Justia Landlord - Tenant Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court concluding that the lease of property in this case did not violate Appellants' first refusal to purchase the property, holding that the district court did not err.John and Melanie Lennon leased property owned by the Larry Lee Luckinbill Living Trust for a 125-year term. Thereafter, Appellants - Anne Holding and the Crandall Creek Ranch Company - brought suit against the Lennons and the trust's trustee, seeking a declaratory judgment stating that the lease violated their right of first refusal. The district court concluded that the right of first refusal remained in effect but that the lease did not trigger that right. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the lease did not trigger Appellants' right of first refusal. View "Holding v. Luckinbill" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court concluding that Boardwalk Realty Associates, LLC (Boardwalk), the court-appointed receiver of rents, lacked authority under Conn. Gen. Stat. 12-163a to impose and collect rent or use and occupancy payments in the place of the subject property's owner, Cadle Properties of Connecticut, Inc., holding that there was no error.This case centered on the Town of Canton's efforts to collect unpaid property taxes on a parcel of real property that was effectively abandoned Cadle and on which M&S Gateway Associates, LLC and Mitchell Volkswagen, LLC (together, Defendants) operated an automobile dealership. Boardwalk brought a complaint seeking rent and use and occupancy payments from Defendants. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, holding that section 12-163a does not permit a receiver of rents to collect rent or use and occupancy payments if the tax delinquent property owner is absent and nor pursuing those payments. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a receiver appointed under section 12-163a is not statutorily authorized to impose and collect rent or use and occupancy payments under the facts and circumstances of this case. View "Boardwalk Realty Associates, LLC v. M & S Gateway Associates, LLC" on Justia Law

The Union Pacific Railroad charged Heber Rentals, LC (“Heber”) and L.K.L. Associates, Inc. (“L.K.L.”) rent under a lease that allowed L.K.L. to continue operating a building materials supply business on land that was owned in fee by Heber—and leased to L.K.L.—but encumbered by Union Pacific’s right of way. After the Supreme Court stated in 2014 that railroad rights of way like Union Pacific’s were “nonpossessory” easements, L.K.L. and Heber stopped paying rent and filed suit against Union Pacific. In addition to requesting declaratory relief, L.K.L. and Heber sought to have their leases rescinded and to receive restitution for rent already paid. Union Pacific brought counterclaims arising out of their nonpayment. On summary judgment, the district court held that Union Pacific’s easement, while nonpossessory, gave it exclusive use and possession rights “insofar as Union Pacific elected to use the land subject to its easement for a railroad purpose.” Although it found that the lease agreements served no railroad purpose, it denied the rescission claim as “untimely and redundant.” In a follow-up order, it ruled that L.K.L. and Heber had abandoned their remaining claims. The district court also rejected all of Union Pacific’s counterclaims. The Tenth Circuit agreed with Union Pacific that its right of way included the unqualified right to exclude L.K.L. and Heber, but the Court agreed with L.K.L. and Heber that their leases were invalid. “Even if the incidental use doctrine applies, neither the leases nor the underlying business conduct furthered a railroad purpose, as the easement requires.” The Court: reversed the district court’s declaratory judgment rulings to the extent they are inconsistent with the Court’s opinion; affirmed the district court’s ruling that the rescission claim was time-barred; affirmed the district court’s rejection of Union Pacific’s counterclaim for breach of contract; reversed its rejection of Union Pacific’s other substantive counterclaims; and reversed the district court’s finding of abandonment. The matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "LKL Associates, et al. v. Union Pacific Railroad Co." on Justia Law

Defendant Town of Windham (Town) appealed a superior court order denying its motion to dismiss the tax abatement appeal of plaintiff Shaw’s Supermarkets, Inc. (Shaw’s), for lack of standing. The Town also appealed the superior court's order granting Shaw’s requested tax abatement. The owner of the property at issue leased 1.5 acres of a 34.21-acre parcel in Windham established as Current Use. The lease, in relevant part, required Shaw’s to pay the Owner its pro rata share of the real estate taxes assessed on the entire parcel, and the Owner was required to pay the taxes to the Town. If the Owner received a tax abatement, Shaw’s was entitled to its pro rata share of the abatement. In 2017, Shaw’s was directed by the Owner to pay the property taxes directly to the Town, and it did. Shaw’s unsuccessfully applied to the Town’s selectboard for a tax abatement and subsequently appealed to the superior court. The Town moved to dismiss, arguing that Shaw’s lacked standing to request a tax abatement on property it did not own. Finding the superior court did not err in finding Shaw's had standing to seek the abatement, or err in granting the abatement, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's orders. View "Shaw's Supermarkets, Inc. v. Town of Windham" on Justia Law

Joliet condemned a housing complex managed by New West and paid $15 million. HUD rent subsidies for low-income tenants provided almost all of the money for operating the development. A $2.7 million fund had been established by New West and HUD, to cover necessary maintenance and repairs in the event of a default by New West. HUD refused to release that account to New West, contending that it now holds the account to cover Joliet’s obligations.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the summary judgment rejection of New West’s suit to recover the account. New West cannot establish conversion of the fund without first establishing ownership. HUD’s lien on the fund does not establish ownership of the fund and New West has not established its ownership by showing that it treated deposits into the fund as taxable income. View "New West, L.P. v. Fudge" on Justia Law

Duncan moved into a San Francisco apartment in 1994. Duncan’s wife moved into the unit in 2010, and they lived together with their daughter. Duncan never missed a rent payment and was never late with his rent. Duncan’s unit was subject to San Francisco’s rent-control ordinance. During his tenancy, the maximum that stabilized rent could be increased was a total of 31 percent, whereas the market rent for a two-bedroom unit in San Francisco increased by 254 percent. In 2014, the building was sold. For the next 14 months, until Duncan was forced to rent a new apartment, the landlords took away various benefits, ignored or delayed responding to maintenance issues, were uncommunicative, and became increasingly hostile in imposing new rules. Duncan contacted the building department. Violations were noted. At different times, the water and power were turned off for nonpayment. Duncan and other residents formed a tenants union.Duncan filed a notice with the Rent Board. The next day, Duncan was served with a 60-day notice of termination of tenancy as an owner move-in. Duncan filed suit under San Francisco’s Residential Rent Stabilization and Arbitration Ordinance. The city also sued the landlords. Jurors found that the landlords engaged in a wrongful eviction and tenant harassment. After damages were trebled, Duncan's recovery was $2.7 million. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting challenges to evidentiary rulings and the sufficiency of the evidence. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of the landlords’ conduct at other properties. View "Duncan v. Kihagi" on Justia Law

Following the outbreak of COVID-19 in early 2020, Los Angeles imposed an eviction moratorium during a “Local Emergency Period” with the stated purposes of ensuring housing security and promoting public health during the pandemic. Related provisions delay applicable tenants’ rent payment obligations and prohibit landlords from charging late fees and interest. A trade association of Los Angeles landlords, sued, alleging violations of the Constitution’s Contracts Clause.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of the plaintiff’s request for preliminary injunctive relief, noting that other courts, including the Supreme Court, have recently considered various constitutional and statutory challenges to COVID-19 eviction moratoria. Under modern Contracts Clause doctrine, even if the eviction moratorium was a substantial impairment of contractual relations, the moratorium’s provisions were likely “reasonable” and “appropriate” given the circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic. The city fairly tied the moratorium to its stated goals. The court noted that contemporary Supreme Court case law has severely limited the Contracts Clause’s potency. View "Apartment Association of Los Angeles County, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles." on Justia Law

An individual bought a condominium, which she consistently rented for short terms. Sixteen years after her purchase, the owner’s association amended its governing documents to prohibit renting properties for less than 30 days. The Court of Appeal agreed with the owner that she was exempt from this prohibition under Civil Code section 4740 (a), which provided that an owner of a property in a common interest development “shall not be subject to a provision in a governing document or an amendment to a governing document that prohibits the rental or leasing of” the owner’s property unless that document or amendment “was effective prior to the date the owner acquired title” to the property. The trial court held that she was not exempt, so judgment was reversed. View "Brown v. Montage at Mission Hills, Inc." on Justia Law

Edwin Schulz appealed a judgment following a bench trial on the damages to his barn, pole barn and shed. Schulz sued Adam Helmers for negligence and breach of contract following a fire that destroyed the barn, pole barn and shed. At the time of the fire, Schulz was leasing the farmstead to Helmers, including the three buildings. He argued the district court applied the wrong measure of damages in his breach of contract claim against Helmers. The district court concluded N.D.C.C. 32-03-09.1 applied to the breach of contract claim, which provided the measure of damages for an injury to property not arising from contract was the diminution of value. The North Dakota Supreme Court concurred with the district court's finding and affirmed the judgment. View "Schulz v. Helmers" on Justia Law

In January 2015, plaintiff Angel Pareja was walking to work when he slipped on ice, fell, and broke his hip. The sidewalk area on which he fell was on property owned and managed by defendant Princeton International Properties, Inc. (Princeton International). The night before, a wintry mix of light rain, freezing rain, and sleet began to fall. Around the time of his fall, light rain and pockets of freezing rain were falling. Pareja’s expert opined that Princeton International could have successfully reduced the hazardous icy condition by pre-treating the sidewalk. The trial court granted summary judgment to Princeton International. The Appellate Division reversed, holding Princeton International had a duty of reasonable care to maintain the sidewalk even when precipitation was falling. The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the trial court, finding that Princeton International owed Pareja a duty only in unusual circumstances, none of which were present here. Princeton International took no action to increase Pareja’s risk, and the record showed that the ice on the sidewalk was not a pre-existing condition. View "Pareja v. Princeton International Properties" on Justia Law