Justia Landlord - Tenant Opinion Summaries
State v. City of Sunnyside
The Washington State Attorney General filed a lawsuit against the city of Sunnyside and several of its officials, alleging that the city's crime-free rental housing program (CFRHP) was being used to evict tenants without due process and that these evictions disproportionately impacted Latinx renters, women-headed households, and families with minor children. The city argued that the Attorney General lacked the authority to bring this suit, as the scope of the Attorney General's authority under RCW 43.10.030(1) limits their ability to act to matters that impact more people than those affected by the CFRHP. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Washington reversed and remanded the case. The court held that the Attorney General did have the authority to bring the suit, as the case involved matters of public concern in which the state had an interest. The court also found that there were genuine disputes of material fact regarding whether the city's enforcement of the CFRHP had a disparate impact on protected classes, and whether the individual respondents were entitled to qualified immunity. However, the court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment on the Attorney General's claims under the Residential Landlord-Tenant Act, finding that the respondents were not landlords and therefore the Act did not apply to them. View "State v. City of Sunnyside" on Justia Law
Liggett v Lew Realty LLC
The plaintiff, K.E. Liggett, is a tenant in a Manhattan apartment building owned by the defendant, Lew Realty LLC. Liggett filed a lawsuit when Lew Realty attempted to increase her rent in 2021, arguing that her apartment is rent-stabilized and she is entitled to a rent-stabilized lease, overcharges, and attorney's fees. Liggett's claim is based on a stipulation from 2000 between Lew Realty and a previous tenant, Edward McKinney, which required McKinney to waive his right to file a Fair Market Rent Appeal (FMRA). Liggett argues that this stipulation is void as it goes against public policy, and because it led to the deregulation of the apartment, the deregulation is invalid and the apartment remains rent-stabilized.The Supreme Court initially denied Lew Realty's motion to dismiss, agreeing with Liggett that the stipulation is unenforceable as it waives the protections of the rent laws. However, the Appellate Division reversed this decision and dismissed the complaint. The Appellate Division concluded that the protection against waiving the benefits of rent control law did not apply to McKinney as he was not an established tenant when he signed the stipulation. The Appellate Division also concluded that Liggett's claim was akin to an FMRA and therefore barred by the statute of limitations.The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Appellate Division. The court held that the stipulation is void as it waives a benefit of the rent laws, regardless of McKinney's status as a tenant. The court also held that the statute of limitations does not bar Liggett's claim that the apartment is subject to rent stabilization. The court remanded the case, allowing Lew Realty to establish other reasons for why the apartment was not rent-stabilized when Liggett took tenancy. The court did not address any issues related to Liggett's rent overcharge claims. View "Liggett v Lew Realty LLC" on Justia Law
Garey v. Stanford Management, LLC
The case revolves around Delanna Garey, who was employed as the director of operations of an apartment building managed by Stanford Management until her termination in January 2023. In February 2023, Stanford and its current director of operations, Eve Dunham, requested the Rumford Police to serve Garey with a criminal trespass notice, barring her from entering the building for a year. In March 2023, Stanford and Dunham posted copies of the criminal trespass notice on the building and sent a letter to the residents stating that former employees were not permitted on the premises. Garey filed a complaint against Stanford alleging defamation, false light invasion of privacy, and reckless or intentional infliction of emotional distress, and seeking declaratory judgment and injunctive relief.The Superior Court granted Stanford’s motion to dismiss Garey’s complaint in its entirety, concluding that Garey failed to state claims upon which relief could be granted. The court reasoned that Stanford’s statements were not provably false; they were statements of opinion, not of fact; the statements were subject to multiple interpretations and should not be attributed their worst possible meaning; and in the alternative, even if the statements were defamatory, they were conditionally privileged.Upon review, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court concluded that Garey met her burden and vacated the Superior Court judgment with respect to her claims for defamation per se and false light invasion of privacy. The court affirmed the dismissal of her claims for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief as moot. The court found that Garey’s complaint sufficiently alleged that Stanford published statements that falsely imply that Garey engaged in dangerous conduct such that the community needs protection. The court also concluded that Garey has sufficiently alleged a claim for false light invasion of privacy. However, Garey’s declaratory judgment and injunctive relief claims were moot because she is no longer precluded from entering the building property. View "Garey v. Stanford Management, LLC" on Justia Law
Frechette v. D’Andrea
The case involves Edward A. Cianci and Raymond Frechette, who purchased a foreclosed property and initiated a summary process action in the Housing Court against the occupants, including Elizabeth D'Andrea. The Housing Court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs for possession. D'Andrea appealed and sought to waive the appeal bond due to her indigency. The Housing Court found D'Andrea to be indigent and waived her appeal bond, but required her to make monthly use and occupancy payments of $1,275 to the plaintiffs to maintain her appeal. D'Andrea appealed this order to the Appeals Court, which reported questions of law to the Supreme Judicial Court.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that use and occupancy payments required of an indigent party under G. L. c. 239, § 5 (e), may not be waived, substituted, or paid by the Commonwealth under the indigency statute because use and occupancy payments are not an "extra fee or cost" as defined in the indigency statute. The court further concluded that the order setting use and occupancy payments in this case did not violate D'Andrea's constitutional rights, even if the order requires her to make payments that potentially exceed her ability to pay. The court reasoned that the summary process statute reasonably imposes a fair balancing of interests between the owner of the property and the party in possession, and the Housing Court performed the fair balancing required. View "Frechette v. D'Andrea" on Justia Law
Todman v. The Mayor and City Council of Baltimore
The case involves Marshall and Tiffany Todman, who were evicted from their rental property in Baltimore. According to the Baltimore City Code, any personal property left in or around the premises after eviction is immediately considered abandoned, and the landlord takes ownership. The Todmans were evicted earlier than expected and lost their belongings under this ordinance. They sued the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, alleging that the city had deprived them of their personal property without due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of the Todmans.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that the Todmans were owed more process than they received and that the city was responsible for that failure of process. The court held that the city's Abandonment Ordinance violated the Todmans' constitutional rights by depriving them of their property without due process of law and that the city is liable for that violation. The court also dismissed the Todmans' conditional cross-appeal, which asked the court to review the district court's dismissal of their takings claim if the court found their due process claims lacked merit. View "Todman v. The Mayor and City Council of Baltimore" on Justia Law
Padilla v. Torres
The case revolves around a dispute between Roy Padilla and Ray Torres, where Padilla, the landlord, filed a petition in the metropolitan court under the Uniform Owner-Resident Relations Act (UORRA), alleging that Torres, his tenant, had not paid rent. The metropolitan court ruled in favor of Padilla, ordering Torres to pay past-due rent and costs amounting to $927. Torres appealed this judgment to the Second Judicial District Court, but the appeal was dismissed because Torres had failed to request a recording of the metropolitan court’s trial.The district court held that without a record of the trial, it could not effectively review Torres’s appeal. The court also rejected Torres’s assertion that he had a right to a recording, explaining that Torres, as appellant, was required to provide an adequate record on appeal. Torres then appealed the dismissal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the metropolitan court’s practice of not recording civil proceedings except on a party’s request was inconsistent with Section 34-8A-6(B) (1993) and violated his state and federal constitutional rights.The Supreme Court of the State of New Mexico held that the failure to record the trial in this matter is contrary to Section 34-8A-6(B) (1993). The court concluded that the statute imposes a duty on the metropolitan court to create a record of its proceedings that will be sufficient to permit appellate review in this case. The court further held that Rule 3708(A) and other similar rules impermissibly conflict with Section 34-8A-6(B) to the extent that the rules condition the creation of this record on a party’s request. The court directed its committee for the Rules of Civil Procedure for the State Courts to correct the rules in conformance with its opinion. Finally, the court reversed and remanded this matter to the metropolitan court for a new trial. View "Padilla v. Torres" on Justia Law
Coan v. Championship Property, LLC
In 2010, Crystal Kaye Coan purchased a property in Lauderdale County, which was subject to a mortgage. Coan defaulted on the mortgage, leading to a foreclosure by Carrington Mortgage Services, LLC, the mortgage assignee. Carrington sold the property to Championship Property, LLC in an online auction in May 2018. Championship then filed an ejectment action against Coan, claiming it was the title owner and seeking possession of the property. Coan countered that the foreclosure sale was void, and therefore, Championship had not acquired the title. In January 2023, Championship requested the trial court to require Coan to deposit $2,000 per month with the court clerk pending a final ruling in the ejectment action. The trial court, over Coan's objection, ordered her to deposit $800 per month.Coan failed to deposit the court-ordered payments for March, April, and May 2023, leading Championship to move the trial court to hold her in contempt. The trial court found Coan in contempt and, as a sanction, ruled in favor of Championship on its ejectment claim, awarding it possession of the property. Coan appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the trial court's decision to require Coan to deposit $800 per month with the court clerk, stating that the trial court had the authority to enter the escrow order. The court also affirmed the trial court's finding of contempt against Coan for failing to comply with the escrow order. However, the court reversed the trial court's sanction awarding Championship possession of the property, stating that the sanction was not appropriate given the current posture of the litigation. The case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. View "Coan v. Championship Property, LLC" on Justia Law
MIMG LXXIV Colonial v. Ellis
The case revolves around a residential eviction dispute between a landlord, MIMG LXXIV Colonial, LLC (Colonial), and a tenant, TajReAna Ellis. Colonial initiated eviction proceedings against Ellis for failing to pay rent, providing a seven-day notice as required by Nebraska’s Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (URLTA). Ellis, however, argued that the federal Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act) imposed a 30-day notice requirement, superseding the state law. The county court rejected Ellis' argument and ruled in favor of Colonial. Ellis appealed to the district court, which reversed the county court's decision, agreeing with Ellis that the CARES Act required a 30-day notice.The case was then brought before the Nebraska Supreme Court. However, by this time, Ellis' lease had expired, and she had vacated the property. The court found that the case was moot as the relief sought by Colonial, a judgment for restitution of the premises, would have no practical effect since Ellis no longer resided in the property. Colonial argued that the case was not moot due to its interest in knowing whether it violated the law and the financial interest related to the district court's taxing of costs. The court rejected these arguments, stating that claims for costs are generally insufficient to avoid mootness.The court also considered whether to reach the merits of the case under the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine. However, it declined to do so, noting that the primary question in the case was a matter of federal statutory interpretation, over which the U.S. Supreme Court has final authority. The court also declined to apply the collateral consequences exception, which is typically used in criminal cases. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed. View "MIMG LXXIV Colonial v. Ellis" on Justia Law
Ex parte The Housing Authority of the City of Talladega
Harold Wallace, a tenant of the Housing Authority of the City of Talladega, fell while descending the back-porch stairs of his apartment due to missing handrails. Wallace sued the Housing Authority for negligence and wantonness. The Housing Authority moved for a summary judgment, arguing that the lack of handrails was an "open and obvious" danger and that Wallace had conceded in his deposition that he was aware of this. The trial court granted the Housing Authority's motion for a summary judgment. Wallace appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals.The Court of Civil Appeals reversed the trial court's summary judgment in favor of the Housing Authority. The Housing Authority then petitioned the Supreme Court of Alabama for certiorari review, arguing that the Court of Civil Appeals' decision conflicts with a prior decision in Daniels v. Wiley, where the court affirmed a summary judgment for the defendant landlord after concluding that the landlord had no duty to the plaintiff tenant with respect to risks created by the muddy condition of a sidewalk within her apartment complex because the danger was "open and obvious."The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the decision of the Court of Civil Appeals, concluding that the decision does not conflict with Daniels. The court clarified that while the Daniels decision is sound, it should not be interpreted as rejecting a landlord's duties under the circumstances described in §§ 360 and 361 of the First Restatement and the Second Restatement. The court found that the Housing Authority failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the principles set forth in §§ 360 and 361 apply to the circumstances in this case, and therefore, the Housing Authority was not entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. View "Ex parte The Housing Authority of the City of Talladega" on Justia Law
WESTWOOD MOTORCARS, LLC v. VIRTUOLOTRY, LLC
Westwood Motorcars, LLC leased commercial property in Dallas to operate an automobile dealership. The lease was set to expire in 2013, but an addendum allowed Westwood to extend the lease for two additional 24-month terms. In 2015, ownership of the property changed hands and Virtuolotry, LLC became the new landlord. Westwood sought to exercise its option to extend the lease for the second additional term, but Virtuolotry’s lawyers refused, asserting that Westwood had breached the lease in numerous ways. Amidst this dispute, Westwood claimed that Virtuolotry and its manager, Richard Boyd, harassed Westwood at the premises, interfering with its business operations. Westwood sued Virtuolotry in district court, seeking a declaratory judgment that it had not breached the lease and that it had properly extended the lease for another two years. Virtuolotry sued in justice court to evict Westwood for unpaid rent, lease violations, and holding over unlawfully.The justice court ruled in favor of Virtuolotry, awarding it "possession only." Westwood appealed the judgment to the county court at law. However, a few weeks before the trial date, Westwood formally withdrew its appeal in county court, and the county court entered a “stipulate[d] and agree[d]” judgment ordering “that possession of the Premises is awarded” to Virtuolotry. Westwood fully vacated the property, but continued its pending suit in district court, adding claims for breach of contract (against Virtuolotry) and constructive eviction (against Virtuolotry and Boyd). The district court ruled in favor of Westwood, awarding damages and attorney’s fees.Virtuolotry and Boyd appealed, and the court of appeals reversed the district court's decision, ruling that by agreeing to the eviction-suit judgment in county court, Westwood “voluntarily abandoned the premises” and thus “extinguish[ed] any claim for damages.” Westwood then petitioned the Supreme Court of Texas for review.The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the court of appeals' decision, ruling that the court of appeals erred by giving a judgment of possession from a court of limited jurisdiction preclusive effect over Westwood’s claim for damages in district court. The Supreme Court of Texas held that Westwood’s agreement to entry of the county-court judgment cannot reflect assent to anything more than what that judgment resolves—i.e., who receives immediate possession of the property. The court remanded the case to the court of appeals for further proceedings. View "WESTWOOD MOTORCARS, LLC v. VIRTUOLOTRY, LLC" on Justia Law