Justia Landlord - Tenant Opinion Summaries

Keystone-Texas Property Holding Corporation owned the Rivercenter Mall and the ground beneath the San Antonio Marriott Riverwalk hotel. Keystone leased the hotel land to Petitioners, who owned and operated the hotel. In 2004, Keystone put the two properties up for sale. After Keystone found a prospective buyer, Petitioners informed Keystone they were interested in buying the land and were not ready to waive their rights under the lease. The deal to sell the properties fell through, and Keystone sued Petitioners for actions Keystone believed scuttled the deal. A jury found for Keystone on all issues and awarded damages for slander of title and tortious interference with a contract. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was no evidence Petitioners caused any damages to Keystone. View "HMC Hotel Props. II Ltd. P’ship v. Keystone-Texas Prop. Holding Corp." on Justia Law

Decedent established a Trust that required, upon Decedent’s death, the trustee to distribute a parcel of land to the trustee and to distribute the remainder of the land to Decedent’s children. The Trust filed a complaint for eviction for unlawfully holding over after the termination of tenancy against Defendants, Decedent’s children. The district court entered judgment in favor of the Trust. Defendants appealed, arguing that the Trust was not a landlord and Defendants were not tenants, but rather, tenants in common with the trustee. Therefore, Defendants argued, an action for eviction could not lie. The superior court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss, concluding that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and that the Trust lacked standing. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding that the superior court did have jurisdiction over trespass and ejectment matters, and therefore, the motion justice erred in dismissing the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Remanded for an evidentiary hearing with respect to the issue of standing. View "Joseph P. Notarianni Revocable Trust v. Notarianni" on Justia Law

Plaintiff rented an apartment from Defendant, a residential hotel. After Plaintiff’s tenancy terminated, she filed suit against Defendant for failing to return her $500 security deposit within thirty days. During the discovery process, Defendant failed to provide informal or formal discovery, resulting in entry of an order compelling discovery and granting Plaintiff her attorney fees as a sanction against Defendant. Plaintiff subsequently filed a motion for sanctions due to Defendant's continued failure to provide discovery. After a hearing at which Defendant did not appear, the court granted the motion for sanctions and entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff. Defendant filed a motion for relief from judgment, which the justice court denied. Defendant filed a notice of appeal, which Plaintiff moved to dismiss, contending that the notice of appeal was not timely filed and that, although the judgment had already been satisfied, Defendant’s failure to file an undertaking required dismissal. The district court granted the motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the notice of appeal was timely filed and that no undertaking was required due to the satisfaction of judgment. Remanded. View "Guethlein v. Family Inn" on Justia Law

In 2004, Paula Bratton and Daniel Hills and their children (“the Brattons”), moved into a house that they rented from Halsey McDonough. In 2008, the Department of Health and Human Services notified McDonough that he was required to relocate the Brattons because of numerous lead hazards throughout the rental property. The Brattons subsequently filed twelve-count complaint against McDonough. The trial court granted McDonough’s motion for judgment as a matter of law as to some of the Brattons’ claims and in favor of McDonough based on a jury verdict on the remaining claims. The Supreme Court vacated the jury’s verdict and remanded the case for a new trial, holding (1) the trial court clearly erred in excluding the Brattons’ qualified expert witness; (2) the trial court erred in entering judgment as a matter of law for McDonough on the negligence claims of the two older children, as well as the intentional infliction of emotional distress and punitive damages claims of all three children; (3) the trial court improperly shifted the burden of proof onto the Brattons to disprove McDonough’s independent causation theories and erred in refusing to give the jury a proper and requested instruction; and (4) the trial court’s errors created a fundamentally unfair trial. View "Bratton v. McDonough" on Justia Law

Roland Riemers appealed a district court judgment dismissing his claims for unpaid rent, late fees, property damage, and punitive damages. Riemers leased a rental property he owned to Heidee Hill, who lived in the home with her family. After the Hills vacated the property, Riemers sued Hill, her husband, and their three children for unpaid rent, late fees, property damage, and punitive damages. The Hills filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and, alleging Riemers' claims were frivolous, also sought attorney fees. The Hills also filed a counterclaim seeking damages for abuse of process. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded it did not have jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal. View "Riemers v. Hill" on Justia Law

Debtor, a New York City tenant, filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy and listed the value of her apartment lease on Schedule B as personal property exempt from the bankruptcy estate as a "local public assistance benefit." At issue was whether the value inherent in debtor's rent-stabilized lease as a consequence of the protections afforded by New York's Rent Stabilization Code, N.Y. Comp. Code R. & Regs. tit. 9, 2520.1 et seq., made the lease, or some portion of its value, exempt from debtor's bankruptcy estate as a "local public assistance benefit" within the meaning of New York Debtor and Creditor Law 282(2). The court certified this unsettled issue to the New York Court of Appeals. View "Santiago-Monteverde v. Pereira" on Justia Law

Plaintiff resided in an apartment from approximately 1997 until 2003. A corporation owned the building during Plaintiff’s occupancy until shortly before Plaintiff vacated the premises. In 2004, Plaintiff sued the corporation, the building’s current landlord, and other parties, alleging that she developed health problems due to mold and other harmful substances in the apartment. The corporation and landlord sought to dismiss the complaint to the extent that Plaintiff alleged mold-induced personal injuries, arguing that Plaintiff was unable to prove either general or specific causation. Supreme Court dismissed all of Plaintiff’s causes of action except those for property damage and breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment. The Appellate Division reversed and reinstated the complaint, concluding that the standard of scientific reliability set forth in Frye v. United States was satisfied in this case. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Plaintiff did not demonstrate on the record a cause-and-effect relationship between exposure to indoor mold and the kinds of injuries she alleged. View "Cornell v. 360 W. 51st St. Realty, LLC" on Justia Law

The Federal Grant and Cooperative Agreement Act, 31 U.S.C. 6301, states that an executive agency must use: “a procurement contract . . . when . . . the principal purpose … is to acquire … property or services for the direct benefit or use” of the government and must adhere to the Competition in Contracting Act and the Federal Acquisition Regulation However, an “agency shall use a cooperative agreement . . . when . . . the principal purpose … is to transfer a thing of value … to carry out a public purpose of support or stimulation … instead of acquiring . . . property or service” and can avoid procurement laws. Under Section 8 of the Housing Act, HUD provides rental assistance, including entering Housing Assistance Program (HAP) contracts and paying subsidies directly to private landlords. A 1974 amendment gave HUD the option of entering an Annual Contributions Contract (ACC) with a Public Housing Agency (PHA), which would enter into HAP contracts with owners and pay subsidies with HUD funds. In 1983, HUD’s authority was amended. HUD could administer existing HAP contracts, and enter into new HAP contracts for existing Section 8 dwellings by engaging a PHA if possible, 42 U.S.C. 1437f(b)(1). Later, HUD began outsourcing services and initiated a competition to award a performance-based ACC to a PHA in each state, with the PHA to assume “all contractual rights and responsibilities of HUD.” After making an award, HUD chose to re-compete, seeking greater savings, expressly referring to “cooperative agreements,” outside the scope of procurement law. The Government Accountability Office agreed with protestors that the awards were procurement contracts. HUD disregarded that recommendation. The Claims Court denied a request to set aside the award. The Federal Circuit reversed, finding that the awards are procurement contracts, not cooperative agreements.View "CMS Contract Mgmt. Servs. v. United States" on Justia Law

Spanish Court Condominium Association filed a complaint under the Forcible Entry and Detainer Act, 735 ILCS 5/9-101, against Carlson, a unit owners, who allegedly had failed to pay monthly assessments for six months. Carlson admitted that she had not paid her assessments, but denied that she owed those assessments, alleging that she incurred water damage to her unit because Spanish Court failed to properly maintain the roof directly above her unit. She asserted “Breach of Covenants” and “Set-Off” for failure to maintain the roof and that Spanish Court failed to repair or replace her toilet, which was rendered inoperable during the investigation of a water leak in an adjoining unit. The trial court granted Spanish Court’s motion to strike the affirmative defenses and entered an agreed order awarding possession of Carlson’s unit to Spanish Court, and a money judgment for unpaid assessments. The appellate court vacated and remanded for reinstatement of Carlson’s affirmative defenses relating to the roof. The appellate court analogized to a landlord/tenant situation, viewing the obligation to pay assessments, and the obligation to repair and maintain the common elements, as mutually exchanged promises. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, holding that the failure to repair is not germane to the forcible proceeding.View "Spanish Court Two Condo. Ass'n v. Carlson" on Justia Law

Edwina Jones rented a residence that she vacated in 2010. Because Jones did not replace heating oil in the residence’s oil tank at the end of her tenancy under the terms of the lease, Cost Management, Inc., the landlord, told Jones that it would return to Jones the $1,500 deposit minus $448, the cost of filling the oil tank. Jones filed a complaint against Cost Management asserting that she was entitled to $1,500, plus statutory double damages, attorney fees, interest and costs. Cost Management counterclaimed for the $448 it paid to fill the tank. The district court found in Jones’s favor on her complaint, found in favor of Cost Management on its counterclaim, and denied Jones’s claims for costs, double damages, and attorney fees under the wrongful-retention statute. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court correctly found that Jones was entitled to receive $1,052 from Cost Management; and (2) because Cost Management overcame the presumption that it wrongfully withheld Jones’s security deposit, the district court did not err by not awarding court costs, double damages, and attorney fees. View "Jones v. Cost Mgmt., Inc." on Justia Law