Justia Landlord - Tenant Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the summary judgment granted by the district court in favor of a non-shareholder officer and a non-shareholder former director in this suit brought by Landlord seeking to pierce the corporate veil of a commercial tenant (Tenant), who failed or refused to pay a judgment against it, holding that the district court did not err.Landlord sued Tenant for nonpayment of rent and recovered a judgment. When Landlord was unable to recover on its judgment it commenced the instant action seeking to pierce Tenant's corporate veil and hold a non-shareholder officer and a non-shareholder former director personally liable for the judgment against Tenant. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of Defendants and dismissed the case with prejudice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding the factors did not weigh in favor of veil piercing. View "407 N 117 Street v. Harper" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals denying a writ of prohibition preventing Judge Peter J. Corrigan from proceeding in a declaratory judgment and preliminary injunction action, holding that Judge Corrigan did not lack jurisdiction to proceed in the case.United Twenty-Fifth Building, LLC sued Jessica Maron, a party to a pending divorce case, alleging that Jessica was interfering with an easement involving a multistory building in Cleveland. Specifically, United argued that Jessica was preventing access to the building's elevator, lobby, and stairwell and delaying the construction of a restaurant in the building. Jessica filed a prohibition petition seeking to prevent Judge Corrigan from exercising jurisdiction in United's case because, under the jurisdictional-priority rule, Judge Corrigan patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to proceed because the case involved property that may be subject to equitable division in her divorce case. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Jessica failed to show that the jurisdictional-priority rule applied under the circumstances of this case. View "State ex rel. Maron v. Corrigan" on Justia Law

The LLC, managed by Kountze, owns the four-unit building. Kountze lives in one unit. When the LLC acquired the property in 2017, the tenants lived in unit 3. In 2020, the LLC served them with a “Notice of Termination of Tenancy” (NOT), stating that the landlord was withdrawing the property from the residential rental market under the Ellis Act and the San Francisco Residential Rent Stabilization and Arbitration Ordinance. The landlord also filed with the Residential Rent Stabilization and Arbitration Board a “Notice of Intent to Withdraw Residential Units from the Rental Market.” Counsel for the landlord testified that she sent the NOT to the tenants’ address with checks for $3,492.62 relocation payments. The postal service returned them due to the overflow of mail in the tenants’ mailboxes. The landlord and tenants had been engaged in protracted litigation, so counsel sent the NOT and checks to their counsel, who responded that he was “not authorized to accept” the payments.The landlord filed this unlawful detainer action. The tenants asserted affirmative defenses relating to the landlord’s lack of intent to withdraw the unit from the market and non-compliance with the Ellis Act. The court of appeal affirmed summary judgment against the tenants, sustaining relevance objections to the tenants’ evidence. The tenants failed to raise a triable issue of material fact as to compliance with the Ellis Act and Rent Ordinance. View "640 Octavia LLC v. Pieper" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal of the underlying eviction proceedings brought under Nebraska's Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (the NURLTA), Neb. Rev. Stat. 76-1401, holding that this case was moot.After Defendant allegedly breached the terms of her residential lease agreement Plaintiff, Defendant's landlord, terminated the lease. When Defendant refused to leave the property Plaintiff initiated eviction proceedings. The county court found in favor of Plaintiff and issued a writ of restitution. Defendant appealed, holding that section 76-1446, which mandates a bench trial for a possession action under the NURLTA, violated her constitutional right to a jury trial. The Supreme Court dismissed Defendant's appeal, holding that Defendant's arguments on appeal were moot, and none of the mootness exceptions applied. View "NP Dodge Management Co. v. Holcomb" on Justia Law

In a forceable entry and detainer (FED) action, the Oregon Supreme Court was asked to determine the proper calculation of damages that could be awarded to a tenant, following multiple instances of landlord noncompliance with certain utility billing requirements that repeated each month, over a series of months. After plaintiff (landlord) brought an FED action against defendant (tenant) to recover possession of the landlord’s premises, tenant alleged a counterclaim that landlord had failed to comply with certain utility billing requirements found in ORS 90.315(4)(b). The trial court agreed with tenant, concluding that landlord had committed 12 separate violations—one per month over the 12 months within the one-year statute of limitations that governed Oregon Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (ORLTA) actions, and awarded tenant statutory damages in an amount equal to 12 months of rent. On landlord’s appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the plain text of ORS 90.315(4)(f) showed that the legislature had not intended for each landlord billing violation to be subject to a separate sanction. The Oregon Supreme Court concurred with the appellate court and affirmed. View "Shepard Investment Group LLC v. Ormandy" on Justia Law

Sathiyaselvam Thangavel and Sasikala Muthusamy were tenants who leased an apartment from Seaford Apartment Ventures, LLC. The complaint filed by Seaford Apartment’s insurer, Donegal Mutual Insurance Company, alleged that the tenants hit a sprinkler head while they flew a drone inside the apartment. Water sprayed from the damaged sprinkler head and caused damage to the apartment building. Seaford Apartment filed an insurance claim with Donegal, who paid $77,704.06 to repair the water damage. Donegal then brought this action against the tenants through subrogation and alleged that the tenants were negligent and breached the property’s rules and regulations. Donegal sought to recover the repair costs from the tenants. Under the "Sutton" rule, landlords and tenants are co-insureds under the landlord’s fire insurance policy unless a tenant’s lease clearly expresses an intent to the contrary. If the Sutton rule applies, the landlord’s insurer cannot pursue the tenant for the landlord’s damages by way of subrogation. In this case, a Delaware superior court ruled in the tenants’ favor at summary judgment that the Sutton rule applied because the lease did not clearly express an intent to hold the tenants liable for the landlord’s damages. To this the Delaware Supreme Court agreed and affirmed. View "Donegal Mutual Insurance Company v. Thangavel" on Justia Law

William Borlay appealed his eviction from an apartment for debts accrued under two leases, and an order for him to pay damages to Hegenes Apartment Management. In December 2021, Hegenes and Borlay executed a six-month lease for an apartment in Fargo. The lease term was from January 1 to June 30, 2022. Borlay owed $730 in rent each month under the lease. Due to a software error, Hegenes charged Borlay $670 instead of $730 during the first five months of the lease. Hegenes became aware of the error in May 2022 and notified Borlay of the error. Hegenes’ tenant ledger showed Borlay failed to pay $300 in rent from January 2022 through May 2022. In June 2022, Hegenes and Borlay executed another six-month lease, again for $730 in rent each month, plus $40 each month for garage rent. If Borlay failed to pay rent by the third day of each month, the lease authorized Hegenes to charge a $50 late fee. On September 9, 2022, Hegenes posted a three-day notice on Borlay’s apartment door. On September 30, 2022, Hegenes sued Borlay to evict him from the apartment, alleging he owed $1,220.50 in unpaid rent and late fees. After hearings on October 14 and October 21, 2022, the district court found Borlay failed to pay $1,220.50 in rent and late fees under both leases. After review of the tenant ledger and payments made subsequent to the notice of eviction, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the district court erred in concluding Hegenes was entitled to a judgment of eviction on the basis of a failure to pay rent under the expired January lease. The Court reversed the judgment and remanded for a determination of whether Hegenes was entitled to evict Borlay for his late payment of rent in September 2022 and, if so, for consideration of an award of attorney’s fees limited to that proceeding. View "Hegenes Apartment Management v. Borlay, et al." on Justia Law

Jones Lang LaSalle Brokerage, Inc. (JLL) represented both parties to an agreement to lease property in northwest Washington, D.C. Because dual representations of that kind pose inherent conflicts of interest, the District of Columbia’s Brokerage Act required JLL to obtain the written consent of all clients on both sides. JLL’s client on the landlord side of the transaction, 1441 L Associates, LLC, declined to pay JLL’s commission. JLL then brought this action to recover the commission. In defending against the suit, 1441 L argued that JLL, when disclosing its dual representation, failed to adhere to certain formatting specifications set out in the Brokerage Act that aim to highlight such a disclosure. The district court granted summary judgment to 1441 L.   The DC Circuit vacated and remand for further proceedings. The court concluded that that the Act does not invariably require adherence to those formatting specifications. Rather, the specifications go to whether the broker can gain an optional presumption that it secured the required written consent for its dual representation. Even without the benefit of that presumption, a broker can still demonstrate that it obtained the requisite written consent. View "Jones Lang Lasalle Brokerage, Inc. v. 1441 L Associates, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the district court's ruling in this eminent domain case between Tenants and City involving the requirement that a condemning authority provide certain relocation benefits and assistance to those displaced by the government's exercise of eminent domain, holding that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Tenants' petition to recover relocation expenses.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Tenants' petition because the Kansas Eminent Domain Procedure Act (EDPA), Kan. Stat. Ann. 26-501 et seq., neither provides a private right of action to recover relocation benefits nor authorizes judicial review of relocation-benefit determinations in eminent-domain appeals; (2) while the Kansas Relocation Assistance for Persons Displayed by Acquisition of Real Property Act (KRA), Kan. Stat. Ann. 58-3501 et seq., does provide an administrative remedy to vindicate the statutory right to relocation benefits, Tenants' failure to exhaust this administrative remedy deprived the district court of subject matter jurisdiction under the KRA; and (3) while Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-2101(d) authorizes appeals to the district court from certain final judgments and orders of a political subdivision, the statute did not apply in this case. View "Kan. Fire & Safety Equipment v. City of Topeka" on Justia Law

Divine Food and Catering, LLC (Divine) appeals from the dismissal of its malicious prosecution complaint against defendants and respondents the Western Diocese of the Armenian Church of North America (the Diocese), St. John Armenian Church (St. John), Archpriest Manoug Markarian (Archpriest Manoug), and Harout Markarian (collectively, defendants). The trial court dismissed the complaint after granting Defendants’ special motion to strike under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, the anti-SLAPP statute. Divine was a commercial tenant of St. John’s banquet hall. St. John and the Diocese (the church entities) filed an unlawful detainer action seeking to evict Divine based on a purported oral month-to-month lease. Following trial, the unlawful detainer court found the written lease was valid and granted judgment for Divine. Divine then filed its malicious prosecution complaint, alleging Defendants brought the unlawful detainer action in order to extort money from Petros Taglyan, the father of Divine’s owner. Divine alleged Defendants had no probable cause to bring the unlawful detainer action.   The Second Appellate District reversed. The court held that the triggers for the interim adverse judgment rule are limited to actual judgments and rulings on dispositive motions. The trial court, therefore, erred by applying the rule based on the unlawful detainer court’s sua sponte comments during trial. Alternatively, Divine has made an adequate showing for anti-SLAPP purposes that the unlawful detainer court’s comments were the product of fraud or perjury, which precludes application of the interim adverse judgment rule. Defendants have shown no other valid basis to support their anti-SLAPP motion. View "Divine Food and Catering v. Western Diocese of the Armenian etc." on Justia Law