Justia Landlord - Tenant Opinion Summaries

In this landlord-tenant dispute, the Supreme Court affirmed the order of the superior court dismissing Landlord's complaint as well as Tenants' counterclaims, holding that the superior court properly dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.This case arose with respect to conduct that occurred in the context of the parties' landlord-tenant relationship. Landlord filed a complaint in the Providence County Superior Court seeking damages from Tenants. Tenants' answer included a six-count counterclaim. Finding that the superior court lacked jurisdiction over the matter, the hearing justice dismissed all claims and counterclaims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the hearing justice did not err when she dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Marzett v. Letendre" on Justia Law

Defendant Factory Mutual Insurance Company (Factory Mutual) appealed a superior court order denying its motion for summary judgment and granting plaintiffs' Daniel Ro and Sebastian Lim motion. Plaintiffs sought a declaration they were implied co-insureds under a fire insurance policy issued by Factory Mutual to the Trustees of Dartmouth College. Plaintiffs were students in 2016 living in campus dormitories. Prior to being assigned a dormitory room, each plaintiff was required to sign a form acknowledging receipt and understanding of the college’s student handbook, which included prohibitions on: (1) possessing charcoal grills in student housing; (2) lighting and burning of any item with an open flame in residence halls; and (3) placing items on, and the use of, “the roof, portico, fire escape, or any other architectural feature not designed for recreational or functional use, except in cases of emergency.” Plaintiffs set up a charcoal grill on a platform outside a fourth floor window in Lim’s dormitory. The grill started a fire on the platform, which then spread to the roof. Firefighters used a substantial quantity of water to extinguish the fire, and all four floors of the dormitory sustained water damage. Factory Mutual, which insured the building, paid the Trustees $4,544,313.55 and then brought a subrogation claim against plaintiffs to recover that amount. The trial court concluded that Factory Mutual could not maintain its counterclaims against either plaintiff, specifically noting, “To the extent Mr. Lim’s possessory interest in Morton Hall is insurable, so is Mr. Ro’s. Mr. Ro’s possessory interest in Morton Hall is analogous to that of a tenant who rents one unit in a residential complex but causes fire damage to another unit in the complex.” In affirming the superior court, the New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded that, even if plaintiffs lacked a possessory interest in their dormitories, and even if their relationship with the college was not strictly that of landlord and tenant, they had a contractual relationship with the college in which they paid for the right, subject to the noted limitations, among others, to occupy a college dormitory for a certain period of time. "This contractual relationship gave rise to the reasonable expectation that Dartmouth College carried fire insurance on its dormitories, that the plaintiffs’ room and board fees contributed, in some way, to the premium for that insurance, and, therefore, that the insurance inured to their benefit." View "Ro v. Factory Mutual Insurance Company, as Subrogee of Trustees of Dartmouth College" on Justia Law

A business owner formed a brewing company with plans to open a brewpub. He signed a lease that provided rent-free access to a commercial unit for a period of time to allow him to prepare the rental space prior to opening for business. But the brewing company encountered numerous delays during construction and did not open for business as planned. It also did not pay rent once the rent-free period ended. After the property owner received no rent for several months, it entered the property and changed the locks. The business owner then sued, claiming the property owner breached the lease, tortiously interfered with a business relationship, and breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The property owner counterclaimed that the brewing company breached the lease. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the superior court dismissed all claims against the property owner and ruled in the property owner’s favor on its counterclaim. The court also denied the business owner’s request to compel discovery and awarded the property owner over $200,000 in damages. The business owner appealed the superior court’s grants of summary judgment, its denial of his motion to compel discovery, and its award of damages. Finding no reversible error, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed. View "Kimp v. Fire Lake Plaza II, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the underlying judgment of the Housing Court in this summary process eviction action awarding possession to Landlord, holding that Tenant's appeals regarding his requests for disabilities accommodations in the Appeals Court and in the single justice session were moot.After a bench trial the Housing Court judge awarded possession to Landlord but granted Tenant a reasonable accommodation in the form of a limited stay of execution. On appeal, Tenant requested disabilities accommodations from the Appeals Court, some of which were granted. Tenant also filed a petition in the county court pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3, which a single justice denied. The appeals were consolidated. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that Tenant's claims arising from the denial of requested disabilities accommodations in the Appeals Court and in the single justice session of this Court were moot. View "Saipe v. Sullivan & Co., Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the intermediate court of appeals' (ICA) judgment on appeal with respect to defendant Nicole Jadan's counterclaim and vacated the district court's judgment, holding that the district court erred by failing to determine whether Jadan's participation in the court proceedings would be meaningful absent language assistance when it resolved her repeated requests for an interpreter.Cambridge Management filed a complaint for writ of possession against Jadan. Jadan counterclaimed for damages. The district court held nine hearings on the complaint and counterclaim. At eight of those court dates, Jadan either requested the assistance of a Polish interpreter or indicated to the court that she struggled with understanding and communicating in English. One judge agreed to appoint an interpreter midway through the district court proceedings, but subsequent court dates proceeded without the service of an interpreter. The court ruled in favor of Cambridge. The ICA affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated in part, holding that the district court's failure adequately to inquire into Jadan's language access needs was not harmless. View "Cambridge Management Inc. v. Jadan" on Justia Law

In March 2014, Evvie Punches rented a one-bedroom apartment in the Conifer Groves complex in Anchorage; she renewed the lease in April 2015. The complex was owned by McCarrey Glen Apartments, LLC and managed by Weidner Property Management, LCC. Punches complained to the property manager since moving in regarding air quality in the apartment, and mold around the toilet. These issues continued despite a number of attempts by Weidner’s maintenance staff to fix them. Punches nonetheless renewed her lease in April 2015. When the property manager tried to arrange an inspection, Punches refused to allow maintenance staff into her apartment because she would not be home. Punches moved out of her apartment on March 2016 after delivering Weidner a “Notice of Defects in Essential Services.” Her notice listed issues with the front door, mold on the ceiling, mold on the carpet, damage from a previous fire, water damage, and “insufficient windows” that permitted “free flowing air throughout” the apartment. Punches moved to Minneapolis some time after she left her Alaska apartment, and sought care in Minnesota for various skin infections and reported that she had been exposed to mold for two years. She continued to pursue a connection between mold exposure and her recurring skin infections and other ailments. In 2017, she sued her former landlord and the property management company, claiming the companies negligently failed to eradicate mold in her apartment, thereby breaching the habitability provisions of the lease and causing her to suffer personal injury and property damage. After considerable delay involving discovery disputes, the superior court granted summary judgment dismissing Punches' personal injury claim. The parties went to trial on the tenant’s property damage and contract claims after the superior court precluded the tenant from introducing evidence relating to her personal injury claim. The jury rejected Punches' claims, and judgment was entered in favor of the companies. Punches appealed, contending that the court erred by ruling against her in discovery disputes, by denying her a further extension of time to oppose summary judgment, and by limiting the evidence she could present at trial. The Alaska Supreme Court concluded the court did not abuse its discretion when making the challenged rulings, and therefore affirmed the judgment against the tenant. View "Punches v. McCarrey Glenn Apartments LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court evicting Defendant from a property and quieting title to it in Plaintiff, Defendant's former husband's corporation (the corporation) but awarding Plaintiff a judgment for the money she provided for its downpayment, holding that the district court did not err.After Plaintiff failed to pay rent for two years the corporation initiated eviction proceedings. Plaintiff denied being a tenant and claimed to co-owned the property. Plaintiff then filed a complaint asking the district court to quiet title to the property in the corporation and restore the premises to it. Defendant filed a countercomplaint requesting partition or, alternative, a constructive trust and restitution. The district court quieted title to the property in Plaintiff. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court did not err in quieting title to the corporation, declining to partition the property or impose a constructive trust upon it, restoring the premises to the corporation, and awarding Defendant a monetary judgment for an unpaid loan. View "Dreesen Enterprises, Inc. v. Dreesen" on Justia Law

Lester McMillan bought a dilapidated house that Terry Asher and Pamela Kitchens (“the Ashers”) planned to repair. The parties orally agreed that the Ashers would perform certain repairs to make the house livable, rent the house from McMillan for five years, and then buy the house from McMillan. For reasons that were disputed, the sale was never consummated. However, the Ashers continued to live in the house, make improvements to the property, and pay monthly rent to McMillan. After relations between the parties soured, McMillan sued to evict the Ashers. The Ashers then sued McMillan for specific performance of the oral contract to convey or, in the alternative, restitution for the value of the improvements. The district court found the oral contract was unenforceable, but awarded the Ashers restitution for certain improvements. McMillan appealed, alleging the district court erred in determining that he was unjustly enriched and in determining the amount of restitution. The Idaho Supreme Court found the district court did not err, except for a minor miscalculation of the amount of restitution. View "Asher v. McMillan" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Johnny Ki Lee and Un Joong Lee sought to evict a commercial tenant, defendant Sean Kotyluk, for selling marijuana without a license. They filed an unlawful detainer action against him based on Code of Civil Procedure section 1161 (3). Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion in limine requesting judgment on the pleadings, claiming plaintiffs’ three-day notice (the notice) was defective because it was served on June 4, 2019, but plaintiffs had not become owners of the property until June 20, 2019. In response, plaintiffs explained that the prior owner of the property, Rosemarie Haynes, had served the notice before transferring ownership of the property to them. The trial court granted judgment on the pleadings because the notice was issued prior to plaintiffs obtaining ownership of the property and because the notice failed to identify the party to whom defendant could return possession of the property. The court also denied plaintiffs leave to amend. Plaintiffs’ appeal raised two questions of first impression: (1) whether a property owner could file an unlawful detainer action based on a notice served by its predecessor in interest; and (2) did notice under section 1161 (3) have to identify a person to whom the tenant could turn over possession of the property if the tenant chose to quit? The Court of Appeal ruled: (1) nothing in the text of section 1161 prevented a successor owner from filing an unlawful detainer action, "nor does such a procedure undermine the purpose of the notice requirement in subdivision (3), which is primarily designed to give the tenant an opportunity to cure the breach and retain possession of the property;" and (2) identifying a specific person was not required by the statute: "Based on our reading of this subdivision, it appears the Legislature purposefully chose not to include such a requirement." View "Lee v. Kotyluk" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' 42 U.S.C. 1983 action alleging that certain provisions of the City of San Jose's 2017 Ordinance and implementing regulations, pertaining to the City's Apartment Rent Ordinance, violated plaintiffs' Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, as well as the Contracts Clause. The challenged provisions of the Ordinance and Regulations require landlords to disclose information about rent stabilized units to the City and condition landlords' ability to increase rents on providing that information.The panel held that plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged that the challenged provisions effect a search and thus their Fourth Amendment claim fails. In this case, plaintiffs offered no factual allegations plausibly suggesting that they maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy in information that, generally speaking, they already disclose to the City in other contexts. The panel also held that plaintiffs failed to raise a colorable Fifth Amendment takings claim, a Contracts Clause claim, an equal protection claim, and substantive and procedural due process claims. Finally, the Ordinance does not violate the "unconstitutional conditions" doctrine as enunciated in Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District, 570 U.S. 595 (2013). View "Hotop v. City of San Jose" on Justia Law