought an eviction action to remove Lyons from the property. Kabella was included as a defendant to allow a resolution of any issues regarding the agreement between Kabella and Lyons. In the litigation initiated by Anderson, Anderson and Kabella asserted the March 29, 2007 agreement between Kabella and Lyons was invalid under N.D.C.C. 47-16-02. Lyons passed away in May 2013, and Heitkamp was appointed personal representative of the estate. The estate used the property since that time. In March 2017, Heitkamp on behalf of Lyons' estate. sued for a declaration the agreement was valid in perpetuity. The district court granted summary judgment to Kabella and found the agreement was a lease that fell within the restrictions of N.D.C.C. 47-16-02, and due to the non-occurrence of any of the contingencies contained in the agreement, it expired on its tenth anniversary, March 29, 2017. The court awarded Kabella damages equal to the fair value of the use of the property subsequent to March 29, 2017. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded "reasonable persons can draw more than one conclusion regarding the nature of the parties’ agreement," and therefore reversed judgment and remanded for a determination of whether this agreement was a lease subject to the limitations of N.D.C.C. 47-16-02, or a grant, option to purchase, or contract for deed outside the limitations of N.D.C.C. 47-16-02. Because the question of whether the limitation within N.D.C.C. 47-16-02 applied to the parties’ agreement remained undetermined, the Supreme Court declined to decide if the agreement was invalid after extending for a period of ten years. View "Heitkamp v. Kabella" on Justia Law

William Nelson appealed a judgment ordering the sale of real property, removing him from the property, ordering him to pay past rent, and awarding Steven Nelson and Gail Nelson-Hom attorney fees for defending against his frivolous pleadings. The North Dakota Supreme Court found the district court erred in granting partial summary judgment on William Nelson's claims of undue influence and lack of mental capacity involving the execution of the quitclaim deed to the property and reversed and remanded for trial on those issues. The Supreme Court reversed the award of costs and attorney fees and remanded for reconsideration. View "Nelson v. Nelson" on Justia Law

Brittany Creech appealed her eviction from her from property in Williams County, North Dakota owned by Louis Tornabeni. Creech argued: (1) Tornabeni's notice of intent to evict was deficient; (2) the summary eviction proceeding violated her right to due process; (3) the district court abused its discretion in excluding certain exhibits; (4) the court's findings of fact were clearly erroneous; and (5) the delivery of the deed was defective and prevented Tornabeni from obtaining ownership of the property. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. View "Tornabeni v. Creech" on Justia Law

In an eviction action, a district court must have both subject matter and personal jurisdiction to enter a valid order or judgment. Barbara Vondell appealed a judgment entered for Spirit Property Management, evicting her from possession of real property and awarding a money judgment against her. For over twenty-five years Luetta Vondell owned a mobile home on a rented lot. Sometime after Luetta was diagnosed with dementia, her daughter Barbara moved in with her, becoming her full-time care giver and agent under a durable power of attorney. In July 2014 Barbara and Luetta Vondell, through Barbara under the power of attorney, signed a one-year lease for the mobile home lot. The lease commenced on July 1, 2014, continuing on a month-to-month basis after the lease term. Luetta died in September 2015. In March 2016 Spirit Property filed suit for eviction and possession of real property for nonpayment of rent. Barbara answered the suit, denying Spirit Property's claims and asserting various defenses. At a May 2016 eviction hearing the district court found Barbara moved out of the home in November 2015, but the mobile home continued occupying Spirit Property's lot. The court found that while lot rent was partially paid for September 2015, no rent was paid in October and November 2015. The court entered an order and judgment against Barbara granting Spirit Property possession of the property and awarding $2,440 for unpaid rent and costs. Barbara argued the district court erred in deciding it had subject matter jurisdiction of the eviction action under N.D.C.C. ch. 47-32 when the court found Barbara terminated the lease and vacated the property in November 2015. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the district court had both subject matter jurisdiction over the eviction and personal jurisdiction over Vondell, and affirmed. View "Spirit Property Management v. Vondell" on Justia Law

Roland Riemers twice sued Heidee Hill, her husband, Jason Hill, and her three children, Hannah Hill, Ashley Roesler, and Hailey Marie Hill, for unpaid rent, late fees, property damage, and punitive damages arising out of a lease agreement signed by Heidee Hill for a house in Emerado. Only Heidee Hill signed the lease agreement, but Heidee and Jason Hill were both identified as applicants on the agreement and the three children were listed as "others who will be sharing the house." The Hill family moved to dismiss Riemers' complaint for failure to state a claim and sought attorney fees. They asserted the property was uninhabitable and had been condemned by the Grand Forks Public Health Department in July 2013. They also counterclaimed for abuse of process, alleging Riemers' claims for unpaid rent and property damage were "so outrageous and ridiculous" to rise to the level of abuse of process. They claimed that despite the property being condemned in July 2013, Riemers sued them for structural damage to the house that was clearly Riemers' responsibility and Riemers had an ulterior motive to harass and embarrass them with a lawsuit void of any factual or legal basis. Riemers appealed the judgment awarding him $8,245.87 from Heidee Hill for unpaid rent and property damage and ordering him to pay Ashley Roesler $10,164 for abuse of process. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court erred in granting summary judgment on the liability issue of the abuse-of-process claim. Accordingly, the Court affirmed in part and reversed the summary judgment on that claim and remanded for further proceedings. View "Riemers v. Hill" on Justia Law

Cheetah Properties 1, LLC and Panther Pressure Testers, Inc. entered into a commercial lease agreement with an initial term that commenced on April 15, 2014, and ended on December 31, 2014. On January 19, 2015, Cheetah brought an eviction action to recover possession of the property. In the complaint, Cheetah sought damages for: (1) delinquent charges for late payment of rent owed up to December 31, 2014; (2) for Panther's willful holdover "in an amount double the yearly value of the Premises for the time of Defendant[']s withholding" under N.D.C.C. 32-03-28; and (3) for any physical damage to the property caused by Panther vacating the premises. Cheetah also sought an award of reasonable attorneys' fees under the lease. Panther vacated the property by January 31, 2015. The district court returned lawful possession of the property to Cheetah and awarded it $22,000 for January 2015 rent and $8,200 for delinquent rent and fees under the lease. The district court declined to impose double damages under N.D.C.C. 32-03-28 based on its finding that Panther's holding over was not willful. After the district court entered its order for judgment, Cheetah moved for an award of reasonable attorneys' fees under the lease. The district court denied Cheetah's request for fees. Cheetah appealed the district court's judgment and the order denying an award of reasonable attorneys' fees. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment concluding Cheetah was not entitled to an award of double damages under N.D.C.C. 32-03-28, but reversed the denial of attorneys' fees. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Cheetah Properties 1, LLC v. Panther Pressure Testers, Inc." on Justia Law

Kara and Kent Poppe appealed a district court summary judgment dismissing their conversion claim. The Poppes rented a house from Pamela Hillis for five years, until February 4, 2013 when Hillis served them with an eviction notice for unpaid rent. The district court ordered the Poppes to vacate the property, and entered a money judgment against them for $1,544 for past due rent. The Poppes requested and received permission from Hillis to remain on the property an additional five hours to remove their belongings with the assistance of a moving truck. The Poppes vacated but left some personal property in the house. Hillis arranged for Community Blessings, owned by Theresa Stockert, to pack, remove and store the remaining property. When the Poppes requested to retrieve their remaining property, Hillis referred them to Stockert. Stockert demanded the Poppes pay $4,600 for packing, moving and storage expenses before the property would be returned. The Poppes did not pay Stockert and did not retrieve their property from Community Blessings. The Poppes' washer and dryer remained in the home until sold by Hillis to new renters. The Poppes sued Stockert for conversion and the parties stipulated the Poppes could retrieve undisputed property from Community Blessings. The Poppes were unable to retrieve all of their property from Community Blessings and litigation continued. The Poppes ultimately joined Hillis as a party to the proceedings and moved to amend the complaint to include an exemplary damages claim alleging Hillis' and Stockert's conduct was oppressive or malicious. Hillis filed a cross-motion for summary judgment alleging a statutory right to dispose of the property, which Stockert joined. The district court entered an order denying the Poppes' motion to amend the complaint and granting summary judgment in favor of Hillis and Stockert. The Poppes argued the district court erred in granting summary judgment because it misinterpreted Hillis' right to remove their personal property from the rental property. Hillis argued she had a right to remove the property under N.D.C.C. 47-16-30.1 and was therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law. After review, the Supreme Court concluded Hillis and Stockert did not have a right under N.D.C.C. 47-16-30.1 to dispose of the Poppes' personal property. Because the district court erred in interpreting Hillis' statutory right to dispose of the property, on remand the Poppes could renew their motion to amend the complaint to include exemplary damages. The Court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded for further proceedings. View "Poppe v. Stockert" on Justia Law