Justia Landlord - Tenant Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, an LLC, owned and managed a commercial office building, and Defendant, an LLC, leased and occupied space in the building. A dispute arose between Plaintiff and Defendant over the scope of the lease and payment of rent. This dispute resulted in two people who had ownership interests in Plaintiff bringing the present action, in the name of Plaintiff, against Defendant to enforce the lease and to collect rent. Barbara Levine, who had fifty percent interest in Plaintiff and was the wife of a part owner of Defendant, disapproved of the lawsuit. The trial court rendered judgment for Defendant. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that Plaintiff lacked standing to bring the action, since one of its member's votes should not have been excluded pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 34-187(b) on the ground that she had an interest in the outcome of the suit that was adverse to the interest of Plaintiff. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Plaintiff properly excluded Levine from voting her interest in determining whether to bring the present action because her interest in the outcome of the action was adverse to that of Plaintiff's in light of her husband's ownership interest in Defendant. View "418 Meadow St. Assocs., LLC v. Clean Air Partners, LLC" on Justia Law

Respondent Atlantic Coast Builders and Contractors, LLC brought an action against its landlord, Petitioner Laura Lewis, for negligent misrepresentation, unjust enrichment, and breach of contract.  Atlantic also sought a return of the security deposit it paid pursuant to its lease with Lewis.  The master-in-equity entered judgment in favor of Atlantic, and the court of appeals affirmed. The landlord appealed, arguing the appellate court erred in its return of the security deposit and in calculating its damages award. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the court of appeals erred in concluding the issue regarding the security deposit was preserved for review. Because the deposit issue was not preserved, the landlord was entitled to retain the deposit. Consequently, Atlantic's damages were reduced by $3500. The Court affirmed the appellate court as to the entry of judgment against the landlord for negligent misrepresentation and unjust enrichment. View "Atlantic Coast Builders and Contractors v. Lewis" on Justia Law

The Belangers rented a trailer from John Mulholland. The Belangers informed Mulholland about problems with their running water and toilet, but no repairs were made. When the Belangers were eventually evicted from their trailer, they had lived there without running water for nine months and without a functioning toilet for five months. The Belangers sued Mulholland for breach of the implied warranty of habitability. The trial court ruled in favor of the Belangers and awarded the Belangers five months' rent. The Belangers appealed, contending that they were entitled to damages for an additional four-month period when they lacked running water but still had a functioning toilet. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment as modified, holding that the Belangers were entitled to damages for an additional four months because, by itself, the lack of running water in the Belangers' trailer for four months rendered the trailer unfit for human habitation.View "Belanger v. Mulholland" on Justia Law

David Caron purchased a majority membership in Goodhall's Chrysler-Plymouth-Dodge-Jeep-Eagle, LLC without having obtained the written consent of Goodhall's, Inc. (Goodhall's), in violation of Goodhall's lease with Goodhall's Chrysler-Plymouth-Dodge-Jeep-Eagle. The lease idenitified Goodhall's as the landlord and Goodhall's Chrysler-Plymouth-Dodge-Jeep-Eagle as the tenant. After a dispute arose concerning the party responsible for remediating certain environmental conditions on the property, Plaintiffs, David Caron and David Caron Chrysler Motors, filed suit against Defendants, Goodhall's and others, claiming that Defendants had violated provisions of its lease regarding Goodhall's responsibility for preexisting environmental conditions and Goodhall's warranty of fitness and habitability. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Defendants, concluding that no contract existed between the parties to this action because the assignment of the majority interest in the tenant to Caron was invalid. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the appellate court improperly failed to consider Plaintiffs' claim that the trial court had improperly concluded that no contract existed between David Caron Chrysler Motors and Goodhall's; and (2) the trial court was incorrect in finding that, because Goodhall's did not consent to the assignment, there was no contract between David Caron Chrysler Motors and Goodhall's. View "David Caron Chrysler Motors, LLC v. Goodhall's, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from a judgment of the district court granting defendant's motion to dismiss her complaint. On appeal, plaintiff principally contended that the dismissal of her claim brought pursuant to section 7434 of the Internal Revenue Code, a provision that created a civil damages remedy for the willful filing of fraudulent "information return[s]," was in error. The court held that plaintiff's allegations of an intentional failure to file required information returns did not state a claim under this provision, which by its terms required an allegation that a fraudulent information return was willfully filed by defendant. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment.View "Katzman v. Essex Waterfront Owners LLC, et al." on Justia Law

A group of residential tenants (collectively, Tenants) alleged claims of negligence against Canyon Cover Properties, LLC and Apartment Management Consultants, LLC (collectively, AMC). AMC argued that it was relieved from liability because Tenants signed a residential lease agreement (Agreement) that included a limited liability provision (Exculpatory Clause) waiving the right to bring an action for negligence against AMC. The district court concluded that the Agreement and Exculpatory Clause did not violate public policy and were therefore valid and enforceable, and accordingly, granted summary judgment for AMC. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because AMC failed to respond meaningfully to Tenants' claim that the Exculpatory Clause was unenforceable because it violated public policy, AMC's brief was rejected and Tenants' claim was accepted that the Exculpatory Clause in the Agreement was unenforceable. Remanded. View "Broderick v. Apartment Mgmt. Consultants, LLC" on Justia Law

The City of Ferguson enacted an ordinance that made it unlawful for property owners to rent or lease their property without a rental license obtained after the owners undertook building inspections, filed affidavits stating whether any adult tenants were registered as sex offenders, and retained a property manager. The St. Louis Association of Realtors petitioned for a declaratory judgment, challenged the validity of the ordinance on constitutional and statutory grounds. The trial court dismissed the petition without addressing the merits of the challenge, holding that the Association lacked standing to file suit. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Association satisfied the requirements for associational standing by showing that at least one of its members would have standing to sue, that the interests the suit sought to protect were germane to the Association's purpose, and that neither the claim asserted nor relief requested required the participation of individual members in the lawsuit. Remanded.View "St. Louis Ass'n of Realtors v. City of Ferguson" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a minor and her mother, sued Defendants, owners of residential rental properties, for negligence and deceptive practices in violation of the Maryland Consumer Protection Act after the minor suffered brain injuries allegedly resulting from her ingestion of lead-based paint at one of Defendants' properties. Defendants moved for summary judgment, contending that they had complied with the Reduction of Lead Risk in Housing Act by registering their property, and therefore, they were immune from suit under the immunity provisions of the Act. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Defendants, holding (1) the Act's provisions granting immunity were constitutional, and (2) Defendants' registration renewals were timely because they were mailed on December 31. The court of special appeals reversed, holding that Defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity because they did not fully comply with the Act where the renewal of their registration was not received by December 31. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded with directions to reverse the circuit court, holding that the immunity provisions in the Act were invalid under the Maryland Declaration of Rights because no adequate remedy was substituted for the grant of immunity and the victim was uncompensated for her injuries.View "Jackson v. Dackman Co." on Justia Law

ORS 105.135(3) requires a plaintiff in an action for forcible entry and detainer (FED) to serve the summons and complaint "by the end of the judicial day next following the payment of filing fees." The issue in this case was whether failure to serve a summons and amended complaint within one day of the payment of filing fees required dismissal of the FED action. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals concluded that such a failure did not require dismissal. Plaintiff Balboa Apartments filed an FED complaint against Defendant Lisa Patrick for nonpayment of residential rent. Plaintiff paid the requisite filing fee at the same time. The summons and complaint erroneously listed Defendant's apartment as unit "#20," when, in fact, defendant occupied unit "#28." A process server attempted service on the wrong apartment, ultimately posting a copy of the summons and complaint on the door of unit 20. Plaintiff learned of the mistake and filed an amended complaint that listed the correct unit number. Plaintiff did not pay an additional filing fee, because none was required. The clerk reset the first appearance date. A process server posted the amended complaint and summons at Defendant's apartment. Defendant petitioned for review, and the Supreme Court accepted review to determine whether the Court of Appeals accurately interpreted ORS 105.135. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with the trial and appellate courts which held dismissal of the case due to the gap in filing and payment of the filing fee was not warranted.View "Balboa Apartments v. Patrick" on Justia Law

Tenant fell behind in its monthly rental payments to Landlord, after which Landlord obtained a summary eviction order in justice court. Landlord subsequently filed a complaint in district court against Tenant for damages for breach of the parties' lease agreement. Tenant filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that Landlord's claim for damages was precluded by the doctrine of claim preclusion and arguing that Landlord was required to seek summary eviction in unison with its claim for damages. The district court denied Tenant's motion. Tenant then petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus directing the district court to vacate its order denying Tenant's motion for summary judgment. The Court denied the petition, holding that the summary eviction scheme provided in Nev. Rev. Stat. 40.253 allows for an exception to claim preclusion in cases such as this one in that it permits a landlord to bring a summary eviction proceeding in justice court and subsequently bring a damages claim in district court.View "G.C. Wallace, Inc. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law