Justia Landlord - Tenant Opinion Summaries

Revel opened an Atlantic City resort-casino, costing $2.4 billion. Revel entered into a 10-year lease with IDEA to run two nightclubs and a beach club. IDEA contributed $16 million of the projected cost of construction in addition to monthly rental payments. The Casino did not turn a profit. Revel filed a “Chapter 22” bankruptcy, seeking permission to sell its assets free of all liens and interests (including leases). The Bankruptcy Court approved and set an auction date. IDEA, concerned that the proposed sale would eliminate the value of its lease notwithstanding its $16 million investment, filed objections. No qualified buyer appeared. The court postponed the auction. A month later, Revel closed the Casino’s doors and barred tenants, IDEA gave notice that it intended to continue operating its beach club and nightclub and expected Revel to honor its obligations to provide uninterrupted utility service. In the meantime Polo agreed to buy the Casino for $90 million. Days before the sale hearing, Revel replied to IDEA’s objections. IDEA appealed an unfavorable order and sought a stay pending appeal, noting that, if the decision were not stayed, its appeal would be moot under 11 U.S.C. 363(m) once the sale closed. The district court denied the motion. The Third Circuit reversed, staying that part of the order that allowed Revel to sell the Casino free of IDEA’s lease. View "In re: Revel AC Inc" on Justia Law

In 2010, Yan Chen, who had a business interest in a restaurant, entered into a 10-year lease agreement with Russell Realty, LLC, and MRT, LLC. The property to be leased was located in Greenville. The lease agreement was drafted by Russell Realty and contained an arbitration clause. In 2012, Russell Realty and MRT sued Chen along with Qiaoyun He, Joe Zou, and Yami Buffet, Inc., alleging breach of contract. Chen filed a response to the motion, alleging that she had been in China for a few months, and that she had not been personally served with notice of the lawsuit. She subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, asserting that the lease agreement contained an arbitration clause and that "said complaint[] fails to state any measures that have been taken in lieu of the fulfillment of such agreed Arbitration Clause." The trial court denied both Russell Realty and MRT's motion for a default judgment and Chen's motion to dismiss. About a month after this, Chen filed a motion to compel arbitration, asserting that, as "part of Plaintiffs['] lease agreement, plaintiff[s] agreed to binding arbitration. In 2013, Chen filed a second motion to dismiss, alleging that Russell Realty and MRT had refused to mediate and had refused to arbitrate. Russell Realty and MRT filed an objection to Chen's second motion to dismiss, asserting that "time of the stay set by the court has almost expired and Defendant Yan Chen has not made any movement, act, or effort to seek Arbitration to resolve the issues." Russell Realty and MRT again sought a default judgment against the defendants, including Chen. She asserted that counsel for Russell Realty and MRT had failed to respond to her attempts to seek a settlement before the hiring of a mediator or arbitrator and that, subsequently, she had contacted a mediator/arbitrator and Russell Realty and MRT had not responded to her choice of mediator/arbitrator. The trial court then entered an order stating that the Chen's appeal was moot as the court had not yet entered a final order. In early 2015, the trial court entered an order awarding Russell Realty and MRT $682,050.10 against all the defendants, including Chen, jointly and severally. Chen appealed. Based on its review of the facts in the circuit court record, the Supreme Court reversed with regard to Chen and remanded the case for the trial court to enter an order requiring arbitration in accordance with the terms of the lease agreement. View "Chen v. Russell Realty, LLC" on Justia Law

Defendants Charles and Stella Ohaeri leased space for a thrift store in a shopping center owned by plaintiff AP-Colton LLC. The thrift store was not a success, and the Ohaeris stopped paying rent. According to the Ohaeris, AP-Colton had fraudulently induced them to enter into the lease by stating that a church was going to move into the space next to theirs, but a competing store moved in instead. AP-Colton originally filed this case as a limited civil action, in which damages were limited to $25,000. The Ohaeris filed a cross-complaint seeking more than $25,000, but they did not pay the $140 fee required to reclassify the case as an unlimited civil action. Thereafter, AP-Colton filed an amended complaint seeking more than $25,000, because the Ohaeris should already have paid the reclassification fee, so AP-Colton did not pay it. After a bench trial, the trial court rejected the Ohaeris' fraud claims and awarded AP-Colton $126,437.25. The Ohaeris argued on appeal of that judgment that among other things, the case remained a limited civil action, and thus, the trial court erred by awarding damages of more than $25,000. The Court of Appeal agreed that the case should have remained a limited civil action. The Ohaeris, however, took the position below that the case had become an unlimited civil action, and the trial court accepted this position by awarding AP-Colton damages in excess of $25,000. The Court of Appeal held that as a result, the Ohaeris were judicially estopped to deny that the case was an unlimited civil action. Accordingly, on condition that it pays the $140 reclassification fee, AP-Colton can recover the full award. View "AP-Colton v. Ohaeri" on Justia Law

A lease agreement included a five-year renewal provision but failed to specify the rent to be paid during the renewal period. The circuit judge granted a judgment on the pleadings, finding the renewal provision unenforceable. Finding no reversible error in that decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Intrepid, Inc. v. Bennett" on Justia Law

Mak owns a Berkeley rental property with four apartments. In 2012 Mak served on Burns, a tenant for 28 years, a 60-day eviction notice, asserting that Mak intended to occupy the apartment. Two months later, Mak and Burns entered a written agreement under which Burns agreed to vacate the apartment, stating that Burns was not doing so pursuant to the 60-day notice, and that such notice “shall upon occupant vacating, be conclusively deemed withdrawn.” Burns vacated the apartment and months later the Maks rented the unit to new tenants (Ziems), at more than double the rent that Burns had paid. In response to Ziems’s application to the Rent Stabilization Board to lower the permissible rent to that paid by Burns, Mak contended that Burns had voluntarily vacated, so that under the Costa-Hawkins Rental Housing Act, Civil Code 1954.50, the Board was prohibited from limiting the rent at the commencement of the new tenancy. The Board and the trial and appeals courts rejected the “landlord’s transparent attempt to circumvent” rent control. The Act creates a rebuttable presumption that a tenant who moves out within one year of service of an owner move-in eviction notice has moved out pursuant to that notice. Mak failed to present evidence overcoming the presumption. View "Mak v. City of Berkeley Rent Stabilization Bd." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a forest ranger at Yosemite National Park, filed suit against defendant, a public entity, after he was injured by a grease fire from a skillet in his rental unit. Defendant provided plaintiff and other tenants with fire extinguishers, but one was not available for plaintiff at the time of the grease fire. Plaintiff filed suit against defendant for damages for the injuries he suffered, alleging that the absence of a fire extinguisher in the residence constituted a dangerous condition of public property. The trial court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that the trial court properly applied the immunity statute by determining that liability was precluded by the immunity accorded to a public entity for failing to provide or maintain fire protection facilities or equipment. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Puskar v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco" on Justia Law

Tenant was served with a three-day notice to quit that listed eight separate incidents that involved damaging the premises, disturbing neighbors and other tenants in the building, and running around naked and/or in boxer shorts. Tenant did not vacate, but filed an answer to an unlawful detainer action, asserting affirmative defenses, including breach of the warranty of habitability, payment of all rent that was due, discrimination based on sexual orientation and religion, laches, and retaliation for requesting repairs. Tenant subsequently entered into a settlement agreement, which included a stipulation for judgment, with the property management company and the property owner. Tenant violated the agreement. The trial court entered a stipulated judgment giving the lessors damages, costs, fees, and possession of the property. Subsequently, tenant sued the lessors for their damaged and missing personal property, which had remained in the rental residence after tenant vacated the premises. The trial court dismissed the complaint. The court of appeal affirmed, holding that the doctrine of res judicata bars all of tenant’s claims and that his daughter, who was not a tenant and did not reside in the rental unit, cannot state a claim against the lessors. View "Needelman v. Dewolf Realty Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-landlord, Mountain View Park, LLC appealed a circuit court decision in which the court declined to approve an agreement concerning, in part, rent arrearages owed by defendant-tenant Gerald Robson, Jr., and issued a writ of possession. In June 2013, the parties entered into a rental agreement, whereby defendant rented a mobile home owned by plaintiff. Defendant eventually fell behind in his rent payments. In May 2014, plaintiff served defendant with a demand for rent and an eviction notice. When defendant failed to pay the rent arrearages, plaintiff filed this possession action. In June 2014, the parties entered into an agreement to cure defendant’s arrearages and avoid eviction. The agreement was submitted to the trial court for approval; however, the court declined to approve it. In its denial of plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration, the court explained that the “agreement provides for issuance of a writ of possession for an indefinite period of time in the future for the nonpayment of future rent not yet due, in addition to the unpaid rent which forms the basis of this eviction action,” and that RSA 540:13-c, II (2007) “does not include authority of the court to issue a writ of possession at some indefinite time in the future for the nonpayment of future rent not yet due.” Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's judgment. View "Mountain View Park, LLC v. Robson" on Justia Law

The Section 8 low-income housing assistance voucher program, 42 U.S.C. 1437f(o), is administered by public housing agencies such as Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority (CMHA). Program regulations define “rent to [the] owner” as “[t]he total monthly rent payable to the owner under the lease for the unit. Rent to owner covers payment for any housing services, maintenance and utilities that the owner is required to provide and pay for.” Velez and Hatcher, voucher recipients, entered into one-year leases with K&D. The leases provide: “If Resident(s) shall holdover after the end of the term of this Rental Agreement, said holdover shall be deemed a tenancy of month to month and applicable month to month fees shall apply.” Velez entered into a month-to-month tenancy after her one-year term expired; Hatcher entered into month-to-month tenancies, and, later, a nine-month agreement. K&D charged fees of $35.00 to $100.00 per month. CMHA did not treat these short-term rental fees as rent under the voucher program. Velez and Hatcher were required to pay the fees and filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court granted CMHA summary judgment, holding that the fees were not rent. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Recasting the charge as a short-term fee, rather than rent, does not change that it is consideration paid by the tenant for use of the rental unit. View "Velez v. Cuyahoga Metro. Hous. Auth." on Justia Law

Elderberry filed suit in the Western District of Virginia alleging breach of a lease for a skilled nursing facility against Living Centers, FMSC, and Continium, and breach of a guaranty contract against Mariner. Separately, in the Northern District of Georgia, Mariner filed a declaratory judgment action against Elderberry, seeking a declaration that it had no obligations under the guaranty. The two actions were consolidated in the Western District of Virginia. The district court denied the parties’ cross motions for summary judgment but held that the guaranty was enforceable against Mariner. The district court entered judgment in favor of Elderberry on all counts and found defendants jointly and severally liable for accrued and future damages, plus pre- and post-judgment interest. The court held that Elderberry lost its right to rent that accrued after it terminated the lease on August 24, 2012; Elderberry is, however, entitled to any rent that accrued prior to termination of the lease; and Elderberry is entitled to non-rent damages that accrued prior to termination of the lease. Given the Georgia Supreme Court’s most recent pronouncement on that state’s statute of frauds, combined with Georgia’s parol evidence rule, the court held that the guaranty satisfies the Georgia statue of frauds. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded with instructions. View "Elderberry of Weber City, LLC v. Living Centers - Southeast" on Justia Law