Justia Landlord - Tenant Opinion Summaries

Defendant Alicia Prentice appealed a district court’s judgment in favor of Plaintiff Phyllis Buatti. Defendant rented an apartment from Defendant. In September 2010, Defendant was served with a demand for rent alleging that the rent was three months in arrears. Subsequently, Defendant was served with a “notice to quit” requiring her to vacate the premises unless the rent was paid. Defendant’s argument on appeal to the Supreme Court was that the demand for rent exceeded the amount of back rent that was actually owed. Upon review, the Court found that the demand for rent exceeded the amount on the landlord’s "notice to quit." The trial court specifically found that neither party was able to prove the amount of the arrearage — the court simply found that an unspecified amount of rent had not been paid as required. The Supreme Court held that because the Plaintiff did not prove the actual amount in arrearage, the judgment in her favor should be reversed. Accordingly, the Court remanded the case back to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Buatti v. Prentice" on Justia Law

Steven and Lauren Siwinski, homeowners in the town of Ogden Dunes, rented their home despite receiving a cease and desist letter advising them that that rentals were prohibited by the town zoning ordinances. The town filed suit against the Siwinskis for violating town ordinances. Both parties moved for summary judgment, and the trial court granted the town's motion for summary judgment and injunctive relief. The trial court entered judgment in favor of the town in the amount of $40,000. The court of appeals reversed and remanded with instructions that the trial court enter summary judgment in favor of the Siwinskis. On transfer, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's granting of summary judgment in favor of the town, holding that the Siwinskis impermissibly rented their dwelling in violation of the town's ordinances. The Court then held that the fine for violating this ordinance should not have exceeded $32,500. Remanded. View "Siwinski v. Town of Ogden Dunes" on Justia Law

Gas producers that lease land from Alaska must pay royalties calculated on the value of the gas produced from the leased area. The royalty may be calculated in one of two methods: the “higher of” pricing or contract pricing. “Higher of” pricing is the default method of calculating royalties and is calculated using market data and the prices of other producers. The Department of Natural Resources (DNR) usually does not calculate the royalty payments under “higher of” pricing until years after production. Under contract pricing, the lessee’s price at which it sells gas is used to determine the royalty payment. Appellant Marathon Oil requested contract pricing from 2008 onward and sought retroactive application of contract pricing for 2003-2008. The DNR approved contract pricing from 2008 onward but denied the retroactive application. The superior court affirmed the DNR’s decision. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Marathon argued that the statute that governs contract pricing permitted retroactive application of contract pricing. Upon review of the arguments and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court concluded that though the statute was ambiguous, it would defer to the DNR’s interpretation. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the superior court’s decision to uphold the DNR’s order.View "Marathon Oil Co. v. Dep't. of Natural Resources" on Justia Law

Chilkoot Lumber Company, a commercial landlord (Chilkoot) and its tenant, Rainbow Glacier Seafood (Rainbow) resolved their lease dispute by settlement and entered the terms of the settlement on the record at trial. Rainbow did not follow through with its duties under the settlement agreement. After the time for performance by Rainbow had expired, Chilkoot moved the court to enforce the agreement. The superior court denied the motion to enforce. On reconsideration, the parties tentatively agreed to reinstate the settlement agreement with new deadlines for performance. When they could not agree on new deadlines, the superior court entered an order that enforced the settlement agreement as modified by Rainbow’s proposed deadlines. Chilkoot subsequently violated the order, and the superior court ordered it to pay $1,000 per day it violated the agreement. Chilkoot appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the superior court erred by imposing its own deadlines and sanctioning Chilkoot $1,000 per day. Upon review of the record, the Supreme Court reversed the superior court’s order. The Court held it was an error for the lower court to conclude that the parties had not reached a settlement agreement and to deny Chilkoot’s motion to enforce the agreement. Furthermore, the Court found that the court’s sanctions against Chilkoot were "coercive and remedial, rather than punitive." The Court reversed the superior court’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings.View "Chilkoot Lumber Co. v. Rainbow Glacier Seafoods, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from the order of the district court granting defendant's motion to dismiss where the suit arose out of a previous landlord/tenant action filed in district court. At issue was whether section 3-10-302, MCA, conferred jurisdiction on justices' and district courts for actions arising under the Montana Residential Landlord and Tenant Act of 1977. The court held that the clear terms of the Montana statute provided that justices' courts shared concurrent jurisdiction with district courts. The court also held that plaintiff's arguments were not made in good faith and sanctions were warranted. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint and remanded for a determination and assessment of costs and reasonable attorney's fees incurred on appeal.View "Fick v. Brown" on Justia Law

Plaintiff's claims against her landlord, on behalf of her children, alleged violations of the disclosure requirements contained in the Residential Lead-Based Paint Hazard Reduction Act of 1992, 42 U.S.C. 4851-4856. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The statute does not provide the children with a cause of action to sue for the violations.View "Roberts v. Hamer" on Justia Law

Appellants appealed the district court's order awarding them attorney fees following settlement of their claims against appellees brought under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. 3601-3619, and California law. At issue was whether the district court erred by deducting some of the hours billed and lowered the hourly rates requested by appellants. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion either by relying, in part, on its own knowledge and experience, or by setting an hourly rate of $350 for appellants' lawyers. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed. View "Ingram, et al. v. Oroudjian, et al." on Justia Law

In a previous landlord/tenant action in 2007, attorney Kevin Brown filed suit against Ronald Fick in district court on behalf of two tenants who alleged that Fick had unlawfully evicted them from a unit he manages. The district court found for Fick. Fick filed the present action in 2010, arguing that Brown had fraudulently brought the prior action in district court rather than in justice's court. The district court granted Brown's motion to dismiss, and Fick appealed. At issue was whether Mont. Code Ann. 3-10-302 confers concurrent jurisdiction on justices' and district courts for actions arising under the Landlord and Tenant Act. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that (1) the clear terms of Montana law provide that justices' courts share concurrent jurisdiction with district courts; and (2) Fick's arguments were not made in good faith, Fick's appeal is frivolous and vexatious and filed for purposes of harassment, and sanctions are warranted. Remanded. View "Fick v. Brown" on Justia Law

In district court, appellants were held liable for violating the Town of Levantâs Article 1010 land use ordinance by allowing a third partyâs mobile home to be moved onto and remain on their land after receiving multiple notices of the violation. At issue was whether appellants could be held responsible for a violation caused by a third party and whether there was evidence that they played a role in leaving the mobile home on their property. The Court affirmed, holding that (1) under the four-factor analysis outlined in Town of Boothbay v. Jenness, the landowners were responsible for land use violations committed on their property, and (2) there was sufficient evidence that the appellants had notice of the violation and the ability and opportunity to correct the violation but failed to do so.

The tenant appealed an eviction order. The appeals court reversed, finding that the management company had not given notice required by state law. One member of the state appellate panel opined that the company violated the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692. The tenant sought damages in federal court. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the management company is not a debt collector under the Act. The company is an agent of the building owner and "obtained" an interest a debt when it was given the right to collect the tenant's rent, before she fell behind on payments.