Justia Landlord - Tenant Opinion Summaries

The apartment building in which Tenants lived was damaged by a fire. For purposes of this appeal, the parties agreed that the fire was caused by Tenants’ negligence. Landlord’s insurer paid for the repairs to the building and then brought this subrogation action against Tenants in the name of Landlord to recover the money it paid to repair the damage caused by the fire. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Tenants, determining that the parties did not reasonably expect that Tenants would be liable for the damage they caused. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the lease agreement clearly reflected the parties’ intention that Tenants would reimburse Landlord for any damage caused by their negligence. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) under the circumstances of this case, it is reasonable that Tenants should be liable for negligence they caused to the leased premises; but (2) the parties would not reasonably have expected that Tenants would be liable for damage to other property belonging to Landlord. Remanded. View "Melrose Gates, LLC v. Moua" on Justia Law

The apartment building in which Tenants lived was damaged by a fire. For purposes of this appeal, the parties agreed that the fire was caused by Tenants’ negligence. Landlord’s insurer paid for the repairs to the building and then brought this subrogation action against Tenants in the name of Landlord to recover the money it paid to repair the damage caused by the fire. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Tenants, determining that the parties did not reasonably expect that Tenants would be liable for the damage they caused. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the lease agreement clearly reflected the parties’ intention that Tenants would reimburse Landlord for any damage caused by their negligence. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) under the circumstances of this case, it is reasonable that Tenants should be liable for negligence they caused to the leased premises; but (2) the parties would not reasonably have expected that Tenants would be liable for damage to other property belonging to Landlord. Remanded. View "Melrose Gates, LLC v. Moua" on Justia Law

Great Lakes, which automotive service stores throughout the Midwest, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The unsecured creditors’ committee filed an adversary action against T.D., which had leased two oil-change stores to Great Lakes. Great Lakes had negotiated the termination of the leases 52 days before it declared bankruptcy, and the creditors’ committee contends that the termination was either a preferential (11U.S.C. 547(b)) or a fraudulent (11 U.S.C. 548(A)(1)) transfer of the leases to T.D. The bankruptcy judge rejected that claim. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded for determination of the value of Great Lakes’ transfer to T.D. and whether T.D. has any defenses to the creditors’ claims. View "In re: Great Lakes Quick Lube, LP" on Justia Law

Boston rented an apartment to defendant under the Los Angeles Rent Stabilization Ordinance (LARSO), L.A. Mun. Code, 151.00 et seq., where the rental agreement contained a forfeiture clause and an insurance clause. After 15 years of defendant failing to obtain insurance, Boston gave defendant a three-day notice to perform or quit. Defendant obtained insurance shortly after the three-day period expired. Boston then sued defendant for unlawful detainer. The trial court ruled in favor of Boston and defendant appealed. The court asserted jurisdiction over the matter under California Rules of Court, rule 8.1002, to settle an important question of law: Whether a tenant’s breach of an LARSO rental contract, regardless of the breach’s materiality or impact on the landlord, justifies the landlord forfeiting the agreement and terminating tenancy. The court held that a tenant’s breach must be material to justify forfeiture. In this case, the tenant’s obligation to obtain and pay for insurance protected the tenant’s interest, not the landlord’s; accordingly, the tenant’s failure to obtain a policy could not have harmed the landlord and therefore was not a material breach of the agreement constituting grounds for forfeiture. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment and awarded costs to defendant. View "Boston LLC v. Juarez" on Justia Law

Respondent decided not to renew the lease of Petitioner, a tenant in an apartment building, and filed a tenant holding over action. Petitioner argued that the non-renewal and tenant holding over action were in retaliation for her advocation on behalf of the apartment building’s tenants association. The circuit court ruled in Petitioner’s favor on the question of retaliation but awarded damages for only one of the two alleged acts of retaliation. Specifically, the court found that Petitioner failed to prove that she was current on the rent at the time that she filed her tenant holding over action. The circuit court also declined to award attorneys’ fees to Petitioner. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) Petitioner was not ineligible for relief as to the second alleged act of retaliation, as Petitioner’s debts to Respondent other than her fixed monthly amount specified as “rent” in her lease did not factor into whether she was current on the rent for purposes of the anti-retaliation statute; and (2) the circuit court erred in refusing to grant attorney fees without permitting Petitioner an opportunity to submit evidence concerning her entitlement to attorneys’ fees and without explaining how it chose to exercise its discretion. View "Lockett v. Blue Ocean Bristol, LLC" on Justia Law

Lionel Simeus filed a complaint against RGR Company LLC with the Lincoln Commission on Human Rights for housing discrimination in violation of section 11.06.020(b) of the Lincoln Municipal Code and 42 U.S.C. 3604(b) of the federal Fair Housing Act. The Commission determined that RGR discriminated against Simeus on the basis of race and national origin and, on behalf of Simeus, filed a charge of discrimination against RGR. After a hearing, the Commission found in favor of Simeus. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Commission did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that RGR’s proffered reasons for its negative treatment of Simeus were a pretext for discrimination or that Simeus was the victim of intentional discrimination. View "RGR Co., LLC v. Lincoln Comm’n on Human Rights" on Justia Law

In 2009-2010, eight tenants were evicted from their respective homes for alleged violations of the Lansing Housing and Premises Code. Each eviction followed an inspection of the buildings conducted in conjunction with criminal drug investigations. Each inspector summarized his findings in an eviction “red-tag” notice form, which he gave to the tenant; none of the red-tags provided any information regarding the right to appeal and have an administrative hearing. Each stated: “You must contact the undersigned, no later than ... to set up an appointment to meet at the structure (to verify that all corrections have been completed) or to acquire an authorized extension. Before the re-inspection you must obtain all required permits and have those repairs inspected .... If you have any questions or concerns about complying within the time indicated, you may contact ….” None of the tenants filed an appeal within the 20-day period prescribed by the code. They later filed suit. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of the Inspectors’ qualified immunity defense with respect to the constitutional adequacy of the notice. Sixth Circuit precedent did not clearly establish that a notice of eviction must include a direct explanation of the post-deprivation appeals process. View "Gardner v. Evans" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs owned a building, with a mortgage, in Hartford, Vermont, where they operated a pizza business. In 2013, they sold the pizza business to defendant and leased him the premises. In November 2013, plaintiffs brought an eviction action, asserting that defendant had failed to pay rent. The court granted plaintiffs a default judgment and a writ of possession in December 2013. The court subsequently granted defendant’s request to vacate the default judgment and stay the writ of possession. Defendant then filed an answer and a counterclaim. In his counterclaim, defendant argued that he was fraudulently induced into entering into the lease agreement and that the lease should be declared void. Alternatively, defendant argued that he had cured any breach of the lease by paying money into an escrow fund. Defendant appealed the trial court’s order granting judgment to plaintiffs on their complaint for ejectment and damages. Finding no reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "Panagiotidis v. Galanis" on Justia Law

Bare Exposure operates “Atlantic City’s Only All Nude Entertainment.” HMS, a private corporation, leases expressway service plazas from the South Jersey Transportation and New Jersey Turnpike Authorities to operate restaurants and convenience stores. The Authorities are not involved in day-to-day operations or management, but only perform long-term maintenance to parking areas, building exteriors, and lobbies. HMS entered into a contract, allowing CTM to install and service brochure display racks in plaza lobbies. HMS “must approve all brochures or publications” before placement. The Authorities were not a party to the CTM contract. HMS discovered a Bare Exposure brochure in a CTM display rack. HMS instructed CTM to remove all Bare Exposure brochures. HMS did not consult with or receive any direction from the Authorities and did not consider the New Jersey Administrative Code. The Authorities never directed HMS to take any actions regarding the brochures. Bare Exposure contends that the Authorities placed government signs and photographs in lobbies and filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging that HMS violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of HMS. HMS did act not “under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State,” absent direct involvement by state authorities either in the decision to remove the brochures or in general plaza operations. View "P.R.B.A. Corp. v. HMS Host Toll Roads, Inc." on Justia Law

Landlords filed an eviction action against Tenant. Eventually, the parties settled the eviction action by a stipulation that was signed by the district court judge. Thereafter, Tenant filed a negligence action alleging that Landlords failed to maintain the house free from toxic mold and fungus and that the mold ruined Tenant’s personal property. Landlords filed a motion in limine to prevent Tenant from entering the parties’ stipulation into evidence to prove causation in the negligence action and moved for summary judgment. The hearing justice granted Landlords’ motion in limine, barring the admission of the district court stipulation. The court then granted summary judgment for Defendants, ruling that Tenant could offer no other evidence of causation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the hearing justice correctly granted the motion in limine, as nothing in the stipulation established that Landlords caused mold to accumulate on Tenant’s personal property; and (2) because Tenant conceded that there was no other evidence on the element of causation, the hearing justice correctly granted Landlords’ motion for summary judgment. View "Curreri v. Saint" on Justia Law