Justia Landlord - Tenant Opinion Summaries

This case first went before the Alabama Supreme Court in "Ex parte Riverfront, LLC," (129 So. 3d 1008 (Ala. 2013)("Riverfront I")). In Riverfront I, Riverfront and Fish Market Restaurants, Inc. had entered into a lease for real property located in Gadsden. The lease contained a forum-selection clause naming Tuscaloosa County as the venue in which any litigation concerning the lease was to be brought. In determining that the forum-selection clause was enforceable, the Supreme Court held that Tuscaloosa County was not a "seriously inconvenient" forum. The Etowah Circuit Court transferred the action to the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court. Shortly thereafter, Fish Market filed a motion to transfer the action, then pending in the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court, back to the Etowah Circuit Court, citing section 6-3-21.1, Ala. Code 1975, that Tuscaloosa County "would be a seriously inconvenient forum." Riverfront responded, arguing that "[t]he issue stated in [Fish Market's] Motion to Transfer has previously been litigated between the parties, and adjudicated in [Riverfront's] favor by the Alabama Supreme Court." The Tuscaloosa Circuit Court held a hearing on Fish Market's motion and granted it. Riverfront then petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court to vacate its order transferring the case back to the Etowah Circuit Court. The Supreme Court found, after review, that Fish Market could have challenged Tuscaloosa County as a "seriously inconvenient" forum in the Etowah Circuit Court and before the Supreme Court in Riverfront I. "Fish Market did not do so and may not now have a second bite at the forum apple and relitigate that issue. The matter has been decided." The Supreme Court granted Riverfront's petition and issued the writ. View "Ex parte Riverfront, LLC." on Justia Law

Rogaciano and Raquel Cabrera bought a house in Pasco, Washington, in 2007. In 2011, they obtained a license from the city to rent the house as a single residential unit. Contrary to the license, the Cabreras rented the upstairs and the basement as separate apartments. The Cabreras leased the basement to Jose Segura and Tabetha Gonzalez (collectively Segura) for a year. Segura paid $600 for the first month's rent, $600 for a rental security deposit, and $150 as a deposit for electric utility service. Five days later, the city of Pasco Code Enforcement Office inspected the property and found that the Cabreras had converted the single family dwelling into a duplex without a permit and that the basement unit was uninhabitable. Accordingly, the city ordered Segura to vacate the premises within 20 days. Segura sought compensation from the Cabreras. The Cabreras did not respond to the letter. On July 19, the Cabreras gave Segura a notice to vacate by August 7, 2011. Segura claimed that after sending the demand letter but before this move-out deadline, Mr. Cabrera entered the unit without notice, changed the locks, removed some of Segura's personal property, and tried to have Segura's car towed from the property. Segura sued the Cabreras on July 26 for damages under the Residential Landlord-Tenant Act (RLTA). The Cabreras answered, alleging, as the only affirmative defense, that"[ d]efendant had no knowledge it was illegal." Segura moved for summary judgment, seeking money for rent, security deposit, utility deposit, relocation assistance and other expenses related to moving into a new home, plus $1,000.00 in emotional distress damages, and $5,209.55 in attorney fees. The trial court granted Segura's motion for summary judgment but rejected the request for emotional distress damages, concluding they were not recoverable under RCW 59.18.085(3). The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of emotional distress damages in a published, split decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the plain language of RCW 59.18.085 does not allow recovery for emotional distress. View "Segura v. Cabrera" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Anna Mae Cashin owned a parcel of land in Hoboken. Two separate structures were located on that property: a six-unit apartment building, and a two-story single-family home built in a converted garage. Plaintiff has rented out five units of the apartment building and used the sixth for storage. Plaintiff lived in the single-family home with her late husband for four years until 1971, when they began renting it out. In 1973, defendant Marisela Bello moved into that unit. Defendant occupied the space with her son. Defendant's rent was $345 per month, five dollars more than the rent she initially paid in 1973. Plaintiff tried to regain possession of the house several times. She first asked defendant to leave in the 1980s so that plaintiff's daughter could live there. In June 2009, plaintiff again asked defendant to leave so that plaintiff's son could live there to be closer to his parents during his father's illness. At that time, plaintiff sent defendant a notice to quit, giving her sixty days to vacate the house. In response, defendant's attorney sent a letter indicating that defendant refused to leave. Plaintiff took no further action to evict defendant at that time. On January 4, 2012, plaintiff, through her attorney, sent defendant another notice to quit. Plaintiff demanded possession of the house under N.J.S.A.2A:18-61.1(l)(3), asserting that the unit was a single-family home and that she, the owner, wished to reside there. Defendant refused to leave, and plaintiff filed a complaint for possession of the house on April 2, 2012. In this appeal, the New Jersey Supreme Court considered whether the Anti-Eviction Act, which permits the owner of a building of three residential units or less to oust a tenant if the owner intends to personally occupy a unit, could be applied to remove a tenant (defendant) from the two-story single-family house built in a converted garage. To that end, the Court had to determine whether "building" denotes a single, unattached physical structure or whether it includes all structures owned by an individual located on the same parcel of land. The Supreme Court found that the Legislature's use of the word "building," in its singular form, was both deliberate and dispositive. "Building" designates a discreet physical structure, not a number of such structures connected only by the ownership of the land on which they sit. By the plain language of N.J.S.A.2A:18-61.1(l)(3), the converted garage constituted its own building for purposes of the Act, and plaintiff could evict defendants. View "Cashin v. Bello" on Justia Law

A lease agreement included a five-year renewal provision but failed to specify the rent to be paid during the renewal period. The circuit judge granted a judgment on the pleadings, finding the renewal provision unenforceable. Finding no reversible error in that decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Intrepid, Inc. v. Bennett" on Justia Law

Mak owns a Berkeley rental property with four apartments. In 2012 Mak served on Burns, a tenant for 28 years, a 60-day eviction notice, asserting that Mak intended to occupy the apartment. Two months later, Mak and Burns entered a written agreement under which Burns agreed to vacate the apartment, stating that Burns was not doing so pursuant to the 60-day notice, and that such notice “shall upon occupant vacating, be conclusively deemed withdrawn.” Burns vacated the apartment and months later the Maks rented the unit to new tenants (Ziems), at more than double the rent that Burns had paid. In response to Ziems’s application to the Rent Stabilization Board to lower the permissible rent to that paid by Burns, Mak contended that Burns had voluntarily vacated, so that under the Costa-Hawkins Rental Housing Act, Civil Code 1954.50, the Board was prohibited from limiting the rent at the commencement of the new tenancy. The Board and the trial and appeals courts rejected the “landlord’s transparent attempt to circumvent” rent control. The Act creates a rebuttable presumption that a tenant who moves out within one year of service of an owner move-in eviction notice has moved out pursuant to that notice. Mak failed to present evidence overcoming the presumption. View "Mak v. City of Berkeley Rent Stabilization Bd." on Justia Law

The Section 8 low-income housing assistance voucher program, 42 U.S.C. 1437f(o), is administered by public housing agencies such as Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority (CMHA). Program regulations define “rent to [the] owner” as “[t]he total monthly rent payable to the owner under the lease for the unit. Rent to owner covers payment for any housing services, maintenance and utilities that the owner is required to provide and pay for.” Velez and Hatcher, voucher recipients, entered into one-year leases with K&D. The leases provide: “If Resident(s) shall holdover after the end of the term of this Rental Agreement, said holdover shall be deemed a tenancy of month to month and applicable month to month fees shall apply.” Velez entered into a month-to-month tenancy after her one-year term expired; Hatcher entered into month-to-month tenancies, and, later, a nine-month agreement. K&D charged fees of $35.00 to $100.00 per month. CMHA did not treat these short-term rental fees as rent under the voucher program. Velez and Hatcher were required to pay the fees and filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court granted CMHA summary judgment, holding that the fees were not rent. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Recasting the charge as a short-term fee, rather than rent, does not change that it is consideration paid by the tenant for use of the rental unit. View "Velez v. Cuyahoga Metro. Hous. Auth." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, purchaser of a nine-unit building in San Francisco, filed a landlord's petition with the Rent Board seeking a determination that the unit was not subject to rent control pursuant to the Rent Board Rules and Regulations and the Costa-Hawkins Rental Housing Act, Civil Code section 1954.50 et seq. At issue was whether Civil Code section 1954.53,1 subdivision (d)(2) authorizes a San Francisco landlord to raise the rent without limit on an apartment otherwise subject to rent control when an occupant, who moved into the apartment as a child when his parents took possession, remained in possession of the unit after his parents vacated it. In Mosser Companies v. San Francisco Rent Stabilization and Arbitration Board, the panel addressed the identical issue and concluded that “the son, although a minor when the rental agreement was entered and not a signatory to the rental agreement, is nonetheless an ‘original occupant’ entitled to the continued protection of the rent control provision.” Because the current law does not permit vacancy decontrol until all lawful occupants residing in a dwelling at the start of the tenancy vacate the premises, the court affirmed the denial of the petition and the claim for declaratory relief. View "T & A Drolapas & Sons, LP v. SF Residential Rent Stabilization & Arbitration Bd." on Justia Law

Jose Santoyo appealed a judgment that awarded damages to Darwin Savre for overpayments under the parties' lease and purchase option agreement and dismissed Santoyo's counterclaim for damages to the leased property. Savre owned and operated Savre's Heavy Truck & Auto Repair in Fargo. Santoyo owned the two parcels of real property and building that are the subject of the leases and option agreement in this case. The original lease term was from June 15, 2008, to June 15, 2010, with Savre paying rent of $2,300 per month until June 15, 2009, at which time the rent would increase to $2,708.33. About the time of the rent increase, Savre and Santoyo entered into a "Lease to Purchase Option Agreement." Although the lease and option agreement required Savre to pay his monthly rent payments on the first of each month, Savre was frequently late in his payments from the beginning of the lease. Santoyo accepted the payments and did not give Savre written notice of any intent to terminate the lease based on Savre's late payment. Savre made monthly payments in varying amounts under the option agreement, and the district court found he paid at least a total of $4,000 each month. In the fall of 2012, Savre and another individual formed JDDS, LLC, intending to use the entity to finance the purchase of Santoyo's property. The district court found, however, that Savre did not attempt to assign, convey, delegate or transfer his purchase option to JDDS. In late 2012, Savre made his first attempt to exercise his option to purchase the property with a handwritten notice to Santoyo. In early 2013, Savre made a second attempt to exercise the option with another handwritten notice to Santoyo. Santoyo did not respond to Savre. By the time of the second attempt to exercise the option, Savre had paid at least $180,000 in monthly payments, satisfying an option agreement requirement. After Santoyo did not sell him the property, Savre stopped making monthly payments. Santoyo initiated eviction proceedings against Savre in the district court. The court granted the eviction and entered judgment against Savre for unpaid rent and Santoyo's costs and disbursements. Savre vacated Santoyo's property at the end of June 2013 and began leasing a different space in Fargo. Savre subsequently commenced this action, alleging that Santoyo breached the option agreement when he failed to sell the property leased to Savre after he exercised his option and that Santoyo had been unjustly enriched. Santoyo denied the allegations and counterclaimed, alleging Savre violated his contractual and statutory duties by damaging the property upon being evicted from the premises. Santoyo argued the district court erred as a matter of law when the court concluded Santoyo had a contractual duty to sell his property to a third party that did not exist at the time of the agreement and had no rights under the agreement. The Supreme Court concluded the district court did not clearly err in finding that Santoyo had breached the agreement and that Santoyo had waived strict compliance with the option agreement's terms when he accepted Savre's late lease payments. Furthermore, the Court concluded the court failed to make sufficient findings of fact to explain dismissal of Santoyo's counterclaim for damages. The Court accordingly affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Savre v. Santoyo" on Justia Law

The federal government provides low-income housing tax credits that are distributed to developers by state agencies, including the Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs. The Inclusive Communities Project (ICP), which assists low-income families in obtaining affordable housing, brought a disparate-impact claim under Fair Housing Act sections 804(a) and 805(a), alleging that allocation of too many credits to housing in predominantly black inner-city areas and too few in predominantly white suburban neighborhoods resulted in continued segregated housing patterns. Relying on statistical evidence, the district court ruled in favor of ICP. While appeal was pending, HUD issued a regulation interpreting the FHA to encompass disparate-impact liability and establishing a burden-shifting framework. The Fifth Circuit held that disparate-impact claims are cognizable under the FHA, but reversed, concluding that the court had improperly required proof of less discriminatory alternatives. The Supreme Court affirmed and remanded. Disparate-impact claims are cognizable under the FHA. The Court noted that the statute shifts emphasis from an actor’s intent to the consequences of his actions. Disparate-impact liability must be limited so that regulated entities can make practical business choices that sustain the free-enterprise system. Before rejecting a business justification—or a governmental entity’s public interest—a court must determine that a plaintiff has shown “an available alternative . . . that has less disparate impact and serves the [entity’s] legitimate needs.” A disparate-impact claim relying on a statistical disparity must fail if the plaintiff cannot point to a policy causing that disparity. Policies, governmental or private, are not contrary to the disparate-impact requirement unless they are “artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers.” When courts find disparate impact liability, their remedial orders must be consistent with the Constitution and should concentrate on eliminating the offending practice. Orders that impose racial targets or quotas might raise difficult constitutional questions. View "Texas Dep't of Hous, & Cmity Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc." on Justia Law

Developer filed suit against the University after the University terminated the lease agreement between the parties because Developer failed to make a rental payment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the University. The court vacated and remanded for further proceedings, concluding that there is a genuine dispute whether a rental payment was due on May 30, 2013, and therefore whether the University was entitled to terminate the lease and to collect damages. View "Howard Town Center Developer v. Howard University" on Justia Law