Justia Landlord - Tenant Opinion Summaries

The City of Ferguson enacted an ordinance that made it unlawful for property owners to rent or lease their property without a rental license obtained after the owners undertook building inspections, filed affidavits stating whether any adult tenants were registered as sex offenders, and retained a property manager. The St. Louis Association of Realtors petitioned for a declaratory judgment, challenged the validity of the ordinance on constitutional and statutory grounds. The trial court dismissed the petition without addressing the merits of the challenge, holding that the Association lacked standing to file suit. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Association satisfied the requirements for associational standing by showing that at least one of its members would have standing to sue, that the interests the suit sought to protect were germane to the Association's purpose, and that neither the claim asserted nor relief requested required the participation of individual members in the lawsuit. Remanded.View "St. Louis Ass'n of Realtors v. City of Ferguson" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a minor and her mother, sued Defendants, owners of residential rental properties, for negligence and deceptive practices in violation of the Maryland Consumer Protection Act after the minor suffered brain injuries allegedly resulting from her ingestion of lead-based paint at one of Defendants' properties. Defendants moved for summary judgment, contending that they had complied with the Reduction of Lead Risk in Housing Act by registering their property, and therefore, they were immune from suit under the immunity provisions of the Act. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Defendants, holding (1) the Act's provisions granting immunity were constitutional, and (2) Defendants' registration renewals were timely because they were mailed on December 31. The court of special appeals reversed, holding that Defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity because they did not fully comply with the Act where the renewal of their registration was not received by December 31. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded with directions to reverse the circuit court, holding that the immunity provisions in the Act were invalid under the Maryland Declaration of Rights because no adequate remedy was substituted for the grant of immunity and the victim was uncompensated for her injuries.View "Jackson v. Dackman Co." on Justia Law

ORS 105.135(3) requires a plaintiff in an action for forcible entry and detainer (FED) to serve the summons and complaint "by the end of the judicial day next following the payment of filing fees." The issue in this case was whether failure to serve a summons and amended complaint within one day of the payment of filing fees required dismissal of the FED action. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals concluded that such a failure did not require dismissal. Plaintiff Balboa Apartments filed an FED complaint against Defendant Lisa Patrick for nonpayment of residential rent. Plaintiff paid the requisite filing fee at the same time. The summons and complaint erroneously listed Defendant's apartment as unit "#20," when, in fact, defendant occupied unit "#28." A process server attempted service on the wrong apartment, ultimately posting a copy of the summons and complaint on the door of unit 20. Plaintiff learned of the mistake and filed an amended complaint that listed the correct unit number. Plaintiff did not pay an additional filing fee, because none was required. The clerk reset the first appearance date. A process server posted the amended complaint and summons at Defendant's apartment. Defendant petitioned for review, and the Supreme Court accepted review to determine whether the Court of Appeals accurately interpreted ORS 105.135. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with the trial and appellate courts which held dismissal of the case due to the gap in filing and payment of the filing fee was not warranted.View "Balboa Apartments v. Patrick" on Justia Law

Tenant fell behind in its monthly rental payments to Landlord, after which Landlord obtained a summary eviction order in justice court. Landlord subsequently filed a complaint in district court against Tenant for damages for breach of the parties' lease agreement. Tenant filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that Landlord's claim for damages was precluded by the doctrine of claim preclusion and arguing that Landlord was required to seek summary eviction in unison with its claim for damages. The district court denied Tenant's motion. Tenant then petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus directing the district court to vacate its order denying Tenant's motion for summary judgment. The Court denied the petition, holding that the summary eviction scheme provided in Nev. Rev. Stat. 40.253 allows for an exception to claim preclusion in cases such as this one in that it permits a landlord to bring a summary eviction proceeding in justice court and subsequently bring a damages claim in district court.View "G.C. Wallace, Inc. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Petitioner Joel Harrington appealed a superior court order in favor of Respondent Metropolis Property Management Group, Inc. (Metropolis). On May 27, 2005, Petitioner entered into a residential lease for an apartment at Hollis Commons Apartments in Concord. The lease agreement required the petitioner to pay a security deposit of $875 to be held "until the termination of Lessee's occupancy." Petitioner entered into two lease renewals, the first in May 2006 renewing the lease for one year, and another in June 2007. The second renewal called for a term commencing on July 1, 2007, and ending "60 days after written notice has been given." The original lease agreement and both lease renewals identified "Hollis Commons Apartments, LLC" as the lessor. The parties had a dispute over the lease agreement and return of the security deposit. Petitioner argued that the trial court erred in finding that Metropolis was not a party to the lease agreement, and in dismissing his contract claims. Although the lease agreement and renewals all show "Hollis Commons Apartments, LLC" as the lessor and either Petitioner or the Petitioner and his wife as the lessees, Petitioner contended that Metropolis must be considered a party to the agreement. Upon review of the trial court record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision to dismiss Petitioner's case.View "Harrington v. Metropolis Property Management Group, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant-Tenant Wendy Wilson appealed a district court ruling that she breached her lease with Plaintiff Nashua Housing Authority. She rented an apartment in a public housing development. The lease provided that tenants "shall not engage in any drug related criminal activity on or off NHA property." Breach of that clause is cause for eviction from the leased unit. After reading a newspaper article about Defendant's arrest, the landlord sent her an eviction notice and subsequently brought a possessory action against Defendant for breach of the lease. At the eviction proceeding, the landlord introduced three criminal drug complaints that alleged Defendant "unlawfully dispensed and sold a certain narcotic drug, to wit: morphine." Defendant contended on appeal that the criminal complaints were not sufficient to prove she breached her lease. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court found that the criminal complaints were not sufficient to prove that Defendant had actually engaged in the alleged activity. As such, the Court reversed the eviction court's decision to the contrary.View "Nashua Housing Authority v. Wilson" on Justia Law

Francis Weber was severely burned by hot mineral water when he lost consciousness in a steam room in Hot Spring State Park. Weber brought a personal injury action against several defendants, including the State. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the State, concluding that it was immune from suit pursuant to the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the State's activities in the park fell within the statutory waiver of immunity for operation and maintenance of a public park as (1) overseeing building construction on leased property and delivery of hot mineral water to lessees are part of the State's operation of the park, and (2) under these circumstances, the State's operation and maintenance of the park included overseeing and/or inspecting its lessee's property. Remanded.View "Weber v. State" on Justia Law

Cantrell Brown appealed the grant of the writ of mandamus by the Court of Civil Appeals to Arlington Properties, Inc. Arlington filed an unlawful detainer claim against Brown in district court in 2009. After a trial, the district court rendered judgment in favor of Arlington on July 21. The court advised Brown that she had until August 4 to appeal the judgment. The judgment was entered into the State Judicial Information System on July 27; Brown filed her appeal August 4. Arlington moved to dismiss the appeal as untimely filed, which the district court denied. At issue in this case before the Supreme Court was the delay between the court's judgment at trial and the official entry of the judgment, and whether Brown's appeal was indeed timely filed. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Brown's appeal was timely filed, and that the circuit court properly denied Arlington's motion to dismiss. View "Arlington Properties, Inc. v. Brown" on Justia Law

Two appeals between MPQ, Inc. (d/b/a Freedom Enterprises) and Birmingham Realty Company were consolidated by the Supreme Court for the purposes of this opinion. The parties entered into a commercial lease agreement. Birmingham Realty filed suit against MPQ for unpaid rent in circuit court. MPQ filed a counterclaim. Birmingham Realty filed a separate unlawful-detainer action against MPQ in district court. The district court dismissed the detainer action, reasoning that the simultaneous actions in the district and circuit courts violated Alabama's abatement statute. Birmingham Realty appealed the district court's dismissal to the circuit court and filed a motion to dismiss MPQ's counterclaim. The circuit court conducted a hearing on all pending motions. It then entered an order affirming the district court's dismissal of the unlawful-detainer action and dismissed MPQ's counterclaims in the rent action. The court suggested that Birmingham Realty move to dismiss the rent action without prejudice so it could refile its unlawful-detainer action in the district court and then later refile an action in circuit court to seek the unpaid rent. Birmingham Realty took the court's advice and filed the suggested motions. MPQ filed a motion to alter, amend or vacate the court's decision in its counterclaim. The circuit court did not rule on either motion. The parties appealed to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court found Birmingham Realty's appeal from the district court to the circuit court was not timely, and as such, the court did not have jurisdiction over the appeal. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and cross-appeal with regard to the unlawful-detainer action and remanded the remaining issues for further proceedings.View "MPQ, Inc. v. Birmingham Realty Co." on Justia Law

Arrowhead Ridge initiated a forcible entry and detainer action when its tenant, Cold Stone Creamery, defaulted on its lease. The trial court granted Arrowhead partial summary judgment, and the issues of mitigation of damages, interest, and attorneys' fees proceeded to trial. The trial court concluded that (1) Arrowhead failed to mitigate its damages due solely to an exclusivity provision in a lease with another tenant, and (2) Arrowhead could not recover its attorneys' fees under either the terms of the lease or state law. The court then denied the parties' motions for a new trial. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because the undisputed evidence established that Arrowhead made substantial efforts to lease the premises to another tenant, the trial court abused its discretion by denying Arrowhead's motion for a new trial; (2) the record established that Arrowhead mitigated its damages by the exercise of reasonable diligence as a matter of law; and (3) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Arrowhead's motion for a new trial on the basis that it could recover the attorneys' fees it incurred due to Cold Stone's default. Remanded.View "Arrowhead Ridge I, L.L.C. v. Cold Stone Creamery, Inc." on Justia Law