Justia Landlord - Tenant Opinion Summaries

Landlords brought an unlawful detainer action against Tenants to regain possession of the premises and recoup damages. The general sessions court later entered a default judgment granting Landlords possession of the property and a $42,500 judgment for past due rent and attorneys' fees. Tenants filed a notice of appeal and posted an appeal bond by depositing $250 cash with the clerk of court. Landlords filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that Tenants violated Tenn. Code Ann. 29-18-130(b)(2) by failing to post a bond equal to one year's rent. The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that a bond for one year's rent was unnecessary because Tenants had already surrendered possession of the property and vacated the premises. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's denial of Landlords' motion to dismiss, holding that the circuit court did not err in determining that section 29-18-130(b)(2) does not require a tenant who has surrendered possession of the property to post a bond for one year's rent when appealing an adverse judgment of the general sessions court in an unlawful detainer action. View "Johnson v. Hopkins" on Justia Law

The Debtor leased a building and, during liquidation in bankruptcy, assumed the lease, 11 U.S.C. 365, and sold the leasehold interest (and other assets) to Tenant. The bankruptcy judge approved the transaction in 2007, after Landlord did not object to the Debtor’s assertion that Landlord did not have any outstanding claim against the Debtor. The approval barred any claims based on pre‐sale events. The lease requires Tenant to maintain the roof. In 2010 the Landlord sued Tenant in state court, based on that obligation. By motion in the closed bankruptcy proceeding, Tenant asked the bankruptcy court to interpret the 2007 order as blocking the claim. The bankruptcy judge concluded that the order did not affect continuing obligations such as the duty to keep leased premises in good repair; Landlord requested a prospective remedy, not damages. The district court disagreed, ruling that Landlord can enforce the good‐repair clause only to the extent that defects in the roof first occurred after the lease’s assumption in bankruptcy. The Sixth Circuit dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction, because the district court did not enter an injunction. The court expressed hope that the bankruptcy judge or the district judge will attend to several issues inherent in both opinions. View "Harrison Kishwaukee, LLC v. Rockford Acquisition, LLC" on Justia Law

The Youth Re-Entry Program helps young people re-enter society after foster care or juvenile detention. About 80 percent of its members are black. The program moved to the Cleveland suburb, Lakewood, to house clients in apartments in Hidden Village. Lakewood’s building commissioner (Barrett) took the position that this was a prohibited institutional use. The program nonetheless moved into Hidden Village. Barrett ordered removal, but the planning commission reversed his decision. The police department sent officers a memo stating that “[c]itations and arrests are the preferred course of action for violations ... in the vicinity of [Hidden Village].” Program participants began complaining about harassment, such as tickets and astronomical fines for jaywalking, failure to attach a license plate to a bicycle, and walking on railroad tracks. The mayor stated that he intended to remove the program. Police, an officer in SWAT attire, a canine unit, and fire and health department workers visited Hidden Village, unannounced and without a warrant, to conduct a “joint inspection.” Another fire inspection followed a week later. Hidden Village sued, 42 U.S.C. 1981-1983. The Youth Program did not participate. The district court denied the defendants summary judgment and held that individual defendants did not enjoy qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part. Hidden Village produced evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude that defendants discriminated on the basis of race. View "Hidden Village, LLC v. City of Lakewood, OH" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were tenants in apartment complexes owned or managed by the corporate defendants. Plaintiffs' leases included a provision providing that, if attorneys' service were required due to the tenant's failure to pay rent, then the tenant must pay $400 in attorneys' fees if a court appearance was required and $200 if the matter was resolved without a court appearance. The tenant was also required to pay actual attorneys' fees in excess of $400. Eviction actions were brought against each plaintiff for the non-payment of rent. Plaintiffs filed a complaint against the corporate defendants and the individual defendant alleging violations of the Anti-Eviction Act, violations of the Consumer Fraud Act (CFA), and negligence. The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court in this case was the sufficiency of plaintiffs' pleading as it related to claims against corporate and individual defendants for consumer fraud and negligence based on lease provisions that imposed fixed attorneys’ fees on tenants that were unrelated to in-house counsel’s actual fee to evict. Applying the indulgent standard used to review motions for dismissal under Rule 4:6-2(e), the Supreme Court concluded plaintiffs alleged sufficient facts to state causes of action against the corporate defendants for consumer fraud and negligence. Plaintiffs have not, however, alleged sufficient facts to support a consumer fraud or negligence claim against the individual defendant. View "Green v. Morgan Properties" on Justia Law

The question in this case was whether the trial court's dismissal of plaintiff's eviction action on account of her lawyer's failure to attend a scheduled status conference can withstand a motion to set aside the judgment pursuant to Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) given the facts of this case. After careful review of those facts, the Supreme Court concluded that it could not and reversed. View "Ying v. Heide" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Thomas Kellogg owned a house and land in Bethel.  In 1999, he entered into a rent-to-own agreement with William Oren whereby Oren would pay over time for the property, at which point ownership would be transferred to him. Beginning in 2000 and then from 2001 onwards, defendant Cindy Shushereba began to occupy the house with Oren in a romantic relationship. By August 2004, it was contemplated that defendant would co-own the property.  Plaintiff indicated that he wished to come to an agreement to sell the property to defendant and Oren. To that end, defendant liquidated her savings and paid plaintiff for a downpayment on the house.  Plaintiff credited Oren and defendant with the amount Oren had paid in rent.  These two contributions left roughly $98,721 to be paid to reach the purchase price.  The parties agreed orally that the balance would be paid monthly over fifteen years. No written purchase and sale agreement was ever prepared, but the parties intended that Oren and defendant would receive title immediately and give a mortgage secured by a promissory note for the installments. Plaintiff delivered a signed warranty deed to defendant, but defendant never signed the promissory note or the mortgage.  Because defendant could not pay the property transfer tax that would be due on recording, she never recorded the warranty deed.  Plaintiff testified that, at the time, he considered himself the mortgage holder only. Ultimately, the relationship between Oren and defendant dissolved, and, in May 2008, Oren moved out. A couple of months later, plaintiff and defendant became sexually involved.  During this time, plaintiff sought neither rent nor the purchase installments from defendant, and she made no payments. At some point in 2010, plaintiff began seeking rent from defendant, and she did make between two and four monthly rental payments of $650. Plaintiff paid the property taxes on the property throughout the time that defendant lived by herself in the house. Oren then sued plaintiff and defendant, seeking to be declared half-owner of the property along with defendant, from whom he sought a partition and accounting.  In September 2009, the superior court rejected Oren's claims. Defendant counterclaimed, contending that she owned the property or, in the alternative, that plaintiff had been unjustly enriched by defendant’s payments to him.  Prior to trial, the court dismissed as res judicata defendant’s claim that she owned the property, leaving the unjust-enrichment claim in her counterclaim. After a bench trial, the trial court ruled in favor of plaintiff’s claims for back rent and property taxes. However, the trial court ruled in favor of defendant with regard to her unjust enrichment claims for the return of the downpayment on the purchase price and several of her alleged capital and repair contributions. Both parties appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the contract between plaintiff and defendant was a contract for deed; the trial court erred in concluding it was a landlord-tenant relationship. Because the agreement between plaintiff and defendant was a contract for deed, the amount of $833 per month that defendant had agreed to pay plaintiff went entirely toward the purchase price plus interest. When the periodic payments were complete, defendant would become the owner of the property, free and clear of any interest of plaintiff, without a further payment. There was not an agreement to pay rent; the $833 monthly payment was not part of a rental agreement between plaintiff and defendant. View "Kellogg v. Shushereba" on Justia Law

A 2010 fire at an apartment in Erie, Pennsylvania took the lives of a tenant and her guest. The third-floor bedroom purportedly lacked a smoke detector and an alternate means of egress, both of which are required under the Section 8 housing choice voucher program (42 U.S.C. 1437f) in which Richardson participated. The district court rejected a defense of qualified immunity in a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 by the estates of the deceased. The Third Circuit reversed. State officials’ approval and subsidization of the apartment for the Section 8 program, even though the apartment allegedly failed to comply with Section 8’s standards, did not constitute a state-created danger toward the apartment’s tenant and her guest in violation of their constitutional substantive due process rights. View "Henry v. City of Erie" on Justia Law

In 1999, I-4 leased Florida land to Lazy Days, with an option to purchase, prohibiting assignment without written consent. In 2008, Lazy Days notified I-4 of its intention to file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy and assign the lease to LDRV. The parties negotiated a settlement agreement in 2009. I-4 consented to assignment. Lazy Days agreed not to “argue against the Bankruptcy Court abstaining from consideration of Lease interpretation issues ... except to the extent necessary in connection with the assumption and assignment of the Lease.” The agreement provided that “there is no intent to, nor is the Lease modified in any respect,” but did not state whether the purchase option survived. The Bankruptcy Court confirmed a reorganization plan incorporating the agreement and closed the case in 2010. In 2011, LDRV attempted to exercise the option. The parties each filed state court lawsuits and LDRV moved to reopen in Bankruptcy Court, which held that the anti-assignment provision was unenforceable and that refusal to honor the option violated the agreement. The district court vacated. The Third Circuit reversed, holding that the Bankruptcy Court properly exercised jurisdiction; the agreement’s exception applied because the proceeding was “in connection with ... assignment of the Lease.” The court rejected arguments that the parties agreed to waive application of 11 U.S.C. 365(f)(3) and that the Bankruptcy Court committed an unconstitutional taking and denied I-4 due process. View "In Re: Lazy Days' RV Ctr., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sought injunctive relief and damages against the Bank after it filed an unlawful detainer action against her in state court without giving 90 days notice to vacate the foreclosed property. At issue on appeal was whether the Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act of 2009 (PTFA), Pub. L. No. 111-22, 701-04, 123 Stat. 1632, 1660-62, provided a private right of action. The court concluded that dismissal of the state unlawful detainer proceedings did not moot plaintiff's claim; the court agreed with the Third Circuit that the regulation of eviction proceedings "does not implicate an important state interest" under Younger v. Harris; but plaintiff had no cognizable interest under the PTFA. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint. View "Logan v. U.S. Bank" on Justia Law

This case concerned a month-to-month tenancy pursuant to a written rental agreement. After the landlord gave the tenants a 30-day no-cause notice of termination of tenancy and the tenants failed to vacate the premises, the landlord filed an action for possession. The tenants filed an answer denying that the landlord was entitled to possession and alleging that the landlord had given notice of termination because of the tenants' legitimate complaints. The trial court rejected the tenants' defense and made written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. On appeal, the Supreme Court concluded that to prove retaliation under ORS 90.385, a tenant must establish that the landlord served the notice of termination because of the tenant's complaint. The tenant need not prove, in addition, that the complaint caused the landlord actual or perceived injury or that the landlord intended to cause the tenant equivalent injury in return. The Court reversed the appellate court's decision and the judgment of the circuit court, and remanded the case to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "Elk Creek Management Co. v. Gilbert" on Justia Law