Justia Landlord - Tenant Opinion Summaries

This appeal stemmed from a 1983 Ground Lease of property in Pocatello which Quail Ridge Medical Investors, LLC (Quail Ridge) leased from Pocatello Hospital, LLC d/b/a Portneuf Medical Centers, LLC (PMC). Previously, Quail Ridge appealed a declaratory judgment entered by the district court which found PMC was entitled to an adjustment in the annual rent owed by Quail Ridge from $9,562.50 annually to $148,500 annually, and that Quail Ridge was obligated to pay PMC $416,812.50 in rent for the period at issue. The Supreme Court affirmed the court’s declaratory judgment. While the first appeal was pending, PMC filed a new action seeking payment of the adjusted rents. In the second action, the district court found on summary judgment that Quail Ridge breached the Ground Lease by failing to pay the adjusted rents. Quail Ridge appealed, arguing the breach of contract and breach of guarantee claims are barred under res judicata. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Pocatello Hospital v. Quail Ridge Medical Investor" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a property owner, and Defendant, a tenant, entered into a one-year commercial rental lease agreement. Prior to the end of the one-year term, the parties extended the lease for a nine-year term. Several months after executing the lease extestion, Defendant vacated the premises and ceased paying rent. Plaintiff commenced this action for rent arrears and an amount equal to the future remaining rent owed on the lease. Supreme Court entered judgment for Plaintiff in the amount of $1,488,604, consisting of the rent remaining due under the lease, reduced by the amount of rent Plaintiff was able to collect by reletting the premises. Defendants appealed, arguing that Plaintiff was barred from collecting unpaid future rents pursuant to an acceleration clause in the leasehold agreement. The Court of Appeals affirmed as modified, holding that the court below erred by limiting the damages hearing to whether Plaintiff relet the premises without allowing Defendants the opportunity to present evidence that the undiscounted accelerated rent amount was disproportionate to Plaintiff’s actual losses, notwithstanding that Plaintiff had possession and no obligation to mitigate. View "172 Van Duzer Realty Corp. v Globe Alumni Student Assistance Ass’n, Inc." on Justia Law

From 2002 to 2012, Defendant leased from Plaintiff business premises located in Portland. In 2012, Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that Defendant had breached certain provisions in the written lease. Defendant counterclaimed, alleging that Plaintiff had failed to perform certain repairs required by the lease. The parties went to mediation on their dispute and reached a settlement agreement through that mediation. Defendant later moved to amend its original counterclaim to add a second count for breach of the settlement agreement. The superior court concluded that the counterclaim seeking to enforce the settlement was moot because Plaintiff signed an agreement reflecting all of the terms of the settlement reached through mediation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Plaintiff executed a general release that complied with the agreement reached through mediation, the superior court correctly determined that Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on its counterclaim seeking to enforce the settlement agreement was moot. View "2301 Congress Realty, LLC v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc." on Justia Law

Marina Pacifica was built on Long Beach waterfront land owned by McGrath and leased to the limited partnership (LP) in the 1970s. The ground lease was subdivided into 570 leases, one for each condominium unit. When LP sold a unit, it assigned the unit lease to the purchaser. The leases required owners to pay monthly rent to McGrath and an “assignment fee” to LP. Both payments were nominal ($15) until 2006, when they would be recalculated so that together, they would equal 10 percent of the value of the underlying land. In 1999, the Homeowners Association purchased the underlying land from McGrath for $17 million. Each owner paid a pro rata share. Owners no longer pay rent. The HOA attempted to buy out the assignment fee before the 2006 adjustment. In 2000, it purchased the interests of two limited partners (56.25 percent) for $5 million. It was unable to reach agreement with Lansdale to buy his 43.75 percent interest. Litigation resulted in a finding that the land’s fair market value was $60,615,500. The HOA instructed owners not to pay and filed suit, alleging that the assignment fee is invalid or overstated, and that the purchase of the underlying land extinguished the lease. The court of appeal reversed a holding that the assignment fee was an invalid transfer fee after December 31, 2008, under Civil Code 1098 and 1098.5 and directed the court to enter judgment for the HOA on contract claims. View "Marina Pac. Homeowners Ass'n v. So. Cal. Fin. Corp." on Justia Law

In the 1950s and ’60s, to encourage private developers to construct, own, and manage housing projects for low- and moderate-income families, the government insured mortgages on those projects in exchange for provisions, such as a 40-year mortgage term, an agreement to maintain affordability restrictions for the duration of the mortgage, and prepayment limitations or prohibitions. The Emergency Low Income Housing Preservation Act of 1987 and the Low-Income Housing Preservation and Resident Homeownership Act of 1990 instituted a process to request the right to prepay mortgages. There were substantive restrictions on HUD granting prepayment requests, limiting its discretion, 12 U.S.C. 4108(a)). Prepayment is one step toward renting at market prices. The Acts permit HUD to grant incentives rather than permission to prepay. Owners claimed that the Acts constituted an as-applied taking. The Claims Court granted the government’s motions: for summary judgment that the takings claims for some properties were unripe for failure to exhaust administrative remedies; for summary judgment that no taking occurred for properties for which mortgages did not include a prepayment right; and for summary judgment of collateral estoppel as to one owner. The Federal Circuit affirmed as to ripeness and prepayment, but reversed as to collateral estoppel. View "Biafora v. United States" on Justia Law

Canal/Claiborne, Limited owned property located at 1661 Canal Street in New Orleans. In January 1995, Canal/Claiborne entered into a lease with Stonehedge Development, L.L.C. Stonehedge entered into a sublease in June 1995 with the State of Louisiana, Department of Children and Family Services. The Department occupied the premises, remitting monthly rent payments of about $53,000.00 to Stonehedge, which in turn remitted monthly payments of about $36,000.00 to Canal/Claiborne until Hurricane Katrina struck the city in 2005. Following Katrina, the Department failed to remove its partially damaged movable property from the premises of the plaintiff’s building. During this time, the Department also failed to remit rental payments to Stonehedge. Canal/Claiborne sought remuneration for lost rental income. The issue presented in this case was whether Canal/Claiborne's quasi-contractual claim of unjust enrichment, based on the lost rental income, fell within the scope of that waiver of sovereign immunity. The Supreme Court concluded that the unjust enrichment claim did not fall within the scope of the waiver of sovereign immunity in contract or tort. Furthermore, the Court also found Canal/Claiborne's suit asserting a claim of unjust enrichment had not been otherwise permitted by the legislature in a “measure authorizing … immunity from suit and liability.” View "Canal/Claiborne Ltd. v. Stonehedge Development, LLC" on Justia Law

In late 2013, when Paul Taylor filed a complaint seeking back rent and possession of a home he rented to James David and Elisabeth Black. Justice of the Peace Court 13 ordered an expedited summary possession trial under 25 Del. C. 5115. The Blacks appealed a Superior Court order denying their petition for a writ of certiorari, arguing that Justice of the Peace Court 13 proceeded contrary to law and denied the Blacks due process of law when it issued a forthwith summons under 25 Del. C. 5115 absent satisfaction of the statutory requirements for issuance of that summons. Furthermore, the Blacks argued the record showed that Justice of the Peace Court 13 proceeded irregularly because it created no record regarding the basis for its issuance of the forthwith summons. The Supreme Court concluded that both of the Blacks’ contentions were meritorious, and reversed the Superior Court. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Black v. Justice of the Peace Court 13, et al." on Justia Law

Whitaker, formerly employed by Milwaukee County, alleged that she was discriminated against in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101 when the county failed to accommodate her disability by refusing to extend her period of medical leave, refusing to transfer her to another position, and then terminating her for reasons related to her disability. The district court granted the County summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding the district court’s conclusion that the complaint impermissibly went beyond the scope of the EEOC charge and that the County was not her “employer” under the statute. Although Milwaukee County was Whitaker’s official employer and was responsible for her compensation, it had no involvement in the principal decisions that she claims violated the statute and no authority to override those decisions, made by the State Department of Health Services. With respect to whether the County is liable for any of its own actions,. Whitaker’s allegations on these matters were outside the scope of her EEOC charge, and, therefore, not subject to judicial consideration. View "Whitaker v. Milwaukee Cnty." on Justia Law

After defendants purchased the building where plaintiff was living in a rent-controlled apartment, defendants served plaintiff with a 60-day notice to quit. Plaintiff subsequently initiated unlawful detainer proceedings against defendants and then filed a complaint alleging several state claims. Plaintiff sought an order restoring him to his apartment, restitution, damages, and attorney fees. On appeal, defendants challenged the trial court's denial of their Code of Civil Procedure section 426.16 special motion to strike plaintiff's first amended complaint because their conduct was protected litigation activity. Plaintiff cross-appealed the trial court's denial of his request for attorney fees in defending the motion. The court affirmed the denial of defendant's motion to strike where plaintiff's complaint was not directed at protected activity. However, the court reversed the denial of attorney fees and remanded for further proceedings to determine whether defendants' motion was frivolous, whether plaintiff is entitled to attorney fees and if so, the amount of such fees. View "Ben-Shahar v. Pickart" on Justia Law

In these three putative class actions, Plaintiffs, current or former tenants of separate apartment buildings, sought damages for rent overcharges. All plaintiffs initially sought treble damages but then waived that demand. At issue was whether Plaintiffs’ claims could properly be brought as class actions. Defendants argued, among other things, that these actions were to “recover a penalty” because, even without trebling, the remedy provided by the Rent Stabilization Law (RSL) 26-516 is a penalty. In each case, the Appellate Division certified a question to the Court of Appeals. The Court answered (1) N.Y. C.P.L.R. 901(b), which prohibits any claim for penalties to be brought as a class action, permits otherwise qualified plaintiffs to utilize the class action mechanism to recover compensatory overcharges even though the RSL 26-516 does not specifically authorize class action recovery and imposes treble damages upon a finding of willful violation; and (2) maintaining these actions as class actions does not contravene the letter or the spirit of the C.P.L.R. or the RSL. View "Borden v. 400 E. 55th St. Assoc., L.P." on Justia Law