Justia Landlord - Tenant Opinion Summaries

A landlord argued that a case brought by the Los Angeles City Attorney to enforce California's Public Nuisance Law (PNL) violated Government Code section 53165.1, which bars local governments from penalizing tenants or landlords solely due to contact with law enforcement. The case involved a 116-unit apartment complex in North Hollywood, where the People alleged a gang-related public nuisance. The complaint sought abatement of the nuisance, a permanent injunction, and civil penalties.The Los Angeles County Superior Court granted a preliminary injunction requiring the defendants to implement several security measures, including proper lighting, video monitoring, and private security. The court also ordered criminal background checks on tenants. Defendants appealed, and a different panel of the Court of Appeal affirmed the preliminary injunction but directed the trial court to consider modifying it in light of section 53165.1. On remand, the trial court modified the injunction to remove the background check requirements but confirmed the validity of the rest of the injunction.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case and held that enforcing the PNL is not prohibited by section 53165.1 because the PNL is a state law, not a local ordinance, rule, policy, program, or regulation. The court also determined that the action brought by the city attorney on behalf of the People of the State of California is not an action by a "local government" within the meaning of section 53165.1. Additionally, the court found that the preliminary injunction did not penalize tenants or landlords solely due to contact with law enforcement. The order was affirmed. View "People ex rel. Soto v. Group IX BP Properties" on Justia Law

Fell Holdings LLC and Stanyan Holdings LLC, misdescribed as California limited liability companies instead of Delaware limited liability companies, filed unlawful detainer proceedings against Fell Street Automotive Clinic, Stanyan Street Automotive Clinic, and Laurence Nasey. Nasey had lost ownership of two properties in San Francisco during a nonjudicial foreclosure but continued operating his businesses through a leaseback arrangement with the new owners, memorialized in a settlement agreement. The agreement allowed Nasey to repurchase the properties, with stipulated judgments against him if he failed to do so.The trial court entered judgments in favor of Fell Holdings and Stanyan Holdings, which were later enforced. Appellants moved to vacate these judgments, arguing that the misdescription of the plaintiffs' corporate status deprived the court of jurisdiction, rendering all judicial actions void. The trial court denied the vacatur motions.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the misdescription of the plaintiffs' corporate status did not automatically void the judgments. Instead, the issue was whether the discrepancy could be cured by amendment under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (a)(1). The court reversed the trial court's orders denying the vacatur motions and remanded the case, directing the trial court to vacate the judgments and enforcement orders without prejudice. The trial court was instructed to consider any motions by the plaintiffs to amend their complaints to correct the misdescription and to address appellants' arguments regarding the release of Nasey's $202,500 earnest money deposit. The parties were to bear their own costs on appeal. View "1215 Fell SF Owner LLC v. Fell Street Automotive Clinic" on Justia Law

A former landlord sued two commercial tenants and their law firm, alleging negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED), malicious prosecution, and abuse of process. The claims arose from prior litigation where the tenants had successfully counterclaimed for damages against the landlord. The landlord claimed that the tenants' actions during the prior litigation caused him emotional distress and were malicious and abusive.In the prior proceedings, the landlord had filed a forcible entry and detainer (FED) action against the tenants, which resulted in the tenants counterclaiming for breach of contract and other damages. The superior court dismissed the landlord's FED claim and some of the tenants' counterclaims but awarded the tenants damages for breach of contract related to property maintenance. The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed this decision.The superior court dismissed the landlord's new claims, taking judicial notice of the prior proceedings without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. The court ruled that the NIED claim was barred by litigation privilege, the malicious prosecution claim failed because the prior proceedings did not terminate entirely in the landlord's favor, and the abuse of process claim failed because the landlord did not allege an ulterior purpose separate from the litigation process.The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's decision. It held that the superior court properly took judicial notice of the prior proceedings and did not need to convert the motion to dismiss. The court agreed that the NIED claim was barred by litigation privilege, the malicious prosecution claim failed due to the lack of favorable termination, and the abuse of process claim failed because the landlord did not allege an ulterior purpose independent from the litigation process. View "Griffith v. Hemphill" on Justia Law

Potomac Place Associates, LLC sought to evict Walter Mendez from his apartment following the death of his mother, Teresa Aparicio, with whom he co-signed a lease in 2003. The building was converted into a condominium in 2006 under the Rental Housing Conversion and Sale Act (RHCSA). Ms. Aparicio, being a low-income elderly tenant, was exempt from the requirement to purchase or vacate, allowing her and Mr. Mendez to continue renting. After Ms. Aparicio's death in 2019, Potomac Place issued a notice to Mr. Mendez to either purchase the apartment or vacate, which he refused, leading to the eviction attempt.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia granted summary judgment in favor of Mr. Mendez, rejecting Potomac Place's argument that the exemption applied only during Ms. Aparicio's lifetime. The court found that Mr. Mendez's tenancy was governed by the Rental Housing Act (RHA), which did not provide grounds for his eviction based on the expiration of the lease or the death of a co-tenant.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case de novo, focusing on the statutory interpretation of the RHA and RHCSA. The court held that the RHCSA's protections for low-income elderly and disabled tenants continued post-conversion, and the RHA did not allow for eviction based on the expiration of the lease or the death of a co-tenant. The court affirmed the Superior Court's decision, concluding that Potomac Place could not evict Mr. Mendez under Section 42-3505.01(j) of the RHA, as the conversion process had been completed in 2006, and the RHCSA no longer applied to Mr. Mendez's tenancy. View "Potomac Place Associates, LLC v. Mendez" on Justia Law

Asegedech Kelecha rented a room in her house to Sara Menghesha starting in 2019. On May 1, 2020, Kelecha changed the locks without giving Menghesha a key, leaving her homeless during the COVID-19 pandemic. Menghesha sued Kelecha for unlawful eviction and obtained injunctive relief to regain access to the property. She then won a partial motion for summary judgment on liability for unlawful eviction. At a jury trial on damages, Menghesha was awarded $7,500 in compensatory damages and $75,000 in punitive damages.After the trial, a juror emailed stating disagreement with the decisions made during deliberations. Kelecha filed a motion for a new trial based on this email. The Superior Court initially ordered an evidentiary hearing but later reconsidered and denied the motion, concluding that such an inquiry would impermissibly intrude into the jury’s deliberative process.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. Kelecha argued that the Superior Court should have held a hearing before denying her new trial motion and that the punitive damages were unsupported by clear and convincing evidence of malice and were unconstitutionally excessive. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Superior Court’s decision, stating that jurors generally cannot impeach their own verdicts under Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b). The court found that any inquiry into the juror’s email would fall under the no-impeachment rule and that no exceptions applied. Additionally, Kelecha’s arguments regarding the sufficiency of evidence for punitive damages and the excessiveness of the award were deemed forfeited because they were not raised in the trial court. Thus, the Court of Appeals upheld the jury’s verdict and the Superior Court’s rulings. View "Kelecha v. Menghesha" on Justia Law

Blossom Bell, a long-term public housing tenant, was held responsible for the criminal conduct of her guest, Daniel Lambert, who assaulted another tenant, Aaron George. Following the assault, Bell forbade Lambert from returning to her unit, and he never did. Despite this, the Oahu Eviction Board terminated Bell's rental agreement and evicted her.The Circuit Court of the First Circuit initially ruled that the Board applied the wrong legal authority and remanded the case for a new hearing. On remand, the parties agreed that the curability of Bell's violation would be governed by specific notification requirements in the rental agreement. The Board again ruled that Bell's violation was incurable and evicted her. Bell appealed, and the circuit court ruled that Bell had cured the violation by barring Lambert from the property, reversing the Board's eviction order and reinstating Bell's lease.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai'i reviewed the case. The court held that the Board erred, abused its discretion, and acted arbitrarily and capriciously in evicting Bell. The court noted that the Board did not properly consider all relevant factors, such as the degree of crime in the housing project, the seriousness of the offending action, and the extent to which Bell took reasonable steps to mitigate the offending action. The court agreed with the circuit court that Bell's violation was curable and that she had cured it by permanently barring Lambert from the property. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's final judgment reinstating Bell's lease. View "Bell v. Hawai'i Public Housing Authority" on Justia Law

Allan Gumarang entered into a lease agreement with Braemer on Raymond, LLC (Lessor) to operate an ice cream parlor. The lease included provisions requiring the Lessor to maintain the property and for Gumarang to obtain liability insurance and indemnify the Lessor against claims arising from his use of the property. In October 2017, a fire destroyed the property, and Gumarang alleged that the Lessor and its management (Management) failed to ensure the property had adequate fire prevention systems.Gumarang filed a lawsuit against the Lessor and Management for breach of contract, negligence, and other claims. In response, the Lessor and Management demanded that Gumarang defend and indemnify them under the lease terms. When Gumarang refused, they filed a cross-complaint for indemnity and breach of contract. Gumarang filed an anti-SLAPP motion to strike the cross-complaint, arguing it arose from his protected activity of filing the lawsuit.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted Gumarang’s anti-SLAPP motion in part, striking the cross-claims for comparative indemnity and equitable indemnity but denied it for the contractual indemnity and breach of contract claims. The court found that the latter claims did not arise from protected activity and that the indemnity provision in the lease was enforceable. The court also denied Gumarang’s request for attorney fees, finding he did not achieve a practical benefit from the partial success of his anti-SLAPP motion.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, affirmed the lower court’s decisions. The appellate court agreed that the cross-claims for contractual indemnity and breach of contract did not arise from Gumarang’s protected activity of filing the lawsuit but from his alleged breach of the lease’s indemnity provision. The court also upheld the denial of attorney fees, concluding that Gumarang did not obtain a significant practical benefit from the partial success of his anti-SLAPP motion. View "Gumarang v. Braemer on Raymond, LLC" on Justia Law

A motorcyclist, Bradley Charles St. John, died after colliding with a 300-pound pig on a rural road and subsequently being struck by another vehicle. The pig had escaped from a nearby property owned by Gary and Judy Schaeffler, who had leased it to Judy’s brother and sister-in-law, Michael and Suzanne Mountjoy. The Mountjoys were responsible for maintaining the property, including the fences, under an oral lease agreement. The Schaefflers visited the property occasionally but did not reside there.St. John’s widow sued the Schaefflers and the Mountjoys for negligence, claiming they failed to properly secure the livestock. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted summary judgment in favor of the Schaefflers, ruling they owed no duty of care to St. John as out-of-possession landlords without actual knowledge of the dangerous condition.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed the case. The court held that a landlord owes a duty of care if they have actual knowledge of a dangerous condition and the right to enter the property to remedy it, or if they have reason to believe a dangerous condition exists at the start or renewal of a lease and fail to conduct a reasonable inspection. The court found that the Schaefflers did not have actual knowledge of the unsecured livestock and had no reason to know the fences were inadequate. Therefore, they had no duty to inspect or secure the property. The court affirmed the trial court’s summary judgment in favor of the Schaefflers. View "Estate of St. John v. Schaeffler" on Justia Law

Kilvert, a Rhode Island company, acquired a commercial property and claimed that SBC Tower, a Delaware company, breached their lease agreement by failing to pay fifty percent of the payments received from subleases. Kilvert filed a Commercial Property Eviction Complaint in Rhode Island district court, seeking eviction and damages. SBC Tower removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island based on diversity jurisdiction. Kilvert moved to remand, arguing that Rhode Island law grants exclusive jurisdiction over landlord-tenant disputes to state district courts.The United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island agreed with Kilvert and granted the motion to remand, holding that Rhode Island law mandates that the state district court is the proper court for this action, making removal improper. SBC Tower appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court determined that the Rhode Island statute in question, R.I. Gen. Laws § 8-8-3(a)(2), allocates jurisdiction among state courts and does not divest federal courts of jurisdiction in cases where diversity jurisdiction is present. The court held that the statute does not preclude removal to federal court and that the federal court has the authority to hear the case. Consequently, the First Circuit reversed the district court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "289 Kilvert, LLC v. SBC Tower Holdings LLC" on Justia Law

The petitioner, owner of an apartment building in Manhattan, filed an application with the Division of Housing and Community Renewal (DHCR) in 2019 to amend its 2016 and 2017 annual registration statements. The petitioner claimed that the registrations erroneously stated that unit 1B was temporarily exempt from rent stabilization due to owner/employee occupancy, while it should have been permanently exempt due to a high rent vacancy in 2002. The petitioner sought to withdraw the erroneous registrations and submit new ones removing unit 1B from the total of rent-stabilized units.The Rent Administrator denied the application, stating that registration amendments could only correct ministerial issues, not substantive changes like recalculating rental history or removing an apartment from rent-stabilized status. The Deputy Commissioner of DHCR upheld this decision, agreeing that the requested amendments went beyond the scope of an amendment application proceeding. The petitioner then commenced a CPLR article 78 proceeding to annul DHCR's determination.The Supreme Court denied the petition and dismissed the proceeding, reasoning that DHCR rationally determined the requested correction was substantive rather than ministerial. The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed, noting that DHCR's interpretation of the Rent Stabilization Code (RSC) as precluding the requested amendments was rational and reasonable.The Court of Appeals of New York reviewed the case and held that DHCR's interpretation of the RSC, which limits amendments to ministerial issues, was entitled to substantial deference. The court found that DHCR's decision to deny the petitioner's application was rational, as it aimed to protect tenants from fraud, preserve agency resources, and ensure rent stabilization disputes were litigated in the proper forum. The order of the Appellate Division was affirmed, with costs. View "Matter of LL 410 E. 78th St. LLC v Division of Hous. & Community Renewal" on Justia Law