Justia Landlord - Tenant Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the decision of the superior court affirming the judgment of the district court in favor of Appellee, Appellant’s landlord, holding that Appellant’s violation of his lease in three ways that were independent from his possession of marijuana justified Appellee’s termination of the lease.Appellee issued Appellant a notice that it was terminating the parties’ lease, stating that Appellant’s use and possession of marijuana, as well as some of Appellant’s other activities, violated the terms of the parties’ lease. Appellee then filed an forcible entry and detainer complaint, and the district court entered judgment granting possession of the apartment to Appellant. Appellant appealed, arguing that because he had a certificate to use marijuana for medical purposes, Appellee and the district court were required to reasonably accommodate his possession and use of marijuana. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that Appellant’s violations of his lease that were independent from his possession of marijuana, standing alone, justified Appellee’s termination of the lease. View "Sherwood Associates LP v. Jackson" on Justia Law

Pro se plaintiff Elena Dogan appeals after the trial court granted a motion for nonsuit brought by her landlord, defendant Comanche Hills Apartments, Inc., and related individuals and entities at the close of her case. Dogan alleged she was injured when some concrete stairs at the apartment complex broke under her foot, causing her to fall. She claimed defendants were responsible for her injuries based on their control of the premises. Shortly after the filing of her initial complaint, the superior court granted Dogan a fee waiver. The case ultimately went to trial on a negligence theory. Several months before trial, Dogan filed a request to waive additional court fees and specifically asked for a waiver of court reporter fees. The request was denied with the stamped notation, "The Court does not provide Court Reporter Services." As a result, there was no court reporter at trial and no reporter's transcript on appeal. Dogan sought to challenge the trial court's decision to grant a nonsuit in defendants' favor. Defendants argued in response that Dogan could not establish error due to the absence of a reporter's transcript. After initial briefing in this case was complete, the California Supreme Court issued its decision in Jameson v. Desta, 5 Cal.5th 594 (2018), holding that the San Diego Superior Court's policy on providing court reporters "is invalid as applied to plaintiff and other fee waiver recipients, and that an official court reporter, or other valid means to create an official verbatim record for purposes of appeal, must generally be made available to in forma pauperis litigants upon request." As defendants appropriately conceded in their post-Jameson supplemental brief, Jameson applied retroactively to all cases, including this one, not yet final on appeal. Because there was no way to now provide a reporter for a trial that has already occurred, the Court of Appeal determined it had no choice but to reverse and remand for a new trial at which an official court reporter would be furnished. View "Dogan v. Comanche Hills Apartments" on Justia Law

Websites like Airbnb serve as intermediaries, providing homeowners a forum for advertising short-term rentals of their homes and helping prospective renters find rooms and houses for temporary stays. Chicago’s 2016 Shared Housing Ordinance requires interested hosts to acquire a business license; its standards include geographic eligibility requirements, restrictions on how many units within a larger building can be rented, and a list of buildings where such rentals are prohibited. Approved hosts are subject to health, safety, and reporting requirements, including supplying clean linens and sanitized cooking utensils, disposing of waste and leftover food, and reporting illegal activity known to have occurred within a rented unit. Keep Chicago Livable and six individuals challenged the Ordinance. The Seventh Circuit remanded for a determination of standing, stating that it was not clear that any plaintiff had pleaded or established sufficient injury to confer subject matter jurisdiction to proceed to the merits. The individual owners did not allege with particularity how the Ordinance (and not some other factor) is hampering any of their home-sharing activities; the out-of-town renters did not convey with sufficient clarity whether they still wish to visit Chicago and, if so, how the Ordinance is inhibiting them. All Keep Chicago Livable contends is that the alleged uncertainty around the Ordinance’s constitutionality burdens its education and advocacy mission; it does not allege that it engages in activity regulated by the Ordinance. View "Keep Chicago Livable v. Chicago" on Justia Law

Tenant filed suit against landlord and others after landlord rejected tenant's offer to purchase the building tenant rented for his audio recording business. Landlord ultimately sold the building to a third party because the offer was for considerably more money.The Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissal of the action and held that a right of first refusal is not an essential term that carries forward into a holdover tenancy unless the parties so indicate. In this case, there was no such indication and tenant's alternative theories for enforcing the right to first refusal lacked merit. View "Smyth v. Berman" on Justia Law

In this summary process eviction action the Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the Housing Court allowing an execution to issue on Landlord’s representation that Tenant had violated a nonfinancial condition of the appeals bond, holding that the Housing Court judge’s order of execution of judgment for failure to comply with a nonfinancial condition of the bond was improper.Landlord served Tenant with a notice of termination of tenancy before bringing a summary process eviction action against her. Following a trial, Landlord received a judgment of execution, and the Housing Court judge allowed the execution to issue. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding (1) a legally effective notice to quit is a condition precedent to a summary process action and part of the landlord’s prime facie case but is not jurisdictional; (2) the notice to quit in this case was not defective; (3) the Housing Court judge abused his discretion when, without providing advance notice that he would conduct trial on the same day as a scheduled hearing on Tenant’s motion to vacate a default judgment, he denied a volunteer attorney’s request for a continuance provided by Housing Court Standing Order 1-01; and (4) the judge lacked statutory authority to impose a nonfinancial condition on the appeals bond. View "Cambridge Street Realty, LLC v. Stewart" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the circuit court denying Appellants’ motion to intervene in a partnership dissolution action, holding that Appellants failed to meet the tripartite test necessary for intervention as a matter of right under S.D. Codified Laws 15-6-24(a)(2).Appellants entered into a farm lease/cash rent agreement with Berbos Farms General Partnership. Appellants sued Berbos Farms to recover unpaid cash rent under the lease for the years 2015. During discovery, Appellants learned that Joe and Lisa Berbos, partners in Berbos Farms, had filed a separate action to dissolve Berbos Farms. Seeking to preserve their right to payment of the 2015 cash rent in the event Berbos Farms was dissolved, Appellants move to intervene in the partnership dissolution action. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Appellants failed to show that the claim for unpaid cash rent might be impaired by the disposition of the partnership dissolution lawsuit, the circuit court correctly denied the motion to intervene under section 15-6-24(a)(2). View "Berbos v. Berbos" on Justia Law

When Revel entered Chapter 11 bankruptcy, its tenant, IDEA, continued to operate nightclubs and a beach club on Revel's Atlantic City casino premises. IDEA sought to protect its right to continue operating by filing an adversary proceeding. Polo became the defendant in the proceeding (and IDEA’s landlord) when the court approved a Purchase Agreement. The Sale Order authorized Polo’s purchase of Revel’s assets “free and clear of all liens, claims, encumbrances and other interests of any kind” under 11 U.S.C. 363(f). The Order contained carve-out provisions that expressly preserved certain rights relating to IDEA’s continued use of the casino premises under the Lease. After entering the Order, the Bankruptcy Court granted Revel’s long-pending motion to reject the Lease retroactively. IDEA filed a notice of its election to retain its rights as a tenant under section 365(h), as expressly allowed by the Sale Order. In an omnibus order, the Bankruptcy Court clarified major aspects of the post-petition landlord–tenant relationship between IDEA and Polo. The Third Circuit affirmed the Bankruptcy Court and the district court. IDEA is permitted to reduce its rental obligations under a tenant-protective provision, 11 U.S.C. 365(h), the Lease, and the doctrine of equitable recoupment, regardless whether its rights arose before or after Revel filed for bankruptcy and regardless whether they arose before or after Revel rejected the Lease. View "Revel AC Inc v. IDEA Boardwalk, LLC" on Justia Law

Lloyd Copenbarger, as Trustee of the Hazel I. Maag Trust (the Maag Trust), sued Morris Cerullo World Evangelism, Inc. (MCWE) for declaratory relief and breach of a settlement agreement made to resolve various disputes, including an unlawful detainer action. MCWE was the lessee of a 50-year ground lease (the Ground Lease) of real property (the Property) in Newport Beach. The Property was improved with an office building and marina (the Improvements). The Ground Lease was set to terminate on December 1, 2018. In 2004, MCWE subleased the Property and sold all of the Improvements to NHOM (the Sublease). Starting in 2009, NHOM experienced cash flow problems due to “a shortage of rents.” In June 2011, MCWE commenced an unlawful detainer action against NHOM based on allegations NHOM failed to maintain and undertake required repairs to the Improvements. Six months later, the Maag Trust intervened in the UD Action as a party defendant under the theory that if NHOM were evicted and the Sublease terminated, then the Maag Trust’s security interest created by the Maag Deed of Trust would be destroyed. In August 2012, MCWE, Plaza del Sol, and the Maag Trust entered into a settlement agreement (the Settlement Agreement). The Maag Trust alleged MCWE breached the settlement agreement by failing to dismiss with prejudice the unlawful detainer action and sought, as damages, attorney fees incurred in that action from the date of the settlement agreement to the date on which MCWE did dismiss the action. Following a bench trial, the trial court found MCWE had breached the settlement agreement by not timely dismissing with prejudice the unlawful detainer action. As damages, the court awarded the Maag Trust attorney fees it claimed to have incurred during the relevant time period. On appeal, MCWE did not challenge the finding that its failure to dismiss the unlawful detainer action constituted a breach of the settlement agreement. Instead, MCWE made a number of arguments challenging the damages awarded. After review, the Court of Appeal reversed the judgment against MCWE because there was a wholesale failure of proof of the amount of damages on the part of the Maag Trust. Therefore, the Court reversed with directions to enter judgment in favor of MCWE on the Maag Trust’s complaint. View "Copenbarger v. Morris Cerullo World Evangelism, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed an order of a single justice of this Court dismissing without prejudice Petitioner’s petition pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 for failure to pay the filing fee or to file a proper affidavit of indigency, holding that the petition was now moot and that the single justice did not err in dismissing the petition.Petitioner filed her petition seeking review of an interlocutory ruling of the trial court denying her late request for a jury trial on a summary process action brought against her. The single justice denied the petition. Thereafter, Petitioner petitioned for review pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3. The single justice dismissed the petition. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the petition has become moot because the underlying case proceeded to a final judgment, and the eviction has occurred; (2) the single justice did not err in dismissing the petition for failure to execute a proper affidavit of indigency or infringe on Petitioner’s right of access to the courts in doing so; and (3) Petitioner was unable to demonstrate the unavailability of adequate alternative means of obtaining appellate review. View "Anderson v. Panagiotopoulos" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court ruling that IOC Realty Specialist Inc. and its sole shareholder, Bernard Tompkins, violated the Disposition of Personal Property Landlord and Tenant Act by knowingly retaining personal property belonging to Samuel Pan, a former tenant, and awarding Pan damages and attorney fees.In his complaint, Pan alleged that IOC, his former landlord, refused to return his personal property that remained on the leased premises after Pan had ended his tenancy. The trial court entered judgment against IOC and Tompkins for the wrongful retention of property pursuant to the Act. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Act applies in commercial lease cases; (2) the district court did not clearly err when it held that IOC violated the Act by refusing to return Pan’s property upon his request; and (3) there was sufficient evidence to support the court’s award of damages and attorney fees under the Act. View "Pan v. IOC Realty Specialist Inc." on Justia Law