Justia Landlord - Tenant Opinion Summaries

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The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Appellate Division reversing the judgment of Supreme Court granting summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs, individual tenants of rented apartments owned by Defendants, on their complaint seeking a declaration that their apartments were subject to rent stabilization, holding that apartments in buildings receiving tax benefits pursuant to N.Y. Real Prop. Tax law (RPTL) 421-g are not subject to luxury deregulation.Plaintiffs' apartments were located in building receiving tax benefits subject to RPTL 421-g. Defendants argued that Plaintiffs' apartments were exempt from rent regulation under the luxury deregulation provisions added to the Rent Stabilization Law (RSL), Administrative Code of City of New York 26-504.1, as part of the Rent Regulation Reform Act of 1993. The Appellate Division agreed and granted Defendants' motions for summary judgment to the extent of declaring that Plaintiffs' apartments were properly deregulated and were not subject to rent stabilization. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Plaintiffs' apartments were not subject to the luxury deregulation provisions of the RSL. View "Kuzmich v. 50 Murray St. Acquisition LLC" on Justia Law

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Willis Swenson appealed, and Kyle Mahlum cross-appealed dismissal of Swenson’s claims against Mahlum and Mahlum’s claims against Carol Hodgerson, Gerard Swenson, Lee Alan Swenson, and Mary Ann Vig (“third-party defendants”). This suit arose over the ownership and leasing of real property in Burke County, North Dakota. Willis Swenson (“Swenson”) and the third-party defendants are the children of Robert and Junietta Swenson. In 2004, Robert and Junietta conveyed the property to their children as joint tenants, reserving a life estate for themselves. In 2005, Robert died and Junietta became the sole life tenant. In 2008, Junietta leased the property to Swenson. Swenson agreed to rental payments of $20,016 per year, due in installments. In December 2009, Swenson leased the property to Mahlum for $31,022.50 per year. The Swenson-Mahlum lease became effective in March 2010 and stated it would expire in October 2019. In November 2011, Swenson signed a new lease with Junietta, beginning in 2012 and ending in 2022. The lease permitted Swenson to assign or sublet the property to any person. In July 2012, Lee Swenson was appointed guardian and conservator for Junietta. In January 2013, Lee Swenson, as guardian and conservator, leased the same property to Mahlum that Willis Swenson already was leasing to Mahlum in the December 2009 lease. The new lease required Mahlum to pay Junietta $31,122.50 each year. Junietta died in November 2013. Mary Vig, as personal representative of Junietta’s estate, informed Mahlum that future rental payments should be split and made to each of Junietta’s children in equal amounts. In January 2017, Willis and his daughter, Dayna Johnson, sued Mahlum for unpaid rent. Swenson alleged Mahlum was required to pay him under the 2009 lease, and Mahlum failed to pay any rent in 2013, 2014, 2015, and 2016. Mahlum answered and filed a third-party complaint, suing the third-party defendants for unjust enrichment. He alleged in 2013 he paid Junietta under the terms of the 2013 lease. He also alleged in 2014, 2015, and 2016 he paid rent to each of Junietta children. Mahlum claimed that the third-party defendants have been unjustly enriched, and that the third-party defendants be ordered to pay Mahlum any amounts the court finds he owed Swenson if Swenson obtained a judgment against him. After review of the circumstances of this case, the North Dakota Supreme Court determined the trial court erred in its findings, and reversed dismissal of Swenson’s breach of contract claim. On remand, the court must decide the amount of damages Swenson was entitled to recover for his breach of contract claim against Mahlum for unpaid rent in 2013, including whether Swenson failed to mitigate those damages. In addition, the court must decide Mahlum’s claims against the third-party defendants. View "Swenson, et al. v. Mahlum, et al." on Justia Law

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Watford City Lodging LLC (“WCL”) appealed the denial of its motion to amend a judgment vacating a default eviction judgment. WCL argued the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the eviction proceedings, exceeded its jurisdiction by making extraneous findings and conclusions of law, and abused its discretion by denying WCL’s motion to amend the judgment. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the district court misapplied the law and abused its discretion by denying WCL’s motion to amend the judgment. View "Watford City Lodging LLC v. Miskin" on Justia Law

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Debra Heitkamp, the personal representative of the Estate of Nick Lyons, appealed a district court judgment in favor of Kevin Kabella following cross-motions for summary judgment, alleging the district court improperly determined the parties’ agreement was invalid because it fell within the limitation on the length of agricultural leases provided by N.D.C.C. 47-16-02. Kabella and Lyons entered into an agreement pertaining to farmland on March 29, 2007. The agreement gave Lyons possession and use of the property “in perpetuity.” In addition to receiving the property in perpetuity, the agreement stated Kabella could sell the property subject to Lyons’ right to purchase the property. Prior to the 2012 farming season, Kabella attempted to lease the property to Kermit Anderson Jr. Lyons refused to vacate the property asserting he was entitled to the use and possession of the property pursuant to his agreement with Kabella. Anderson brought an eviction action to remove Lyons from the property. Kabella was included as a defendant to allow a resolution of any issues regarding the agreement between Kabella and Lyons. In the litigation initiated by Anderson, Anderson and Kabella asserted the March 29, 2007 agreement between Kabella and Lyons was invalid under N.D.C.C. 47-16-02. Lyons passed away in May 2013, and Heitkamp was appointed personal representative of the estate. The estate used the property since that time. In March 2017, Heitkamp on behalf of Lyons' estate. sued for a declaration the agreement was valid in perpetuity. The district court granted summary judgment to Kabella and found the agreement was a lease that fell within the restrictions of N.D.C.C. 47-16-02, and due to the non-occurrence of any of the contingencies contained in the agreement, it expired on its tenth anniversary, March 29, 2017. The court awarded Kabella damages equal to the fair value of the use of the property subsequent to March 29, 2017. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded "reasonable persons can draw more than one conclusion regarding the nature of the parties’ agreement," and therefore reversed judgment and remanded for a determination of whether this agreement was a lease subject to the limitations of N.D.C.C. 47-16-02, or a grant, option to purchase, or contract for deed outside the limitations of N.D.C.C. 47-16-02. Because the question of whether the limitation within N.D.C.C. 47-16-02 applied to the parties’ agreement remained undetermined, the Supreme Court declined to decide if the agreement was invalid after extending for a period of ten years. View "Heitkamp v. Kabella" on Justia Law

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Orozco opened Pauly’s Famous Franks N Fries at San Jose's "The Plant" shopping center. Before signing a 10-year lease, he asked the leasing manager whether restaurants with competing concepts or products were being considered for the remaining space. The manager told him no, even as she was negotiating with Al’s Beef, a national franchise selling hot beef sandwiches, hot dogs, and french fries. Orozco signed the lease without knowledge that the Plant had leased space to Al’s and personally guaranteed rent payments. The lease, which Orozco did not fully read, contained statement that the landlord had not made any promises about products offered by other tenants or future tenants. Pauly’s had a successful debut, with steadily increasing revenue. Approximately six months after Pauly’s opened, Al’s opened two doors down. Pauly’s business declined and, within six months of the debut of Al’s, Pauly’s closed. A jury found intentional misrepresentation and concealment and awarded compensatory damages, primarily for Pauly’s lost profits. The court ruled that Orozco was not entitled to rescission of the guaranty. The court of appeal affirmed in part. Substantial evidence supports the finding of intentional misrepresentation and the award of lost profits. Orozco was entitled to rescission of the guaranty. Because Orozco prevailed in obtaining rescission of the guaranty, he is entitled to attorney’s fees under the lease. View "Orozco v. WPV San Jose, LLC" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Appellate Court reversing the judgment of the trial court dismissing the summary process action initiated by Landlord, holding that the the trial court properly concluded that the inclusion of undesignated charges for obligations other than rent rendered the pretermination notice jurisdictionally defective.In this summary process action, Landlord provided a pretermination notice to Tenant, Tenant, who resided in federally subsidized housing, asserting nonpayment of rent as the ground for proposed termination. The notice also alleged violations of leases that were no longer in effect. The trial court granted Tenant's motion to dismiss, determining that the notice was defective because it contained legally impermissible and factually inaccurate grounds for termination. The Appellate Court reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the the notice was not effective because it was inaccurate to the point that Tenant's ability to prepare a defense against the alleged reason for termination was impaired. View "Presidential Village, LLC v. Perkins" on Justia Law

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Starting in February of 2014, Philip McGimpsey (“McGimpsey”) and his wife Jolene leased a home from D&L Ventures, Inc. D&L was a Nevada corporation owned by David Asher and his wife Georgina. The residential property McGimpsey leased from D&L was located in Eagle, Idaho. D&L obtained the Property in a 2013 foreclosure sale and received a trustee’s deed, which excluded any warranties. A dispute arose out of a breach of contract claim between the McGimpsey and D&L, who entered into a combined lease/Buy-Sell Agreement for the property. On discovering that D&L was an unregistered Nevada corporation conducting business in Ada County, McGimpsey failed to close on the purchase of the home in 2017, because he believed D&L to be in violation of Idaho Code section 30-21-502(a). After the closing date passed, D&L informed McGimpsey that the contractual provisions terminated upon his failure to close and reminded McGimpsey he had to vacate the property, pursuant to the Buy-Sell Agreement. About a month later, D&L registered with the Idaho Secretary of State as a Nevada corporation and filed all of its tax returns and paid its other obligations. McGimpsey subsequently filed a complaint against D&L, and the corporation counterclaimed against McGimpsey and third-party defendants. D&L moved for summary judgment that was granted in part and denied in part. The district court ultimately concluded that D&L had the legal ability to convey the property via warranty deed and that McGimpsey breached the Buy-Sell Agreement by failing to close and failing to show that his breach was excused by D&L’s alleged inability to convey marketable title. McGimpsey and third-party defendants timely appealed and their appeals were consolidated. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s award of summary judgment to D&L because Idaho Code section 30- 21-502 did not impair the validity of contracts; therefore, D&L had the legal ability to convey the property via warranty deed. View "McGimpsey v. D&L Ventures" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court in favor of Defendant on the ground that Plaintiff was not legally entitled to recover rent monies which he had paid to Defendant over the period of time during which he was renting a waterfront condominium from her while she was in violation of R.I. Gen. Laws 34-18-22.3, holding that the hearing justice properly granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment.Plaintiff sought retroactive recovery of rent paid to Defendant because Defendant had not complied with section 34-18-22.3, which requires a landlord who is not a resident of the state to designate an in-state agent for service of process. The superior court granted summary judgment for Defendant. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff was not allowed to recover from Defendant for her alleged violation of section 34-18-22.3 because he failed to show that he suffered harm as a result of Defendant's violation; (2) because Plaintiff did not incur any damages as a result of Defendant's alleged offense, there was no basis for recovery under R.I. Gen. Laws 9-1-2; and (3) the trial justice did not err when he determined that the elements of unjust enrichment were not satisfied based on the facts of this case. View "Olsen v. DeMayo" on Justia Law

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This appeal stemmed from a civil action brought by United Grand to recover overdue rent from Malibu Hillbillies and its guarantor. After a default judgment, United Grand sought almost $2 million in attorney fees for its efforts to enforce the judgment against the guarantor. The trial court subsequently found that United Grand had engaged in extensive misconduct throughout the duration of the action and imposed a terminating sanction striking from the complaint United Grand's prayer for attorney fees. However, the trial court also entered judgment in favor of United Grand and against the guarantor in the amount of the unpaid rent and accrued interest she had already paid.The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment of dismissal, the order dissolving the injunction and the order denying attorney fees on appeal. The court held that many of United Grand's claims were forfeited and the few cognizable claims of error were meritless. Finally, the court dismissed the appeal from the sanctions orders. View "United Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court held in this eviction action that, under the circumstances of this case, the retaliation defense was not available under Minn. Stat. 504B.441 but that the common law should recognize a defense when a landlord retaliates against a tenant for making a good-faith complaint to the landlord of a material violation of a local or state law, residential covenants, or the lease.By special verdict, a jury found that Tenant materially violated the terms of the lease but that Landlord retaliated against Tenant as a penalty for complaining about the condition of the leased premises. The district court entered judgment for possession of the rental unit in favor of Tenant apparently based on the retaliation defense under Minn. Stat. 504B.285, subd. 2, and Minn. Stat. 504B.441. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the retaliation defense was unavailable to Tenant under either statutory provision. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) Tenant could not assert a statutory defense; but (2) the language of the verdict was adequate to satisfy the requirements of the common-law retaliation defense that the Court recognized today. View "Central Housing Associates, LP v. Olson" on Justia Law