Justia Landlord - Tenant Opinion Summaries

The Miks sued the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), claiming that they were unlawfully evicted from their rental home after their landlord defaulted on her mortgage and the property was sold at a foreclosure sale. The district court dismissed, under the Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act of 2009 (12 U.S.C. 5220), which imposes certain requirements on successors in interest to foreclosed properties in order to protect tenants, but which does not provide a private right of action. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part, agreeing that the PTFA does not provide a private right of action. The PTFA does, however, preempt less protective state laws, and requires that successors in interest to foreclosed properties provide bona fide tenants with 90 days’ notice to vacate and to allow them to occupy the premises until the end of their lease term unless certain conditions are met. While tenants may not bring a federal cause of action for violations of the PTFA, they may use such violations to establish the elements of a state law cause of action. Under state law, the Miks stated a claim for wrongful eviction but did not state claims for denial of due process and outrageous infliction of emotional distress. View "Mik v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp" on Justia Law

Menzies, an air cargo handling business, leased CenterPoint’s 185,280-square-foot warehouse near O’Hare Airport. Another tenant used the building to store airplane parts until 2006. Under the lease, Menzies is responsible for repairing the “floor,” while CenterPoint is responsible for repairing the “foundation.” CenterPoint constructed improvements costing $1.4 million, at Menzies’ request, including increasing the number of dock doors from two to 38 and installing 45,000‐pound dock levelers. When Menzies began moving its operations into the building in November 2007, the six‐inch concrete slab did not exhibit any visible damage. By January 2009, the slab had begun to deteriorate. The damage was not consistent with typical wear and tear. The slab could not support Menzies’ equipment. CenterPoint paid $92,000 for repairs, then stopped doing so and did not submit an insurance claim. The slab is so damaged that it must be replaced, at an estimated cost of $966,000 to $1.23 million. Menzies sued CenterPoint for breach and CenterPoint counterclaimed. The district court held that neither party was entitled to recover because the slab had a “dual nature as both floor and foundation,” but “the damage at issue was related to the slab’s function as a floor.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Aeroground, Inc. v. CenterPoint Props. Trust" on Justia Law

Landlords brought an unlawful detainer action against Tenants to regain possession of the premises and recoup damages. The general sessions court later entered a default judgment granting Landlords possession of the property and a $42,500 judgment for past due rent and attorneys' fees. Tenants filed a notice of appeal and posted an appeal bond by depositing $250 cash with the clerk of court. Landlords filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that Tenants violated Tenn. Code Ann. 29-18-130(b)(2) by failing to post a bond equal to one year's rent. The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that a bond for one year's rent was unnecessary because Tenants had already surrendered possession of the property and vacated the premises. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's denial of Landlords' motion to dismiss, holding that the circuit court did not err in determining that section 29-18-130(b)(2) does not require a tenant who has surrendered possession of the property to post a bond for one year's rent when appealing an adverse judgment of the general sessions court in an unlawful detainer action. View "Johnson v. Hopkins" on Justia Law

The Debtor leased a building and, during liquidation in bankruptcy, assumed the lease, 11 U.S.C. 365, and sold the leasehold interest (and other assets) to Tenant. The bankruptcy judge approved the transaction in 2007, after Landlord did not object to the Debtor’s assertion that Landlord did not have any outstanding claim against the Debtor. The approval barred any claims based on pre‐sale events. The lease requires Tenant to maintain the roof. In 2010 the Landlord sued Tenant in state court, based on that obligation. By motion in the closed bankruptcy proceeding, Tenant asked the bankruptcy court to interpret the 2007 order as blocking the claim. The bankruptcy judge concluded that the order did not affect continuing obligations such as the duty to keep leased premises in good repair; Landlord requested a prospective remedy, not damages. The district court disagreed, ruling that Landlord can enforce the good‐repair clause only to the extent that defects in the roof first occurred after the lease’s assumption in bankruptcy. The Sixth Circuit dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction, because the district court did not enter an injunction. The court expressed hope that the bankruptcy judge or the district judge will attend to several issues inherent in both opinions. View "Harrison Kishwaukee, LLC v. Rockford Acquisition, LLC" on Justia Law

On October 18, 2000, Tenant leased Landlord's billboard for fifteen years, commencing on December 1, 2000 and ending September 30, 2015. The lease obligated Tenant to pay the full annual basic rent for 2007 to Landlord on January 1, 2007. Tenant later terminated the lease, effective January 8, 2007, and gave Landlord a check representing rent for the period of January 1, 2007 through January 8, 2007. Landlord filed suit against Tenant seeking the balance of the basic rent for 2007. Tenant moved for summary judgment, suggesting that Landlord agreed to pro-rate rent for 2007 during an oral communication. Supreme Court granted summary judgment for Tenant. The Appellate Division reversed and granted summary judgment for Landlord. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Tenant was obligated to pay the full annual basic rent for the calendar year 2007, the parties did not agree in the lease to apportion rent post-termination except in specified circumstances not relevant here, and Tenant's claim that the parties orally agreed to such apportionment was barred by the lease's "no oral modification" clause. View "Eujoy Realty Corp. v. Van Wagner Commc'ns, LLC" on Justia Law

Defendant leased a single-family dwelling to Tenants pursuant to a lease agreement in which Tenants were permitted to keep pets but would be responsible for any property damage or disturbance caused by their pets. Three times in one month, a dog owned by Tenants allegedly attacked Plaintiff. Plaintiff sued Defendants seeking damages on a common law theory of negligence. The superior court granted summary judgment for Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because there were no triable issues as to whether Defendants were ever in possession of control over Tenants' dog, the superior court did not err in its judgment. View "Fields v. Hayden" on Justia Law

The Youth Re-Entry Program helps young people re-enter society after foster care or juvenile detention. About 80 percent of its members are black. The program moved to the Cleveland suburb, Lakewood, to house clients in apartments in Hidden Village. Lakewood’s building commissioner (Barrett) took the position that this was a prohibited institutional use. The program nonetheless moved into Hidden Village. Barrett ordered removal, but the planning commission reversed his decision. The police department sent officers a memo stating that “[c]itations and arrests are the preferred course of action for violations ... in the vicinity of [Hidden Village].” Program participants began complaining about harassment, such as tickets and astronomical fines for jaywalking, failure to attach a license plate to a bicycle, and walking on railroad tracks. The mayor stated that he intended to remove the program. Police, an officer in SWAT attire, a canine unit, and fire and health department workers visited Hidden Village, unannounced and without a warrant, to conduct a “joint inspection.” Another fire inspection followed a week later. Hidden Village sued, 42 U.S.C. 1981-1983. The Youth Program did not participate. The district court denied the defendants summary judgment and held that individual defendants did not enjoy qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part. Hidden Village produced evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude that defendants discriminated on the basis of race. View "Hidden Village, LLC v. City of Lakewood, OH" on Justia Law

Twelve-year-old K.V. threw a large rock that struck nine-year-old G.E. in the head. The incident took place near the intersection of three backyards, one of which belonged to the rental home of the Vitals, K.V.'s parents, the second of which belonged to the Englunds, G.E.'s parents, and the third of which belonged to Robert Smith, the Vitals' landlord. The Englunds filed an action against K.V., the Vitals, and Smith. The claims against Smith included negligence, negligent rental, and punitive damages. The trial court granted summary judgment for Smith. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in concluding that Smith did not owe a duty of care to G.E. based on his position as landlord and did not owe a duty to protect G.E. from the alleged intentional or criminal conduct of K.V. View "Englund v. Vital" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit alleging that defendants had engaged in a conspiracy to fraudulently increase rents payable by tenants in over 400 buildings they owned in New York City, in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961-1968, and the New York Consumer Protection Act (NYCPA), N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law 349(a). The parties subsequently agreed to a settlement. At issue on appeal was the fairness, adequacy, and reasonableness of the settlement. The court concluded that the district court's careful review of the settlement warranted the great deference the court normally accords to trial court findings with respect to the fairness of class action settlements. The court also concluded that a fundamental conflict did not exist between the members of the class, and that the Class Counsel's representation was adequate under Rule 12(a)(4). Therefore, it was not necessary to divide the class into subclasses with separate representation. To the extent that plaintiffs argued that the rejection of the settlement by all five remaining named class representatives requires its rejection, the court could not agree. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Charron v. Wiener" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were tenants in apartment complexes owned or managed by the corporate defendants. Plaintiffs' leases included a provision providing that, if attorneys' service were required due to the tenant's failure to pay rent, then the tenant must pay $400 in attorneys' fees if a court appearance was required and $200 if the matter was resolved without a court appearance. The tenant was also required to pay actual attorneys' fees in excess of $400. Eviction actions were brought against each plaintiff for the non-payment of rent. Plaintiffs filed a complaint against the corporate defendants and the individual defendant alleging violations of the Anti-Eviction Act, violations of the Consumer Fraud Act (CFA), and negligence. The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court in this case was the sufficiency of plaintiffs' pleading as it related to claims against corporate and individual defendants for consumer fraud and negligence based on lease provisions that imposed fixed attorneys’ fees on tenants that were unrelated to in-house counsel’s actual fee to evict. Applying the indulgent standard used to review motions for dismissal under Rule 4:6-2(e), the Supreme Court concluded plaintiffs alleged sufficient facts to state causes of action against the corporate defendants for consumer fraud and negligence. Plaintiffs have not, however, alleged sufficient facts to support a consumer fraud or negligence claim against the individual defendant. View "Green v. Morgan Properties" on Justia Law