Justia Landlord - Tenant Opinion Summaries

The Texas Optometry Act prohibits commercial retailers of ophthalmic goods from attempting to control the practice of optometry; authorizes the Optometry Board and the Attorney General to sue a violator for a civil penalty; and provides that “[a] person injured as a result of a violation . . . is entitled to the remedies. In 1992, Wal-Mart opened “Vision Centers” in its Texas retail stores, selling ophthalmic goods. Wal-Mart leased office space to optometrists. A typical lease required the optometrist to keep the office open at least 45 hours per week or pay liquidated damages. In 1995, the Board advised Wal-Mart that the requirement violated the Act. Wal-Mart dropped the requirement and changed its lease form, allowing the optometrist to insert hours of operation. In 1998, the Board opined that any commercial lease referencing an optometrist’s hours violated the Act; in 2003, the Board notified Wal-Mart that it violated the Act by informing optometrists that customers were requesting longer hours. Optometrists sued, alleging that during lease negotiations, Wal-Mart indicated what hours they should include in the lease and that they were pressured to work longer hours. They did not claim actual harm. A jury awarded civil penalties and attorney fees. The Fifth Circuit certified the question of whether such civil penalties, when sought by a private person, are exemplary damages limited by the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Chapter 41. The Texas Supreme Court responded in the affirmative, noting that “the certified questions assume, perhaps incorrectly, that the Act authorizes recovery of civil penalties by a private person, rather than only by the Board or the Attorney General.” View "Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Forte" on Justia Law

This was an interlocutory appeal involving a premises-liability case. Cynthia Adams, one of the defendants in the case, filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court denied. Plaintiff Anthony Hughes brought a negligence claim against multiple parties: BKB, LLC d/b/a the Electric Cowboy; Jonathan Self, manager of the Electric Cowboy; and Adams, the owner of the property on which Electric Cowboy operates. Hughes alleged that he was “attacked and assaulted by a third party assailant” at the Electric Cowboy in 2011. Hughes claimed that all the defendants “had either actual or constructive knowledge of the third party’s violent nature or actual or constructive knowledge that an atmosphere of violence existed on the premises of the Electric Cowboy.” Adams was an absentee landlord, who did not physically occupy, possess, or exercise control over the Electric Cowboy and/or the leased premises prior to or at the time of the incident in question; Adams did not frequent or visit the Electric Cowboy; Adams had no control or involvement in the operations or management of the Electric Cowboy; she was never employed by the Electric Cowboy; she did not supervise the Electric Cowboy, and she did not have the right to supervise the Electric Cowboy. Adams petitioned the Supreme Court for interlocutory appeal when her motion for summary judgment was denied. A panel of the Supreme Court issued an order granting the petition and staying the trial court proceedings. Finding that Adams was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law, the Court reversed the trial court’s denial of summary judgment and rendered judgment in favor of Adams. View "Adams v. Hughes" on Justia Law

The apartment building, constructed in 1912, was used first as a factory, before it was abandoned. Goldtex purchased the the building in 2010 and hired KlingStubbins to design a plan to convert the entire building into rental apartment units and retail space. The building was almost gutted for conversion into a residential building with 163 apartment units and ground floor retail space that began accepting tenants in 2013. A housing advocacy group filed suit alleging violation of the design and accessibility requirements of the Fair Housing Act (FHA), 42 U.S.C. 3604(f)(3)(C). The district court dismissed, citing HUD’s interpretation of the provision—which exempts converted buildings from the accessibility requirements if they were constructed prior to March 13, 1991. The Third Circuit affirmed, finding the agency’s interpretation entitled to deference. The interpretations are reasonable and reflect a legitimate policy choice by the agency in administering an ambiguous statute. View "Fair Hous. Rights Ctr. v. Post Goldtex GP LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, tenants on property owned by Baird Properties, were required to vacate the premises they leased and to remove their belongings when the property was condemned due to a lack of electricity, heating and water. Plaintiffs brought an action under the Residential Landlord and Tenants Act alleging that Baird Properties and Michael Baird purposely sabotaged utility services to the property in order to set events in motion that would force Plaintiffs to vacate the premises. After a trial, the superior court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiffs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial justice correctly found that a landlord-tenant relationship existed between Plaintiffs and Baird Properties; (2) the trial justice did not err in determining that Baird tampered with essential services to the property; and (3) the award of attorney’s fees was reasonable. View "Gregoire v. Baird Props., LLC" on Justia Law

Leonard and Judith Peverieri and Peverieri Investments, LLC (landlords) appealed a trial court’s judgment confirming an arbitration award in favor of Couch Investments, LLC (tenant). Landlords argued that the arbitrator exceeded his powers when he found not only that landlords were liable for the cost of storm water drainage improvements required by the Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ), but also ordered remedies. Landlords argued on appeal that the trial court erred in denying their petition to vacate the arbitration award, and that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s judgment. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the outcome, but on different grounds from the Court of Appeals. View "Couch Investments, LLC v. Peverieri" on Justia Law

The Blanchards agreed to sell Marathon County property to the Hoffmans, who paid $30,000 up front. The land contract balance was due in 2015, with an option to close early by paying off the Blanchards’ new $142,000 mortgage, obtained as part of the agreement. The parties signed a separate “rental agreement,” under which the Hoffmans paid $500 per month. The land contract was not recorded. The lender obtained an Assignment of Leases and Rents as collateral, but did not obtain an Assignment of Land Contract. The bank recorded its mortgage and the Assignment. In 2014, the Blanchards filed a bankruptcy petition. The trustee filed an adversary proceeding against the lender under 11 U.S.C. 544(a)(3), which grants him the position of a bona fide purchaser of property as of the date of the bankruptcy, to step ahead of the mortgage and use the Blanchards’ interest in the land contract for the benefit of unsecured creditors. The trustee argued that a mortgage can attach a lien only to real property and that the Blanchards' interest under the land contract was personal property. The district court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the bank. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. A mortgage can attach a lien to a vendor’s interest in a land contract under Wisconsin law; this lender perfected its lien by recording in county land records rather than under UCC Article 9. View "Liebzeit v. Intercity State Bank, FSB" on Justia Law

Defendant-landlords appealed a jury verdict and post-judgment order involving warranty-of-habitability and consumer-protection claims. Landlords William and Susan O’Brien purchased the subject property in the 1980s, which included a two-story house and brick building (referred to as the creamery) with a common wall to the rear of the house. In December 2002, following foreclosure proceedings on their home, plaintiff-tenants, Timothy and Penny Terry, along with their two children, accepted landlords’ offer to occupy the house rent-free for a short period. After their first year in the house, tenants began paying rent. There was no written rental agreement, but from at least December 2005, six years before tenants filed this lawsuit, there was an oral agreement to pay monthly rent in an amount that varied over the years. Eventually, the parties’ relationship deteriorated. In March 2005, Burlington Code Enforcement (BCE) inspected the house and cited landlords for multiple problems that required repair. A follow-up inspection in January 2006 confirmed that most of the repairs had been completed. BCE inspected the property again later in 2006 and found additional items that required repair, most of which were completed soon thereafter. In 2008, BCE performed several more inspections and issued notices of violations, many of which concerned the creamery. In May 2008, Vermont Gas inspected the house’s furnace and determined that it needed to be repaired or replaced because it was in extremely poor condition. In November 2008, landlords had space heater installed on the first floor of the house, but it was insufficient to heat the second floor. As a result, tenants began using space heaters on the second floor at night. In late 2008, a fire broke out in the attic of the house above one of the bedrooms. The state fire investigator determined that the fire had begun at an electrical splice located in the attic. The investigator also noted tenants’ use of multiple extension cords and supplemental wiring due to the insufficient number of functioning outlets. The investigator concluded that the fire was caused by a combination of the load on the older electrical system, moisture from the cellulose insulation, and the inability of the knob-and-tube wiring to shed heat due to it being buried in the insulation. In 2011, the Terrys filed suit against landlords, alleging: (1) breach of the oral rental agreement; (2) breach of the warranty of habitability; (3) breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment (with respect to public health hazards); (4) violation of the Consumer Protection Act (CPA); (5) negligence; and (6) negligent infliction of emotional distress. Tenants sought, among other things, compensatory, consequential, punitive, and exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees. Landlords counterclaimed for unpaid rent. Landlords’ arguments on appeal of the jury verdict were: (1) the trial court’s jury instructions misled the jury on tenants’ habitability and CPA claims, resulting in prejudice to landlords; (2) the court erred by vacating the jury’s unpaid-rent award in its post-judgment order; and (3) the court abused its discretion by awarding tenants attorney’s fees on their habitability and CPA claims and by denying landlords’ attorney’s fees based on tenants’ contributory negligence. The Supreme Court found that the trial court’s CPA instruction was overly broad and prejudicial to the landlords, and therefore the verdict was vacated with respect to the CPA claim. Absent their habitability claim, there was no basis for tenants to withhold rent. Therefore, the jury’s verdict regarding unpaid rent must stand. The Court also vacated the award of attorney fees, and remanded the matter back to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Terry v. O'Brien" on Justia Law

This case first went before the Alabama Supreme Court in "Ex parte Riverfront, LLC," (129 So. 3d 1008 (Ala. 2013)("Riverfront I")). In Riverfront I, Riverfront and Fish Market Restaurants, Inc. had entered into a lease for real property located in Gadsden. The lease contained a forum-selection clause naming Tuscaloosa County as the venue in which any litigation concerning the lease was to be brought. In determining that the forum-selection clause was enforceable, the Supreme Court held that Tuscaloosa County was not a "seriously inconvenient" forum. The Etowah Circuit Court transferred the action to the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court. Shortly thereafter, Fish Market filed a motion to transfer the action, then pending in the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court, back to the Etowah Circuit Court, citing section 6-3-21.1, Ala. Code 1975, that Tuscaloosa County "would be a seriously inconvenient forum." Riverfront responded, arguing that "[t]he issue stated in [Fish Market's] Motion to Transfer has previously been litigated between the parties, and adjudicated in [Riverfront's] favor by the Alabama Supreme Court." The Tuscaloosa Circuit Court held a hearing on Fish Market's motion and granted it. Riverfront then petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court to vacate its order transferring the case back to the Etowah Circuit Court. The Supreme Court found, after review, that Fish Market could have challenged Tuscaloosa County as a "seriously inconvenient" forum in the Etowah Circuit Court and before the Supreme Court in Riverfront I. "Fish Market did not do so and may not now have a second bite at the forum apple and relitigate that issue. The matter has been decided." The Supreme Court granted Riverfront's petition and issued the writ. View "Ex parte Riverfront, LLC." on Justia Law

Rogaciano and Raquel Cabrera bought a house in Pasco, Washington, in 2007. In 2011, they obtained a license from the city to rent the house as a single residential unit. Contrary to the license, the Cabreras rented the upstairs and the basement as separate apartments. The Cabreras leased the basement to Jose Segura and Tabetha Gonzalez (collectively Segura) for a year. Segura paid $600 for the first month's rent, $600 for a rental security deposit, and $150 as a deposit for electric utility service. Five days later, the city of Pasco Code Enforcement Office inspected the property and found that the Cabreras had converted the single family dwelling into a duplex without a permit and that the basement unit was uninhabitable. Accordingly, the city ordered Segura to vacate the premises within 20 days. Segura sought compensation from the Cabreras. The Cabreras did not respond to the letter. On July 19, the Cabreras gave Segura a notice to vacate by August 7, 2011. Segura claimed that after sending the demand letter but before this move-out deadline, Mr. Cabrera entered the unit without notice, changed the locks, removed some of Segura's personal property, and tried to have Segura's car towed from the property. Segura sued the Cabreras on July 26 for damages under the Residential Landlord-Tenant Act (RLTA). The Cabreras answered, alleging, as the only affirmative defense, that"[ d]efendant had no knowledge it was illegal." Segura moved for summary judgment, seeking money for rent, security deposit, utility deposit, relocation assistance and other expenses related to moving into a new home, plus $1,000.00 in emotional distress damages, and $5,209.55 in attorney fees. The trial court granted Segura's motion for summary judgment but rejected the request for emotional distress damages, concluding they were not recoverable under RCW 59.18.085(3). The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of emotional distress damages in a published, split decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the plain language of RCW 59.18.085 does not allow recovery for emotional distress. View "Segura v. Cabrera" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Anna Mae Cashin owned a parcel of land in Hoboken. Two separate structures were located on that property: a six-unit apartment building, and a two-story single-family home built in a converted garage. Plaintiff has rented out five units of the apartment building and used the sixth for storage. Plaintiff lived in the single-family home with her late husband for four years until 1971, when they began renting it out. In 1973, defendant Marisela Bello moved into that unit. Defendant occupied the space with her son. Defendant's rent was $345 per month, five dollars more than the rent she initially paid in 1973. Plaintiff tried to regain possession of the house several times. She first asked defendant to leave in the 1980s so that plaintiff's daughter could live there. In June 2009, plaintiff again asked defendant to leave so that plaintiff's son could live there to be closer to his parents during his father's illness. At that time, plaintiff sent defendant a notice to quit, giving her sixty days to vacate the house. In response, defendant's attorney sent a letter indicating that defendant refused to leave. Plaintiff took no further action to evict defendant at that time. On January 4, 2012, plaintiff, through her attorney, sent defendant another notice to quit. Plaintiff demanded possession of the house under N.J.S.A.2A:18-61.1(l)(3), asserting that the unit was a single-family home and that she, the owner, wished to reside there. Defendant refused to leave, and plaintiff filed a complaint for possession of the house on April 2, 2012. In this appeal, the New Jersey Supreme Court considered whether the Anti-Eviction Act, which permits the owner of a building of three residential units or less to oust a tenant if the owner intends to personally occupy a unit, could be applied to remove a tenant (defendant) from the two-story single-family house built in a converted garage. To that end, the Court had to determine whether "building" denotes a single, unattached physical structure or whether it includes all structures owned by an individual located on the same parcel of land. The Supreme Court found that the Legislature's use of the word "building," in its singular form, was both deliberate and dispositive. "Building" designates a discreet physical structure, not a number of such structures connected only by the ownership of the land on which they sit. By the plain language of N.J.S.A.2A:18-61.1(l)(3), the converted garage constituted its own building for purposes of the Act, and plaintiff could evict defendants. View "Cashin v. Bello" on Justia Law