Justia Landlord - Tenant Opinion Summaries

At issue in this appeal was Conn. Gen. Stat. 21-80a, which protects residents of mobile manufactured home parks by limiting the availability of summary process actions. Under the statute, if a resident proves that he or she engaged in one or more of the protected activities enumerated in the statute within the six months preceding the park owner's eviction proceeding, the owner may not maintain a summary process action against that resident unless the owner can show that one of the exceptions specified in the statute applies. Defendants, residents of a mobile manufactured home park owned by Plaintiff, appealed from the judgment of the appellate court affirming the trial court's judgment of possession in favor of Plaintiff, claiming that judgment of possession should be granted in their favor because Plaintiff's summary process action was barred under section 21-80a. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) defendants were in material noncompliance with the lease and were using the dwelling unit or the premises for a purpose which was in violation of the rental agreement; and (2) thus, the appellate court's ultimate conclusion that Defendants' violation was encompassed by 21-80a was proper. View "Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal" on Justia Law

After Tenants failed to pay rent for the last four months of living in a home owned by Landlord, Landlord commenced a forcible entry and detainer action against Tenants. Landlord did not respond to Tenants' request for a return of their security deposit. Tenants subsequently commenced a small claims action against Landlord seeking to recover double damages for their security deposit. Landlord, in turn, filed a small claims action against Tenants seeking damages for unpaid rent and late fees. The district court awarded Landlord four months of unpaid rent and late fees and awarded Tenants the amount of their security deposit. The superior court affirmed. Tenants appealed, contending, inter alia, that Landlord's competing small claims action should not have been permitted to proceed until she returned their security deposit. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because neither the security deposit statute nor the lease prohibited Landlord from bringing a separate claim for breach of other terms of the rental agreement, the district court did not err in considering Landlord's small claims action simultaneously with Tenants' claim; and (2) the district court did not err in refusing to impose double damages, attorney fees, and costs. View "Lyle v. Mangar" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review a Memorandum Opinion of the Court of Appeals and to address four issues stemming from a lawsuit by LensCrafters to enforce a noncompete provision against optometrist Dennis Kehoe after a sublease contract between the two parties ended. After review of the "complex, convoluted, and contentious eleven-year dispute," the Supreme Court held that (1) the district court properly dismissed LensCrafters' breach of contract claim on summary judgment because LensCrafters terminated the parties' contract as a matter of law and, with it, the contract's noncompete provision; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Kehoe's request to supplement his pleadings shortly before trial; and (3) summary judgment dismissing Kehoe's malicious abuse of process and tortious interference with contract counterclaims was proper because Kehoe did not demonstrate genuine issues of material fact. Because we hold that the noncompete provision was not in effect during any relevant time, the Court did not address Kehoe's fourth issue, whether the provision would have been contrary to public policy. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Memorandum Opinion of the Court of Appeals in part and reversed in part. View "Lenscrafters, Inc. v. Kehoe" on Justia Law

In late April 2006 Samuel Sengul leased a commercial storefront in downtown Juneau to Robert Manus, who was acting on behalf of CMS Franklin, Inc. The building was under construction when Sengul and CMS entered into the lease agreement, but the lease provided that Sengul would deliver the property to CMS in a specified improved condition by the time the lease commenced on June 1. The lease also included a rent abatement provision, which was at issue in this case. The building was not in improved condition until approximately June 8. Manus did not pay any rent, nor did he mention the rent abatement provision when he took possession of the building. Sengul finally demanded rent in late July, but Manus refused to pay, claiming abatement. In September, Manus had still not paid any rent, and Sengul put a lock on CMS's store door and placed signs demanding rent in the store windows. Manus had the lock cut off, but began to move the inventory out of the store, vacating it and returning the keys to Sengul two days after the lockout. Sengul then sued CMS and Manus for unpaid rent. The superior court determined that CMS had waived its right to rent abatement and owed Sengul unpaid rental amounts for the time that Manus had occupied the building. But the court also concluded that Sengul's lockout amounted to constructive eviction and awarded CMS damages as a refund for work performed on the premises that CMS was unable to benefit from after the constructive eviction. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with the superior court that Sengul's actions constituted constructive eviction, but the Court disagreed that CMS waived its entitlement to have the rent abated. The case was remanded for the superior court to recalculate the damages owed to CMS.View "Sengul v. CMS Franklin, Inc." on Justia Law

Quality Auto Body, Inc. and Bradley R. Huebner ("Quality Auto Body") appealed a trial court's findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order for judgment awarding immediate possession of leased premises, a money judgment for past due rent and late fees, and a money judgment for reasonable attorney's fees, costs, and disbursements to Working Capital #1, LLC. Although an order for judgment is not appealable, "an attempted appeal from an order for judgment will be treated as an appeal from a subsequently entered consistent judgment, if one exists." The Supreme Court treated this case as an appeal, and affirmed the trial court's judgment awarding Working Capital immediate possession of the leased premises, a money judgment for past due rent and late fees, and a money judgment for reasonable attorney's fees, costs, and disbursements. View "Working Capital #1 v. Quality Auto Body" on Justia Law

Rosa Steward leased a home from Holland Family Properties. Rosa's son Dontral suffered lead poisoning as a result of his exposure to high levels of lead paint, which caused severe physical and mental impairments. Dontral, through his mother (Steward), filed a complaint against Holland and Jean Cross, the owner of property Dontral often visited. Both properties contained lead-based paint. Steward claimed that Defendants were liable for his injuries based on theories of negligence per se and common law negligence. The circuit court dismissed both counts on demurrer. At issue on appeal was whether Defendants, landlords subject to the Virginia Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (VRLTA), had a duty in tort to the tenants of leased properties to comply with building and housing codes concerning public health and safety. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a tort duty was not imposed on these landlords by the common law, the leases executed in this case, or the VRLTA. View "Steward v. Holland Family Props., LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff in this case was a Section Eight tenant in a property owned by Defendants. For reasons beyond her control, Plaintiff prematurely terminated her lease. Defendants retained Plaintiff's security deposit, and Plaintiff filed a warrant in debt seeking the return of her security deposit. The district court ruled in favor of Defendant. The circuit court affirmed. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in ruling that her security deposit could be retained by Defendants to satisfy the alleged rent obligation of the housing authority. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Plaintiff failed to preserve this argument for appeal, the argument was waived. View "Brandon v. Cox" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, owner of a New York City loft, brought an action in ejection against defendant because she occupied an apartment in the loft for which she had not paid any rent since 2003. The court held that the landlord had not complied with Multiple Dwelling Law 302 because the loft did not have a residential certificate of occupancy. The landlord had not received an extension of time to comply and thus could not maintain an ejectment action based on non-payment of rent. View "Chazon, LLC v Maugenest" on Justia Law

Plaintiff entered into a lease with the housing authority in 2007 as "Resident" and named her two sons as "Household Members." The lease provided that certain criminal activities could lead to immediate eviction. Plaintiff received a notice to vacate a few weeks later, after a visit by her daughter led to a gunfight in the parking lot. While plaintiff's challenge was pending, second and third notices issued. Police had been called to her apartment and determined that plaintiff had stabbed her husband, who was living at the apartment and was high on cocaine. Officers found joints on the counter. Plaintiff vacated. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on federal claims and declined to exercise jurisdiction over state law claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The case is moot because plaintiff never contested the second and third notices and, therefore, cannot be restored to the apartment; there was evidence that she lied on her application and was never eligible for tenancy. She incurred no expenses and state court proceedings provided all the process that was due. The court rejected a claim of emotional distress and a claim that the complex constituted segregated housing.View "Stevens v. Hous. Auth. of South Bend" on Justia Law

The Heins rented a house from Julia Benintendi and the Perkerwicz family (hereinafter B&P). B&P alleged the Heins caused considerable damage to the property when they vacated the premises. The Heins countered that B&P unlawfully retained their security deposit and refused to reimburse the Heins for home and lawn improvements. B&P sued and obtained a default judgment. The district court subsequently set aside the default judgment and held a jury trial. B&P were awarded damages but not attorney fees or costs. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying attorney fees to both parties; (2) the district court incorrectly required each party to bear its own costs because, as the prevailing party, B&P was entitled to its costs under Mont. Code Ann. 25-10-101; and (3) the district court did not manifestly abuse its discretion in setting aside the default judgment because it had good cause to do so. View "Benintendi v. Hein" on Justia Law