Justia Landlord - Tenant Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal of the underlying eviction proceedings brought under Nebraska's Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (the NURLTA), Neb. Rev. Stat. 76-1401, holding that this case was moot.After Defendant allegedly breached the terms of her residential lease agreement Plaintiff, Defendant's landlord, terminated the lease. When Defendant refused to leave the property Plaintiff initiated eviction proceedings. The county court found in favor of Plaintiff and issued a writ of restitution. Defendant appealed, holding that section 76-1446, which mandates a bench trial for a possession action under the NURLTA, violated her constitutional right to a jury trial. The Supreme Court dismissed Defendant's appeal, holding that Defendant's arguments on appeal were moot, and none of the mootness exceptions applied. View "NP Dodge Management Co. v. Holcomb" on Justia Law

In a forceable entry and detainer (FED) action, the Oregon Supreme Court was asked to determine the proper calculation of damages that could be awarded to a tenant, following multiple instances of landlord noncompliance with certain utility billing requirements that repeated each month, over a series of months. After plaintiff (landlord) brought an FED action against defendant (tenant) to recover possession of the landlord’s premises, tenant alleged a counterclaim that landlord had failed to comply with certain utility billing requirements found in ORS 90.315(4)(b). The trial court agreed with tenant, concluding that landlord had committed 12 separate violations—one per month over the 12 months within the one-year statute of limitations that governed Oregon Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (ORLTA) actions, and awarded tenant statutory damages in an amount equal to 12 months of rent. On landlord’s appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the plain text of ORS 90.315(4)(f) showed that the legislature had not intended for each landlord billing violation to be subject to a separate sanction. The Oregon Supreme Court concurred with the appellate court and affirmed. View "Shepard Investment Group LLC v. Ormandy" on Justia Law

Sathiyaselvam Thangavel and Sasikala Muthusamy were tenants who leased an apartment from Seaford Apartment Ventures, LLC. The complaint filed by Seaford Apartment’s insurer, Donegal Mutual Insurance Company, alleged that the tenants hit a sprinkler head while they flew a drone inside the apartment. Water sprayed from the damaged sprinkler head and caused damage to the apartment building. Seaford Apartment filed an insurance claim with Donegal, who paid $77,704.06 to repair the water damage. Donegal then brought this action against the tenants through subrogation and alleged that the tenants were negligent and breached the property’s rules and regulations. Donegal sought to recover the repair costs from the tenants. Under the "Sutton" rule, landlords and tenants are co-insureds under the landlord’s fire insurance policy unless a tenant’s lease clearly expresses an intent to the contrary. If the Sutton rule applies, the landlord’s insurer cannot pursue the tenant for the landlord’s damages by way of subrogation. In this case, a Delaware superior court ruled in the tenants’ favor at summary judgment that the Sutton rule applied because the lease did not clearly express an intent to hold the tenants liable for the landlord’s damages. To this the Delaware Supreme Court agreed and affirmed. View "Donegal Mutual Insurance Company v. Thangavel" on Justia Law

William Borlay appealed his eviction from an apartment for debts accrued under two leases, and an order for him to pay damages to Hegenes Apartment Management. In December 2021, Hegenes and Borlay executed a six-month lease for an apartment in Fargo. The lease term was from January 1 to June 30, 2022. Borlay owed $730 in rent each month under the lease. Due to a software error, Hegenes charged Borlay $670 instead of $730 during the first five months of the lease. Hegenes became aware of the error in May 2022 and notified Borlay of the error. Hegenes’ tenant ledger showed Borlay failed to pay $300 in rent from January 2022 through May 2022. In June 2022, Hegenes and Borlay executed another six-month lease, again for $730 in rent each month, plus $40 each month for garage rent. If Borlay failed to pay rent by the third day of each month, the lease authorized Hegenes to charge a $50 late fee. On September 9, 2022, Hegenes posted a three-day notice on Borlay’s apartment door. On September 30, 2022, Hegenes sued Borlay to evict him from the apartment, alleging he owed $1,220.50 in unpaid rent and late fees. After hearings on October 14 and October 21, 2022, the district court found Borlay failed to pay $1,220.50 in rent and late fees under both leases. After review of the tenant ledger and payments made subsequent to the notice of eviction, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the district court erred in concluding Hegenes was entitled to a judgment of eviction on the basis of a failure to pay rent under the expired January lease. The Court reversed the judgment and remanded for a determination of whether Hegenes was entitled to evict Borlay for his late payment of rent in September 2022 and, if so, for consideration of an award of attorney’s fees limited to that proceeding. View "Hegenes Apartment Management v. Borlay, et al." on Justia Law

Jones Lang LaSalle Brokerage, Inc. (JLL) represented both parties to an agreement to lease property in northwest Washington, D.C. Because dual representations of that kind pose inherent conflicts of interest, the District of Columbia’s Brokerage Act required JLL to obtain the written consent of all clients on both sides. JLL’s client on the landlord side of the transaction, 1441 L Associates, LLC, declined to pay JLL’s commission. JLL then brought this action to recover the commission. In defending against the suit, 1441 L argued that JLL, when disclosing its dual representation, failed to adhere to certain formatting specifications set out in the Brokerage Act that aim to highlight such a disclosure. The district court granted summary judgment to 1441 L.   The DC Circuit vacated and remand for further proceedings. The court concluded that that the Act does not invariably require adherence to those formatting specifications. Rather, the specifications go to whether the broker can gain an optional presumption that it secured the required written consent for its dual representation. Even without the benefit of that presumption, a broker can still demonstrate that it obtained the requisite written consent. View "Jones Lang Lasalle Brokerage, Inc. v. 1441 L Associates, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the district court's ruling in this eminent domain case between Tenants and City involving the requirement that a condemning authority provide certain relocation benefits and assistance to those displaced by the government's exercise of eminent domain, holding that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Tenants' petition to recover relocation expenses.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Tenants' petition because the Kansas Eminent Domain Procedure Act (EDPA), Kan. Stat. Ann. 26-501 et seq., neither provides a private right of action to recover relocation benefits nor authorizes judicial review of relocation-benefit determinations in eminent-domain appeals; (2) while the Kansas Relocation Assistance for Persons Displayed by Acquisition of Real Property Act (KRA), Kan. Stat. Ann. 58-3501 et seq., does provide an administrative remedy to vindicate the statutory right to relocation benefits, Tenants' failure to exhaust this administrative remedy deprived the district court of subject matter jurisdiction under the KRA; and (3) while Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-2101(d) authorizes appeals to the district court from certain final judgments and orders of a political subdivision, the statute did not apply in this case. View "Kan. Fire & Safety Equipment v. City of Topeka" on Justia Law

Divine Food and Catering, LLC (Divine) appeals from the dismissal of its malicious prosecution complaint against defendants and respondents the Western Diocese of the Armenian Church of North America (the Diocese), St. John Armenian Church (St. John), Archpriest Manoug Markarian (Archpriest Manoug), and Harout Markarian (collectively, defendants). The trial court dismissed the complaint after granting Defendants’ special motion to strike under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, the anti-SLAPP statute. Divine was a commercial tenant of St. John’s banquet hall. St. John and the Diocese (the church entities) filed an unlawful detainer action seeking to evict Divine based on a purported oral month-to-month lease. Following trial, the unlawful detainer court found the written lease was valid and granted judgment for Divine. Divine then filed its malicious prosecution complaint, alleging Defendants brought the unlawful detainer action in order to extort money from Petros Taglyan, the father of Divine’s owner. Divine alleged Defendants had no probable cause to bring the unlawful detainer action.   The Second Appellate District reversed. The court held that the triggers for the interim adverse judgment rule are limited to actual judgments and rulings on dispositive motions. The trial court, therefore, erred by applying the rule based on the unlawful detainer court’s sua sponte comments during trial. Alternatively, Divine has made an adequate showing for anti-SLAPP purposes that the unlawful detainer court’s comments were the product of fraud or perjury, which precludes application of the interim adverse judgment rule. Defendants have shown no other valid basis to support their anti-SLAPP motion. View "Divine Food and Catering v. Western Diocese of the Armenian etc." on Justia Law

Through an Asset Purchase Agreement, seller Huntcole, LLC (Huntcole), transferred to buyer 4-Way Electric Services, LLC (4-Way), all property necessary to conduct the refurbishment business. The Asset Purchase Agreement did not include the building where the refurbishment business was located. Instead, Huntcole leased that building to 4-Way through a separate Lease. Three years after buying the business, 4-Way announced it was moving to a new building in a different city. It began removing large pieces of commercial equipment it believed it had purchased from Huntcole to conduct the refurbishment business. Huntcole protested and argued that because the equipment was affixed to the building, it was not transferred to 4-Way through the Asset Purchase Agreement. The trial court ruled in favor of Huntcole, finding the affixed equipment had been excluded from the Asset Purchase Agreement. After its review, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the trial court's judgment. The Supreme Court found that based on the plain language of the Asset Purchase Agreement, 4-Way, by purchasing all assets necessary to conduct the refurbishment business, did in fact purchase the very equipment needed to conduct the business. The Asset Purchase Agreement also clearly designated the equipment as personal property and not as building improvements or fixtures. The Supreme Court concurred with the trial court that 4-Way did not have the right to cause damage to the building in a way that breached the Lease. The case was remanded to the trial court to determine the appropriate amount of damages to repair the building in accordance with the Lease, and to recalculate Huntcole's attorney fees' awards. View "4-Way Electric Services, LLC v. Huntcole, LLC, et al." on Justia Law

The three plaintiffs in this case had each rented rooms at an extended-stay motel for some time. They fell behind on their rent and were threatened with immediate eviction. They sued to stop that from happening, claiming that they were in a landlord-tenant relationship with the motel and could not be evicted without dispossessory proceedings in court. The motel argued that it had signed agreements with the plaintiffs that foreclosed their claims because, among other things, the agreement stated that their relationship was one of “Innkeeper and Guest,” and “not . . . Landlord and Tenant.” The trial court agreed with plaintiffs, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. After its review, the Georgia Supreme Court vacated the appellate court's opinion and remanded with direction for the trial court to determine the parties' relationship under the proper legal framework. View "Efficiency Lodge, Inc. v. Neason, et al." on Justia Law

After the Supreme Court held in HUD v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 (2002), that a public housing authority may enforce a term in a tenant’s lease allowing eviction if a member of the household or guest commits a crime (even without the tenant’s knowledge), some cities enacted ordinances extending that approach to private leases. Granite City, Illinois, required private landlords to evict tenants not as a condition of receiving a subsidy but as a matter of regulatory compulsion. Plaintiffs permitted their adult daughter to stay in their leased home occasionally, and one night they welcomed their daughter and her boyfriend into their house briefly. After they left, they were arrested for stealing a van. The City served a “Notice of Violation.” A hearing officer directed Plaintiffs’ landlord to begin eviction proceedings. The landlord dragged his feet long enough for them to file suit under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. A district court entered a temporary restraining order, which it later converted to a preliminary injunction. In January 2022, Plaintiffs gave up their lease voluntarily and moved out of Granite City.   The Seventh Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of a justiciable controversy. Plaintiffs contend that if they prevail on the merits, they will be entitled to nominal damages. The court explained Plaintiffs’ potential problem is that their complaint did not allege a “completed” violation of their rights, so they have failed to identify a concrete injury that could be redressed by nominal damages. View "Deborah Brumit v Granite City, Illinois" on Justia Law